The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation
Résumé
We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Pré-publication, Document de travail |
Titre |
en
The Incentive Properties of Collective Reputation
|
Résumé |
en
We build a model of collective reputation under moral hazard to analyze incentives under collective reputation. Producers can produce high quality, but it is only imperfectly detected. Products not detected as of high quality are pooled by to the collective reputation structure. Collective reputation can yield higher quality and welfare than individual reputation. While groups unravel in absence of transfers even when efficient, simple collective reputation contracts implement the First Best.
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Auteur(s) |
Pierre Fleckinger
1, 2, 3
, Wanda Mimra
4
, Angelo Zago
5
1
CES -
Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
( 15080 )
- Maison des Sciences Économiques - 106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital - 75647 Paris Cedex 13
- France
2
CERNA i3 -
Centre d'économie industrielle i3
( 73831 )
- 60, boulevard Saint Michel, 75272 Paris Cedex 06
- France
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
ETH Zürich -
Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [Zürich]
( 180925 )
- Hauptgebäude, Rämistrasse 101, 8092 Zürich
- Suisse
5
UNIVR -
Università degli studi di Verona = University of Verona
( 542958 )
- Università degli Studi di Verona,
Via dell'Artigliere, 8 -
37129, Verona
- Italie
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2017
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
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Voir aussi |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Quality, Collective Reputation, Incentives
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