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## Introduction

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# Introduction

## An Old Bridge for a New Bosnia?

Along with the siege of Sarajevo, the concentration camps of Prijedor and the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, the destruction of the *stari most* (old bridge) of Mostar on 9 November 1993 has become one of the main symbols of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>1</sup> Its reconstruction eleven years later, on 23 July 2004, was hailed as a triumph for the ‘international community’ and a step towards reconciliation among the three constituent *narodi* (peoples<sup>2</sup>) of Bosnia: the Muslims/Bosniacs,<sup>3</sup> the Serbs and the Croats.<sup>4</sup> The dual symbolism of the destruction and rebirth of the *stari most* made it an apt image to grace the covers of several books about wartime and post-war Bosnia. As always, however, such symbolism conceals as much as it reveals about the realities of the war and its aftermath: what appears on book covers is in large part a representation produced by and for the international community, along with the local elites who are linked to it. In other words, the *stari most* is most often perceived ‘from above’ (from the top down).

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<sup>1</sup> The term ‘Bosnia’ hereafter refers to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole.

<sup>2</sup> In socialist Yugoslavia, a clear distinction was established between the six South-Slavic constituent *narodi* (peoples) of the Yugoslav federation (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, Macedonians and Montenegrins) and the national minorities – also called *narodnosti* (‘nationalities’) – living in the country. Although the English term ‘people’ is the official translation of the term ‘*narod*’ in post-war Bosnia, contributors to this book were given their own choice of terminology (nation, nationality, ethno-national group, etc.).

<sup>3</sup> The name ‘Muslim’ (*Musliman*, with a capital ‘M’) has been used to designate the Slavic-speaking Muslims of Bosnia since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but became their official national name only in 1968. In September 1993, the *Bošnjački sabor* (Bosniac Assembly) declared ‘Bosniac’ (*Bošnjak*) to be the new national name. The latter should not be confused with the term ‘Bosnian’ (*Bosanac*), which applies to all inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas ‘Bosniac’ was introduced in 1995 into the new Bosnian Constitution, the name ‘Muslim’ is still frequently used in everyday conversations. Therefore, contributors to this book had the choice of using either of these terms.

<sup>4</sup> According to the population census carried out in 1991, on the eve of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina had 4,364,574 inhabitants, of whom 1,905,829 (43.7 percent) declared themselves as Muslims, 1,369,258 (31.4 percent) as Serbs, 755,895 (17.3 percent) as Croats and 239,845 (5.5 percent) as Yugoslavs.

In the first place, the *stari most* retains its symbolic power as a bridge between Croat and Muslim erstwhile enemies only if one ignores some realities on the ground, starting with the fact that the bridge does not actually connect Croat and Bosniac parts of Mostar but two banks of the Bosniac sector – the line of division in most of the town runs more to the west, along the main boulevard. A detailed inquiry would further reveal a variety of meanings attached to the bridge by local residents, only some of whom treat it as a symbol of multi-ethnic Bosnia. When the keystone was placed in the top of the arch of the ‘new old bridge’, it was covered with lilies, the flower that has become a symbol of the Bosniac people. A few hundred meters away, in the Mostar Franciscan monastery, a fresco depicts Ottoman soldiers throwing Catholic monks from the bridge. Further investigation would also show discord between French and German architects competing for control of the reconstruction, and the dismissal of local stonemasons, trained especially for the project, when a Turkish firm was given the final contract for the work. The ‘new old bridge’, meant as a symbol of reconciliation, can thus also be perceived as an object of intense material and symbolic rivalries involving both local and global actors (see e.g. Grodach 2002).

In this book, we aim to offer a similar reversal of perspectives by considering post-war Bosnia ‘from below’. In the existing literature, Bosnia is often presented as an ‘ethnic mosaic’ that has been undone by ethnic cleansing (Jansen 2005). What this volume demonstrates, however, is that the Bosnian ‘mosaic’ has always been and continues to be multilayered: while there are still some forms of interethnic coexistence in Bosnia, the war has not only affected ethno-national identifications, but also a large array of other categories such as urbanity and rurality, gender, generation, class and occupation. The chapters of this book thus shed new light on the multiple social groups and conflicts, individual and collective memories, moral categories and claims that shape Bosnian society, the various interactions unfolding between local and global actors, and the ruptures and continuities of the post-war period. This introduction contextualizes these studies by reviewing the dramatic events experienced in Bosnia since 1990 and the ways in which they have been represented by scholars and other analysts. We then discuss the approach ‘from below’ underlying this collection and present the chapters themselves along with the main themes they address.

