



**HAL**  
open science

# **The Europeanization of political and administrative careers. The case of the directors- general of the Commission**

Didier Georgakakis, Marine de Lasalle

## ► **To cite this version:**

Didier Georgakakis, Marine de Lasalle. The Europeanization of political and administrative careers. The case of the directors- general of the Commission. 2007. <halshs-00122151>

**HAL Id: halshs-00122151**

**<https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00122151v1>**

Submitted on 28 Dec 2006

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



HAL Authorization

## **The Europeanization of political and administrative careers. The case of the directors- general of the Commission**

Didier Georgakakis and Marine de Lassalle

Abstract : Though the creation of European posts and careers is certainly one of the most tangible expressions (and at the same time one of the mainsprings) of European construction, it however remains to be seen in what way these posts are “European” and in what way they are “Europeanising” themselves. In the absence of statistic studies, we know little about the objectivization of Europeanization processes in heavy careers or socio-professional structures. Can we actually speak of a Europeanization of political and administrative careers? If so, what does it consist in and what are the possible and tangible indicators? Moreover, is it a continuous and equal process according to the positions, nationalities and European political sectors? If not, what varies and what can we say about the socio-political conditions of these variations? These questions can find a first group of answers when confronted to the case empirically limited represented by the prosopography of the Directors General of the European Commission.

Keywords : European commission, European civil service, Eurocrats, Europeanization, careers of senior officials, political capital

Biography : Didier Georgakakis and Marine Delassalle are senior lecturer at Robert Schuman University of Strasbourg where they are director and deputy director of the Group of European Political Sociology – PRISME (CNRS). Didier Georgakakis is in charge with the master of European policies of Strasbourg and its Jean Monnet Module. Its research are about political communication and European institutions. He has recently published “ Was it really just ‘poor communication’? Lessons from the Santer Commission’s resignation. ” in *Politics and the European Commission. Actors, interdependence, legitimacy* Ed Andy Smith, Routledge 2004. Marine Delassalle is in charge with the research section of master of European policies of Strasbourg and the research program on elites and european public policies of the Human Science House of Strasbourg.

Contact :

Groupe de sociologie politique européenne / IEP de Strasbourg,  
47 av de la Forêt Noire, 67 000 Strasbourg.

[Didier.georgakakis@urs.u-strasbg.fr](mailto:Didier.georgakakis@urs.u-strasbg.fr)

[Marine.Dekassalle@urs.u-strasbg.fr](mailto:Marine.Dekassalle@urs.u-strasbg.fr)

Recent research on Europeanization processes have mainly laid stress on the production of policies (Radaelli, 2003), the transformation of national and local areas (Fligstein), and how these different areas are articulated — cf. debates on multi-level<sup>1</sup> governance. Actually, they haven't analysed much the effects of European construction on the professionalization of the players who are in charge of this construction or intermediaries. European professionalization processes take different paths. It goes from people who casually work for Europe at local and national levels for example, and acquire "European" skills, to retraining mechanisms because of which people originally trained within a national scope, end up living on and for Europe, according to Max Weber's expression. No matter how different these processes are, the analysis of Europe's professionals leads one to wonder how a group of "European" standards and collective practices from indicators (Europe's players' positions, trainings, careers, external and internal processes of demarcation, etc.) likely to give a deeper sociological meaning to the concept of Europeanization (Georgakakis, 2002).

Supprimé :

Though the creation of European posts and careers is certainly one of the most tangible expressions (and at the same time one of the mainsprings) of European construction, it however remains to be seen in what way these posts are "European" and in what way they are "Europeanising" themselves. Work on permanent representatives, working groups' negotiators or senior officials of the Commission have well showed that the agents that hold posts closely linked to states were led to adopt completely different attitudes from a submission to their country of origin, under the effect of interdependences and complex situations to which they are submitted (Hooghe, 1999, Trondal, Smith, 2004). In the absence of statistic studies, we know little about the objectivization of Europeanization processes in heavy careers or socio-professional structures. Can we actually speak of a Europeanization of political and administrative careers? If so, what does it consist in and what are the possible and tangible indicators? Moreover, is it a continuous and equal process according to the positions, nationalities and European political sectors? If not, what varies and what can we say about the socio-political conditions of these variations?

Supprimé :

Without necessarily solving them all, these questions can find a first group of answers when confronted to the case empirically limited represented by the prosopography of the Directors General of the European Commission. We will neither go back over the protocol of this investigation still in progress, nor the sociopolitical and methodological obstacles implied by the sociography of such a personnel (Georgakakis and de Lassalle, 2005). On the basis of the first results of this study, we will all the same suggest, some clues on the modes of Europeanization of these very high-ranking officials and the variations to which this process is submitted.

This investigation in progress on the European Commission's directors general and deputy Directors-General is part of a research programme undertaken by the GSPE since 2001 on the "European elites". This programme consists in realizing a database about the Commissioners, the Directors-General and the deputy Directors-General of the Directorate-General and the Secretariat-General of the European Commission, and the major posts of the European Parliament (President, Vice-Presidents, Quaestors, Presidents of the commissions and Group Presidents). At present, this database includes about 1000

<sup>1</sup> . for a more general perspective of this work, see the introduction of this article.

entries explaining “biosocial” data (age, sex, place of birth and nationality, marital status, etc.), career elements (posts successively held), diplomas and place of training, commitments (political, European associations), publications and decorations...

As things stand at present in the research field, the first elements we have allow a close examination of the data. It is on the basis of that examination and the first reflections that it inspires us that we wrote article. We work at the same time on the formulation of a more thorough analysis (particularly on the basis of a Match Factor Analysis) and the realization of several interviews that will be the subject of subsequent publications.

This investigation has been possible thanks to the support of the Maison Interuniversitaire des Sciences Humaines et Sociales d’Alsace (CNRS UMS 2552). We would like to thank its steering committee and managers, the interviewers who have participated in data collection and acquisition<sup>2</sup> and the investigators who have played a part in the framework of the seminar of preliminary reflections.

### **The Directors-General’s careers: between national and European dependences**

**Supprimé :** L’eupéanisation d

One could be surprised that a study aiming at explaining the Europeanization of political and administrative careers focused on European officials, renowned by nature (or, which means the same, by status) as already Europeans. That would mean we forget that the “Europeanization” of the European Commission’s Directors-General is far from being obvious from the socio-political point of view. The rare literature on the very high-ranking European administration shows that the Directors-General’s attitudes are very heterogeneous. A good part of them share definitions of Europe that are far from reflecting the European Commission’s presumed supranationalism (Hooghe, 1999, Page, 1997). Doubt can also arise when analysing the political features of the post. Located on top of the administration, the post of Director-General is kept under tight national watch and has long been considered a seat for people who were “pitchforked” into it (Spence, 1997). These very particular features among the Commission’s posts turned the Directors-General and their deputies into a privileged observation ground to understand the demarcation logics compared to national administrative paths and outline a few indicators of careers’ Europeanization.

