Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information - HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article dans une revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2012

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Yuval Heller
  • Fonction : Auteur
Eilon Solan
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-00715606, version 1 (08-07-2012)

Identifiants

Citer

Tristan Tomala, Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan. Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (1), pp.222-234. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002⟩. ⟨hal-00715606⟩

Collections

HEC CNRS
72 Consultations
0 Téléchargements
Dernière date de mise à jour le 06/04/2024
comment ces indicateurs sont-ils produits

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Plus