## **The War in Bosnia and its Aftermath**

The beginning of the war in Bosnia in April 1992 cannot be explained outside the larger context of the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia. To be sure, the existence of Bosnia pre-dates the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918, but its inclusion into a multinational state at least partially explains its preservation as both an autonomous territorial entity and a multiethnic society. In 1939, the growing rivalry between Serbs and Croats within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia led to the first territorial partition of Bosnia. Two years later, Bosnia was annexed by the



Map 1 The Western Balkans

Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, NDH), and the war opposing the Croat fascist *ustaze* allied with Axis forces, Serb royalist *četnici*, and communist Partisans took more than 300,000 lives. In 1945, the new socialist and federal Yugoslavia re-established Bosnia-Herzegovina as a republic within its former territorial boundaries. This contributed to the restoration of the interethnic balance that had been profoundly disturbed by World War II, and to the silencing of Serb and Croat territorial claims on Bosnia. Twenty-three years later, in 1968, the League of Communists recognized the Muslims as the third constituent people of the republic, thus elevating them to the same status as the Serbs and Croats.

In the 1980s, the crisis of socialist Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalist ideologies (see e.g. Gagnon 2004; Hayden 1999; Woodward 1995a) thus represented a threat to the very existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which did not escape the rise to power of nationalist parties (see Andjelic 2003). On 18 November 1990, the first free elections were won by three parties organized along ethno-national lines: the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka demokratske akcije*, SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (*Srpska demokratska stranka*, SDS) and the Croat Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ). During the following year, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia proclaimed their independence, while the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska narodna armija*, JNA), together with various Serb paramilitary formations, seized about one third of Croatia's territory. Already by this time, the Serbian and Croatian presidents, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman respectively, were contemplating the partition of Bosnia as a possible solution to their territorial ambitions. On the ground, the nationalist parties in power began to confront each other more and more violently over the political fate of the republic. In the autumn of 1991, the SDS and HDZ began to create Serb and Croat 'autonomous regions'. In March 1992, the organization of a referendum on independence, its boycott by the SDS and the creation of a self-proclaimed 'Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' (*Republika Srpska*, RS) announced the collapse of the consociational mechanisms that had been meant to ensure the institutional cohesiveness of Bosnia.

On 6 April 1992, war extended into Bosnia (see e.g. Bougarel 1996; Burg and Shoup 1999; Magaš and Žanić 2001) and Serb forces began their siege of Sarajevo. At first, the Army of *Republika Srpska* (*Vojska Republike Srpske*, VRS) with the support of the former Yugoslav army and of neighbouring Serbia, confronted the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, ARBiH) and the Croat Defence Council (*Hrvatsko vijeće obrane*, HVO). In May 1993, however, the HDZ's creation of the self-proclaimed 'Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna' (*Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna*) led to fierce fighting between Muslims and Croats in Herzegovina and central Bosnia. This conflict was ended in March 1994, under strong diplomatic pressure from the United States, by the Washington Agreement, which established the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine*) based on strictly consociational institutions and divided into ethnically defined cantons. The

readjustment of the military balance after the discrete US circumvention of the UN weapons embargo and the dramatic reconfiguration of frontline positions between July and October 1995 then led to the opening of peace negotiations at a US military base in Dayton (Ohio), and to the signing of the General Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995.

From April 1992 to December 1995, the war was increasingly internationalized (see e.g. Burg and Shoup 1999; Gow 1997). At the diplomatic level, various peace plans were put forward by the EU, the UN and the great power ‘Contact Group’, before the United States imposed its own solution. On the ground, humanitarian aid was provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), while the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was repeatedly extended (for the reopening of the Sarajevo airport, then for escorts of humanitarian convoys, and finally, to protect the ‘safe areas’ created by the UN Security Council in May 1993). At the same time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became more and more involved in the progression of the war, as illustrated by the February 1994 ultimatum directed at Serb forces besieging Sarajevo and the bombing campaign against Serb positions in Autumn 1995. This internationalization of the war hastened the redefinition of the role of various regional and international organizations in Europe and prompted some major changes in international law, such as the recognition of the right to use force for humanitarian purposes, and the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in February 1993.

