Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Revisited: Return of the Median Voter
|
Résumé |
en
We study a linear location model (Hotelling, 1929) in which n (with n ≥ 2) boundedly rational players follow (noisy) myopic best-reply behavior. We show through numerical and mathematical analysis that such players spend almost all the time clustered together near the center, re-establishing Hotelling's " Principle of Minimum Differentiation " that had been discredited by equilibrium analyses. Thus, our analysis of the best-response dynamics shows that when considering e.g. market dynamics as well as their policy and welfare implications, it may be important to look beyond equilibrium analyses
|
Auteur(s)
|
Nobuyuki Hanaki
1
, Emily Tanimura
2
, Nicolaas J Vriend
3
1
GREDEG -
Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion
( 185786 )
- GREDEG - Bâtiment 2 - Campus Azur du CNRS - 250 rue Albert Einstein - CS 10269 - F
06905 SOPHIA ANTIPOLIS Cedex
- France
-
Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) ( 117617 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR7321 ( 441569 )
;
-
Université Côte d'Azur UMR7321 ( 1039632 )
2
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
-
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne UMR8174 ( 7550 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR8174 ( 441569 )
3
QMUL -
School of Economics and Finance
( 196437 )
- Mile End Road, London E1 4NS United Kingdom
- Royaume-Uni
-
Queen Mary University of London ( 303063 )
|
Date de publication |
2019-01
|
Volume |
157
|
Page/Identifiant |
145-170
|
Commentaire |
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Date de publication électronique |
2017-12-28
|
Collaboration/Projet |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
-
R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location/R.R3.R30 - General
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés |
en
Stochastic stability, Best-response dynamics, Invariant measures, Hotelling location model, Principle of Minimum Differentiation, Nash equilibrium
|
DOI |
10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.014 |