Représentation sémantique sous-spécifiée pour les conjonctions de subordination
Laurence Danlos

To cite this version:

HAL Id: halshs-00082846
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00082846
Submitted on 28 Jun 2006

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.
Discourse dependency structures as DAGs

Laurence Danlos
TALANA/ LATTICE
Université Paris 7
Laurence.Danlos@linguist.jussieu.fr

Mots-clefs – Keywords

Discourse
MTT (Meaning-Text Theory ou Théorie Sens-Texte)
RST (Rhetorical Structure Theory)
SDRT (Segmented Discourse Representation Theory)

Abstract – Résumé

We show that the semantic level for discourses, understood as a dependency representation, can be mathematically characterized as DAGs. Our argumentation is based on discourses with three clauses and two discourse connectives. This simple case allows us to state that DAGs for discourses are not arbitrary: they present structural constraints.

Nous montrons que les représentations sémantiques pour les discours, conçues comme des représentations de dépendances sémantiques, ont la structure mathématique d’un DAG. Notre argumentation repose sur des discours très simples, à savoir sur les discours comportant trois propositions et deux connecteurs de discours. Ces discours, bien que simples, permettent d’aboutir à une conclusion importante : les DAG représentant les discours ne sont pas arbitraires, ils présentent des contraintes structurelles.
1 Introduction

Within a multi-level approach for discourse processing, this paper focuses on the semantic level. This level reflects the discourse structure (how things are said, how the discourse is rhetorically organized). This structure plays an important role, e.g., it constraints both anaphora resolution and the attachment of incoming propositions in understanding. The informational content level (what is said) will not be discussed here, neither the syntactic level.

The semantic representation is understood as a dependency representation, as in MTT although MTT deals only with (complex) sentences, discarding discourses. An extension of MTT from sentences to discourses requires (at least) to take into account adverbial connectives (therefore, next) on the top of other connectives such as subordination and coordination conjunctions. As advocated in most discourse theories, e.g. RST and SDRT but not DRT, we assume that a connective denotes a “discourse relation”, which is viewed as a predicate with two arguments. The discourse structure in RST corresponds roughly to a semantic dependency representation. This is not the case in SDRT, although one can infer a dependency representation from a SDRS boxed representation (as we will do it in this paper).

One concern in this paper is to determine to which mathematical object dependency structures for discourses correspond. In RST, it is a principle that this object is a tree. In SDRT, the issue is not discussed. We will show that this object is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), more precisely, a labeled ordered DAG (abbreviated as LODAG). This result fits with MTT to the extent that the semantic representations for sentences in MTT are DAGs with pointers to “dominant” nodes.

Our argumentation is based on one of the simplest cases of discourses, namely discourses of type \( S_1 \) \( \text{Conn}_a \) \( S_2 \) \( \text{Conn}_b \) \( S_3 \) with two discourse connectives (\( \text{Conn}_{a/b} \)) and three clauses (\( S_i \)). We will show (Section 2) that they are topologically only four types of LODAGs for these discourses. This allows us to state that LODAGs for discourses are not arbitrary: they present structural constraints (Section 3). This is an important result since many authors in the discourse community hang on trees as discourse structures, even if it means to use artificial trees as shown infra. They reject DAGs because they view them as completely unconstrained (except the acyclicity constraint) and so as unusable in discourse processing.

Only discourses in which sentences are linked by discourse connectives are considered here. I stipulate that the results obtained can be extrapolated to discourses in which sentences are simply juxtaposed without discourse connective. Note that this paper concerns only the topological structure of semantic dependency representations for discourses: not a word is said on how to compute them (neither in understanding nor in generation).

Before getting to the heart of the matter, let us give some preliminaries.

