Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete Markets - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Economic Theory Année : 2004

Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete Markets

Résumé

We study a strategic market game associated to an intertemporal economy with a finite horizon and incomplete markets. We demonstrate that generically, for any finite number of players, every sequentially strictly individually rational and default-free stream of allocations can be approximated by a full subgame-perfect equilibrium. As a consequence, imperfect competition may Pareto-dominate perfect competition when markets are incomplete. Moreover - and this contrasts with the main message conveyed by the market games literature - there exists a large open set of initial endowments for which full subgame-perfect equilibria do not converge to n-efficient allocations when the number of players tends to infinity. Finally, strategic speculative bubbles may survive at full subgame-perfect equilibria.

Dates et versions

hal-00279003 , version 1 (14-05-2008)

Licence

Paternité

Identifiants

Citer

Gaël Giraud, Sonia Weyers. Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete Markets. Economic Theory, 2004, 23 (3), pp.467-491. ⟨10.1007/s00199-003-0389-9⟩. ⟨hal-00279003⟩
126 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More