



HAL
open science

Parties, Pressure groups and the Politics of Municipal Expenditures in France

Richard Balme, Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot

► **To cite this version:**

Richard Balme, Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot. Parties, Pressure groups and the Politics of Municipal Expenditures in France. Les Cahiers du CERVL, 1989, New Leaders, Parties and Groups: Comparative Tendancies in Local Leadership, pp.309-336. <halshs-00005040>

HAL Id: halshs-00005040

<https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00005040v1>

Submitted on 19 Oct 2005

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



HAL Authorization

Les Cahiers du
CENTRE D'ETUDE ET DE RECHERCHE SUR LA VIE LOCALE
INSTITUT D'ETUDES POLITIQUES DE BORDEAUX

Document de travail

**NEW LEADERS,
PARTIES AND GROUPS :
COMPARATIVE TENDANCIES
IN LOCAL LEADERSHIP**

Edited by :

**Harald BALDERSHEIM, Richard BALME, Terry Nichols CLARK,
Vincent HOFFMANN-MARTINOT, Hakan MAGNUSSON**

Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Conference

Paris, April 1989



TABLE

| | |
|---|-----|
| EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION | 4 |
| <u>PART I : NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW CITIZENS AND NEW LEADERS</u> ... | 6 |
| WHY CAUSES POLITICAL CULTURES ? SOURCES AND DYNAMIC PROCESSES Terry N. CLARK, <i>University of Chicago</i> | 7 |
| CULTURAL CHANGE AND THE RISE OF THE NEW FISCAL POPULISTS Ronald INGLEHART <i>University of Michigan, Ann Arbor</i> | 25 |
| THE SOURCES OF FISCAL AND SOCIAL LIBERALISM AMONG CITIZENS IN SIX COUNTRIES Michael BRAUN <i>University of Chicago, Zuma-Mannheim</i> | 49 |
| POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND URBAN POLICY Rowan A. MIRANDA <i>Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago</i> | 90 |
| WHY ARE (MOST) SWISS LEADERS INVISIBLE ? THE SWISS COMMUNAL ETHIC Terry CLARK <i>University of Chicago</i> Claude JEANRENAUD <i>University of Neuchatel</i> with assistance from Vincent HOFFMANN-MARTINOT and Erwin ZIMMERMANN | 114 |
| NEW MAYORS IN NORWAY ? Herge O. LARSEN <i>Institute of Social Science, University of Tromso, Norway</i> | 133 |
| NEW POLITICIANS IN SWEDEN ? Bengt NORRVING <i>Department of Political Science, University of Lund</i> | 148 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| TRENDS IN THE RECRUITMENT OF LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS IN GREECE (1972-1988) | |
| Kl. S. KOUTSOUKIS | |
| <i>Pantios School of Political Sciences</i> | 155 |
| THE POLITICS OF LOCAL FISCAL REFORM IN SCOTLAND | |
| Arthur MIDWINTER | |
| <i>Department of Politics, University of Strathclyde</i> | 169 |
| THE IMPACT OF AN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM ON THE EMERGENCE OF NEW LEADERS. THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE | |
| Avrahm BRICHTA | |
| <i>University of Haifa</i> | 177 |
| GRASS ROOTS MOVEMENTS AND LOCAL LEADERS IN POLAND | |
| Andrzej KOWALCZYK | |
| <i>Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw</i> | 218 |
| <u>PART II : NEW PARTIES IN LOCAL POLITICS</u> | 228 |
| STABILITY AND CHANGE : THE PARTY SYSTEM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL IN SWEDEN | |
| Hakan MAGNUSSON | |
| <i>University of Lund</i> | 229 |
| NEW TRENDS IN LOCAL POLITICS IN ITALY | |
| Enrico ERCOLE | |
| <i>Istituto Superiore di Sociologia, Universita di Milano</i> | 240 |
| AUSTRALIA : PARTISAN PRIORITIES IN A NON-PARTY SYSTEM | |
| John R. ROBBINS | |
| <i>Department of Politics, University of Adelaide</i> | 258 |
| REFLECTIONS ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES | |
| Stephen C. BROOKS | |
| <i>University of Akron, Ohio</i> | 273 |
| CHANGEMENTS POLITIQUES ET NOUVEAUX MODELES DE GESTION MUNICIPALE DANS LES VILLES FRANCAISES | |
| Jean-Yves NEVERS | |
| <i>Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de Toulouse-le-Mirail</i> | 281 |

PART III : NEW GROUPS IN LOCAL POLITICS 308

PARTIES, PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE POLITICS OF MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN FRANCE

Richard BALME

Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Centre d' Etude et de Recherche sur la Vie Locale, I.E.P. de Bordeaux

Vincent HOFFMANN-MARTINOT

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Centre d' Etude et de Recherche sur la Vie Locale, I.E.P. de Bordeaux 309

INTEREST GROUPS IN NORWEGIAN LOCAL POLITICS

Sissel HOVIK

Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research 337

THE GROWTH REVOLT IN THE SUBURBS : A NEW POLITICAL MOVEMENT ?

Mark BALDASSARE

Programm in Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine 357

URBAN INNOVATION ? CONDITIONS UNDERPINNING THE TRANSFORMATION OF MOVEMENT INTO PARTY : THE CASE OF THE URBAN REFORM GROUP OF EDMONTON, CANADA

James LIGHTBODY

Political Science, University of Alberta

Gerry WRIGHT

Extension University of Alberta 379

LOW INCOME INTEREST GROUPS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL POLITICS

Richard HULA

Institute for Urban Studies, University of Maryland - College Park 409

BUREAUCRATIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE MUNICIPAL GROUP UNIVERSE : 1975 AND 1986

Paul SCHUMAKER and Allan CIGLER

University of Kansas


Howard FAYE

University of Washington 424

LOCAL PRESSURE GROUPS IN DECISION MAKING IN POLAND. NEW TENDANCIES

Pawei SWIANIEWICZ

University of Warsaw 435



**PARTIES, PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE POLITICS
OF MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN FRANCE**

Richard BALME

Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques

and

Vincent HOFFMANN-MARTINOT

Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique

Centre d'Etude et de Recherche sur la Vie Locale
Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux



RESUME

The paper proposes an analysis of determinants of public expenditures in French cities over 20.000 between 1983 and 1985. Different factors are estimated using bivariate analysis. Environmental determinants are contrasted with political variables including influence of the bureaucracy and pressure groups, and partisan ideology of mayors. Results show that ideology is more influential on short-term changes, while interest groups pressure is more significant on long term policy outputs. Among the latter, business groups seem more influential on local public spendings than services users or municipal employees. Different modes of interests articulation according to mayors partisan affiliation draw different patterns of influence on policies in French cities.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is first to show that there is more politics in French local government than is generally assumed by the comparatist's "common sense", and that such issues deserve more detailed investigations than have been devoted by previous studies of the French case. We also hope to contribute to the analysis of determinants of policy outputs in local governments. These determinants are naturally important for policy science, but also for the more general knowledge of politics. However, as noted by Yves Mény (1985), local governments policies are rarely considered *sui generis*. Rather, they appear as secondary variables in researches focusing on different topics. This seems to be especially the case in France, where two common ideas have led to neglect such investigations. Local policies outputs would not vary, because the centralized structure of the national political system would allow merely no room for decision to local authorities. Similarly, there would be no partisan politics at the local level, but only a local administration exerted through the *Préfets*, state representatives in the *Départements*.