**Semantic dependency representation for \( S_1 \) \( \text{Conn}_a \) \( S_2 \).** I adopt a conventional semantic dependency representation for discourses of the type \( S_1 \) \( \text{Conn}_a \) \( S_2 \). Namely, \( \text{Conn}_a \) denotes a discourse relation \( R_a \). \( R_a \) is a predicate with two arguments \( \pi_1 \) and \( \pi_2 \), which correspond to the semantic representations of \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) respectively. These arguments are both ordered (\( \pi_1 \)

---

1. MTT stands for Meaning-Text Theory (Mel’cuk, 1997).
3. A DAG which includes pointers to “dominant” nodes is roughly equivalent to a LODAG (Candito & Kahane, 1998).
Discourse dependency structures as DAGs

precedes \(\pi_2\)\(^4\) and labeled, with the labels nucleus (noted as N) and satellite (noted as S) which are taken from RST. \(\pi_1\) is said to be the nucleus of \(R_{a}\), \(\pi_2\) its satellite. In the tradition of dependency grammar, this semantic representation is represented as the LODAG in the left-hand side of Figure 1. This LODAG is written as \(R_{a}(\pi_1, \pi_2)\) in an abbreviated form. In SDRT, it corresponds to the boxed representation shown in the right-hand side of Figure 1 (\(e_i\) denotes the main eventuality of \(Si\))\(^5\).

![Diagram of LODAG and SDRS for S1 Conn a S2](image)

**Compositionality principle.** I assume the following principle: if a discourse \(D_n\) with \(n\) sentences is such that a sub-discourse \(D_p\) with \(p\) sentences and \(1 \prec p \prec n\) can be inferred, then the DAG for \(D_n\) must include the DAG for \(D_p\). This intuitive principle needs to be formally precised.

**Interpretation of dependency relations in trees.** Two different ways can be used to interpret dependency relations in trees: the standard one used in mathematics and computer science, and the “nuclearity principle” put forward in RST (Marcu, 1996). Let us illustrate them with the tree in Figure 2. With the standard interpretation, the nucleus of \(R_c\) is its left daughter (the tree rooted at \(R_a\)), while with the nuclearity principle, it is \(\pi_1\) (the leaf which is the nucleus of \(R_a\)). Similarly, with the standard interpretation, the satellite of \(R_a\) is its right daughter (the tree rooted at \(R_b\)), while with the nuclearity principle, it is \(\pi_2\) (the leaf which is the nucleus of \(R_b\)). To put it in a nutshell, the arguments of a discourse relation can be intermediary nodes or leaves with the standard interpretation, while they can only be leaves with the nuclearity principle.

![Diagram of Binary tree](image)

\(^4\)Subordinate conjunctions are the only connectives which offer linear order variants: a subordinate clause can be preposed to the main clause. In (Danlos, 2003), I discuss preposed subordinate clauses in detail both at the syntactic and semantic level, and I propose an (underspecified) semantic dependency representation for subordinate clauses which does not depend on their position. So it can be assumed in this paper, which deals only with semantics, that subordinate clauses are always postposed. The order of the semantic arguments \(\pi_1\) and \(\pi_2\) corresponds thus to the order of the sentences (\(S1\) precedes \(S2\)) for any connective \(Conn_a\).

\(^5\)In fact, in dependency formalisms, the arguments of a discourse relation are semantic dependency representations (i.e. LODAGs), while in SDRT they are labels (\(\pi_i\)) for semantic representations. Figure 1 skips this difference: in the LODAG, \(\pi_i\) stands for a LODAG, in the SDRS, it stands for a label. We will come back to this difference at the end of Section 2.
I will show (Section 2) that the standard interpretation should be adopted. The point I want to make now is that one could argue that the nuclearity principle should be adopted instead, but one should not feel free to use both interpretations for the same tree. This is however what is done by some authors. For example, the discourse in (1) is represented as the tree on the left-hand side of Figure 3 by (Webber et al., 2003) (this tree is a copy of theirs: it is the reason why the edges are neither labeled nor directed).

(1) a. Although John is very generous -
   b. if you need some money,
   c. you only have to ask him for it -
   d. he’s very hard to find.

Let us show that some predicate-argument relations are given by the nuclearity principle, while other ones are given by the standard interpretation in their tree. From (1), (2) can be inferred. This is evidence that the arguments of the discourse relation “concession” in their tree are a and d. These predicate-argument dependencies are given by the nuclearity principle.

(2) a. Although John is very generous,
   d. he’s very hard to find.

From (1), (3) can also be inferred. This is evidence that the arguments of “elaboration” in their tree are a and the tree rooted at “condition”. These dependencies are given by the standard interpretation.

(3) a’. John is very generous -
   b. if you need some money,
   c. you only have to ask him for it.

Nevertheless, one should not feel free to use artificial trees relying on a mixed interpretation (the standard one and the nuclearity principle) just to avoid DAGs. One has to admit that discourse structures are DAGs, for example, the DAG on the right hand side of Figure 3 for (1). This DAG is conform to our compositionality principle: it can be viewed as the fusion of the dependency graphs for (2) and (3), with the discourse in (1) being viewed as the fusion of the discourses in (2) and (3).

![Figure 3: Artificial tree and DAG for (1)](image)
2 LODAGs for $S1 \text{ Conn}_a$ $S2 \text{ Conn}_b$ $S3$

In discourses of the type $S1 \text{ Conn}_a$ $S2 \text{ Conn}_b$ $S3$, it is compulsorily the case that the nucleus of $R_a$ is $\pi_1$ and the satellite of $R_b$ is $\pi_3$. On the other hand, the satellite of $R_a$ and the nucleus of $R_b$ may vary depending on scope. More precisely, the satellite of $R_a$ may $a$ priori be:

- either the representation of the whole right hand side of $\text{Conn}_a$, i.e. the semantic representation of $S2 \text{ Conn}_b$ $S3$. I call this case “wide scope” of $\text{Conn}_a$ or $R_a$. It leads to graph (A) in Figure 4. The dependency relations in (A), which is tree shaped, must be interpreted in the standard way: the satellite of $R_a$ is its right daughter, i.e. the tree rooted at $R_b$.

- or the representation of one of the two sentences in the right hand side of $\text{Conn}_a$. This case leads either to graph (A1) or (A2) in Figure 4.

![Graph (A)](image)

![Graph (A1)](image)

![Graph (A2)](image)

Figure 4: LODAGs for the various scopes of $R_a$

Similarly, depending on the scope of $\text{Conn}_b$, the nucleus of $R_b$ may $a$ priori be $R_a(\pi_1, \pi_2)$, $\pi_2$ or $\pi_1$ as shown in the LODAGs in Figure 5.

![Graph (B)](image)

![Graph (B1)](image)

![Graph (B2)](image)

Figure 5: LODAGs for the various scopes of $R_b$

We are now ready to study the combinatory coming from the fusion of LODAGs (Ai) and (Bj). The goal is to distinguish the LODAGs which correspond to discourses $S1 \text{ Conn}_a$ $S2 \text{ Conn}_b$ $S3$ from those which do not (i.e. which cannot be linguistically realized).
A) Graph (A). This graph is linguistically realized in (4a). The wide scope of \( \text{Conn}_a = \text{because} \) can be seen in the dialogue in (4b-c) in which the answer is \( \text{Because S2 Conn}_a \text{ S3} \). Moreover, from (4a), \( \text{S2 Conn}_a \text{ S3} \) can be inferred: if (4a) is true, then it is true that \( \text{Fred played tuba while Mary was taking a nap} \). On the other hand, \( \text{S1 Conn}_a \text{ S2} \) or \( \text{S1 Conn}_b \text{ S3} \) cannot be inferred: if (4a) is true, neither \( \text{Mary is in a bad mood because Fred played tuba} \) nor \( \text{Mary is in a bad mood while she was taking a nap} \) is true. The reader will check that the adverbial \( \text{Conn}_a = \text{therefore} \) in (4d) also has wide scope.

(4) a. Mary is in a bad mood because Fred played tuba while she was taking a nap.
   b. - Why is Mary in a bad mood?
   c. - Because Fred played tuba while she was taking a nap.
   d. Fred wanted to bother Mary. Therefore, he played tuba while she was taking a nap.

B) Graph (B). This graph is linguistically realized in (5a). The wide scope of \( \text{Conn}_b = \text{in order that/to} \) can be seen in the dialogue in (5b-c) in which the question is \( \text{Why S1 Conn}_b \text{ S2?} \) From (5a), \( \text{S1 Conn}_a \text{ S2} \) can be inferred, while neither \( \text{S2 Conn}_b \text{ S3} \) nor \( \text{S1 Conn}_b \text{ S3} \) can be so. The adverbial \( \text{Conn}_b = \text{therefore} \) in (5d) has also wide scope.

(5) a. Fred played tuba while Mary was taking a nap in order to bother her.
   b. - Why did Fred play tuba while Mary was taking a nap?
   c. - In order to bother her.
   d. Fred played tuba while Mary was taking a nap. Therefore, she is in a bad mood.

C) Graphs (A1) and (B1). The fusion of (A1) and (B1) leads to LODAG (C) in Figure 6. This LODAG is not tree shaped: \( \pi 2 \) has two parents, it is the satellite of \( \text{R}_a \) and the nucleus of \( \text{R}_b \). It is linguistically realized in (6a), in which \( \text{S2} \) is said to be “factorized” since both \( \text{S1 Conn}_a \text{ S2} = \text{Mary is in a bad mood because her son is ill} \) and \( \text{S2 Conn}_b \text{ S3} = \text{Her son is ill}. \) Precisely, he has an attack of bronchitis can be inferred from (6a). On the other hand, \( \text{S1 Conn}_b \text{ S3} = \text{Mary is in a bad mood}. \) Precisely, her son has an attack of bronchitis cannot be inferred. A similar situation is observed in (6b) and (6c).

(6) a. Mary is in a bad mood because her son is ill. Precisely, he has an attack of bronchitis.
   b. Fred played tuba. Next he prepared a pizza to please Mary.
   c. Fred was in a foul humor because he hadn’t slept well that night because his electric blanket hadn’t worked.

D) Graphs (A1) and (B2). The fusion of (A1) and (B2) leads to LODAG (D) in Figure 6. This LODAG is not tree shaped: \( \pi 1 \) has two parents, it is the nucleus of both \( \text{R}_a \) and \( \text{R}_b \). It is linguistically realized in (7), in which \( \text{S1} \) is said to be “factorized” since both \( \text{S1 Conn}_a \text{ S2} = \text{Fred prepared a pizza to please Mary} \) and \( \text{S1 Conn}_b \text{ S3} = \text{Fred prepared a pizza}. \) Next he took a nap can be inferred. On the other hand, \( \text{S2 Conn}_b \text{ S3} \) cannot be inferred.

(7) Fred prepared a pizza to please Mary. Next, he took a nap.

Let us underline the following point. Interpreting tree shaped graphs (A) and (B) with the “nuclearity principle” amounts to interpreting (A) as (C), and (B) as (D). But then, cases with

\(^{6}\)To indicate that it is stressed when spoken, the word **while** is written in capital letters in (4).

\(^{7}\)When **while** is not stressed, the question in (4b) may be given as answer only **Because S2**. The interpretation of (4a) corresponds then to LODAG (C) in Figure 6. The ambiguity of discourses such as (4a) or (5a) below, which include two subordinating conjunctions, is discussed in detail in (Danlos, 2003).

\(^{8}\)Maybe, Mary enjoys tuba, but not when she is taking a nap.

\(^{9}\)When **while** is not stressed, the interpretation of (5a) may correspond to LODAG (D) in Figure 6.

\(^{10}\)This discourse is a modified version (including discourse connectives) of an example taken in (Blackburn & Gardent, 1998). These authors acknowledged that the structure of this discourse is a “re-entrant graph”.

\(^{11}\)With the nuclearity principle, the satellite of \( \text{R}_a \) in (A) is \( \pi 2 \), and the nucleus of \( \text{R}_b \) in (B) is \( \pi 1 \).
Discourse dependency structures as DAGs

Figure 6: Graphs (C) and (D)

wide scope are not represented at all, they are not taken into account, which is unacceptable. This is the reason why trees should be interpreted in the standard way and not with the nuclearity principle.

