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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2022

Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection

Résumé

This article surveys recent attempts at characterizing competitive allocations under adverse selection when each informed agent can privately trade with several uninformed parties: that is, trade is nonexclusive. We rst show that requiring market outcomes to be robust to entry selects a unique candidate allocation, which involves cross-subsidies. We then study how to implement this allocation as the equilibrium outcome of a game in which the uninformed parties, acting as principals, compete by making oers to the informed agents. We show that equilibria typically fail to exist in competitive-screening games, in which these oers are simultaneous. We nally explore alternative extensive forms, and show that the candidate allocation can be implemented through a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets.
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Dates et versions

hal-03629592 , version 1 (04-04-2022)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03629592 , version 1

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Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, François Salanié. Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection. 2022. ⟨hal-03629592⟩
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