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Pré-publication, Document de travail Année : 2020

Communication, Feedbacks and Repeated Moral Hazard with Short-lived Buyers

In-Uck Park
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

We show that experience good sellers facing myopic buyers can solve the inherent moral hazard problem by communicating their observation of quality before trade, provided that communication is part of their public track record. Such cheap-talk communication, if trusted, allows market prices to reflect the actual value created, thus providing an immediate reward for the seller's effort which complements the conventional, reputational incentives. Pre-trade communication achieves maximal efficiency when truthful and the full efficiency as the noise in the seller's observation vanishes. We fully characterize the conditions for communication to improve efficiency and the extent to which it does so.
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Dates et versions

hal-03095669, version 1 (04-01-2021)

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Bruno Jullien, In-Uck Park. Communication, Feedbacks and Repeated Moral Hazard with Short-lived Buyers. 2020. ⟨hal-03095669⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 07/04/2024
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