Stochastic petropolitics: The dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies
Fabien Prieur
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 179696
- IdHAL : fabien-prieur
- ORCID : 0000-0002-6651-304X
- IdRef : 112588220
Résumé
We investigate the link between resource revenues volatility and institutions. We build a stochastic differential game with two players (conservatives vs. liberals) lobbying for changing the institutions in their preferred directions. First, uncertainty surrounds the dynamics of institutions and the resource revenues. Second, the lobbying power is asymmetric, the conservatives’ power being increasing with resource revenues. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in the set of affine strategies. We then examine to which extent uncertainty leads to more liberal institutions in the long run, compared to the deterministic case. We finally explore the institutional impact of volatility using a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973–2005. Focusing on financial liberalization, we find that as oil revenue volatility increases, liberalization goes down. This result is robust to different specifications and sample distinctions.
Format du dépôt | Notice |
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Type de dépôt | Communication dans un congrès |
Titre |
en
Stochastic petropolitics: The dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies
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Résumé |
en
We investigate the link between resource revenues volatility and institutions. We build a stochastic differential game with two players (conservatives vs. liberals) lobbying for changing the institutions in their preferred directions. First, uncertainty surrounds the dynamics of institutions and the resource revenues. Second, the lobbying power is asymmetric, the conservatives’ power being increasing with resource revenues. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in the set of affine strategies. We then examine to which extent uncertainty leads to more liberal institutions in the long run, compared to the deterministic case. We finally explore the institutional impact of volatility using a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973–2005. Focusing on financial liberalization, we find that as oil revenue volatility increases, liberalization goes down. This result is robust to different specifications and sample distinctions.
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Auteur(s) |
Raouf Boucekkine
1
, Fabien Prieur
2
, Chrysovalantis Vasilakis
3, 4
, Benteng Zou
5
1
AMSE -
Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
( 526949 )
- 5-9 Boulevard Bourdet
CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- France
2
CEE-M -
Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier
( 1002397 )
- 2 Place Viala
INRAE - MSA
34060 Montpellier Cedex 2
- France
3
UCL IRES -
Institut de recherches économiques et sociales
( 154528 )
- 3 place Montesquieu - 1348 Louvain-La-Neuve
- Belgique
4
IZA -
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics
( 237214 )
- Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5-9 D-53113 Bonn Germany
- Allemagne
5
University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]
( 366875 )
- Campus Kirchberg
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359 Luxembourg
Campus de Limpertsberg
162a, avenue de la Faïencerie
L-1511 Luxembourg
Campus de Belval
2, avenue de l'Université
L-4365 Esch-sur-Alzette
- Luxembourg
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Langue du document |
Anglais
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Vulgarisation |
Non
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Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Invité |
Non
|
Audience |
Internationale
|
Actes |
Non
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Titre du congrès |
Workshop “Power to empower emerging Africa"
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Date début congrès |
2020-03-05
|
Ville |
Marrakech
|
Pays |
Maroc
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Public visé |
Scientifique
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Sous-type de document pour les Communications |
Présentation orale
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Domaine(s) |
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Mots-clés (JEL) |
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Projet(s) ANR |
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Mots-clés |
en
Institutional dynamics, Petropolitics, Lobbying games, Stochastic dynamic games, Financial liberalization policies
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