The increasing internationalization of the Bosnian war is due as much to the larger post-Cold War climate as to its sheer brutality. The war was the most deadly conflict in Europe since World War II with an estimated 100,000 – 150,000 people killed. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ (*etničko čišćenje*), the violent expulsion of certain populations in order to create ethnically homogenous territories, was used systematically by Serb and Croat forces and resulted in the displacement of more than 2,100,000 people, or about half of the pre-war Bosnian population (see e.g. Bassiouni 1994; Gow 2003). Only the cities of Sarajevo and Tuzla, which were controlled by the Bosnian Army, maintained relative ethnic diversity, while Banja Luka was emptied of most of its non-Serb population and Mostar was divided into Bosniac and Croat sectors. Ethnic cleansing meant serious war crimes committed against the civilian population, including murders, torture and rape, which have been documented by the UN and various human rights organizations. In July 1995, Serb forces overran the erstwhile UN ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica, killing about 8,000 Bosniac men and expelling the rest of the population. The Srebrenica massacre led the ICTY to charge Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, respectively the highest-ranking political and military leaders of the RS, with genocide. In August 2001, General Radislav Krstić, former commander of the Serb forces in eastern Bosnia, was convicted of genocide by the ICTY for his participation in the Srebrenica

massacre, and the sentence was upheld by the ICTY Court of Appeals in April 2004.<sup>5</sup>

In December 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement made official the existence of two distinct entities (the Federation and the *Republika Srpska*) within a minimal common institutional framework, and drew a demilitarized Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) beyond which the three warring parties had to withdraw (see e.g. Bieber 2005; Bose 2002). In this way, the peace agreement endorsed the territorialization of the constituent peoples of Bosnia and therefore also the main result of war and ethnic cleansing. At the same time, however, it confirmed the existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state and prioritized the implementation of human rights, beginning with the right to return for all displaced persons (DPs) and refugees. These founding paradoxes of Dayton, with the diverging implications of its military and civilian aspects, the gap between its institutional mechanisms (based on ethnically defined territorial units) and its demographic aims (return of DPs and refugees), have made it the object of never-ending polemics at both the local and international levels. At the same time, Bosnian institutions themselves have become more and more elaborate: in 1999, the municipality of Brčko was turned into a neutral District; in 2002, important constitutional amendments extended the constituent status (*konstituiranost*) of the Bosniac, Serb and Croat peoples to the whole territory of Bosnia and introduced new complex consociational mechanisms at all institutional levels (Bieber 2005; ICG 2002c).

At the military level, the Dayton Peace Agreement created the Implementation Force (IFOR), renamed the Stabilization Force (SFOR) one year later, to replace the wartime UNPROFOR. This new international force numbered 60,000 troops and fell under NATO command; its mandate was to supervise the implementation of the military part of the peace agreement (separation of the warring parties, control of the IEBL) and, further, to contribute to lasting internal security. The civilian aspects of the peace agreement were entrusted to a foreign High Representative,<sup>6</sup> whose main role was originally to ensure that the signatories to the agreement implemented it and to coordinate the activities of the various international organizations and agencies present on the ground, beginning with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (elections, democratization), the International Police Task Force (IPTF) (monitoring of police forces), the UNHCR (return of displaced persons and refugees), the Commission on Real Property Claims (CRPC) (restoration of confiscated real estate), the EU and the World Bank (humanitarian aid, reconstruction) (see e.g. Bose 2002; ESI 2000).

It is possible to divide the post-war period into several distinct periods according to the internal social and political evolution and to the transformation of

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<sup>5</sup> For all ICTY indictments and rulings, see <<http://www.un.org/icty>>.

<sup>6</sup> The High Representative is appointed by an international Peace Implementation Council, to which he presents regular progress reports (see <<http://www.ohr.int>>).



Map 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (with the sites discussed in this volume)

the international presence. The first period, from January 1996 to July 1997, was dominated by the consolidation of the peace, with the deployment of SFOR, the transfer to the Federation of most of the Serb-held neighbourhoods and suburbs around Sarajevo, the establishment of the IEBL and provisory common institutions, and the reconstruction of basic infrastructure (roads and bridges, electricity and telecommunication networks, etc.). But the political elites tied to the war maintained their hegemonic position. In September 1996, the first post-war general elections were won by the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ, despite a split in the SDA that had led to the creation of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Stranka za Bosnu i Herzegovinu*, SBiH) by wartime Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić.<sup>7</sup> Laws on 'abandoned' real estate and the privatization of public enterprises were passed by ruling parties in both entities in the attempt to consolidate the results of ethnic cleansing. At that time, international actors largely accepted this situation: the High Representative restricted his role to mediation between the ruling nationalist parties; OSCE endorsed the results of the elections despite massive fraud and political pressures; SFOR refused to consider the arrest of war criminals as part of its mission; and the World Bank turned to the dominant political elites to implement its reconstruction programs. The RS, however, was subject to financial sanctions, following its refusal to participate to the common institutions established by Dayton.

During the second period, from July 1997 to July 1999, the hegemony of the nationalist parties began to weaken and the international community became more directly involved in political and social processes. In July 1997, a serious crisis broke out between the leadership of the SDS, closely linked to Radovan Karadžić and hostile to the peace agreement, and Biljana Plavšić, President of the RS, who took a more conciliatory stance. Finally, SFOR prevented a coup attempt against Plavšić and, following special elections in the RS in December 1997, pressure from the High Representative facilitated the appointment of Milorad Dodik, leader of the Party of Independent Social Democrats (*Stranka nezavisnih socijaldemokrata*, SNSD), as the new RS Prime Minister. This successful move then led the Peace Implementation Council to grant new powers to the High Representative (the 'Bonn powers'), which allowed him to dismiss elected politicians and civil servants deemed to be obstructing the implementation of Dayton, and to impose legislative measures when Bosnian political actors could not reach a compromise.

In the months that followed, High Representative Carlos Westendorp pushed through various laws on new state symbols and personal identification documents, a common currency (the *Konvertibilna Marka*, KM) and uniform car number plates, while thoroughly amending the entity laws on 'abandoned' real estate. These moves, along with the expansion of the activities of other international organizations, strongly contributed to the restoration of relative freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and to the beginnings of an effective return and

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<sup>7</sup> For all electoral results, see the website of the Election Commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina, <<http://www.izbori.ba>>.

restitution process (41,191 'minority returns' in 1998, out of which 6,586 in the RS). Nevertheless, the political changes brought by the general elections of September 1998 were limited: in the Federation, the SDA and HDZ still dominated political life in spite of some electoral losses; in the RS, the *Sloga* ('Harmony') coalition led by Milorad Dodik retained its majority in the National Assembly thanks to the support of Bosniac and Croat representatives, but the ultra-nationalist Nikola Poplašen defeated Biljana Plavšić in the presidential election. Thereafter, international pressures became even stronger, as evidenced by Poplašen's dismissal in March 1999 following his refusal to reappoint Dodik as Prime Minister.

The 'Bonn powers' thus enabled the High Representative to remove some major obstacles to the implementation of Dayton, but in the long run this threatened to distort Bosnian political life and deprive local institutions of any real power and legitimacy. From July 1999 onward, the priority of the new High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch was thus to unify the political forces opposed to the nationalist parties and to hand over responsibility for implementing the peace agreement to local actors. At first, this 'ownership' strategy enjoyed some significant successes. In the Federation, the general elections held in November 2000 resulted in a severe defeat for the SDA and the rise to power of the Alliance for Change (*Alijansa za promjene*), led by the Social Democratic Party (*Socijaldemokratska partija*, SDP) and the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBiH) (ESI 2001b; ICG 2002a). This success, however, was tarnished in the RS by the collapse of the *Sloga* coalition and the return to power of the SDS in alliance with the Party of Democratic Progress (*Partija demokratskog progresna*, PDP). Ultimately, attempts by the HDZ to establish a third Croat entity in the Spring of 2001, the political conflicts and personal rivalries that undermined the Alliance and the enduring paralysis of state-level institutions compelled Petritsch to resort to the 'Bonn powers': he dismissed several high-ranking Croat politicians in March 2001 and imposed a new election law in August 2001, as well as significant constitutional amendments in April 2002.

The period stretching from July 1999 to November 2002, which most of the chapters of this book address, is therefore especially crucial. For the first time, political forces supported by the international community were in power. On the ground, 'minority returns' (261,617 between 2000 and 2002, with 109,156 in the RS) and property restitutions (67.8 percent of reclaimed properties having been restored by the end of 2002) were gaining momentum without leading to outbreaks of violence as some had anticipated. Against this background, Bosnia's future became closely linked with the potential success of the Alliance for Change and the 'ownership' policy promoted by Petritsch. From this perspective, however, the political and social changes of this period remain quite limited. The 2002 constitutional reforms extending the constituent status of the Bosniac, Serb and Croat peoples to the whole territory of Bosnia significantly modified the institutional framework established by Dayton (Bieber 2005; ICG 2002c). Other important reforms were launched in the fields of civil service, taxation, the armed forces, secret services, justice, and education, with the aim of strengthening

common institutions and turning Bosnia into a viable state. Yet all of these reforms were implemented only partially and with utmost difficulty, and the return and restitution process itself turned out to be extremely complex (see e.g. Cox 1998; ICG 2002b; Ito 2001; O'Thuatail and Dahlman 2005; Philpott 2005). The economic situation in the country remained appalling, with the unemployment rate close to 40 percent of the working-age population and strong social tensions resulting from the dismantling of the social welfare system inherited from the socialist and wartime periods.

Furthermore, while all these changes reflect a gradual normalization of the political and social climate in Bosnia, they are probably due less to the actions of the Alliance for Change than to the repeated interventions by the international community and to changes in the regional context, especially the death of Tudman in December 1999, the electoral defeat of the HDZ in Croatia in January 2000, and the fall of Milošević in Serbia in October 2000. This fact underscores some of the limits and paradoxes of Petritsch's 'ownership' policy. When he left Bosnia in June 2002, the role of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in local institutional and political contests was probably more important than ever. Four months later, after the general elections in November 2002, the three nationalist parties were back in power. Thus, two years after the election of the Alliance had aroused such great hopes, Bosnia seemed to be back to the situation of November 1990 (ICG 2003).

It would be misleading, however, to label this a 'return to the beginning'. On the contrary, as the nationalist parties regained power, international actors abandoned their last hopes that the consequences of war and ethnic cleansing could be completely undone. Whereas the restitution process was close to completion (92.5 percent of the reclaimed property having been restored at the end of 2003), the number of 'minority returns' had started to decrease sharply (44,868 in 2003, with 18,051 in the RS; 17,948 in 2004, with 7,718 in the RS), and the on-going crisis of the Bosnian economy and public finances presented additional obstacles to the implementation of the 2002 constitutional amendments. On the other hand, the return of the nationalist parties did not lead to a renewal of ethnic violence. Economic recovery and integration into Europe became the international community's new priorities, as evidenced by Bosnia's admission to the Council of Europe in October 2002 and the handover to the EU of missions previously administered through other international organizations (IPTF was replaced in January 2003 by the European Union Police Mission, EUPM, and SFOR in December 2004 by the European Military Force, EUFOR).

At the same time, the new High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, became more hesitant: after trying to garner support from the nationalist parties for the implementation of reforms initiated by his predecessor, Ashdown also resorted extensively to the 'Bonn powers'. In June and December 2004, after NATO rejected Bosnia's candidature to its 'Partnership for Peace' program due to the RS's refusal to arrest war criminals, the High Representative dismissed several high-ranking members of the SDS. The resulting institutional paralysis, together

with the approach of the tenth anniversary of Dayton, reactivated simmering debates about the need to revise the Constitution attached to the peace agreement (see e.g. Bieber 2005; Chandler 2005; Solioz 2005). The last months of 2005, however, were marked by some institutional breakthroughs: the RS National Assembly accepted the principle of unified military and police forces, and, on 25 November 2005, negotiations between Bosnia and the European Commission on a Stabilization and Association Agreement began.

### **Dayton: A Distorting Lens for Post-War Bosnian Realities?**

Since 1992, editorialists and social scientists have often used the case of Bosnia to point to a return of ‘ethnic nationalisms’, the rise of a specific kind of ‘new war’, or the failure of ‘traditional peacekeeping’. Similarly, since the mid-1990s, Bosnia has occupied a prominent place in peace studies and international relations theory. It is difficult to establish an exhaustive assessment of the literature on post-war Bosnia, as it involves authors with a wide range of perspectives and academic backgrounds. Moreover, this literature has evolved over the years, reflecting changes in the Bosnian situation itself. The first observation that must be made is that the ways in which post-war realities have been analyzed largely reflect perceptions of the war itself. Between 1992 and 1996, most of the literature on Bosnia consisted of testimonies, journalistic enquiries and official reports on the ongoing war and ethnic cleansing campaigns (e.g. Bassiouni 1994; Gutman 1993; Rohde 1997). Academic publications were much less common; those that appeared were mostly based on research done before the war (e.g. Bax 1995; Bringa 1995; Donia and Fine 1994; Malcolm 1994b). Most of these strove to refute the thesis put forth by bestselling authors that Bosnia was a country torn apart by ‘ancient hatreds’ (Kaplan 1993) or a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 1997). This wartime literature played a key role in revealing war crimes to a large international audience and in preparing the ground for a better understanding of the country. However, because it was influenced by the central issue of the definition of the war – civil war or foreign military aggression – this literature often neglected the role of economic motivations in the dynamics of war and ethnic cleansing (see e.g. Andreas 2004; Bojičić and Kaldor 1999), or the full complexity of political and military configurations on the ground (see e.g. Bax 2000; Bjelaković and Strazzari 1999; Duijzings 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). Moreover, the will to ‘deconstruct nationalism’ (Campbell 1998) and to valorise ‘betrayed traditions’ (Donia and Fine 1994) led some authors to oversimplify the history of interethnic relations in Bosnia and to reify other aspects of Bosnian social realities, such as the cleavage between town and countryside (see e.g. Allcock 2002; Bougarel 1999b).

Early analyses of the post-war period were similarly driven by various critical stances toward the war, including toward the role played by international actors. This was especially true in the first years following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. At that time, the literature on Bosnia remained structured around

binary oppositions: the two dominant scenarios for Bosnia – ‘gradual reintegration’ vs. ‘definitive partition’ – tended to reflect the two definitions of the war as ‘aggression’ or ‘civil war’. In the first scenario, obstruction by nationalist parties was perceived as the main obstacle to the ‘undoing’ of ethnic cleansing and the ‘restoration’ of a multiethnic Bosnia, and the international community was once again criticized for its lack of determination (e.g. Cousens and Cater 2001). In the second scenario, all attempts at preserving the existence of Bosnia were dismissed as illusory, as the war was said to have revealed the futility of imposing a common institutional framework onto irremediably hostile populations (e.g. Chandler 1999). These two scenarios, however, share an important feature: both draw on the political projects and interpretative schemes that dominated the war period, thereby obscuring a more nuanced understanding of what are complex, changing and often paradoxical realities.

At the end of the 1990s, academics and other experts began to more closely scrutinize important phenomena such as the role of clientelistic networks and practices in the maintenance of nationalist party hegemony (ESI 1999), the impact of neo-liberal policies on the (non)restoration of the state (e.g. Donais 2005; Pugh 2002, Stojanov 2001), and various attempts to promote ‘civil society’ through new-style NGOs (e.g. Belloni 2001; Chandler 1998; Smillie 1996). Case studies on topics like ‘minority returns’ or local institutions also began to supplement more general work that was not based on field research. At the same time, the political and social transformations experienced in Bosnia led to a gradual reformulation of the debates that dominated the immediate post-war period. On one hand, the strengthening of the powers of the High Representative and of the international organizations present on the ground prompted growing questions about the possible unintended effects of the transformation of Bosnia into a ‘quasi-protectorate’ (e.g. Bose 2002; ICG 2003; Zaum 2003) and the need to develop an ‘ownership’ policy that would return the responsibility for the peace process to local actors (e.g. ESI 2001a; ICG 2003; Solioz 2005). On the other hand, the precarious consolidation of state-level institutions, the increasing pluralization of Bosnian politics and the incomplete return of DPs rendered obsolete those analyses based on the ‘reintegration vs. partition’ binary. These were replaced with more balanced discussions on the adaptation of institutional frameworks and territorial divides inherited from Dayton (Caspersen 2004; ESI 2004; Solioz 2005), and on the reform of key state sectors such as the armed forces, justice and education. Within a decade, Bosnia thus became the object of a very rich and diverse literature, through which an impressive amount of data has been collected. This literature has also contributed to the crystallization of larger debates about contemporary peacekeeping and state-building operations and the place they occupy in the ‘new world (dis)order’ (see e.g. Bellamy and Williams 2004; Paris 2005).

In spite of their contribution, however, many analyses of post-war Bosnia share some common flaws, starting with the perception of post-war Bosnia through the lens of Dayton. Much of the existing literature takes the Dayton Peace Agreement

as a starting point in order to assess its (non)implementation and ultimately to consider conceivable long-term political solutions. From such a perspective, the various realities of post-war Bosnian society are either framed in terms of the legal categories set forth in the peace agreement or simply dismissed as trivial because they do not fit into this framework. To be sure, political and social processes on the ground are indeed influenced by Dayton and its implementation, but they can in no way be reduced to it. Over the years, assessments of Dayton have become more nuanced and better informed. Nevertheless, the literature on post-war Bosnia remains dominated by legal scholars and political scientists, producing an overemphasis on institutional and electoral issues, excessive influence by the main international organizations on academic research, and an over-reliance on these organizations' official reports and websites or interviews with their representatives. The main consequence of this approach 'from above' is that the way Bosnian citizens relate to the experience of war and the uncertainties of the post-war period have been either ignored or reduced to data from opinion polls and interviews with local 'experts' and NGO leaders.<sup>8</sup>

