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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2007

A study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games

Résumé

Approval voting features are analysed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: Myerson's Large Poisson Games. I first establish the Magnitude Equiva- lence Theorem (MET) which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of pivotal events. I also show that the Winner of the election coincides with the Profile Condorcet Winner at equilibrium when preferences are restricted to be single-peaked. This is a positive result that strengthens the positive conclusions some scholars have previously drawn over this voting rule. I finally show that, with- out the previous restriction over preferences, both concepts do not generally coincide anymore.
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Dates et versions

hal-00192488 , version 1 (30-11-2007)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-00192488 , version 1

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Matias Nunez. A study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games. 2007. ⟨hal-00192488⟩
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