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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2021

Escaping Social Pressure: Fixed-Term Contracts in Multi-Establishment Firms

Résumé

We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.
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Dates et versions

hal-03177848 , version 1 (23-03-2021)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03177848 , version 1

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Andrea Bassanini, Eve Caroli, François Fontaine, Antoine Reberioux. Escaping Social Pressure: Fixed-Term Contracts in Multi-Establishment Firms. 2021. ⟨hal-03177848⟩
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