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Article Dans Une Revue Dynamic Games and Applications Année : 2020

Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case

Résumé

Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (Math Oper Res 21:209–236, 1996a, Math Oper Res 21:237–251, 1996b), Rosenberg (Int J Game Theory 27:577–597, 1998) and De Meyer and Marino (Cahiers de la MSE 27, 2005) provided an explicit construction for optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the dependent case.

Dates et versions

hal-03166411 , version 1 (11-03-2021)

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Citer

Fabien Gensbittel, Miquel Oliu-Barton. Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case. Dynamic Games and Applications, 2020, 10 (4), pp.819-835. ⟨10.1007/s13235-020-00347-y⟩. ⟨hal-03166411⟩
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