Good neighbors are hard to find: computational complexity of network formation
Richard Baron
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 739855
- IdHAL : richard-baron
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7361-2230
Jacques Durieu
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 745490
- IdHAL : jacques-durieu
- ORCID : 0000-0002-1011-1316
- IdRef : 058054529
Philippe Solal
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 745847
- IdHAL : philippe-solal
- IdRef : 058054499
Résumé
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in a simple strategic game of network formation.We find that deciding if a player has a strategy that guarantees him a certain payoff against a given strategy profile of the other players is an NP-complete problem. Deciding if there exists a strategy profile that guarantees a certain aggregate payoff is also NP-complete. Deciding if there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies which guarantees a certain payoff to each player is NP-hard. The problem of deciding if a given strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium is investigated as well.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Good neighbors are hard to find: computational complexity of network formation
|
Résumé |
en
We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in a simple strategic game of network formation.We find that deciding if a player has a strategy that guarantees him a certain payoff against a given strategy profile of the other players is an NP-complete problem. Deciding if there exists a strategy profile that guarantees a certain aggregate payoff is also NP-complete. Deciding if there is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies which guarantees a certain payoff to each player is NP-hard. The problem of deciding if a given strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium is investigated as well.
|
Auteur(s) |
Richard Baron
1
, Jacques Durieu
1
, Hans Haller
2
, Philippe Solal
1
, Savani Rahul
3
1
CREUSET -
Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne
( 3154 )
- 6 rue basse des rives 42023 Saint-Etienne cedex 2
- France
2
Department of economics
( 24317 )
- France
3
Department of Computer Science [Warwick]
( 56591 )
- University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
- Royaume-Uni
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2008-03-11
|
Volume |
12
|
Numéro |
1
|
Page/Identifiant |
1-19
|
Classification |
C72 · D02 · D85
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Strategic games · Network formation · Computational complexity
|
DOI | 10.1007/s10058-008-0043-x |
Loading...