Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Access content directly
Journal Articles Games and Economic Behavior Year : 2022

Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case

Abstract

We consider a sender-receiver game, in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver's decision is a real number. We assume that utility functions are concave, single-peaked and single-crossing. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a decision, which requires the sender's approval to be implemented. Otherwise, the sender "exits". At a perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit, the receiver must maximize his expected utility subject to the participation constraints of all positive probability types. This necessary condition may not hold at the receiver's prior belief, so that a non-revealing equilibrium may fail to exist. Similarly, a fully revealing equilibrium may not exist either due to the sender's incentive compatibility conditions.We propose a constructive algorithm that always achieves a perfect Bayesian equilibrium without exit.
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Dates and versions

hal-03231673 , version 1 (21-05-2021)
hal-03231673 , version 2 (18-01-2022)
hal-03231673 , version 3 (23-05-2022)

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Stéphan Sémirat, Françoise Forges. Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case. Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 134, pp.242-263. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.004⟩. ⟨hal-03231673v3⟩
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