It is no longer possible to admit such a picture of French local government. Even before the recent decentralization reform implemented by the Socialist central government, a progressive move towards more local autonomy was already set in motion. Before World War II, under the Third Republic, large cities already enhanced their capacity of decision through the development of their own administrative services. After the 1960s, they became competitive with state agencies, especially concerning city planning, and this was extended to mid-size cities in the 1970s. This gain in autonomy was reinforced by legislative decisions concerning self-government. Since 1980, cities have some room to decide the distribution of rates between the different categories of taxes¹. Central grants also became non-specific², while deregulation has been applied to fees for local public services (Hoffmann-Martinot and Nevers 1989).

This movement was then strengthened by the decentralization reforms, giving more functional responsibility and more legal autonomy to local governments. Along the same line, parties become more and more active in the Vth Republic local elections, despite the recent tendency to the decline of ideological cleavages, "openness" in the new terminology. The long term evolution of French political institutions seems to comfort local autonomy. We expect therefore politics to matter in French local government. This paper proposes an evaluation of the impact of politics on local policy outputs, measured through public expenditures in French cities.

Theories of public policy outputs most of the time oppose two categories of hypotheses. The "environment matter hypothesis" generally consider socio-economic characteristics, such as population change, income, urbanization, as the main determinants of policy outputs. Such theories are exemplified by the early works by Wilensky on comparing Welfare policies (Wilensky 1975). In a strict version, deliberately overstated for analytical purpose, policy outputs would be exclusively adaptive, and directly determined by the environment's conditions. At least on long periods, political behaviors would only reflect the necessity imposed by the environment.


Alternative theories rely on the "politics matter hypothesis". Different versions consider different factors. Maybe the most opposed to the precedent is the bureaucratic model, where organizations select behaviors which do not follow anymore criteria of adaptation to their environment (Crozier 1964). Policy outputs are then determined by the budget maximization induced by bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971), or in a more bounded version of rationality by the incrementalism of administrative behavior (Wildavsky 1979). Policy outputs are according to this interpretation the resulting product of interaction between bureaus and clientele of beneficiaries.

Other theories are more oriented toward representative democracy and participation in politics. They underline the impact of parties and ideology on policy formation (Hibbs 1977, Castles and Mc Kinlay 1979, Castles 1982). Governments' affiliation to liberal or conservative ideologies through partisan representation seem to determine Welfare State or market oriented policies.

Other studies focused on pressure politics, especially on unions' influence on the economy. However, detailed analysis of macro-economic performances considered as policy outputs (growth, inflation, unemployment) showed that more than ideology or strength of pressure groups, relations between organized interests and political parties were the condition for successful bargaining and robustness of the economy. Corporatist arrangements, where strong and centralized unions are able to negotiate and implement policy at the macro-level because of their relations with leftist parties, seem to determine policy outputs (Schmidt 1982).

We consider in this paper the impact of such factors on public expenditures in French cities over 20.000. Details on the survey are reported in Appendix. Our dependent variables are current spendings and personnel spendings per capita in constant French Francs (year of reference: 1983). More precisely, for the first half of the 1983-1989 electoral term (1983, 1984, and 1985), we selected means $(1983+1984+1985/3)$ and changes $(1985-1983, \text{ in } \%)$ as measures respectively of expenditures levels and changes. We consider the level of expenditures as an indicator of long term policy outputs,

while short term changes in expenditures are considered as an indicator of policy change. We expect environment to override political variables for long term policy outputs, while short term changes should mainly be determined by political factors. Among these, we expect the bureaucracy to exert long term incremental effects, while ideology and pressure groups should mainly be significant on short term changes.



We first consider the impact of environmental factors (Section I), and the influence of pressure groups and the bureaucracy (Section II). Section III investigates the impact of parties, before turning to relations between parties and organized groups (Section IV). The analysis allows to distinguish different patterns of influence in French cities.

I SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES

Population size (1982 census) is positively but weakly correlated with the current spending mean (Pearson correlation coefficient: $r=.17$, $P=.029$); this result confirms numerous previous works (see e.g. Bahl 1969). At this general level of observation it seems quite impossible to identify potential scale economies or, on the contrary, diseconomies; it is only by analysing separately various municipal services that it could be accurately assumed (see Pommerehne and Blankart 1979). Yet the division of our sample into demographic groups (see table 1) does not show a linear relation between population and expenditure, but rather "level effects"; scale economies are likely to occur as city size is greater than 50.000.

TABLE 1: EXPENDITURE LEVELS BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS OF CITIES

| | 1983-85 current spending (mean per capita in FF) | 1983-85 personnel spending (mean per capita in FF) |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| Cities < 30.001 (N=61) | 3.059 | 1.363 |
| Cities > 30.000 & < 50.001 (N=40) | 3.661 | 1.608 |
| Cities > 50.000 & < 100.001 (N=20) | 3.583 | 1.589 |
| Cities > 100.000 (N=11) | 3.545 | 1.537 |

More significant correlations are found, especially between:

- the population change between the two last census years (1975-1982) and 1983-1985 current as personnel expenditure change ($r=.26$, $P=.001$); actually, a strong demographic change often induces an extension of the urban space and therefore necessarily creation of new equipments; in addition congestion problems are likely to lead to investment operations in order to improve the capacity of services supply. However, as it is stressed by Bahl (1981), the relation between demographic change and expenditure change remains highly complicated for analysis.

- the percentage of young people (less than 20 years old) and the current expenditure ($r=-.37$, $P=.000$) and personnel expenditure mean ($r=-.35$, $P=.000$), with a positive correlation between the current expenditure mean and the percentage of elderly people (more than 65 years old) ($r=.23$, $P=.005$); this result confirms several studies on American cities where, according to Bahl (1981), municipalities intervene and spend more for elderly and retired people than for young ones. But studies devoted to that question are rather few in France. Still the analysis of our sample shows that a strong proportion of elderly people in the population is associated with variables which are positively correlated with a high expenditure level, such as central city position in an agglomeration, unemployment rate, and city size. The percentage of elderly is especially high in old cities of big agglomerations, where social problems are acute and social welfare programs very extended, as it has been the case in most large Western cities since the 1970s.