#### *A double post*

The Directors-General are a good example of the fact that the European construction goes hand in hand with the construction of particular posts. However, this particularity does not mean that the agents who hold these posts renounce to any link with their state of origin. In the case in point, we can say that the Directors-General’s post is double. On the one hand, their remit make them work in interdependences that differentiate them from a univocal allegiance to the States. On the other hand, the structure of their careers remains quite dependent of their national ties.

**Supprimé :** est et, en définitive, assez proche de celles des très hautes fonctions publiques des Etats membres

From various points of views, the Directors-General hold a very particular post. Located at the top of their hierarchy, they are at the highest rank in the European Civil Service : A1 in the former nomenclature, A 15/16 in the new one stemming from the Kinnock reform implemented

**Supprimé :**

<sup>2</sup> Among them, thanks to Philippe Juhem, Valérie Lozac’h, Virginie Schnabel, Véronique Charlety, Emmanuel Henry, Caroline Thouet, who participated in the data collection and acquisition with the authors. Special thanks to Philippe Juhem who created the software allowing statistical data processing.

since May 2004. Their mission places them at the heart of the European Commission's activity so much that it is submitted to a grater and greater codification. The documents of the recent administrative reform of the Commission are a good example of this codification. As argued, Directors-General have to "supervise" the DG's activity (legislative proposals or communications, implementation of European policies or programmes, assessment of policies). They are also the main « driving belt » of the Commissioners: "the *main tasks* of a Director-General are to train, inform and supervise their personnel in order to see to it that the political intentions of the commission are carried out (*underlined by the institution*)". Since the reform was implemented, their political and managerial responsibility has been reinforced and is now coupled with a juridical responsibility on the nature and the financing of the decisions made.

Such responsibilities are from being purely formal: they turn the Directors-General into "managers" or "supermanagers" as it is said today inside the Commission. Within Directorates-General, Directors-General have direct authority over the whole DG, beginning with the Directors and then the Heads of Unit. They are assisted in this task by a mini-cabinet composed of one assistant and counsellors, and often replaced by deputy Directors-General. This position in the hierarchy gives them great room to manoeuvre in terms of decision making, in the sense of « who decides » about the Commission's proposals. It implies that they master a group of political practices, such as the management of relations with the Commissioner's cabinet, that is often delicate, the distribution of positions of responsibility within the DG, the defence of the interests of their DG in cross-sectional consultation within the Commission and their ability to defend the proposal of their DG outside and particularly before permanent representatives of the States within the PRC. It can also have long-lasting effects on the organization of the DGs, or even on what specialized literature calls their own "administrative culture". Therefore, it often occurs that Directors-General who have worked for a long time at the same post (sometimes for a decade) have contributed on a long-term basis, to structure the working habits or the "administrative culture" of a DG, like in the cases of agriculture, development and competition (on this point, Abelès, Bellier, Mac Donald, 1993, Cini, 1996).

These common particularities of the post, which are a good indicator of the empowerment of the position, make the Directors-General see themselves as members of a "club". This perception is associated to the homology of their activity and their weekly meetings. It is also based on the relative convergence of their sociological and professional property. While we could have thought that during at least several years of European construction, the accession to that post would be extremely attainable, the Directors-General and deputy Directors-General were already senior officials in their country of origin. Less than 5% of them have a work experience that does not go through one civil service or the other. Even though they come from different countries, they differentiate themselves from certain characteristics specific to the Senior Civil Service of their country of origin. For example, the German Directors-General are usually younger than their national counterparts. The British Directors-General, at least for the first generations, are less "fast-streamers" than their national counterparts, predisposed to transversal careers (Eymeri, 2001). The age and gender conditions of the Directors-General and their deputies are also quite close (for further detail, Georgakakis et de Lassalle, 2005).

These converging properties must not hide the fact that differences between Directors-General do exist. Within this group there is a whole series of cleavages or at least gradations that make their authority vary within the Commission. Still, these gradations depend less on the presumed

Supprimé : Il n'en demeurent pas m

administrative culture that they would have inherited from their countries of origin, than the structure of the European political and administrative game. If they all objectivize one sector of policy (external relations, competition, domestic market, agriculture, etc.), the DGs firstly have an extremely variable weight. It is typically the case in terms of sector autonomy and competence, where high community competence sectors are opposed (Competition, Agriculture) to lower-competence sectors (Social Affairs, Enterprise, etc.). It is also the case in terms of personnel: the Admin (personnel and administration) and Relex (external relations) Directorates-General are each composed of 2,000 and 1,700 officials, whereas the JHA (Justice and Home Affairs) and DEV (development) Directorates-General are only composed of 170 and 250<sup>3</sup>. From this point of view, the influence of the Directors-General is connected to the sectors' degree of autonomy, or in other words their ability to implement political systems that are specific to the European Union. The DGs' variations in the number and field of action can disturb the order, but there again, they often operate in relation with the European economic situation (enlargements, changes in the Commission's agenda, etc.). It is also the case for the Director-General's potential longevity at their post that has effects on the European credit their peers and partners give to them.

Supprimé :

If these different elements plead in favour of the idea that the exercise of this job is above all the product of European constraints and interdependences, one has anyway to wonder about the political status of the post of Director-General and its consequences on the selection of whom hold it. Whatever the above-mentioned variations are, the post of Director-General is still defined as a highly political assignment. Recruiting the Directors-General springs from a highly controlled process. Three elements are associated to the appointment of a Director-General: the College, the SG and the capitals through the Brussels' Permanent Representations. Their influence has changed with time. The strong presence of Emile Noël, Secretary-General from 1960 to 1985, has given way to more direct kinds of negotiations between the College and the Permanent Representations. With the very last Commissions, the appointment stems from a highly « managerialized » process. From a formal point of view, the notices of vacancy are published and the candidatures evaluated by the DG admin on the basis of their « management skills » and by an Advisory Committee of appointments which interviews the candidates and gives its opinion to a Commissioner who will make the final decision<sup>4</sup>. From an informal point of view however, the political skills required appear obvious enough inside the circle in order to reveal the result of the procedure beforehand<sup>5</sup>. The fact that, even though it keeps a strong collegial dimension, the Commission is thought as a government without being called as so, has furthermore strengthened the Commissioner's authority on the departments who come under their portfolio, and therefore on “their” Director-General and his appointment.

This political status of this post has consequences. It is reflected in two exemplary dimensions of the ambiguity of the adjective « political » in Brussels. In the same way as we know in the States, first the Directors-General are above all the holders of political resources. These resources can be associated to political commitments, participation in networks or clubs, in Cabinets of Ministers, especially those who became Commissioners, etc. But above all, and it is often the first meaning of the adjective “ political ” in European circles, their country of origin

<sup>3</sup>. Report DG admin, October 2002.

<sup>4</sup>. [http://europa.eu.int/comm/reform/2002/selection/index\\_fr.html](http://europa.eu.int/comm/reform/2002/selection/index_fr.html)

<sup>5</sup>. It is particularly the case of the « Renouveau et Démocratie » union, opposed to the Kinnock reform and who reveals the name of the Directors-General before the end of the procedure to denounce pretences of transparency. On trade unions at the Commission, see Georgakakis, 2003

is highly important. For a long time, we can say that the nationality represented at the same time a condition and a limit to the accession to posts of Directors-General. The logics of national representativeness are thus very important in the appointments and, without the existence of written rules, we can notice a relative proportionality of the Directors-General's presence. The most numerous are thus the German and the fewest are the Finnish.

Supprimé : Ensuite,

### Number of Directors-General by nationalities (1960-2000)

Nationalities	Total	DG	Deputy DG
Germans	36	23	13
French	30	16	14
British	29	16	13
Italians	28	18	10
Belgians	18	9	9
Spanish	12	5	7
Dutch	10	5	5
Danish	6	3	3
Greeks	5	4	1
Luxembourg	5	3	2
Swedish	4	1	3
Irish	3	1	2
Austrian	3	1	2
Portuguese	2	2	-
Finnish	0	-	-
Unknown	16	14	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>86</b>

Nationality is also a condition of accession and a limit because it has limited the Directors-General's capacity to choose their sectors for a long time. As the two following tables attest, a Director-General who is not French is not likely to access to the Agriculture DG, a Director-General who is not Italian to the Economic Affairs DG, for a Director-General who is not German to the Competition DG, etc. We can say the same about the deputy Directors-General, even if their appointments take us back to the management of political balances which remain structured by the appointment of the Directors-General. Therefore, if the post of the Agriculture DG has been « French flag » one for a long time, the deputies have been German, British or Italian. The deputy Directors-General of the Economic Affairs DG are German, the Directors-General of the development DG (« German flag ») have rather been French or British, etc.

### Number of years of DG's directorate by nationalities<sup>6</sup>

	Ex. rel.	Ec. Aff.	Dm Mk.	comp	emp	agri	trans.	dev.	admin	pres	Res ch	telec.	Reg. Pol	ener.	cred.	budg.
Ger.	31	4	1	35				34	3	5	9					
Brit	11				3		23	5	2			14		10		

<sup>6</sup>. For legibility reasons, only the most significant data were chosen.

Bel.					26				12					7		17
Dan								3	2							
Spa						3	1						13	4		1
Fren	5		7		3	43	3	2	15	8		10	5			15
Gree											3	3		7		
Dut				10				2							10	
Ita	3	35	12					13	2	3	15	2	4			21
Luxb.			17							9			3			

### Number of years of the DDG's directorate by nationalities<sup>7</sup>

Nat.	Ex r el	Eco A ff	Dm Mk	comp	emp.	agri.	trans.	dev.	admin.	pres.	resch.	telec.	Reg pol.	ener.	cred.	budg.
Ger.	7	17	20		0	37				1						
Brit.	2		3		7	31		25	7		12		8			
Bel.	21			6	5			6			5					3
Dan.	4				4			3	2							
Spa.	17				16	2										
Fren.	14	7		11	1	3		21						5		
Gree.								5								
Dut.	12		13				10	3				16			7	
Ita.	2		12	10		33			22							13
Lux.			5						9				3			

These elements remind that as Lavisce used to say at the beginning of the century about the State, Europeanization is not necessarily a « finished » process. In the case in point, the national ties are definitely present, and particularly in relation with the conditions of accession to the post. Still, contrary to what exists for other international officials, these national ties exist here rather under an identity form than an assimilated one: in a state of resource, or at least of constraint, that limit the path, define what is possible to do in terms of accession to given sectors or play a role in the distribution of the political credit of very high-ranking officials (Whether you are French or Portuguese, you are given a different area under the presidency of Jacques Delors than under Barroso's). That must be one of the main characteristics of the Europeanization process.

#### Europeanization paths

If the exercise of this post implies that, although they are strongly linked to the States, the Directors-General are not likely to be complete national agents any longer, one still has to wonder about the way their careers at the Commission objectivize themselves in more directly "European" properties or resources. From this point of view, the prosopographic analysis allows to set a group of indicators that make us understand better what «the Europeanization» of the careers of these very high-ranking officials means.

Before paying attention to key indicators, it must be straight away specified that careers' Europeanization goes through a *modification in the career development patterns*. That is a key element. Joining Europe means *de facto* entering a field within which recognition patterns are, at least part of them, linked to the legitimate representations that are current in this circle. The demarcation from the States, the development of the European vocation, in short all that helps to attest to the balance between the agents' path and their ability to defend the community's

**Supprimé :** Poste singulier, le poste de Directeur général l'est enfin dans sa dimension sociologique. Si les Directeurs généraux proviennent de nationalités très différentes, ils ne reproduisent pour autant pas toujours les logiques d'accèsion aux postes à responsabilité qui sont ceux de leur pays d'origine. Par exemple, les Directeurs généraux allemands sont généralement plus jeunes que leurs homologues nationaux. Les Directeurs généraux britanniques sont moins souvent que leurs homologues nationaux des "fast-streamers" à la carrière mobile et rapide (Eymery).<sup>¶</sup> Quelles que soient les variations nationales, l'accès à ces postes renvoie à des conditions d'âge et de sexe. Les Directeurs généraux ont ainsi en moyenne 50 ans et il y a peu de différences entre les nationalités les plus représentées dans le poste de ce point de vue (cf. tableau en annexes). Cette population est en outre très masculine. Le Directeur général ou le Directeur général adjoint est avant tout un homme, les femmes ne représentant que 2,5 % des Directeurs généraux et 2 % des Directeurs généraux adjoints sur la période 1958-2002. De façon univoque, les Directeurs généraux proviennent enfin de la fonction publique, qu'elle soit nationale ou communautaire. Alors qu'on aurait pu penser qu'au moins pendant plusieurs années de la construction européenne le jeu soit extrêmement ouvert, seuls 3 % de l'ensemble des Directeurs généraux et adjoints ont un parcours qui ne passe pas par l'une ou l'autre des fonctions publiques (pour plus de détails, Georgakakis et de Lassalle, 2005).<sup>¶</sup>

**Supprimé :** Ces différentes caractéristiques suffisent à se convaincre que

**Supprimé :** des Directeurs généraux s'objectivent dans leur carrière.

<sup>7</sup>. idem

interest are particularly important elements within the Commission. These processes must be all the more highlighted that the analysis suggested here is based on notices of *Who's Who* that are based on the agents' statement. As such, the notices record « objective » career elements as much as identity strategies (Collovald, 1988), incidentally variable depending on the fact that the notices appear in national or European *Who's Whos*<sup>8</sup>. Consequently, at the same time as careers, the prosopography allows to analyse the transformation of biographical accounts and particularly how they are led to join European experiences, the membership of European associations, the mention of a foreign certificate and the mastery of foreign languages, etc. Beyond a game of strategy in the common meaning of the word, it sends back deeper to a work on oneself that goes along with a great transformation of social and political resources required by these posts, and if not, of professional habitus.

