Minimum wage, on-the-job search and employment : On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article dans une revue Economic Modelling Année : 2012

Minimum wage, on-the-job search and employment : On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage

Résumé

We study the impact of a minimum wage in a segmented labor market in which workers are at different stages of their careers. At the end of a learning-by-doing period, workers paid the minimum wage quit "bad jobs" for better-paying "good jobs", following an on-the-job search process with endogenous search intensity. A rise in the minimum wage reduces "bad jobs" creation and prompts workers to keep their "bad jobs" by reducing on-the-job search intensity. The ambiguous impact on unqualified employment replicates and explains the findings of several empirical studies. However, a minimum wage rise reduces overall employment and output. Download Info
Loading...
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

halshs-00742749, version 1 (17-10-2012)

Identifiants

Citer

Frédéric Gavrel, Isabelle Lebon, Thérèse Rebière. Minimum wage, on-the-job search and employment : On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage. Economic Modelling, 2012, 29, pp.691-699. ⟨10.1016/j.econmod.2012.01.005⟩. ⟨halshs-00742749⟩
92 Consultations
0 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 20/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus