Tax Evasion and Social Interactions - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Public Economics Année : 2007

Tax Evasion and Social Interactions

Résumé

The paper extends the standard tax evasion model by allowing for social interactions. In Manski's (1993) nomenclature, our model takes into account endogenous interactions, i.e., social conformity effects, exogenous interactions, i.e., fairness effects, and correlated effects. Our model is tested using experimental data. Participants must decide how much income to report given individual and group tax rates and audit probabilities, and given a feedback on the
other members' reporting behavior. Myopic and self-consistent expectations are considered in the analysis. In the latter case, the estimation is based on a two-limit simultaneous tobit with fixed group effects. A unique social equilibrium exists when the model satisfies coherency conditions. In line with Brock and Durlauf (2001b), the intrinsic nonlinearity between individual and group responses helps identify the model. Our results provide evidence of fairness effects but reject social conformity.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
MS_2005-021_FinalMarch07.pdf (221.33 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

halshs-00238448 , version 1 (30-03-2009)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-00238448 , version 1

Citer

Bernard Fortin, Guy Lacroix, Marie Claire Villeval. Tax Evasion and Social Interactions. Journal of Public Economics, 2007, 91 (11-12), pp. 2089-2112. ⟨halshs-00238448⟩
161 Consultations
1580 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More