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Article Dans Une Revue Group Decision and Negotiation Année : 2007

Multi-party negotiation when agents have subjective estimates of bargaining powers

Cas de négociation multi-parties avec des agents ayant une estimation subjective du pouvoir de marchandage

Résumé

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.

Dates et versions

hal-02654717 , version 1 (29-05-2020)

Identifiants

Citer

Nicolas Quérou, Patrick Rio, Mabel Tidball. Multi-party negotiation when agents have subjective estimates of bargaining powers. Group Decision and Negotiation, 2007, 16 (5), pp.417-436. ⟨10.1007/s10726-006-9058-2⟩. ⟨hal-02654717⟩
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