Format du dépôt |
Fichier |
Type de dépôt |
Pré-publication, Document de travail (working paper) |
Résumé |
en
Motivated by recent discussions about the issue of risk perceptions for climate change related events, we introduce a non-cooperative game setting where agents manage a common pool resource under a potential risk, and agents exhibit different risk perceptions. We first highlight that risk and risk perceptions have qualitatively differing impacts on optimal decisions. Then, focusing on the effect of the polarization level and other population features, we show that the type of perception (overestimation,
underestimation) and the pre- and post-shift resource quality levels have first-order importance on the qualitative nature of behavioral adjustments and on resource conservation. When there are non-uniform perceptions within the population, the intra-group structure qualitatively affects the degree of resource conservation. Moreover, science-based agents (using the probability estimate making consensus within the scientific community) may react in non-monotone ways to changes in the polarization level. The size of the science-based agents’ sub-population does not qualitatively affect how an increase in the polarization level impacts behavioral adjustments, even though it affects the magnitude of this change. Finally, it is shown how risk perceptions affect the comparison between centralized and decentralized management, and several policies are discussed based on their likely effects on welfare.
|
Titre |
en
Common pool resource management and risk perceptions
|
Auteur(s)
|
Can Askan Mavi
1
, Nicolas Quérou
2
1
University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]
( 366875 )
- Campus Kirchberg
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359 Luxembourg
Campus de Limpertsberg
162a, avenue de la Faïencerie
L-1511 Luxembourg
Campus de Belval
2, avenue de l'Université
L-4365 Esch-sur-Alzette
- Luxembourg
2
CEE-M -
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier
( 1002397 )
- 2 Place Viala
INRAE - MSA
34060 Montpellier Cedex 2
- France
-
Université de Montpellier ( 410122 )
;
-
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique UMR 5211 ( 441569 )
;
-
Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement UMR1135 ( 577435 )
;
-
Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro ( 1090073 )
;
-
Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement ( 1042499 )
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Licence |
Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification
|
Date de publication |
2020-12-10
|
Titre de la collection |
CEE-M working papers ; 2020-21
|
Page/Identifiant |
41 p.
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Documents de travail |
Working paper
|
Voir aussi |
-
http://faere.fr/pub/WorkingPapers/Mavi_Querou_FAERE_WP2021.02.pdf
|
Domaine(s) |
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société
-
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
-
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q20 - General
-
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q54 - Climate • Natural Disasters and Their Management • Global Warming
-
D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics/D.D9.D91 - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
-
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games
|
Projet(s) ANR |
-
-
Risques changeants et ressources communes mobiles: Analyse économique des comportements des usagers et instruments de politique publique pour la soutenabilité
[En savoir plus]
CRaMoRes -
ANR-19-FRAL-0010
FRAL
- 2019
|
Mots-clés |
en
C72, Conservation, Perception bias, Environmental risk, Renewable resources, Dynamic games, Dynamic games JEL Classification: Q20, Q54, D91
|