A related flaw that appears in many analyses is the reduction of Bosnian realities to their ethnic dimensions. This 'ethnic bias' is obvious in the work of authors who favour partition scenarios and therefore tend to emphasize ethnic conflicts. In a more indirect and unexpected way, though, this has also been present among the advocates of a unified Bosnia. Not only do some of them give in to interpretations of the war in terms of collective guilt, but they also tend to reduce its impact to the spatial separation of ethno-national groups, a process they argue that the marginalization of nationalist elites and the revision of Dayton would be sufficient to 'undo'. Paradoxically, such analysts therefore tend to focus on the very constitutional issues that nationalist parties want to keep at the top of the political agenda. Moreover, the increased use of ethnic quotas following the 2002 constitutional reform, along with the continued proliferation of ethnic statistics and maps by the organizations in charge of the return process, show how the very notion of 'undoing ethnic cleansing' risks trapping the Bosnian population within the ethno-national categories these very organizations purport to reject (Jansen 2005). At the same time, other changes and continuities have gone largely unnoticed or are still subordinated to a normative reading of the war and its aftermath. It was only after the defeats of the *Sloga* coalition and the Alliance for Change, for example, that the majority of commentators discovered that authoritarianism and corruption were not limited to nationalist parties (see, however, Chandler 2002), and that such political practices were partly inherited from the socialist period (see, however, ESI 1999).

The difficulties international organizations have met in their endeavours to 'rebuild the state' and 'promote civil society' in post-war Bosnia and other post-war contexts have led specialists of peace studies to place increasing emphasis on

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<sup>8</sup> Paradoxically enough, such a tendency appears even in work that strives to develop a critical approach to international intervention.

the (lack of) interaction between local and international actors (see e.g. Pouligny 2004) and the (non)regeneration of social and political bonds (see e.g. Pugh 2000; Stover and Weinstein 2004). A comparison with the existing anthropological literature on peacekeeping operations (see e.g. Cockburn and Žarkov 2002; Duijzings 2002a, 2002c), return and reconciliation processes (see e.g. Grandits and Kosztanyi 2003; Leutloff-Grandits 2005) or non-governmental organizations (see e.g. Sampson 2002b; Stubbs and Deacon 1998) in former Yugoslavia reveals both points of convergence and divergence. Against this background, we now turn to a discussion of the ethnographic perspectives used in this book, in hopes of demonstrating their advantages in contributing to a better understanding of post-war Bosnia, and of encouraging a fruitful dialogue between anthropologists and other social scientists working on post-war societies.

### **From Socialist Ethnology to Socio-Cultural Anthropology**

The impetus for this book came out of the editors' own experiences: as we conducted research in post-war Bosnia (Duijzings 2002b; Helms 2003a; World Bank 2002), we were struck by the disconnects between 'top-down' political analyses and what we and other researchers were seeing 'on the ground'. Inevitably, because of the focus on local-level fieldwork, most contributors to this volume are anthropologists, but we also included authors from other disciplines who use ethnographic methods. The goal is to describe and theorize the dynamics of social and political life from the perspective of those who do not appear in dominant, 'top-down' historical and political analyses (see e.g. Eriksen 1995). As Chris Hann has pointed out in the context of post-socialist Europe, ethnographic studies focus attention on ordinary people and marginalized segments of the society, giving voice to their preoccupations and worldviews rather than denying them agency (Hann 1994).

Following the assertions of anthropologists working on other post-socialist (e.g. Burawoy and Verdery 1998; Hann 2002) and war-torn societies (e.g. Das and Kleinman 2000, 2001; Nordstrom 1995), we argue that a local-level approach to post-war Bosnia has much to offer, since it provides for a more nuanced and holistic understanding of local contexts and is better able to represent the complexities of everyday life. Careful attention to local dynamics reveals historical continuities and discontinuities as well as systems of meaning that are not always immediately obvious to the outside observer. Further, by describing local conditions along with the experiences and strategies of the actors involved, this approach allows for a disengagement of scholarly analysis from various agendas (whether 'local' or 'Western') and a deconstruction of the essentialist bias through which Bosnia has often been represented and understood. Approaching social and political realities 'from below' can thus offer explanations from an 'insiders' perspective', illuminating such questions as, for instance, why nationalism is still a

dominant force in Bosnia, but also why local actors do not always behave according to nationalist logic.

In order to further contextualize the studies presented in this volume, we find it useful to briefly outline the history of local-level research done in Bosnia since 1945. In socialist Yugoslavia, as in all of Central and Eastern Europe, this primarily took the form of ethnology, a largely descriptive and atheoretical discipline that was mostly concerned with documenting rural material culture, folklore and customs as a way of ‘discovering’ the national ‘Self’.<sup>9</sup> During the socialist period, the political climate in Bosnia was one of the most repressive in all of Yugoslavia, which meant that ethnographic research on ethnicity, religion, or interethnic relations was especially controlled. Ethnology was allotted few resources, had little visibility, and ethnologists were forced to restrict themselves to ‘harmless’ topics such as material culture (Beljkašić-Hadžidedić 1988; Buturović and Kajmaković 1988). As a consequence, while ethnologists in Zagreb, Ljubljana and Belgrade would eventually adopt some of the more theoretically-driven approaches of Western social and cultural anthropology, such a development did not occur in Bosnia.