Among the socio-economic variables, the most significant correlation is found between a measure of city wealth, the *potentiel fiscal* (fiscal capacity) per capita³ in 1983, and the current expenditure ($r=.47$, $P=.000$) and personnel expenditure mean ($r=.33$, $P=.000$). The correlation between the *percent of workforce* and the current expenditure ($r=.28$, $P=.001$) and personnel expenditure mean ($r=.34$, $P=.000$) is less strong but as significant. Those results are very similar to numerous previous findings according to that the wealthier a city, the more it is likely to spend (see Derycke 1982: 57-59).

Two agglomeration variables are strongly correlated with current expenditure. One is the *inclusion in a communauté urbaine*⁴ ($r=-.53$, $P=.000$), largely explaining levels differences: the 1983-85 mean only comes to 2.474 F per capita in average for the 27 cities belonging to a communauté urbaine, while it reaches 3.590 F for the 105 which do not participate in such a supra-municipal structure. The other variable is the *suburban nature* of a city, opposed to agglomeration centers or isolated cities (in other words not included in an agglomeration): in that case, $r=-.35$, with $P=.000$. The 1983-85 annual mean is significantly lower in the 65 suburban cities (3.062 F per capita) than in the 59 municipalities centers of agglomerations (3.651 F) - what is likely to illustrate the assumption of an "exploitation of center-cities by suburban communes" - or in the 8 isolated cities (3.666 F).

II PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY

Budgetary growth is generally attributed to the maximizing behavior of bureaucrats, and to pressure groups' activity to obtain services provided by the government. We try here to assess a few questions with regard to this interpretation: do bureaucrats and pressure groups really want more public expenditure? Which groups are most active and most influent on the budgetary decision-making? How much does this influence affect policy outputs?

Pressure groups' spending preferences

The first thing that we need to know is whether the pressure resulting from groups' activity is indeed oriented towards more spending. Mayors were asked by our questionnaire to evaluate organized groups' spending preferences for the city budget on a scale ranking from 1 (far less spending) to 5 (much more spending). The median point of the scale 3 indicates a preference for the same level of expenditure. Results displayed in Table 2 clearly show that organized groups' preferences are spending oriented, as the mean for all categories of groups is above this median point. The only

groups opposed to spendings are taxpayers organizations and business unions. Note however that shopkeepers, chambers of commerce and industry and even homeowners do not favor a reduction in expenditures. Most pro-spending groups are leisure voluntary groups such as sports clubs or cultural associations, services users and neighborhood groups.

TABLE 2: PRESSURE GROUPS SPENDING PREFERENCES
(as reported by mayors)

| Mean | Std Dev | N | |
|------|---------|-----|--------------------------------------|
| 3.46 | .53 | 31 | PRESSURE GROUPS SPENDING PREFERENCES |
| 4.14 | .78 | 99 | SERVICES USERS |
| 4.18 | .71 | 93 | NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS |
| 3.90 | 1.02 | 69 | ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION GROUPS |
| 3.80 | 1.10 | 82 | TENANTS ASSOCIATIONS |
| 3.90 | .94 | 79 | WAGE-EARNERS UNIONS |
| 3.03 | 1.17 | 62 | CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY |
| 3.16 | 1.17 | 100 | SHOPKEEPERS ASSOCIATIONS |
| 4.41 | .65 | 104 | LEISURE VOLUNTARY GROUPS |
| 3.62 | .66 | 101 | ELDERLY GROUPS |
| 4.11 | .66 | 95 | YOUTH MOVEMENTS |
| 2.94 | 1.23 | 64 | HOMEOWNERS GROUPS |
| 2.49 | 1.09 | 65 | BUSINESS UNIONS |
| 1.76 | .98 | 45 | TAXPAYERS ORGANIZATIONS |
| 4.06 | .52 | 56 | AD-HOC GROUPS PREFERENCES |
| 3.85 | .95 | 64 | LABOUR GROUPS PREFERENCES |
| 2.82 | 1.00 | 44 | CAPITAL GROUPS PREFERENCES |

These results validate the idea of a pressure towards budgetary growth. They also help define this pressure: groups whose interests are mainly defined by revenues of capital (homeowners, shopkeepers, chambers of commerce and industry, business unions), are not perceived by mayors as opposed to expenditures, but nearly satisfied with their current level. This seems to support the result by Clark and Ferguson for US cities, showing no systematic anti-spending orientation of business groups (Clark and Ferguson 1983). In France, this preference might even be strengthened by the state contributing to the payment of taxes on firms to local authorities (see Guengant and Uhaldeborde 1989). Groups whose interests are mainly defined in term of income from labor (tenants and wage-earners unions) clearly exhibit preferences for a higher level of expenditures. Ad-hoc groups, specifically services-demanding (services users, neighborhood organizations, environment protection groups, leisure

voluntary associations, elderly groups or youth movements) are the most spending oriented organizations. In other words, if we exclude taxpayers organizations and business unions, all groups are spending oriented. The cleavage lies between groups satisfied with the current level of spending, and those wishing an increase in public expenditures.

Is this preferences pattern likely to impose a bias in public policies? Table 3 displays mayors' evaluation of spending preferences for a different set of actors intervening in the budgetary process. Citizens are perceived as less liberal than organized groups concerning the city budget, and this result therefore supports the idea of the bias induced by pressure politics. Note that the council seems to reflect the pressure of organized groups rather than follow citizens preferences. This is probably due to the policy process, where groups are more active than individual citizens, and to the recruitment of councillors, often selected among voluntary groups leaders (Balme 1988).

TABLE 3: OTHER ACTORS SPENDING PREFERENCES
(as reported by mayors)

| Mean | Std Dev | N | |
|------|---------|-----|---|
| 2.82 | 1.23 | 87 | CITIZENS |
| 3.22 | .98 | 104 | MUNICIPAL COUNCIL |
| 3.83 | .76 | 102 | HEADS OF MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS (BUREAUCRATS) |
| 3.94 | .76 | 98 | MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES UNIONS |
| 3.89 | .59 | 95 | MUNICIPAL BUREAUCRACY |
| 3.43 | 1.02 | 61 | CENTRAL STATE AGENCIES |

The municipal bureaucracy, summing heads of departments in the city hall and municipal employees unions, also favors more spendings. Their preferences are higher than usual pressure groups, but nevertheless do not reach the peak of leisure groups. Indeed, bureaucrats are spending-oriented, but they are not the group with the most intense preferences.

Finally, in a centralized governmental structure, is this bias likely to be tempered by public policy orientations defined by the state? Apparently not, as local agencies of central administration seem to favor spending at a level similar to the one for average pressure groups. There seem to be few counter-forces to a general preference for expenditure growth among the intervening actors in the budgetary process.

