Matching in the large: An experimental study
1
School of Information, University of Michigan
2 School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University
3 Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
4 Carnegie Mellon Tepper School of Business
5 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
6 BNU - Beijing Normal University
2 School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University
3 Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
4 Carnegie Mellon Tepper School of Business
5 GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
6 BNU - Beijing Normal University
Résumé
We compare the performance of the Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) and Gale–Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms in a laboratory setting where we increase the number of participants per match. In our experiment, we first increase the number of students per match from 4 to 40; when we do so, participant truth-telling increases under DA but decreases under IA, leading to a decrease in efficiency under both mechanisms. Furthermore, we find that DA remains more stable than IA, regardless of scale. We then further increase the number of participants per match to 4,000 through the introduction of robots. When robots report their preferences truthfully, we find that scale has no effect on human best response behavior. By contrast, when we program the robots to draw their strategies from the distribution of empirical human strategies, we find that our increase in scale increases human ex-post best responses under both mechanisms.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Résumé |
en
We compare the performance of the Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) and Gale–Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms in a laboratory setting where we increase the number of participants per match. In our experiment, we first increase the number of students per match from 4 to 40; when we do so, participant truth-telling increases under DA but decreases under IA, leading to a decrease in efficiency under both mechanisms. Furthermore, we find that DA remains more stable than IA, regardless of scale. We then further increase the number of participants per match to 4,000 through the introduction of robots. When robots report their preferences truthfully, we find that scale has no effect on human best response behavior. By contrast, when we program the robots to draw their strategies from the distribution of empirical human strategies, we find that our increase in scale increases human ex-post best responses under both mechanisms.
|
Titre |
en
Matching in the large: An experimental study
|
Auteur(s) |
Yan Chen
1, 2
, Min Jiang
3
, Onur Kesten
4
, Stéphane Robin
5
, Min Zhu
6
1
School of Information, University of Michigan
( 231180 )
- School of Information University of Michigan 4322 North Quad 105 S. State St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1285
- États-Unis
2
School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University
( 534652 )
- Chine
3
Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
( 537328 )
- Chine
4
Carnegie Mellon Tepper School of Business
( 231181 )
- Tepper School of Business Carnegie Mellon University 5000 Forbes Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213
- États-Unis
5
GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne -
Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne
( 102550 )
- 93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Écully
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint-Étienne cedex 02
- France
6
BNU -
Beijing Normal University
( 300798 )
- No. 19, XinJieKouWai St., HaiDian District,
Beijing 100875, P. R. China
- Chine
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Date de publication |
2018-07
|
Volume |
110
|
Page/Identifiant |
295 - 317
|
URL éditeur |
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825618300599
|
Commentaire |
Rang CNRS : 1
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Matching, School choice, Experiment, Scale
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.004 |
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