Finitely repeated games with semi-standard - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Mathematical Economics Année : 2011

Finitely repeated games with semi-standard

Résumé

This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs as the duration of the game increases.

Domaines

Dates et versions

hal-00580938 , version 1 (29-03-2011)

Identifiants

Citer

Tristan Tomala, Pauline Contou-Carrère. Finitely repeated games with semi-standard. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011, 47 (1), pp.14-21. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.10.005⟩. ⟨hal-00580938⟩
79 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More