Effect of pressure groups activity

Mayors were also asked about pressure groups' activity, using the same categories. Answers rank from 1 "no activity"

to 5 "an intense activity" with the median point of the scale 3 at "some activity". The level of activity is perceived as reasonable, as the mean score for all groups lies below the median point of the scale (See table 4). Generally speaking, pressure is not very high. Exceptions exist however: leisure groups and to a lesser extent elderly groups, youth movements and shopkeepers organizations are more active than others. As expected, individual citizens are not very active to define policies (see table 5), and the score for taxpayers organizations is remarkably low. The municipal council and heads of municipal departments are rather active, which is not surprising, while municipal employees' unions score lower than service-demanding groups. Pro-spending groups are more active than anti-spending ones, but the most active groups are defined by specific interests in services provision.

TABLE 4: PRESSURE GROUPS ACTIVITY
(reported by mayors)

| Mean | Std Dev | N | |
|------|---------|-----|--------------------------------------|
| 2.76 | .49 | 45 | PRESSURE GROUPS ACTIVITY(MEAN SCORE) |
| 2.98 | .73 | 99 | SERVICES USERS |
| 3.00 | 1.04 | 98 | NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS |
| 2.48 | .86 | 83 | ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION GROUPS |
| 2.67 | .99 | 89 | TENANTS ASSOCIATIONS |
| 2.32 | .89 | 78 | HOMEOWNERS GROUPS |
| 2.79 | .86 | 86 | WAGE-EARNERS UNIONS |
| 2.75 | .97 | 71 | CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY |
| 2.45 | .98 | 74 | BUSINESS UNIONS |
| 3.14 | .78 | 99 | SHOPKEEPERS ORGANIZATIONS |
| 3.93 | .71 | 102 | LEISURE VOLUNTARY GROUPS |
| 1.92 | 1.03 | 60 | TAXPAYERS ORGANIZATIONS |
| 3.26 | .91 | 101 | ELDERLY GROUPS |
| 3.37 | .85 | 97 | YOUTH MOVEMENTS |
| 2.99 | .48 | 54 | PRO-SPENDING GROUPS ACTIVITY |
| 2.20 | .76 | 54 | ANTI-SPENDING GROUPS ACTIVITY |
| 3.15 | .51 | 73 | AD-HOC GROUPS ACTIVITY |
| 2.74 | .68 | 78 | LABOUR GROUPS ACTIVITY |
| 2.61 | .70 | 57 | CAPITAL GROUPS ACTIVITY |

TABLE 5: OTHER ACTORS ACTIVITY
(reported by mayors)

| Mean | Std Dev | N | |
|------|---------|-----|--------------------------------|
| 2.31 | .91 | 86 | CITIZENS |
| 3.68 | .74 | 97 | MUNICIPAL COUNCIL |
| 3.61 | .83 | 99 | HEADS OF MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENTS |
| 2.86 | .70 | 100 | MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES UNIONS |
| 3.23 | .54 | 96 | MUNICIPAL BUREAUCRACY |
| 2.79 | .91 | 67 | CENTRAL STATE AGENCIES |

Does this activity affect policy outputs? Consider first the level of expenditures (see table 6). Indeed the pressure resulting from general group activity is positively related to the level of current spendings and personnel expenditures. The effect of this pressure is different however according to group categories. Ad-hoc groups demanding services do not determine policy outputs. The most important effect is due to business unions activity. Generally speaking, the effect of group activity is more important for groups whose interests are linked to capital (shopkeepers, chambers of commerce and industry, business unions) than for those whose interests are linked to labor (tenants organizations and wage-earners unions). The level of expenditure per capita seems mainly determined by the pressure to support investment and production of capital, and secondarily to the pressure for allocation and redistribution linked to consumption issues.

TABLE 6: EFFECT OF GROUP ACTIVITY ON THE LEVEL OF EXPENDITURES

| | Current Spending (mean per capita 1983-1985) | Personnel Spending |
|--------------------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| Pressure Groups (Mean all groups) | .2810 (35) P= .051 | .2712 (35) P= .058 |
| Ad-hoc groups | -.0146 (58) P= .457 | -.0282 (58) P= .417 |
| Chambers of Commerce | .3616 (56) P= .003 | .3435 (56) P= .005 |

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Business Unions | .4359 (61) P= .000 | .3968 (61) P= .001 |
| Shopkeepers organizations | .3338 (81) P= .001 | .3130 (81) P= .002 |
| Tenants Organizations | .2720 (73) P= .010 | .2891 (73) P= .007 |
| Wage-earners unions | .1959 (70) P= .052 | .1773 (70) P= .071 |
| Bureaucracy | .2771 (78) P= .007 | .2886 (78) P= .005 |
| Municipal Employees Unions | .1711 (82) P= .062 | .1628 (82) P= .072 |
| Heads of Municipal Services | .2461 (81) P= .013 | .2272 (81) P= .021 |
| Central State Agencies | .3557 (56) P= .004 | .3530 (56) P= .004 |

How does this fit with a bureaucratic model of public spendings? The municipal bureaucracy exerts a significant effect on the level of expenditures. Note however that this effect is lower than the one exerted by general pressure groups, and each of the business categories. This may reflect the centralized structure of the Government, as pressure of local governments employees is mainly applied at the central level, for instance through the negotiation of new status after the decentralization reforms. Note also that the effect is higher for top-bureaucrats, that is heads of municipal departments, than for employees unions. This seems to suggest that cities expenditures are more affected by strategies of bureaus' executives than by privileges obtained by rank-and-files employees through unions' activity.

Finally we should underline the strong correlation between the level of expenditures and the activity of state agencies. Cities with a high level of spendings per capita exhibit activity of pressure groups, especially business groups, and

involvement of bureaucrats and state agencies in the policy process.

The effect of group activity on change in expenditure follows a different pattern (see table 7). Pressure resulting from overall group activity does not determine short-term change in policy outputs. More precisely, the effect of group activity is more specific than concerning the level of expenditures. The only groups affecting such changes are ad-hoc groups, whose activity is positively related to current spendings growth, and shopkeepers organizations activity, whose activity is negatively related to change in personnel expenditures. None of the other categories, neither the municipal bureaucracy, neither state agencies, have significant effect. Long term effects of group activity, primarily due to capital, are significant on the level of expenditures. Short-term effects on changes in expenditures are less significant and more ambivalent: groups demanding services favor current spendings' growth, while shopkeepers organizations and maybe chambers of commerce and industry seem to limit the growth of personnel expenditures.