E) Graphs (A2) and (B1). The fusion of (A2) and (B1) leads to LODAG (E) in Figure 7, in which $\pi_3$ has two parents. I cannot find any discourse corresponding to (E), i.e. with $S_3$ factorized.

F) Graphs (A2) and (B2). The fusion of (A2) and (B2) leads to LODAG (F) in Figure 7. This graph cannot represent a discourse $SI\ Conn_s\ S2\ Conn_s\ S3$ since it does not include $\pi_2$.

Figure 7: Graphs (E) and (F)

So far, we have examined only cases where a given discourse relation has only one satellite and one nucleus. We are left with multi satellite or nucleus cases.

G) Graphs (A1), (A2) and (B2). The fusion of (A1), (A2) and (B2) leads to LODAG (G) in Figure 8. This LODAG could be said to be linguistically realized in (8a). In (8a), $R_a = Elaboratio$ has two satellites, $\pi_2$ and $\pi_3$, since both $SI\ Conn_s\ S2$ and $SI\ Conn_s\ S3$ can be inferred. $R_b = Narration$ links $\pi_2$ and $\pi_3$. The following question arises: is $R_b$ in a satellite dependency relation with $R_a$? It is hard to give an answer for (8a). However the answer seems positive for (8b) with $R_a = Explanation$, $R_a(\pi_1, \pi_2)$ and $R_a(\pi_1, \pi_3)$ (multi-satellite case), $R_b = Joint$ and $R_b(\pi_2, \pi_3)$. This leads to LODAG (G’) in Figure 8. However, consider (8c) which differs from (8b) only by the use of or instead of and. Graphs (G) or (G’) would not do justice to this discourse: neither $R_a(\pi_1, \pi_2)$ nor $R_a(\pi_1, \pi_3)$ can be laid down. (8c) can only be represented as graph (A) (repeated in Figure 8) with $R_a = Explanation$ and $R_b = Disjunction$.

(8) a. Guy experienced a lovely evening last night. More precisely, he had a fantastic meal. Next he won a dancing competition.\textsuperscript{12}

b. Mary is in a bad mood because she had’nt slept well and it is raining.

c. Mary is in a bad mood because she had’nt slept well or it is raining.

\textsuperscript{12}This discourse is a modified version (including discourse connectives) of an example taken in (Lascarides & Asher, 1993).
We touch here a crucial question in discourse processing (within a multi-level approach): to what extent the semantic (dependency) level (how things are said) should echo the informational content level (what is said)? I don’t pretend to give a general answer to this fundamental question. However, I claim that (8b) and (8c) should be represented at the semantic level as the very same graph. This graph can only be (A), which is the only possibility for (8c). For the sake of homogeneity, (8a) should also be represented as (A). Recall moreover that (4a) with wide scope of Conn is also represented as (A). All in all, (A) happens to be a semantic representation which is shared by discourses whose informational content is quite different. Is it a problem? I would say no, because, from (A), semantic to content rules, based on the values of Ra and Rb, can make the difference: they can compute the following (simplified) logical forms, which show that the discourses in (8) and (4a) do not have the same type of informational content, although they share the same (dependency) semantic representation:

- for (8a) with Ra = Elaboration and Rb = Narration: \( e_1 \land e_2 \land e_3 \land \text{precede}(e_2, e_3) \land \text{subevent}(e_2, e_1) \land \text{subevent}(e_3, e_1) \).
- for (8b) with Ra = Explanation and Rb = Joint: \( e_1 \land e_2 \land e_3 \land \text{cause}(e_1, \text{and}(e_2, e_3)) \), i.e., \( e_1 \land e_2 \land e_3 \land \text{cause}(e_1, e_2) \land \text{cause}(e_1, e_3) \).
- for (8c) with Ra = Explanation and Rb = Disjunction: \( e_1 \land e_2 \land e_3 \land \text{cause}(e_1, \text{or}(e_2, e_3)) \), i.e., \( e_1 \land e_2 \land e_3 \land (\text{cause}(e_1, e_2) \lor \text{cause}(e_1, e_3)) \).
- for (4a) with Ra = Explanation and Rb = Circumstances [while]: \( e_1 \land e_2 \land e_3 \land \text{overlap}(e_2, e_3) \land \text{cause}(e_1, \text{overlap}(e_2, e_3)) \).

