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Article Dans Une Revue Belgrade Philosophical Annual Année : 2011

THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST PHYSICALISM AND THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Résumé

This paper is concerned with the two-dimensional argument against physicalism. It examines the role of primary and secondary intensions in the entailment from conceivability to metaphysical possibility in the modal arguments against physicalism. It is argued in the paper that this approach has two fatal flaws. One is that it does not provide a justification for the claim that diverging primary intensions are the only basis for necessity of identities. The other is that the conceptual analysis does not succeed in proving that macro concepts in general are a priori derivable from the complete microphysical descriptions.
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Dates et versions

hal-01888250 , version 1 (13-10-2018)

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Daniel Kostic. THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL ARGUMENT AGAINST PHYSICALISM AND THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS. Belgrade Philosophical Annual , 2011, 24, pp.929 - 939. ⟨10.1080/09515089.2011.633696⟩. ⟨hal-01888250⟩
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