TABLE 7: EFFECT OF GROUP ACTIVITY ON EXPENDITURES' CHANGE

| | Current Spending (change in expenditures per capita 1983-1985) | Personnel Spending (change in expenditures per capita 1983-1985) |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| Pressure Groups (Mean all groups) | .1740 (35) P= .159 | -.0667 (35) P= .352 |
| Ad-hoc groups | .3044 (58) P= .010 | .1427 (58) P= .143 |
| Chambers of Commerce | -.0618 (56) P= .326 | -.1955 (56) P= .074 |
| Business Unions | -.0063 (61) P= .481 | .0266 (61) P= .419 |
| Shopkeepers organizations | -.0652 (81) P= .281 | -.2306 (81) P= .019 |
| Tenants Organizations | -.0588 (73) P= .311 | -.0067 (73) P= .478 |

| | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Wage-earners unions | .0768 (70) P= .264 | .0856 (70) P= .241 |
| Bureaucracy | -.0373 (78) P= .373 | .0576 (78) P= .308 |
| Municipal Employees Unions | -.0105 (82) P= .463 | .0320 (82) P= .388 |
| Heads of Municipal Services | -.0471 (81) P= .338 | .0607 (81) P= .295 |
| Central State Agencies | -.1688 (56) P= .107 | .3530 (56) P= .109 |

III PARTIES AND MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES

Previous research findings

Results of researches conducted in several Western countries on the impact of partisan politics on local budgetary policies appear rather confusing as they are very divergent and often contradictory.

For some of the first American studies, partisanship did not have any significant effect on budgets (Dawson and Robinson 1965, Dye 1966 and 1967), but later they were contradicted (Lineberry and Fowler 1967, Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1971).

In Great-Britain, the partisan variable is considered as non significant in some works (e.g. Oliver et Stanyer 1969). However, according to most recent studies, the relation between the political colour and specific categories of expenditures is positive (Sharpe and Newton 1984). A similar demarcation line is found in Italy. For some economists or political scientists, the partisan variable has no real explanatory power (Giarda 1967, Galli and Prandi 1970). Still, based on the 1971 expenditures of the 325 municipalities with over 20.000 inhabitants, the contribution of Aiken and Martinotti (1985) leads to an opposite direction. In West Germany there are not so many comparative analyses of effects of the partisan variable on city finances, except the recent work of Grüner et al. (1988) and studies conducted in the 1970s by Robert C. Fried (1974 and 1976), and their results

remain somewhat limited and vague. Using budget data for 1972/73 of all 277 Danish municipalities, Skovsgaard (1981) has shown that social-democratic cities spend more for social purposes than others. This result was validated by Mouritzen (1989), studying total municipal expenditures from 1982 to 1986. Studies conducted as well in Norway (analysis of budgets of 460 municipalities by Kjellberg and Hansen 1976, of 46 cities by Kuhnle 1981) as in Sweden (Birgersson 1975, based on a sample of 36 municipalities) show a similar differentiation of fiscal behaviors of conservative versus social-democratic cities.

In France, there is only a limited number of studies devoted to the effect of the partisan orientation on municipal fiscal policies. Jacques Ducros (1966) was a pionier : comparing two municipalities in the southern region of Paris, one under communist control (Villejuif), the other with a rightist mayor (Montrouge), he observed that the first one was characterized by a strong extension of social services and a high debt level, while the second privileged urban planning operations and rigorously practised a balanced budget. Left-right differences for general, as well as for specific categories of expenditures, were validated by other analyses also based on limited samples (Bouvier 1979, Milch 1974), and by the important work of Kobielski (1974), covering budgets of 240 communes with over 15.000 inhabitants for the year 1968. Kobielski mainly studied effects on current expenditures of city size, political colour, and "administrative structure of agglomeration" (using a four-fold distinction: cities of the Paris region, cities-centers of agglomeration, suburban cities, and isolated cities). He underlined the specific profile of the communists municipalities, adopting redistributive policies (in particular in educational and social actions) and favoring services financing by taxpayers rather than by users.

On the whole, it seems that most studies conducted in France, or in other Western countries, have tested the impact of politics on municipal budgets in a too limited way :

- A large part of these works was conducted by economists, who generally are likely to suppose that political variables are more or less negligible compared with socio-economic factors

- Very often analyses are based on limited periods and samples. Only levels at a determined point of time are selected without regard to changes, which largely reflect the real dynamics of policies. Moreover, especially in French studies (Kobielski's work appears as an exception), only a limited number of cases are used to ground the comparison.

In order to analyse our sample of cities with over 20.000 inhabitants, we have tried to consider the content and limits of these previous works.

Expenditure levels

A weak and positive correlation is found between the right-wing cities and the 1983-85 current spending mean ($r=.18$, $P=.022$). As it is indicated by table 8, on average, rightist cities spend more (3.492 F and 1.520 F) than leftist ones (3.190 F and 1.442 F):

TABLE 8: EXPENDITURES LEVELS AND PARTISANSHIP

| | 1983-85 current spending (mean per capita in FF) | 1983-85 personnel spending (mean per capita in FF) |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| All cities (N=132) | 3.361 F | 1.486 F |
| Rightist cities (N=75) | 3.492 F | 1.520 F |
| RPR cities (N=37) | 3.645 F | 1.589 F |
| UDF cities (N=27) | 3.390 F | 1.470 F |
| Divers Droite cities (N=11) | 3.229 F | 1.407 F |
| Leftist cities (N=57) | 3.190 F | 1.442 F |
| PCF cities (N=18) | 3.303 F | 1.507 F |
| PS cities (N=39) | 3.137 F | 1.412 F |

But these two groups of cities display differentiated spending behaviors. RPR cities spend more than the other cities controlled by the right (3.645 F at 1.589 F). On the other side, communist municipalities appear more spending oriented than socialist ones, while their personnel expenditures (1.507 F) are, after RPR cities, the highest of the sample. In order to estimate more accurately the impact of the partisan variable on personnel expenditures, we constructed a commonly used ratio of percentage of those expenditures in total current spending:

TABLE 9: IMPORTANCE OF PERSONNEL EXPENDITURES BY POLITICAL PARTIES

% of personnel expenditures in

total current spending

| | |
|----------------------|-------|
| All cities | 44,28 |
| Rightist cities | 43,70 |
| RPR cities | 43,99 |
| UDF cities | 43,26 |
| Divers Droite cities | 43,82 |
| Leftist cities | 45,04 |
| PCF cities | 45,21 |
| PS cities | 44,96 |

This ratio is higher for leftist cities, and particularly for those controlled by the PCF (45,04%); among the 18 communist cities in our sample (15 won in 1971 or before, 3 in 1977), several display a ratio equal or superior to 50%, like Bagneux (53,76%) and Malakoff (51,49%) in the Paris region, or Bègles (54,59%), a suburban municipality of the Bordeaux agglomeration.

This first approach focused on levels is nothing but a "photography" at a specific point of time of a situation resulting from policies conducted for years. It is now necessary to improve the capacity of interpretation through an analysis of changes which occurred during the first part of the 1983-1989 municipal term.

