The Impact of Firing Restrictions on Labor Market Equilibrium in the Presence of On-the-job Search
Fabien Postel-Vinay
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)
,
Hélène Turon
1
ECON -
Département d'économie (Sciences Po)
2 CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
3 LEA - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée
4 Department of Economics
5 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
7 University of Bristol [Bristol]
8 IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor
9 DELTA - Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée
10 INRA
2 CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
3 LEA - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée
4 Department of Economics
5 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
7 University of Bristol [Bristol]
8 IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor
9 DELTA - Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée
10 INRA
Fabien Postel-Vinay
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1321862
Hélène Turon
- Fonction : Auteur
Résumé
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, or may be induced to accept one that they would otherwise reject with a negotiated severance package. We formalise those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model that allows for employed job search. We find that our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job-to-job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment and that ignoring on-the-job Search leads one to overstate the adverse impact of firing costs on employment.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Fichier |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
The Impact of Firing Restrictions on Labor Market Equilibrium in the Presence of On-the-job Search
|
Résumé |
en
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, or may be induced to accept one that they would otherwise reject with a negotiated severance package. We formalise those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model that allows for employed job search. We find that our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job-to-job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment and that ignoring on-the-job Search leads one to overstate the adverse impact of firing costs on employment.
|
Auteur(s) |
Fabien Postel-Vinay
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
, Hélène Turon
1
ECON -
Département d'économie (Sciences Po)
( 226874 )
- 28 rue des Saints-Pères - 75007 Paris
- France
2
CREST -
Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique
( 2579 )
- 5, Avenue Henry Le Chatelier
91120 Palaiseau
- France
3
LEA -
Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée
( 37750 )
- France
4
Department of Economics
( 120984 )
- University College London - Gower Street - London - WC1E 6BT
- Royaume-Uni
5
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
7
University of Bristol [Bristol]
( 220393 )
- Senate House, Tyndall Avenue, Bristol BS8 1TH
- Royaume-Uni
8
IZA -
Institute for the Study of Labor
( 103374 )
- Bonn
- Allemagne
9
DELTA -
Département et Laboratoire d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée
( 25318 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 Paris
- France
10
INRA
( 54079 )
- France
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Date de production/écriture |
2014-03-01
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2014-03
|
Volume |
124
|
Numéro |
575
|
Licence |
Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale
|
Page/Identifiant |
31-61
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Firing restrictions, Labour market equilibrium, Productivity shocks, Wage cuts
|
DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12040 |
Spire (Sciences Po) | 2441/5e9a6u2pke9ulafplci76jms73 |
UT key WOS | 000332799500002 |
Origine :
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
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