Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation: when endogenous heterogeneity matters
Raphael Soubeyran
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 170254
- IdHAL : raphael-soubeyran
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7334-4555
- IdRef : 20038354X
Mabel Tidball
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 735431
- IdHAL : mabel-tidball
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5576-0977
- IdRef : 066992931
Agnes Tomini
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 772654
- ORCID : 0000-0002-7066-836X
Katrin Erdlenbruch
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 171176
- IdHAL : katrin-erdlenbruch
- ORCID : 0000-0002-5470-2636
- IdRef : 087956330
Résumé
In this paper, we focus on resource conservation in a model of decentralized management of groundwater and rainwater. We show that a conservation policy may have opposite effects on the level of the resource, depending on the outcome of the decentralized management. More precisely, we consider identical farmers who can use two water resources (groundwater and/or rainwater) and we study the symmetric and asymmetric feedback stationary Nash equilibria of the dynamic game. We show that a subsidy on the use of rainwater may increase the level of the aquifer at the symmetric equilibrium, whereas it decreases the level of the aquifer at the asymmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the usual focus on (interior) symmetric equilibria in dynamic games may provide misleading policy implications.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation: when endogenous heterogeneity matters
|
Résumé |
en
In this paper, we focus on resource conservation in a model of decentralized management of groundwater and rainwater. We show that a conservation policy may have opposite effects on the level of the resource, depending on the outcome of the decentralized management. More precisely, we consider identical farmers who can use two water resources (groundwater and/or rainwater) and we study the symmetric and asymmetric feedback stationary Nash equilibria of the dynamic game. We show that a subsidy on the use of rainwater may increase the level of the aquifer at the symmetric equilibrium, whereas it decreases the level of the aquifer at the asymmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the usual focus on (interior) symmetric equilibria in dynamic games may provide misleading policy implications.
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Auteur(s) |
Raphael Soubeyran
1
, Mabel Tidball
1
, Agnes Tomini
2
, Katrin Erdlenbruch
3
1
LAMETA -
Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée
( 2583 )
- Avenue Raymond Dugrand-CS79606, 34960 Montpellier cedex 2
- France
2
GREQAM -
Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille
( 199934 )
- Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13236 Marseille cedex 02
- France
3
UMR G-EAU -
Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages
( 182889 )
- 361 rue J.F. Breton - BP 5095 34196 Montpellier Cedex 5
- France
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Audience |
Non spécifiée
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Public visé |
Scientifique
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Commentaire(s) |
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Localisation géographique du document |
Centre de Documentation P. Bartoli, UMR LAMETA, Montpellier (S BR 1542)
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Commentaire |
[Departement_IRSTEA]Eaux [TR1_IRSTEA]GEUSI
[Departement_IRSTEA]Eaux [TR1_IRSTEA]GEUSI |
Date de publication |
2015-09
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Volume |
62
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Vulgarisation |
Non
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Nom de la revue |
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
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Numéro |
1
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Page/Identifiant |
19-34
|
Financement |
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Voir aussi |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
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Indexation contrôlée |
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Éditeur commercial |
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Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés |
en
groundwater, differential game, asymmetric equilibrium, rainwater
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DOI | 10.1007/s10640-014-9813-9 |
irste@doc (Irstea) | PUB00042087 |
ProdINRA | 279180 |
UT key WOS | 000359432000003 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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