Expenditures changes

A new type of rightist local leaders appeared at the 1983 municipal elections, proposing a radical change of local public management through the application of a neo-conservative program. One of the most visible of those leaders was the head of Cacharel, Jean Bousquet, who became the mayor of Nîmes and resolutely tried to break with a 18-year-old "clientelist" municipal communism and to manage his city like a firm (Hoffmann-Martinot 1988). Similarly, Alain Carignon beat Hubert Dubedout in Grenoble with a fiscally conservative program. All the newly elected rightist local officials were rapidly called by medias "new mayors", as the 1983 municipal elections marked a strong and spectacular victory of rightist candidates who promised to transform radically the traditional style and practices of local management. But in fact a substantial part of those "new mayors" were unable to produce something new beyond their ideological and electoral discourse, as it was the case in Draguignan whose mayor, Jean-Paul Claustres, could not resist "the sirens of clientelism".

Results from the French *Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation* clearly show a differentiation of municipal practices along their partisan affiliation for spending

preferences of mayors, preferred and applied strategies. More rightist mayors favor cutback measures for total spending as for specific categories of expenditures. Along the same line most of them wish a stabilization or a reduction of personnel staff, a greater use of fees, a limitation of the progression of taxes, a reduction of some services, and cooperation with the private sector. This right/left shift is also reflected through the strategies which have been applied since 1983. On the whole socialist and even more communist municipalities remain hostile to experiments of privatization or contracting out, of greater use of fees, and of reduction of personnel numbers or compensation (Hoffmann-Martinot and Nevers 1988). Ideological orientations seem therefore to have a strong influence on municipal fiscal policies which have been implemented since 1983; they also induce specific patterns within the left (stronger attachment to the traditional public and direct management from communist local officials) and, to a lesser extent, within the right (between RPR and UDF).

Table 10 indicates current and personnel expenditures change between 1983 and 1985 along the partisan line.

TABLE 10: EXPENDITURES CHANGES AND PARTISANSHIP

| | 1983-85 current spending change (in %) | 1983-85 personnel spending change (in %) |
|----------------------|--|--|
| All cities | 7.24 | 4.24 |
| Rightist cities | 7.19 | 3.14 |
| RPR cities | 7.15 | 3.00 |
| UDF cities | 7.70 | 4.16 |
| Divers Droite cities | 6.10 | 1.13 |
| Leftist cities | 7.31 | 5.69 |
| PCF cities | 5.63 | 3.93 |
| PS cities | 8.09 | 6.50 |

Change rates of leftist cities are higher but in fact they hide a crucial behavior difference between communist and socialist municipalities. Actually, expenditure policies of communist cities appear to be much more conservative, as their current and personnel spending change rates only reach 5.63% (instead of 8.09 for socialist cities) and 3.93% (against 6.50). Therefore a major shift is not found between rightist and leftist policies, but rather within the left.

Estimating the impact of partisanship (PCF, PS, RPR, UDF, or Divers Droite) on personnel expenditures change, the highest and most significant correlation coefficient is found

with socialist cities ($r=.22$, $P=.005$).. A same result is given with this spending measure for the previous electoral term (1977-1982) ($r=.22$, $P=.002$).

On the right side, a large number of municipalities began to implement a retrenchment program as a means of adaptation to austerity. In constant FF, 22 reduced personnel expenditures (instead of 6 leftist cities, 3 communist and 3 socialist), and 7 even managed to diminish total current spending. In cities whose mayors were the most ideologically oriented - "new mayors" ($N=28$) aggressively defending fiscally conservative programs - those cutback policies were more vigorously conducted, as their current and personnel spending change rates were 6.94 and 2.08% (as against 7.19 and 3.14% for all rightist cities).

IV PARTISAN PATTERNS OF GROUP RESPONSIVENESS

Is pressure politics homogeneous, or does it depend on elite ideologies and partisan affiliation? Mayors were asked to evaluate how much policy was responsive to preferences of each of these categories of groups. Answers provide a measure of groups' influence as perceived by mayors. Patterns of influence vary along mayors' partisan membership (see table 11).

TABLE 11 : PRESSURE GROUPS INFLUENCE BY PARTIES

| | | GROUPS | BUREAUCRACY | AD-HOC GROUPS |
|-----------------------|------|---------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|
| For Entire Population | | 2.7773 | 3.3506 | 3.2448 |
| GAU83 | 1.00 | 2.7981 | 3.4429 | 3.3827 |
| DRO83 | 1.00 | 2.7622 | 3.2885 | 3.1441 |
| PC83 | 1.00 | 3.0000 | 3.3571 | 3.3750 |
| PS83 | 1.00 | 2.7846 | 3.4643 | 3.3841 |
| RPR83 | 1.00 | 2.79 | 3.1304 | 2.9286 |
| UDF83 | 1.00 | 2.07 | 3.3929 | 3.3333 |
| DVD83 | 1.00 | 2.8000 | 3.4333 | 3.2308 |
| | | MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES | SERVICES USERS | NEIGHBOR- HOOD GROUPS |
| For Entire Population | | 3.3404 | 3.2151 | 3.1383 |
| GAU83 | 1.00 | 3.4474 | 3.3514 | 3.4167 |
| DRO83 | 1.00 | 3.2679 | 3.1250 | 2.9655 |
| PC83 | 1.00 | 3.4286 | 3.1429 | 3.1429 |
| PS83 | 1.00 | 3.4516 | 3.4000 | 3.4828 |
| RPR83 | 1.00 | 3.2400 | 2.9167 | 3.0000 |

| | | | | |
|-------|------|--------|---------|--------|
| UDF83 | 1.00 | 3.5625 | .3.3333 | 3.0556 |
| DVD83 | 1.00 | 3.0000 | 3.2143 | 2.8000 |

| | | TENANTS | HOMEOWNERS | WAGE EARNERS UNIONS |
|-----------------------|------|---------|------------|------------------------|
| For Entire Population | | 2.7831 | 2.3582 | 2.7215 |
| GAU83 | 1.00 | 2.8919 | 2.3333 | 3.2571 |
| DRO83 | 1.00 | 2.6957 | 2.3750 | 3.2955 |
| PC83 | 1.00 | 3.1429 | 2.2000 | 3.1667 |
| PS83 | 1.00 | 2.8333 | 2.3636 | 3.2759 |
| RPR83 | 1.00 | 2.6500 | 2.3333 | 2.4500 |
| UDF83 | 1.00 | 2.6923 | 2.3077 | 1.8000 |
| DVD83 | 1.00 | 2.7692 | 2.5000 | 2.4286 |

| | | CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE | BUSINESS UNIONS | SHOP- KEEPERS |
|-----------------------|------|----------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| For Entire Population | | 2.6324 | 2.1471 | 3.2396 |
| GAU83 | 1.00 | 2.5000 | 2.1481 | 3.1579 |
| DRO83 | 1.00 | 2.7143 | 2.1463 | 3.2931 |
| PC83 | 1.00 | 2.2500 | 1.6667 | 2.8333 |
| PS83 | 1.00 | 2.5455 | 2.2083 | 3.2188 |
| RPR83 | 1.00 | 2.8000 | 2.1579 | 3.3333 |
| UDF83 | 1.00 | 2.8889 | 2.4545 | 3.1053 |
| DVD83 | 1.00 | 2.4615 | 1.8182 | 3.4667 |