If these transformations in the very high-ranking officials' presentation are everything but inconsiderable, they are strengthened thanks to their interweaving in more structural processes of career Europeanization. These processes first go through the definition of *specific European careers*. These careers are especially observed from indicators of European longevity and experience. Among these Directors-General, we can thus differentiate three groups. The first one includes agents (28%) who made all their career in European institutions. Conversely, the second one regroups agents (30%) who made their whole career in the national Civil Service before they were directly appointed Directors-General or deputy Directors-General. Finally, the third one pools agents whose career is "mixt" (42%). Among the latter, we can oppose those who have further professional experience in national administrations (47%) to those who worked more in community institutions (53%). If the sharing-out is today almost equivalent, the number of long careers within the Commission and more generally the experience in European institutions increases with time.

This experience in the European institutions varies according to the paths. For those who directly come from the states, it's about competences accumulated within their national administration or when they were negotiators. For example some were able to participate in the accession negotiations of their country and/or hold representation posts of their States before European institutions or permanent Representation, and/or finally hold political and administrative posts linked to the European institutions in their national civil service. For those whose career within the Commission is the longest, paths vary depending on whether agents had a sectional or a more versatile career, stand out. In the first case, sectional mobility is low and we can notice careers whose European status is the continuation of the national career. In economic circumstances where « needs » have been formalized, agents who had showed their great sectional ability at the national level, were in a way imported. For example in Great Britain, we can mention Peter Pooley, born in 1936, holder of a diploma at Cambridge, civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture from 1958 to 1978. He participates in the first accession negotiations between 1961 and 1963. After that, he is a member of the permanent Representation from 1979 to 1982 before being appointed deputy Director-General of the Agriculture DG in 1982. This type of career is very frequent, particularly in the DGs which distinguish by their « monosectional » character, and import specialized officials from the member states and more seldom from the international sector (Economic Affairs, Agriculture, Transport and Energy, among other examples). In the second case, we are confronted with

---

<sup>8</sup>. Like *The European Companion*, Ed DPR (from 1991 to 1994) or more recently *Le Trombinoscope* ou *Eurosources*, Ed Dod's & le Trombinoscope

more varied careers that include in particular an experience in Commissioners' cabinet. (see *infra*)<sup>9</sup>.

*The Europeanization of the political networks and resources* is another dimension of the Europeanization of careers. While the sociology of ministerial cabinets or of high-ranking administration reminds us of the weight of political resources, the sociology of the Directors-General shows that it is not about a national bar, despite the technization and denial processes of the politics that are in current use in the Commission. Of course, the accession to the post is often linked to national political resources, as the fact of having been a member of a ministerial cabinet at the national level. It is not rare to see a minister who became a Commissioner imports one or two close colleagues with him. But phenomena more typically linked to European institutions stand out. On one hand, the fact that they have been a member of a Commissioner's cabinet, more than of a minister's, becomes an important condition. We also notice an increase in time of the appointments to the post of Director-General and deputy director-General of agents who went through a Commissioner's cabinet. In the 1960s, 11% of the Directors-General and deputy DGs are in this case. They account for 17% in the 1970s, 21% in the 1980s, 30% in the 1990s and 45% at the beginning of the years 2000. In other words, going through a cabinet and learning of European political abilities it involves, seems to be a more and more required track record. On the other hand, we observe a progressive process of euphemisation or dilution of national resources. The Directors-General whose career is versatile are a good example of this phenomenon. It is not rare, in that case, that they begin a career as cabinet members of a Commissioner of the same nationality, and then work in cabinets of Commissioners from other countries. The fact that they have been members of a cabinet of a President of the Commission is not neutral, which tends to show that the influence of resources stands beyond national logics.

This Europeanization process of the political resources is also noticed in the Directors-General activist involvement. There again, the information provided by the *Who's Whos* are not sufficient indicators to grasp all the importance of these militant involvements. Only a few Directors-General and deputy Directors-General mention their duties within a political movement, particularly when it refers to « youth » commitments. These discreet statements of a political membership are quite surprising when one knows the importance of political networks in the Senior Civil Service. This importance is very far from being specific to France. In other countries like Germany, where there is no equivalent to the French of networks *énarques* (former students of *Ecole Nationale d'administration*) or former students of civil service schools, political membership is even the foundation of the structuring of policy networks (Derlien, 1997). If, at first level, this invisibility in the *Who's Whos* can be explained in part by euphemisation strategies of political ties that are in current use within senior national civil services (defence of general interest, political disinterestedness, etc.), it is the result at the same time of a process more specific to the European Union. Regarding the structural weakness of the European party federations, the party ties are often national (SP, CDU, etc.). They therefore tend to nationalize their profile, which is not necessarily a good way to legitimately hold the highest posts in the European Civil Service. From this point of view, we will notice that signs of ties to European associations are more numerous, like the membership of the *European Movement* characterized by a federalist commitment<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>9</sup> On the political status and the running of the cabinets at the commission, cf. Joanna et Smith, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> It is the case of Raymond Riflet, Robert Toulemon and Dutch Directors-General, Wissels and Van Rijn.

The Europeanization of the very high-ranking administrative personnel goes finally hand in hand with *processes of selection of agents already « Europeanised » or who have a strong international capital*. This selection is noticed in several indicators. The biographical indicators available in the database do not or hardly allow to precisely know the social origins of the Directors-General that would require further investigation means. Among the 200 Directors-General and deputy Directors-General seldom are those who, like Christopher Audland, son of a British brigadier born in Germany, Eneko Landaburu Llamendi, Spanish born in Paris, and Daniel Strasser, Belgian also born in Paris, assert binational origins or parental paths marked by formative experiences abroad (sons of ambassadors, diplomats, or private executives abroad, and even political refugees, etc.). It still remains that the selection processes of a more Europeanised personnel is noticed under other forms. It is the case of diplomas obtained abroad whose mention tends to gain more credit with the time. From various origins, they testify to an internationalisation of careers as much as a « Europeanization » *stricto sensu*. Thus, the degrees obtained in the United States are among the most numerous and concern about fifteen Directors-General and deputy DGs. For the others we notice that some areas are dominating like Paris ( foreign ENA, Sorbonne), London, Strasbourg and Bruges (College of Europe). The possession of foreign diplomas is moreover very variable according to the national origins and it confirms the heavy training structures of the elites in the countries concerned. More than half of the Greek Directors-General mention a degree course abroad. The British are well represented in the United States. The German case is interesting. They divide their studies between France and the USA. Sectional cleavages also rise so that some sectors ( the Relex or Economic Affairs DGS, for example) are more often chosen than others by agents who possess these European or international academic resources.

