Can rationing rules for common resources impact self-insurance decisions ? - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Strategic Behavior and the Environment Année : 2013

Can rationing rules for common resources impact self-insurance decisions ?

Résumé

When users have ex-ante demands over a common resource and when resource size is not sufficient to cover all the individual demands, there is a need to establish a rationing rule. I test whether the choice of the rationing rule impacts the individual decision to self-insure, i.e., to invest in a secure alternative resource, instead of relying on a free but uncertain common resource. Four rationing rules, empirically relevant for water management, are compared using a laboratory experiment. According to Nash predictions, the investment in self-insurance is the same with the four rules. However, the experimental data show that agents' decisions are impacted by the rule. Coordination on the optimal self-insurance level is higher with the no allocation rule. However, total gains are higher with the constrained-equal awards rule, and their variability is reduced. Rules which are defined as a proportion of posted demands, such as the proportional and constrained-equal losses rules, induce sub-optimal levels of self-insurance.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

hal-02647066 , version 1 (29-05-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02647066 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 190123

Citer

Marianne Lefebvre. Can rationing rules for common resources impact self-insurance decisions ?. Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2013, 3 (3), pp.185-222. ⟨hal-02647066⟩
16 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More