| | | LEISURE GROUPS | TAXPAYERS | CITIZENS |
|-----------------------|------|----------------|-----------|----------|
| For Entire Population | | 3.7624 | 2.2264 | 2.9286 |
| GAU83 | 1.00 | 3.7250 | 2.2500 | 2.9688 |
| DRO83 | 1.00 | 3.7869 | 2.2069 | 2.9038 |
| PC83 | 1.00 | 3.8571 | 2.5000 | 3.3333 |
| PS83 | 1.00 | 3.6970 | 2.2000 | 2.8846 |
| RPR83 | 1.00 | 3.6400 | 2.0769 | 2.6818 |
| UDF83 | 1.00 | 3.7619 | 1.6667 | 2.8750 |
| DVD83 | 1.00 | 4.0667 | 2.7000 | 3.2857 |

| | | MUNICIPAL COUNCIL | SERVICES | STATE AGENCIES |
|-----------------------|------|-------------------|----------|-------------------|
| For Entire Population | | 3.6905 | 3.3978 | 2.8594 |
| GAU83 | 1.00 | 3.6061 | 3.4167 | 2.8148 |
| DRO83 | 1.00 | 3.7451 | 3.3860 | 2.8919 |
| PC83 | 1.00 | 3.2857 | 3.2857 | 2.6667 |
| PS83 | 1.00 | 3.6923 | 3.4483 | 2.8333 |
| RPR83 | 1.00 | 3.4762 | 3.0833 | 2.9333 |
| UDF83 | 1.00 | 3.7500 | 3.3889 | 2.6667 |
| DVD83 | 1.00 | 4.1429 | 3.8667 | 3.0000 |

The overall level of group responsiveness is not different according to left-right criteria. What varies is the distribution of influence among the different groups. Leftist mayors are more responsive to the bureaucracy, to neighborhood groups, ad-hoc groups, to wage-earners unions and tenants associations, while rightist mayors feel more influenced by chambers of commerce and shopkeepers. Note however that there is virtually no general left-right difference for taxpayers, homeowners, leisure groups, elderly groups and youth movements.

A more detailed examination of the structure of this influence along partisan cleavages reveals more subtle differences. Differences among the left: communist mayors do not feel more responsive than their socialist colleagues to wage-earners or municipal employees. As opposed to the common idea, communist policy-making does not appear driven by unions influence. The difference is that communist leaders feel less responsive to capital (chambers of commerce, business unions, shopkeepers organizations, homeowners' groups) than socialist mayors, and more responsive to tenants organizations, individual citizens and taxpayers. The communist pattern of influence can therefore be characterized as an anti-capitalist populism, in contrast with the social-democratic model, mainly responsive to services users, neighborhood groups, youth movements, and more cooperative with capital.

Differences among the right are also important. The first cleavage is between the two large parties (RPR gaullist and UDF center-right) and the "miscellaneous right", adding independents and members of small parties. This category is more important in rural areas and small towns. Such mayors clearly display a distinctive pattern of influence. They are significantly more responsive than others to homeowners and shopkeepers, but also to leisure groups. The municipal council and state agencies are more influent than in other cities, suggesting that mayor's leadership is comparatively weak. They feel the most responsive to taxpayers and to citizens, and in this sense can be termed populist. Compared to other rightist mayors, they are much less responsive to chambers of commerce and to business unions, even less than socialist mayors. They define a pattern of small property influence, populist and anti-monopolist.

The difference between UDF and RPR is much weaker. Both parties are more responsive to business and less to tenants and wage earners than the leftist ones. RPR mayors seem more middle-class oriented than UDF ones, as they are more influenced by wage-earners and shopkeepers, and less by business unions and chambers of commerce.

The structure of pressure groups influence along partisan lines defines four main patterns: business influence through large rightist parties can broadly be contrasted with a more tempered influence of capital in socialist cities, close to a social-democratic model. Communist cities exhibit an anti-capitalist populism, while miscellaneous rightist leaders are mainly influenced by small property interests.

To summarize, analyses presented here allow us to assert: politics does matter in French municipal government. In that political system traditionally depicted as centralized *par nature*, patterns of policies are locally much more differentiated than commonly assumed. On a normative basis and for a long time, the state apparatus has been presented (by the dominant approaches of law or *science administrative*) as able by itself to reduce or on the contrary to enhance municipal autonomy. Such a conception contributed to overlook deeper dynamics of local development (action of local organized groups, political organizations and leaders, public employees,...) that the decentralization process tries to reinforce.

NOTES

¹ Before the law of January 10, 1980 cities were only allowed to vote for the total amount of their fiscal revenues. Within certain constraints, they are now allowed to modulate rates between four categories of taxes: taxes on land, taxes on built properties, taxes on firms, taxes on residents

² In 1979 for current spending with the creation of the *Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement*, and in 1983 for investment spendings with the *Dotation Globale d'Equipement*

³ the *potentiel fiscal* is the main measure of the fiscal wealth of French municipalities; for each of them, it equals the sum of the 4 direct taxes if applied tax rates would be equal to the average national ones

⁴ intermunicipal public bodies created by the law of December 31, 1966, *communautés urbaines* are 9 (Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Strasbourg, Dunkerque, Le Creusot-Montceau-les-Mines,

Cherbourg, Le Mans and Brest) and group 250 municipalities; they are responsible for normally municipal functions, on an obligatory (urban planning, fire fighting, public transportation, water supply, garbage collection,...) or a facultative basis

