Long persuasion games - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Theory Année : 2008

Long persuasion games

Résumé

This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium characterization is provided for unilateral persuasion games, and the second for multistage, bilateral persuasion games. As in Aumann and Hart [R.J. Aumann, S. Hart, Long cheap talk, Econometrica 71 (6) (2003) 1619-1660], we use the concepts of diconvexification and dimartingale. A leading example illustrates both geometric characterizations and shows how the expert, whatever his type, can increase his equilibrium payoff compared to all equilibria of the unilateral persuasion game by delaying information certification.

Dates et versions

hal-00360719 , version 1 (11-02-2009)

Identifiants

Citer

Frédéric Koessler, Francoise Forges. Long persuasion games. Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143, pp.1-35. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.006⟩. ⟨hal-00360719⟩
287 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More