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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2009

Intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions in a multiple equilibria model

Marchandage intra-firmes et frictions d'appariement dans un modèle d'équilibre multiple

Résumé

In this paper, we combine a monopolistic model à la Dixit and Stiglitz and a matching model derived from Pissarides (2000) in the case of large firms. As in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), we consider an intra firm bargaining model for the wage determination. Moreover, we allow for increasing returns to scale in the aggregate production function leading to multiple equilibria existence. Finally, based on economy dynamics study and numerical simulations, we show how the dynamical properties are altered in the case of multiple equilibria compared to the one of unique equilibrium and illustrate the issues of economic policy design in the case of multiple equilibria.
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Dates et versions

hal-02811652 , version 1 (06-06-2020)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-02811652 , version 1
  • PRODINRA : 415506

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Julie Beugnot, Mabel Tidball. Intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions in a multiple equilibria model. 21. Annual Conference of the European Association of Labour Economists, Sep 2009, Tallinn, Estonia. 33 p. ⟨hal-02811652⟩
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