#### **A Europeanization which changes with the wind.**

If one now understands better what Europeanization means from the career point of view, one should yet insist on the fact that this process is far from being univocal. Contrary to the idea of a near mechanical career integration, the Europeanization processes take different paths here, according to time, nationalities and the sectors led by the Directors-General.

##### *Variations in time*

What did the Directors-General and their deputy do ten years before they were appointed? This simple question is a good way to wonder about the underlying influence of the national political and administrative capitals in comparison with the accumulation of European resources. It particularly allows to differentiate clear cleavages between those who held posts that were directly State-related before, and others that already worked within community institutions.

From this point of view, the trend goes along the same lines of the increasing influence of those who made their career within European institutions, or can prove they have had a longer career within the Commission than within their national Civil Service. But contrary to the idea of a trend that would be self-evident, this change is quite far from being linear and progressive. Instead, we have a V-shaped curve. To put it plainly, in the 1970s, the Directors-General came more clearly from European careers than in the 1980s, the curve reversing in the 1990s. Here are some figures: in 1971, three Directors-General out of the thirteen whose careers are known come from national administrations. Yet should we specify that none of them is directly appointed to the post of Director-General. Robert Toulemon was Robert Marjolin's head of cabinet (Commission's VP) before being Director-General at the External Relations DG, and

Director-General of Industrial Affairs from 1968; Ugo Mosca, an Italian diplomat who became Director-General of Economic affairs in Roma held a similar post at the Commission from 1967, after having spent six years at the Italian Permanent Representation; Helmut Sigrist, a German diplomat, was deputy Secretary-General of the Commission between 1965 and 1967 before becoming Director-General of External Relations in 1968. Other Directors-General have worked in community institutions for at least ten years. They are either agents who have belonged to other institutions than the Commission and have partly been integrated into it (F. Spaak, Jacques Cros or Ernst Albrecht for example), or agents that made their careers within the Commission, and particularly former heads of unit or directors promoted Directors-General (Jozef Van Gronsveld, Paolo Rho, Jacques-René Rabier, Lamberto Lambert, Hans-Broder Krohn, W.Schlieder<sup>11</sup>), and finally agents who have worked within Commissioners' cabinets (E.Albrecht). We are witnessing a very internal recruitment that corroborates the statements on Emile Noël's key role in the recruitment of Directors-General with a "in-house" profile.

In the 1980s, we witness quite a clear change in the recruitment logics. This change allows in a certain way to assess the consequences of the first enlargement to Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark. The consequence of Great Britain joining Europe, as that's the way it has been identified by the players, is not due to the increase of the British population, but to a more general modification in the global accession conditions to the posts of Directors-General. We are indeed witnessing a « renationalisation » of the profiles that exceeds the weight of those who have recently joined Europe. Therefore, six Directors-General out of sixteen whose career is known, held posts in the national civil service ten years before and were mostly directly appointed Directors-General from national posts. This concerns R. Denman and E. Gallhager, diplomats who have held posts in various British ministries who became respectively Directors-General of External Relations in 1977 and Fisheries in 1978; O.B Henriksen, a Danish official of the Ministry of Economy appointed at the Credit and Investment DG in 1977; P. Fasella, an Italian scholar appointed to the Research DG at the beginning of the 1980s; T. Padoa-Schioppa, who directly comes from the Bank of Italy to become Director-General of Economic Affairs and C. Villain who went from the French economy and finances sector to the Agriculture DG.

During the 1990s, the trend progressively reverses. 13 Directors-General out of the 21 Directors-general whose careers are known, held a post in the European Civil Service ten years before, whereas only three of them held a post in a national civil service, a fourth one was a permanent representative. We also witness at that time a diversification of profiles as the Directors-General whose profile is more atypical are « mostly » recruited during that decade (two Directors-General coming from the political sphere, one from the international civil service, and one coming from the private sector).

The change is finally clearer in the year 2000. Out of 22 Directors-General, 19 have belonged to the European Civil Service for more than ten years. At the same time we witness the constitution of careers, in the sense that the posts are the result of a certain stability. 4 of them were already Directors-General ten years before (against 2, ten years earlier). If they can keep their post for a long time, they more and more often move from a post to another, which unveils internal promotion channels. We will not go back to this here, but in the case in point they go from sectional channels to more versatile DGs or in a higher position in the symbolic hierarchy of the DGs (Enrico Cioffi goes from the Credit and Investment DG to the External

---

<sup>11</sup> Respectively appointed Director-General of the Administration and Personnel DG in 1965, Director-General of the Transport DG in 1965, Director-General of the Press and information DG in 1970, Director-General of the Budget DG in 1968, Director-General of the Development DG in 1970, Director-General of the Competition DG in 1971.

Relations DG, Robert Coleman from the Transport to the Health and Consumer Protection DG, Guy Legras from the Agriculture DG to the External Relations DG , etc. )<sup>12</sup>.

*Variable Europeanization paths according to nationalities*

If experience in community institutions becomes a necessary resource for the holding of posts of DG, the paths of this Europeanization vary according to nationalities. It is not a matter of awarding « good Europeans » certificates or giving in to political stakes of the comparison of those who were « pitchforked » (Georgakakis, de Lassalle 2005). On the other hand, we can consider the national diversity of the types of involvement of and in Europe that informs on the forms of anticipation of the opportunities offered by the European construction in the national senior officials' careers. While this opportunity seems to be attainable early in a German, Belgian or Luxembourg or even French career, it is rather a « second » career that is given to British and Spanish officials.

**Types of careers according to nationalities<sup>13</sup>**

origin	Community Civ. Serv.	mixt carr. / communit. dominant	sub-total European civ.serv.	National civ.serv.	mixt Carr / national dominant	sub-total national civ.serv.
German	32,26%	32,26 %	64,5%	25,8%	9,68 %	35, 5 %
Belgian	37 %	25 %	62 %	13 %	25 %	38 %
Italian	45 %	13%	58 %	33 %	9%	42 %
French	14 %	38 %	52 %	24 %	24 %	48 %
Dutch	30 %	20 %	50 %	30 %	20 %	50 %
Danish	20 %	20 %	40 %	20 %	40 %	60%
british	8%	12 %	20 %	60 %	20 %	80 %
Spanish	0 %	20 %	20 %	40 %	40 %	80 %

Concerning the first group, and without going into a thorough analysis of the national appointments habits, a quick count shows that the German and the Belgian appointed Directors-General and deputy Directors-General among which respectively 65% and 62% of them had made their entire career or most of it in community institutions. Taking only the German case as an example, the first German who were appointed to the posts of Director-General and deputy Director-General are partly direct appointments, mainly coming from diplomacy. But quickly, internal profiles are required: Hans-Broder Krohn, appointed deputy Director-General of the Agriculture DG in 1964 was a head of unit there at first ; Ernst Albrecht was a member of a commissioner's cabinet before being appointed Director-general of the Competition DG in 1968 and Hans Michaelis was a ECSC head of section and Euratom's Director-general of economy before being promoted Director-General of Research and Technology in 1968, etc. In the 1970s, more than two thirds of the German appointed had made their entire career, or most of it, in community institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, only two Directors-General out of 20 German appointments were direct appointments – they are

<sup>12</sup> The investigation coming to an end – temporarily - during the year 2002 , the effects of the new enlargement to 25 countries which is obviously going to transform this evolution, will not be taken into account.