---

This analysis corresponds to the SDRS proposed by (Lascarides & Asher, 1993) for (8a) modulo some adjustment explained at the end of this section.
Discourse dependency structures as DAGs

H) Graphs (A1), (B1) and (B2). The fusion of (A1), (B1) and (B2) leads to LODAG (G) in Figure 9. This LODAG could be said to be linguistically realized in (9). In (9), $R_b = \text{Circumstances}$ has two nuclei, $\pi_1$ and $\pi_2$, which are linked by $R_a = \text{Joint}$. However, as in the previous case, one may well wonder if the graph for (9a) should not be Graph (H’) with a nucleus relation between $R_b$ and $R_a$ or graph (B) with wide scope of $R_b$. By the same argumentation as previously, graph (B) should be adopted.

(9) Fred washed the dishes and Guy cleaned up the bathroom, while Mary was taking a nap.

I) Graphs (A1), (A2) and (B2). The fusion of these graphs lead to LODAG (I) in Figure 10. I cannot find any example corresponding to this LODAG, which would be a case of multi satellites for the same relation ($\pi_2$ and $\pi_3$ are both satellites of $R_a$) with no link between the satellites but with a link between the factorized nucleus ($\pi_1$) and the non adjacent satellite ($\pi_3$).

J) Graphs (A2), (B1) and (B2). Along the same lines, the fusion of these graphs lead to LODAG (J) in Figure 10 and I cannot find any example corresponding to this LODAG.

No other fusion of graphs (A_i) and (B_j) leads to a LODAG which corresponds to a discourse. So we have arrived at the following result.

The dependency structure of a discourse $S_1 \text{ Conn}_a S_2 \text{ Conn}_b S_3$ is one of the four LODAGS (A), (B), (C) and (D). (A) and (B), which are tree shaped, cover wide scope cases (including multi satellite or nucleus cases), (C) and (D), which are not tree shaped, cover multi parent cases (factorization of a sentence).
Before commenting on this result, let us examine the semantics-syntax interface in MTT when both \( R_a \) and \( R_b \) are lexicalized by subordination conjunctions. While the non tree shaped graphs (C) and (D) do not raise any problem\(^{14}\), the trees (A) and (B) do so. In these trees, the root, a discourse relation node, is the mother of another discourse relation node. In the standard case, which leads to a straightforward semantics-syntax rule, a discourse relation node is the mother of sentential nodes. Therefore a specific rule has to be called upon in the semantics-syntax interface so that the syntactic tree obtained from (A) (respectively (B)) is equivalent to the tree obtained from (C) (respectively (D)) (Danlos, 2003).

Consider now SDRT. The interpretation given in the tree shaped graph (A) corresponds to the SDRS shown in the leftmost box of Figure 11. This SDRS can be schematized as in graph (A') in which the tree rooted at \( R_b \) is circled and labelled by \( \pi_4 \) (see note 4). The interpretation given in the non tree shaped graph (C) corresponds to the SDRS in the bottom part of Figure 11. LODAGS (B) and (D) also correspond to well-formed SDRSS. In conclusion, LODAGS (A)-(D) translate straightforwardly in SDRT, modulo a circling and labeling operation for discourse relations with wide scope (e.g., transforming (A) as (A')). The reader can check that all the LODAGS proposed for the discourses we have analyzed are compatible with a SDRT analysis.

