Investing to Cooperate:Theory and Experiment - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2013

Investing to Cooperate:Theory and Experiment

Résumé

We study theoretically and in a lab-experiment investment decisions in environments where property rights are absent. In our setting a player chooses an investment level before interacting repeatedly with a given set of agents. The investment stochastically affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period. We show that investments with less volatile returns are more likely to be observed since they facilitate cooperation. We also show that the investor might be forced to invest more than he would in an environment with legal protection, to keep other players cooperative. Experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
2013-henry-et-galbiati-investing-to-cooperate.pdf (453.89 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-03473941 , version 1 (10-12-2021)

Identifiants

Citer

Jean-Pierre Benoît, Roberto Galbiati, Emeric Henry. Investing to Cooperate:Theory and Experiment. 2013. ⟨hal-03473941⟩
26 Consultations
13 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More