<sup>13</sup> . For legibility reasons, only the more significant data were chosen.

two Directors-General of the Economic Affairs DG (Matthes in 1983 and Regling in 1999) with very particular profiles, we will come back to this later – and in 2000 there is no direct appointment any longer. Thus, since the end of the 1970s, no more German has a longer « national » than « European » experience. The Directors-General and their deputies have been able to spend a few years at national level, but they have made almost all their careers in European institutions and a lot of them have only experienced the European administration. As another indicator: the German and the Belgian are the only ones to practice clear « denationalisation » strategies – consequently, among all the Directors-General and their deputies who have gone through commissioners' cabinets, there are mainly Germans and Belgians who have gone through Commissioners' cabinets which were not of their nationality (and which are moreover mainly Belgian, German or from Luxembourg themselves).

Unlikely, British and Spanish have appointed 80% of DGs who had made all their career or most of it in the British or Spanish civil services. If these figures record a differential in the time spent in community institutions, and confront the nationalities that joined Europe first with those whose joining was more belated, the Directors-General of the latter do not all have absolutely similar careers. So, 60% of the Danish have made their entire career or most of it in the national civil service. But among these 60%, two thirds of them have made most of their career only in national institutions, which means that they are agents who have a European experience, often at the Commission, before they were appointed. Whereas, at the same time, out of the 80 of British or Spanish « appointments », only one fourth of the British and half of the Spanish have experienced this type of socialization to Europe. This does not mean that they haven't had any experience in the participation in the accession negotiations or Permanent Representation, but this experience remains marked by the national framework.

This second group is “Europeanising” itself far slower and later. Out of the 12 British appointed Directors-General or deputy DGs in the 1970s, only one has an experience within a European institution. That is Raymond Appelyard who first made an international career (biology research worker in the United States and Canada, he joins the UN after), before spending ten years as Euratom's director and being appointed Director-General of the Information and Innovation Market in 1980; this heavy trend endures, even if a very relative “Europeanization” occurs. It is marked by the fact that if half of the Directors-General or their deputies remain directly appointed, they have worked more than their predecessors in the British Permanent Representation, whereas the other half is composed of British officials who joined the Commission as directors and became Directors-General or deputy DGs a few years later. It is the case of Leslie Fielding, an ambassador who became Chief adviser of the External Relations DG and then head of the CE delegation in Tokyo before being appointed Director-General of the External Relations DG, or Fairclough, a British official during thirty years (mainly in the colonial and environmental sectors) before being appointed Director-general of the Environment DG and then deputy Director-general of the Development DG. That way, they have an experience at the Commission, even if their careers are more marked by a national dimension. During the 1990s, there are no more “direct appointments” of Directors-General who however went through a Permanent Representation<sup>14</sup>. Out of the ten Directors-General

---

<sup>14</sup> It concerns John Frederick Mogg, British official of trade and industry who alternates posts at the Permanent Representation and positions in the British senior civil service, before joining the Commission as a deputy Director-General and becoming Director-General of the internal market and industrial affairs DG and Director-General of the industrial market DG in 1993 and also David Roberts, official at the ministry of Agriculture since the 1970s who joins the British Permanent Representation in 1988 at the British Permanent Representation and becomes deputy Director-General of the Agriculture DG in 1991.

and their deputies appointed, eight have an experience within community institutions, which surpasses for half of them the national dimension of their careers<sup>15</sup>. Spanish are in a globally similar scenario<sup>16</sup>.

With a few exceptions, the examination of the average number of years spent by the agents of different nationalities in typical career stages (national or international private careers, public national and public European, political and union, etc.<sup>17</sup>) confirms these results. It allows to explain that German, Belgian and Luxembourg-native Directors-General and their deputies have an average career duration in community institutions that greatly surpasses the time spent in their respective national civil services. Unlikely, the British, the Spanish and the Greeks, who have national careers that surpass their « European » careers, the most « national » being the British whose Directors-General have nearly 14 years of national career and the deputies more than 16 years (against 6 and 5 years of « European » career). There again, notable differences between countries that have joined Europe at the same period are observed, particularly if we consider the cases of deputy Directors-General (see table in the appendices).

### **Type of career and number of years at a post for DGs before their appointment**

(the table should be read as follows : in an average German career what's the number of years spent in the private sector for example)

	Private national S.	Private internat. S.	Pub. nat. S.	Europ. Pub. S.	intern. Pub. S.	Pol. and union	Permanent Representation	SG
German(n=23)	1	0	5,5	14,5	0,7	0,5	0	0,5
British (n=16)	2,5	0,1	13,9	6,2	0,8	0	1	0,5
Austrian (n=1)	1	0	22	6	3	0	0	0
Belgian (n=9)	1	0	4	15	0,7	0	0	0
Danish (n=2)	0	0	14,5	7	0	0	3,5	0
Spanish (n=5)	3	0	11,4	6,6	2,6	0	3,5	0
French (n=16)	0	0	6,7	13,9	0,2	0	0,4	0
Greek (n=4)	1,6	0	11,3	6	2,3	0	0	0
Dutch(n=5)	0	0	11,6	7	0,2	2	0	0
Irish (n=1)	0	0	32	1	0	0	0	0
Italian (n=18)	2,2	0,2	11,7	5,5	2,5	0,1	0,5	0
Luxemb. (n=3)	3,6	0	1,3	14,7	0	7	0	2
Portuguese (n=1)	23	0	0	6	0	0	0	4

<sup>15</sup>. It is the case of Coleman, Jones, Richardson and Lowe.

<sup>16</sup>. To four direct nominations in the 1980s succeed in the 1990s nominations of agents who have made a great part of their career (2/7) or a considerable part of it (4/7) in community institutions. There again, in 1990 and 2000, the number of direct nominations becomes very minority, as only Valenzuela Marzo, diplomat appointed in 1999 deputy director-General at the directorate of external Relations is in that situation.

<sup>17</sup> The stays in permanent representations and Secretariates-General of the Commission are autonomized to measure their importance/influence.

Swedish (n=1)    0        0        27    5        0        0        0        0

*Variable Europeanization paths according to the sectors*

The Europeanization process appears finally cleaved according to the sectors. We can indeed show that DGs whose management is Europeanised, marked by a strong mobility in several sectors of the Commission as well as in cabinets, are structurally in conflict with the DGs whose management is more State-related and highly specialized. The most typical of the first group are the Competition DG and the Personnel DG, but other sectors can correspond to this type (internal market, development, press and information, telecommunication, regional policy, and all the most recent DGs). In this case The Directors-General and the deputy Directors-General made all their career or part of it in community institutions, but they experienced a strong mobility between sectors that they alternate with stays in Commissioners' cabinets. Unlikely, there are DGs far more sectional whose management is more specialized and seems more state-related. The typical DGs are here Industrial Affairs, Social Affairs, Agriculture, Transport, Environment, Energy. We will not come back here to the most typical cases of these polarities (on this point, Georgakakis de Lassalle, 2005). But, on the other hand, we would like to insist on the fact that the Europeanization of the Directors-General's profiles tends to affect sectors that were formerly known as the most technical and « national », and that it operates according to differentiated patterns according to the sectors.

