A theory of elite-biased democracies
Raouf Boucekkine
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 757104
- ORCID : 0000-0002-8601-7115
Paolo Melindi-Ghidi
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1020364
Résumé
Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new institutional rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elite-biased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
A theory of elite-biased democracies
|
Résumé |
en
Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new institutional rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elite-biased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007
|
Auteur(s) |
Raouf Boucekkine
1, 2
, Rodolphe Desbordes
3
, Paolo Melindi-Ghidi
4, 1, 2
1
AMSE -
Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques
( 526949 )
- 5-9 Boulevard Bourdet
CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
- France
2
UCL IRES -
Institut de recherches économiques et sociales
( 154528 )
- 3 place Montesquieu - 1348 Louvain-La-Neuve
- Belgique
3
SKEMA Business School
( 214127 )
- Campus Sophia Antipolis 60 rue Dostoïevski 06902 Sophia Antipolis
- France
4
EconomiX -
EconomiX
( 2564 )
- Bâtiment G
200 Avenue de la République
92001 NANTERRE CEDEX
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2021-07
|
Date de publication électronique |
2021-04-29
|
URL éditeur |
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165489621000275
|
Volume |
112
|
Page/Identifiant |
159-166
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Projet(s) ANR |
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007 |
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