Does the representation of the household behavior matter for welfare analysis of tax-benefit policies ?
Olivier Bargain
(1, 2)
,
Miriam Beblo
(3)
,
Denis Beninger
(3)
,
Richard Blundell
(4, 5)
,
Raquel Carrasco
(6)
,
Marie-Concetta Chiuri
(2, 7)
,
Francois Laisney
(8, 3)
,
Valérie Lechene
(4, 9)
,
Nicolas Moreau
(10, 11)
,
Michal Myck
(4, 12)
,
Javier Ruiz-Castillo
(6)
,
Frédéric Vermeulen
(13)
1
IZA -
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
2 Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD)
3 Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
4 IFS - Laboratory of the Institute for Fiscal Studies
5 UCL - University College of London [London]
6 UC3M - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid [Madrid]
7 UNIBA - Università degli studi di Bari Aldo Moro = University of Bari Aldo Moro
8 BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
9 University of Oxford
10 GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
11 LIRHE - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Ressources Humaines et l'Emploi
12 DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
13 Tilburg University [Tilburg]
2 Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD)
3 Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
4 IFS - Laboratory of the Institute for Fiscal Studies
5 UCL - University College of London [London]
6 UC3M - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid [Madrid]
7 UNIBA - Università degli studi di Bari Aldo Moro = University of Bari Aldo Moro
8 BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
9 University of Oxford
10 GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
11 LIRHE - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Ressources Humaines et l'Emploi
12 DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
13 Tilburg University [Tilburg]
Olivier Bargain
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- PersonId : 774714
- ORCID : 0000-0003-1042-9997
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Denis Beninger
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Richard Blundell
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Francois Laisney
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- PersonId : 1109472
Nicolas Moreau
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Michal Myck
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Résumé
A widely shared intuition holds that individual control over money matters for the decision process within the household and the subsequent distribution of resources and welfare. As a consequence, there are good reasons to depart from the unitary model of the household and to explore the possibilities offered by models of the family accounting for several decision makers in the household and for the potential impact of tax reforms on the balance of power. This paper summarizes both the methodological and empirical findings presented in the next three papers of this special issue of the Review of the Economics of the Household. This series of contributions primarily entails a concrete comparison of the policy implications of the choice between the unitary and a particular multi-person representation: the collective representation. On the one hand, it suggests a methodology to implement the collective model of labor supply in a realistic context where participation is modeled together with working hours, and where the full tax-benefit system is accounted for. On the other hand, the empirical part relies on comprehensive simulations of tax reforms in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and allows to quantify the distortions that may affect policy recommendations based on the unitary model
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Does the representation of the household behavior matter for welfare analysis of tax-benefit policies ?
|
Résumé |
en
A widely shared intuition holds that individual control over money matters for the decision process within the household and the subsequent distribution of resources and welfare. As a consequence, there are good reasons to depart from the unitary model of the household and to explore the possibilities offered by models of the family accounting for several decision makers in the household and for the potential impact of tax reforms on the balance of power. This paper summarizes both the methodological and empirical findings presented in the next three papers of this special issue of the Review of the Economics of the Household. This series of contributions primarily entails a concrete comparison of the policy implications of the choice between the unitary and a particular multi-person representation: the collective representation. On the one hand, it suggests a methodology to implement the collective model of labor supply in a realistic context where participation is modeled together with working hours, and where the full tax-benefit system is accounted for. On the other hand, the empirical part relies on comprehensive simulations of tax reforms in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, and allows to quantify the distortions that may affect policy recommendations based on the unitary model
|
Auteur(s) |
Olivier Bargain
1, 2
, Miriam Beblo
3
, Denis Beninger
3
, Richard Blundell
4, 5
, Raquel Carrasco
6
, Marie-Concetta Chiuri
2, 7
, Francois Laisney
8, 3
, Valérie Lechene
4, 9
, Nicolas Moreau
10, 11
, Michal Myck
4, 12
, Javier Ruiz-Castillo
6
, Frédéric Vermeulen
13
1
IZA -
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
( 237214 )
- Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9 D-53113 Bonn Germany
- Allemagne
2
Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD)
( 151495 )
- Turin
- Italie
3
Centre for European Economic Research (Mannheim, Germany) -
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
( 139699 )
- L 7, 1 68161 Mannheim
- Allemagne
4
IFS -
Laboratory of the Institute for Fiscal Studies
( 163521 )
- The Institute for Fiscal Studies 7 Ridgmount Street, London WC1E 7AE.
- Royaume-Uni
5
UCL -
University College of London [London]
( 300875 )
- Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT
- Royaume-Uni
6
UC3M -
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid [Madrid]
( 45695 )
- Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Madrid
- Espagne
7
UNIBA -
Università degli studi di Bari Aldo Moro = University of Bari Aldo Moro
( 300766 )
- Piazza Umberto I - 70121 Bari
- Italie
8
BETA -
Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 93745 )
- Université de Lorraine, UFR Droit Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 place Carnot CO 70026, 54035 Nancy Cedex
Université de Strasbourg, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 67085 Strasbourg Cedex
- France
9
University of Oxford
( 302612 )
- Wellington Square, Oxford OX1 2JD
- Royaume-Uni
10
GREMAQ -
Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
( 744 )
- manufacture des tabacs - bat. F 21 Allée de Brienne 31000 TOULOUSE
- France
11
LIRHE -
Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de recherche sur les Ressources Humaines et l'Emploi
( 569 )
- Place Anatole France 31042 Toulouse Cedex
- France
12
DIW Berlin -
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
( 153237 )
- Mohrenstraße 58, 10117 Berlin
- Allemagne
13
Tilburg University [Tilburg]
( 210366 )
- PO Box 90153, 5000LE Tilburg
- Pays-Bas
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Page/Identifiant |
99-111
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Date de publication |
2006
|
Volume |
4
|
Financement |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Collective model, Household labor supply, Intra household allocations, Tax reform
|
DOI | 10.1007/s11150-006-0001-8 |
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