The way the Europeanization of careers spreads, from the most political sectors to the most technical ones, is well reflected in the transformations experienced by the Transport DG (now Transport and Energy). This DG stands out by a recruitment that is both very national and very specialized since it was created. Italian Railway Officials, British Senior Officials specialized in maritime or air issues, an Italian scholar specialized in transport economy follow one another at the posts of Directors-General and deputy Directors-General until the end of the 1980s. The managers' prerogatives then transform, as the careers of the three last Directors-General or deputy DGs appointed show.

It concerns Robert Coleman. After being a lawyer in London at the beginning of his career, he joined the industrial affairs DG as an administrator in 1971. He spent much time there, becoming a head of unit in 1983 and Director in 1988 before being appointed Director-General of the Transport DG in 1990, a post he will hold until 2000, when he was appointed Director-General of the Health and Consumer Protection DG. It is also the case of Robert Lamoureux. After beginning his career as a scholar, he joins the Secretariat-General as an administrator in 1978 (78-80) then the Commission's Legal Service (81-83). Then, he became an adviser (85- 88) and then deputy head (89-92) in the cabinet of Jacques Delors, who was President of the Commission. Appointed Director of the legal service and then Director of the industrial policy (94-95) he became then deputy Director-General at the External Relations DG in 1996, before being appointed Director-General of the Transport and Energy DG in 2000. It is finally the case of Fernando Esteban Alonso, Spanish born in 1947, whose career is in itself a symbol of the sector's transformations. Scholar specialized in transport economy, he became an administrator at the European Conference of Ministers of Transport - OECD in Paris from 1968 to 1981. Then, he is President of the Spanish regional railways, and then Director-General of the shipping enterprise Navinoe and of the agricultural enterprises of the government's land, before joining the Commission as the Eurostat Director in 1989. He is then appointed Director at the personnel DG before becoming deputy Director-General of the Energy and Transport DG in 2001.

Those three careers recount several evolutions that can be spotted in all the careers of « technical » DGs, that are both connected with their Europeanization and their desectorialization. Europeanization because it seems more and more difficult to appoint to these posts of Directorate-General agents that are directly imported from the national administration ; desectorialization because careers seem structured by more and more marked mobility processes, even for representatives of the less “Europeanised” nationalities in the meaning we described before. Therefore, whereas in a first period the British used to directly import highly specialized officials in community institutions to hold specific post of Directorate-General, the current British Directors-General have careers that are marked both by a longer stay in community institutions and by a “ generalist” dimension reflected in a greater cross-sectional mobility. And these two dimensions exist in all the sectors of the commission where, in other words, they now structure the community’s political and administrative area.

This effect of closing and autonomization is obtained according to characteristics specific to each DG, which forbids to conclude that there is a total homogenization of the properties of the Directors-General. For all that, neutralization effects of the most salient properties of what has been described as « DG culture » (Abélès, Bellier, Mac Donald, 1993) are at work. This relative homogenization is for example reflected by the case of the Employment and Social Affairs DG.

The employment DG stands out insofar as its leaders – at least at the beginning- display more their « political ties », which makes the Directorate quite atypical. In an area where law and economy prevail, they have studied social sciences (J.D. Neirinck, first Director-General from 1963 to 1967 has a PhD in social sciences, R. Rifflet, second Director-General has studied History and teaches at the Sociological Institute). They publish articles or essays specialized in the social policy area, or even social Europe (J. Neirinck publishes for example *The Rome Treaty Social Policy and EEC Applied Labour Economics and Social Policy of the EEC* in 1969 and 1970, in circumstances where the « social Europe » theme is not yet politically mobilized; F. Vinck wonders about the *limites de l'action sociale de la Haute Autorité de la CECA*, R. Rifflet publishes several articles in the review “ Cahiers de Sociologie ”. Finally, they are more “ politicised”, or display more their political opinion (Neirinck is a trade unionist, Rifflet is President of the European International left and publishes in “ *Socialisme* ”, etc.). At such point that in 1973, the British appoint W.Shanks to the Directorate of the Employment DG, who is for once not a specialized official, but a former correspondent of the conservative *Financial Times*, who has spent several years in the British private sector.

From the end of the 1970s a « Europeanization » effect has been applied on the properties of the leaders of the Employment DG with the appointment of Jean Degimbe. He was a head of cabinet at the ECSC from 1958 to 1966, an adviser at the cabinet of Raymond Barre and then of François-Xavier Ortoli from 1967 to 1976, before being Director-General of the Employment DG until 1992. This logic will be pursued by the appointment of Hywel Ceri Jones and most of all of Odile Quintin<sup>18</sup>, with a long experience acquired within the Directorate-General. The appointment of Lonnröth, a Swedish of Finnish origin, last deputy

---

<sup>18</sup> . Head of unit of the DG6 in 1971, she went to the DG1 in 1974 where she remained until 1981 before holding the post of head of unit at the DG5 (82-93); her career speeded up after that as she became Director from 94 to 99 before being appointed deputy Director-General in 1999 and Director-General in 2000. She published : "L'Europe sociale. Enjeux et réalités", La doc française, 1999.

Director-General appointed, allows to reflect at the same time the effects of this Europeanization and the neutralization of the most specific properties of the former leaders (he has an ENA diploma (cycle for foreign students), he has a credit as an international expert as he was director of employment at the ILO before he was appointed) as well as the preservation of “social” logics of the DG, (he has a social sciences degree and he is a specialist in employment as he worked for a long time at the Swedish Ministry of Labour).

