Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Theory and Decision Année : 2016

Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness

Résumé

This paper empirically investigates the interaction between repeated transactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. We design an indefinitely repeated games experiment between identifiable players. In this experiment, the probability of continuation and the level of shared information vary over the treatments. The level of contractual completeness is decided by participants at each period. Our results show that past interactions are a stronger determinant of the level of investment in contractual completeness than the perspective of future business.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-01300654 , version 1 (11-04-2016)

Identifiants

Citer

Jean Beuve, Claudine Desrieux. Repeated interactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. Theory and Decision, 2016, 80 (1), pp.125-158. ⟨10.1007/s11238-015-9493-0⟩. ⟨hal-01300654⟩
78 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More