REFERENCES

- Aiken Michael, Martinotti Guido. 1985. "The Impact of Political and Urban Systems on Municipal Expenditures". In: Terry N. Clark, Gerd-Michael Hellstern and Guido Martinotti (Eds.), Urban Innovations as Response to Urban Fiscal Strain. Berlin: Verlag Europäische Perspektiven: 33-57.
- Bahl Roy W. 1969. Metropolitan City Expenditures. A Comparative Analysis. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
 --. 1981. "The Next Decade in State and Local Government Finance: A Period of Adjustment", in: Roy W. Bahl (Ed.), Urban Government Finance. Emerging Trends. Beverly Hills: Sage: 191-220.
- Balme Richard. 1988. "L'action politique au quotidien: les conseillers municipaux dans deux communes françaises", in: Albert Mabileau and Patrick Quantin (Eds.), Les Citoyens et la Politique Locale. Paris: Pédone: 155-175.
- Beyme Klaus von. 1984. "Do Parties Matter? The Impact of Parties on the Key Decisions in the Political System", Government and Opposition. Vol. 19, Nr. 1, Winter: 5-29.
- Birgersson Bengt Owe. 1975. "Services in Communes of Different Types: The Impact of Financial Resources and Political Majority in Swedish Communes", meeting "Politics, Policy, and the Quality of Life", Bellagio, June.
- Bouvier Joël. 1979. "Le comportement dépensier des municipalités. Le cas du département des Hauts-de-Seine", thèse de doctorat de 3ème cycle. Université de Nanterre.
- Castles Francis G. 1982. "The Impact of Parties on Public Expenditure", in: F.G. Castles (Ed.), The Impact of Parties: Politics and Policies in Democratic Capitalist States. Beverly Hill: Sage.: 21-96.
- Castles Francis G., Mc Kinlay Robert D. 1979. "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics", British Journal of Political Science, Vol.9: 152-172.
- Clark Terry Nichols, Ferguson Lorna Crowley. 1983. City Money. Political Processes. Fiscal Strain and Retrenchment. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Crozier Michel. 1964. Le Phénomène Bureaucratique. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Dawson Richard E., Robinson James A. 1965. "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States", Journal of Politics, 25: 265-289.
- Derycke Pierre-Henri. 1982. Economie et planification urbaines. 2/ Théories et modèles. Paris: PUF.
- Ducros Jacques. 1966. "Politique et finances locales", Analyse et Prévision: 499-520.
- Dye Thomas R. 1966. Politics, Economics and the Public. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- . 1967. "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment and Educational Policy", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11, August: 353-380.
- Fried Robert. 1974. "Politics, Economics and Federalism: Aspects of Urban Government in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland". In: Terry Nichols Clark (Ed.), Comparative Community Politics. New York: John Wiley: 313-350.
- . 1976. "Party and Policy in West German Cities", American Political Science Review, 70, March: 11-24.
- Galli Giorgio, Prandi Alfonso. 1970. Patterns of Political Participation in Italy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Giarda Pietro. 1967. "Un'analisi sui determinanti delle spese degli enti locali". In: Cesare Cosciani (Ed.), Studi sulla finanza locale. Milan: Giuffrè.
- Grüner Hans, Jaedicke Wolfgang, Ruhland Kurt. 1988. "Rote Politik im schwarzen Rathaus? Bestimmungsfaktoren der wohnungspolitischen Ausgaben bundesdeutscher Grosstädte", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1: 42-57.
- Guengant Alain, Uhaldeborde Jean-Michel. 1989. Crise et réforme des finances locales. Paris: PUF (GRAL).
- Hibbs Douglas A. 1977. "Political Parties and Macro-Economic Policy", American Political Science Review, 71: 1467-1487.
- Hoffmann-Martinot Vincent. 1988. "Nîmes: la construction d'une image moderniste", Les Annales de la recherche urbaine, Juin-Juillet, no.38: 95-103.
- Hoffmann-Martinot Vincent, Nevers Jean-Yves. 1986. "Rooms of manoeuver and strategies of French municipalities in a context of austerity and decentralization", ECPR Joint Sessions, Göteborg, April 1-6.
- 1989. "French Policy Change in a Period of Austerity: A Silent Revolution".

- In: Susan E. Clarke (Ed.), Urban Innovation and Autonomy: The Political Implications of Policy Change. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Kjellberg Francesco, Hansen Tore. 1976. "Municipal Expenditures in Norway: Autonomy and Constraints in Local Government Activity", Policy and Politics, 4: 25-50.
- Kobielski José. 1974. "L'influence de la structure des communes urbaines sur leurs dépenses de fonctionnement. Analyse statistique". Thèse de doctorat en sciences économiques. Université de Rennes.
- Kuhnle Stein. 1981. "Economics, Politics and Policy in Norwegian Urban Communes". In: Kenneth Newton (Ed.), Urban Political Economy. London: Frances Pinter: 63-81.
- Lineberry Robert L., Fowler Edmund P. 1967. "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities", American Political Science Review: 701-716.
- Mény Yves. 1985. "Les politiques des autorités locales". In: Madeleine Grawitz, Jean Leca (Eds.), Traité de science politique. Vol.4: 423-465.
- Milch J.E. 1974. "Influence as Power: French Local Governments Reconsidered", British Journal of Political Science, 4: 139-161.
- Mouritzen Poul Erik. 1989. "Fiscal Policy-Making in Times of Resource Scarcity. The Danish Case". In: Susan E. Clarke (Ed.), Urban Innovation and Autonomy: The Political Implications of Policy Change. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Niskanen William. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine.
- Oliver F., Stanyer J. 1969. "Some Aspects of the Financial Behaviour of County Boroughs", Public Administration, 47: 203-223.
- Pommerehne Werner, Blankart Charles Beat. 1979. "Les économies d'échelle dans les services urbains", Revue économique, no.2, mars: 338-354.
- Schmidt Manfred G. 1982. "Does Corporatism Matter? Economic Crisis, Politics and Rates of Unemployment in Capitalist Democracies in the 1970s", in: Gerhard Lehmbruch, Philippe C. Schmitter (Eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making. Beverly Hills: Sage: 237-258.
- Sharkansky Ira, Hofferbert Richard I. 1971. "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics and Public Policy", American Political Science Review, 64: 508-522.

Sharpe L.J., Newton Kenneth. 1984. Does Policy Matter? Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Skovsgaard Carl-Johan. 1981. "Party Influence on Local Spending in Denmark". In: Kenneth Newton (Ed.), Urban Political Economy. London: Frances Pinter: 48-62.

Wildavsky Aaron. 1979. The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Boston: Little, Brown.

Wilensky Harold L. 1975. The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures. Berkeley: The University of California Press.

APPENDIX

The French Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project was launched in 1983 as part of the international research program coordinated in Chicago by Terry Nichols Clark. Rapidly it was supported by various ministries and institutions like the *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*, the Department of Housing, the *Association des Maires de Grandes Villes de France*, and the *Centre de Formation des Personnels Communaux*.

In 1985 two groups of local officials were surveyed in all cities with over 20,000 inhabitants (N=381): mayors and chief administrators. The general pattern of the two distinct questionnaires was very similar to the international one. Some specific themes or topics were added, especially relating to the decentralization reform or the center-periphery relations and a list of 38 strategies was proposed, including some omitted in other countries like "municipalization" or "publicization" of services formerly delivered by private actors.

Objective data like personnel and budgetary information (various data on municipal revenue and expenditures) were transmitted in a standardized presentation by central institutions - like the *Ministère des Finances*, the *Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations* and the *Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques* - and added to the original survey data base.

Since 1985 many reports were published in professional reviews and books by the main researchers involved in this project: Richard Balme (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques/ Bordeaux), Jeanne Becquart-Leclercq (Université de Lille II), Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique/ Bordeaux), and Jean-Yves Nevers (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique/ Toulouse).