The example of the Economic Affairs DG - last case that we will study in this article -allows to show that the acculturation in community institutions and desectorialization is not the only way of “Europeanization” possible. The DG remains specific and atypical in a way, insofar as the study of the DG’s leaders’ careers show that they come from the economic sector of the state, that is to say the Departments of Finances and/ but also and foremost the big National Banks or the international economic sector (IMF, OECD, UN); it is therefore another form of “Europeanization” particularly “internationalised” and, in that sector very close to the elites of the international banking analysed by F. Lebaron (2000, pp 208-211),

Supprimé : ”

Several cases allow to illustrate this dimension. The case of Mosca, Director-General from 1967 to 1979 is a good example. He is indeed a diplomat who has alternated posts in embassies and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, before being directly appointed Director-General, which corresponds to the typical way of recruiting the first Directors-General. After him, the specificity of the Directorate stands out. Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa is an Italian born in 1940, with a degree in economics of the University Bocconi in Milan, and a Master in economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). After an experience in the private sector in a German firm (1966-1968), he joined the study department of the Bank of Italy as an economist and where he was going to make his career. He became Head of the “monetary market” department of the Bank in 1975 that he will leave to become Director-General of the DG2 five years later (1980-1985), before coming back as deputy Director-General, a post he will hold until 1997. As the President of the Italian stock exchange committee he returned to community institutions by being appointed member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB) at the end of his career. Heirich Matthes, a German appointed deputy director-General in 1983, alternated at posts in the national banking sector (he was Chief executive at the Bundesbank for more than ten years) and at the OECD at the beginning of his career. Massimo Russo, an Italian appointed Director-General the same year has a Masters degree from Yale. He alternated posts at the OECD and the IMF where he stayed for nearly 15 years. Antonio Costa was the UN Secretariate-General’s economic adviser for more than 10 years before he became deputy Secretary-General at the OECD and then Director-General of the DG2.

As a conclusion, we hope we understand better the Europeanization of Europe’s professionals’ paths. It is quite a slow process that goes through the construction of heavy structures, and particularly what we can call a European institutional capital, defined less and less by the ability to transform these national resources within “flag-bearing DGs” rather than by the accumulation of specifically European resources (in-house career, cabinets, feat of arms and internal political resources control, etc.). We still had to specify and perhaps balance more precisely all the conditions (often very heterogeneous) that lead to the structuring of this process in both its common and differentiated trends. As the variations analysed show, the appointment logics result at the same time from national and sectional differentiated European habits, political opportunities offered by the power distribution within the national political and administrative elites, enlargement circumstances, increased control of the States, and sectional development. It remains that the power distribution mechanisms between DGs and therefore

within European institutions seem to take over little by little or completely, or at least be more and more intergrated in the polarities specific to this area. From that point of view, the prosopographic analysis of European agents ends up being very close to the one of the state agents as it was realized by historians of the European states' construction between the seventeenth and nineteenth century: it leads to wonder, beyond the figures and the individual paths, about the movement by which political institutions build and structure themselves (Descimon, Schaub, Vincent, 1997).

## Bibliography

Abéles (M), Bellier (I.), MacDonald (M.), 1993 : *Approche anthropologique de la Commission européenne*, Commission Européenne, Bruxelles.

Cini (M.) : 1996a : «La Commission européenne : lieu d'émergence de cultures administratives. L'exemple de la DG IV et de la DG XI», *Revue française de science politique*, 46(3),

Cini (M.), 1996 : *The European Commission. Leadership, Organisation and Culture in the EU Administration*, Manchester, Manchester University Press

Collovald (A), 1988 : " Identité(s) stratégique(s) ", *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, n°73, pp.29-40

Descimon (R), Schaub (J.-F), Vincent (B), 1997 : *Les figures de l'administrateur. Institutions, réseaux, pouvoirs en Espagne, en France et au Portugal, 16<sup>ème</sup>-18<sup>ème</sup> siècle*, Paris, EHESS

Eymeri (J.M.), 2001 : *Pouvoir politique et haute administration. Une comparaison européenne*, Maastricht, IEAP.

Georgakakis (D.), 1999 : " Les réalités d'un mythe : figure de l'eurocrate et institutionnalisation " dans V. Dubois, D.Dulong (dir.), *La question technocratique. De l'invention d'une figure aux transformations de l'action publique*, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg.

Georgakakis (D), 2002 : " L'Europe sur le métier : pour une sociologie politique de la construction européenne ", in Georgakakis, dir, *Les métiers de l'Europe Politique. Acteurs et professionnalisations de l'Union européenne*, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, coll " sociologie politique européenne, p.9-32.

Georgakakis (D.), 2003 : " Les syndicats de fonctionnaires et la construction de la fonction publique européenne ", in Dehousse (R.), Surel (Y.), *L'institutionnalisation de l'Europe*, L'Harmattan.

Georgakakis (D.), de Lassalle (M), 2004 : "Les directeurs généraux de la Commission européenne : premiers éléments d'une enquête prosopographique", *Regards Sociologiques*.

Hooghe (L.), 1999 : " Supranational activists or intergovernmental agents ? : explaining the orientations of senior Commission officials ", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.32, n°4, p.435-463.

Hooghe, (L.), 2000 " Euro-socialists or Euro-marketers? : EU top officials on capitalism ", *Journal of Politics*, vol.62, n°2, p.430-454.

Joanna (J.) et Smith (A.), 2002. *Les Commissaires européens. Technocrates, diplomates ou politiques ?*, Paris, presses de Sciences-Po.

**Supprimé :** Pour conclure, on espère ainsi mieux comprendre l'eupéanisation des trajectoires des professionnels de l'Europe. Il s'agit d'un processus assez lent lié qui passe par la construction de structures lourdes, et notamment ce qu'on pourrait appeler un capital européen, défini par l'accumulation de ressources proprement européennes (carrière maison, cabinets, etc.) ou à la capacité à convertir ses ressources nationales au sein d'une " DG à drapeaux ". Il n'en demeurent pas moins qu'il existe des variations qui engagent des usages nationaux différenciés de l'Europe, mais aussi des logiques propres à cet espace. C'est notamment le cas des conjonctures historiques d'élargissement ou de contrôle accrues des Etats et des mécanismes de distribution du pouvoir entre directions générales. De ce point de vue, l'analyse prosopographique des agents de l'Europe est en définitive très proche de celle des agents de l'Etat : elle invite au delà des chiffres et des trajectoires individuelles à s'interroger sur le mouvement même par lequel se construit l'institution (descimon, schaub vincent). ¶

Lebaron (F.), 2000 : *La croyance économique, les économistes entre science et politique*, Paris, Seuil, coll Liber

Mendras (H.), Suleiman (E.) 1995 (ed.), *Le recrutement des élites en Europe*, Paris, La découverte.

Mathiot (P.) et Sawicki (F.), “ Les membres des cabinets ministériels socialistes en France (1981-1993). Recrutement et reconversion, *Revue Française de Science politique*, vol.49, n° 1 et 2, février et avril 1999.

Page (E.C.), *People who run Europe*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.

*Politix*, 1998 : “ l’Europe en formation(s) ”, n° 43, L’Harmattan.

Radaelli (C.), 2003, « The Europeanization of public policy », in Featherstone K, Radaelli C., (eds), *The Politics of Europeanisation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 27-56.

Smith (A.) 2004 (ed), *Politics and the European Commission : actors, interdependence, legitimacy*, Routledge, ECPR.

Spence (D.), 1997 : *Structure, Functions and procedures in the Commission*, in Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence (eds) *The European Commission*, London, Catermill, 2ed

Trondal (J.), 2004, “ Political dynamics of the “parallel administration” of the European Commission”, in Smith (A.) (eds), *Politics and the European Commission : actors, interdependence, legitimacy*, Routledge, ECPR