\(^{14}\)In MTT, there is no problem in transforming a non tree shaped semantic LODAG into a syntactic tree (Candito & Kahane, 1998).
3 Analysis of the results and conclusion

The summary of the results we arrived at does not take into account the discourse connectives / relations at stake. However, for a given pair of connectives, it may happen that only some of these LODAGs are observed. For example, if Conn\textsubscript{a} is an adverbial and Conn\textsubscript{b} a subordinate conjunction, then (B) with wide scope of R\textsubscript{b} should be excluded. On the top of part of speech considerations, the lexical value of each connective may exclude some of these LODAGs. Finally, the distinction between “coordinating and subordinating” discourse relations (Lascarides & Asher, 1993) must certainly be taken into account\textsuperscript{15}. Technically, it could be done by considering that there are two kinds of branching nodes in LODAGs. Then, it ought to be established which kind(s) of branching nodes is (are) allowed in each LODAG (A)-(D). To conclude, there is a maximum of four LODAGs representing the semantic analyses of discourses S1 Conn\textsubscript{a} S2 Conn\textsubscript{b} S3. A linguistic (corpus) study should refine this result according to the specific values of Conn\textsubscript{a} and Conn\textsubscript{b}. I stipulate that these results can be extrapolated to cases where sentences are simply juxtaposed without discourse connective.

It can be considered that there is only a few LODAGs corresponding to discourses with three clauses\textsuperscript{16}. A number of \textit{a priori} possible LODAGs do not correspond to coherent discourses, e.g. LODAG (E). As a consequence, some structural constraints can be brought out, as the following one: R\textsubscript{a} must “left-dominate” \pi\textsubscript{2}. The notion of left-dominance is introduced in (Danlos, 2003)\textsuperscript{17}. Let us here examine the consequences of this left-dominance constraint in non formal terms. R\textsubscript{a} is the mother of \pi\textsubscript{1} (Section 2) and must left-dominate \pi\textsubscript{2}. This means that R\textsubscript{a} establishes some semantic link between S1 and S2\textsuperscript{18}. This result may sound trivial on psycho-linguistics grounds: what would be a discourse in which the second sentence is not linked at all to the first one?\textsuperscript{19} It has an important consequence: the semantic representation of a discourse with \(n\) clauses, \(n \geq 3\), cannot be or include LODAG (K) in Figure 12, since in (K) R\textsubscript{a} does not left-dominate \pi\textsubscript{2}, or informally, there is no link between S1 and S2. A graph such as (K) is a “cross dependency” case in the terms of (Webber et al., 2003) who stipulate that “\textit{discourse structure itself does not admit crossing structural dependencies}”. I agree with them, but not on a stipulative ground. To conclude, semantic dependency structures for discourses are LODAGs but these LODAGs present some structural constraints, which can help us to cut down the number of possibilities when processing discourses, be it in analysis or generation, or be it in SRDT or in an extension of MTT to discourses.

\textsuperscript{15}Roughly, Explanation and Elaboration are subordinating relations while the others are coordinating ones.

\textsuperscript{16}In RST, there are only 2 trees (2 is the number of binary trees with 3 leaves), namely trees (A) and (B), which are supposed to be interpreted with the nuclearity principle (being so interpreted as (B) and (D) respectively). We have seen that this is too restrictive: wide scope cases are not taken into account (neither multi satellite or nucleus cases).

\textsuperscript{17}The definition of left-dominance is the following: a node X in a tree left-dominates a node Y iff Y is a daughter of X (immediate dominance) or there exists a daughter Z of X such that Y belongs to the left-frontier of the tree rooted at Z. For example, R\textsubscript{a} left-dominates \pi\textsubscript{1} and \pi\textsubscript{2} in (A), while R\textsubscript{b} left-dominates \pi\textsubscript{1} and \pi\textsubscript{3} in (B).

\textsuperscript{18}This result can be seen as a weaken version of the adjacency constraint in RST, i.e. two adjacent clauses are linked by a discourse relation. This constraint does not hold because it is too restrictive: for example, in discourses analyzed as (D), S3 is linked to S1 (which is not adjacent) and not to S2 (which is adjacent).

\textsuperscript{19}The link between the first two sentences can be given by a third sentence, as in (10) in which S3 establishes a joint link between S1 and S2 through its plural subject. The LODAG for (10) is topologically (B).

(10) It is raining. Ted arrived late. These two facts, which are not related, irritated Mary.
References