Too much scrutiny of interethnic relations would have risked exposing what Mahmut Mujačić observed in 1972, that ‘in everyday life, in the relations among ... [ethno-]national groups, the [ethno-]national question is in some way present; “that spark is smouldering” and it’s enough for people to start talking about it ... for the spark to ignite’ (Mujačić 1972: 1092). It was thus impossible for Bosnian ethnologists to develop a research agenda that would tackle such problems as the rising interethnic tensions in the 1980s (Beljkašić-Hadžidedić 1988: 72). During the socialist period, the rare Bosnian scholars who did venture to write about local-level interethnic relations were historians, sociologists or political scientists, rather than ethnologists.<sup>10</sup> These researchers emphasized the ambivalence of *komšilik* (good neighbourliness) or the importance of rural/urban migrations, clientelistic networks, religious institutions and collective memories. However, some of them fell afoul of the Bosnian League of Communists, or published their work only as confidential reports. Against this background, foreign (Western) anthropologists played an important role in addressing these issues in unconcealed terms, despite

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<sup>9</sup> Whereas classical ethnology sought to ‘discover’ the national ‘Self’, socio-cultural anthropology has developed in the West around the ‘discovery’ of the colonial ‘Other’ (see for example Asad 1995 [1973]). On the history of ethnology in Central and Eastern Europe, see among others Hann, Sarkany and Skalník 2005. On Yugoslavia, see among others Hammel and Halpern 1969; Naumović 1999; Rihtman-Auguštin and Čapo Žmegač 2004.

<sup>10</sup> See among others Ćimić 1966; Hurem 1972; Mujačić 1972; Tomić 1988. As rare examples of Bosnian ethnographic work dealing with local-level interethnic relations, see Stojaković 1982, 1986-1987.

their own difficulties in getting access to and carrying out research in Bosnia.<sup>11</sup> The work of anthropologists William Lockwood, Cornelia Sorabji and Tone Bringa showed, among other things, that ethno-national identifications in Bosnia were fluid and contextual, that interethnic relations were based on stable rules of reciprocity that were nonetheless negotiated on a day-to-day basis, and that peaceful coexistence did not amount to a blurring of ethnic boundaries (Bringa 1995; Lockwood 1975; Sorabji 1989).

Cornelia Sorabji, for example, has used her insights from fieldwork in Sarajevo in the mid 1980s to challenge some misleading interpretations of official Yugoslav nationality policy and terminology, outlining the complex ways in which ethno-national categories and interethnic relations were perceived by Bosnians themselves before the war. While socialist Yugoslavia recognized six separate South-Slavic peoples or nations, Sorabji showed that, in everyday life, ‘the notion of *narod* is more multifaceted than that of nation and that Bosnian citizens understood it in different ways in different contexts’ (Sorabji 1995: 89). She also emphasized the importance of the concept of *komšije* (neighbours), which mirrors that of *narod*: ‘the *narods* were separate, but even their separate existence was predicated upon their interconnectedness; neighbours were warm, trusting and united, but at another level this unity was predicated upon difference’ (Sorabji 1995: 90). Sorabji pointed out that Bosnians already had a sense of ethno-national belonging before the war, but ‘for the most part tolerance, good will and a conscious desire for cooperative and civil relationships filled the joints between the three populations. At the same time, non-ethnic differences, differences of class and status, of rural and urban origin, and of access to resources, were far more salient than much current analysis suggests’ (Sorabji 1993: 33-4).

These differences between Western anthropologists and local ethnologists should not be overstated, however. East European ethnological traditions historically modelled themselves on strands of ethnology in ‘the West’, particularly the German tradition of *Volkskunde* with its strong emphasis on the ‘discovery’ of the national ‘Self’. In more recent years, since the late socialist period, social and cultural anthropology has become more and more influential in Slovenia, Croatia and, to a lesser extent, in Serbia (see e.g. Baskar 1998; Naumović 1999; Rihtman-Auguštin and Čapo Žmegač 2004). In the 1990s, local ethnologists came under pressure to produce work that supported new nationalist ideologies. However, in both Serbia and in Croatia, some ethnologists – such as Ivan Čolović and Milena Dragičević-Šešić in Serbia or Ivo Žanić and Reana Senjković in Croatia – have worked to deconstruct nationalist categories and myths by scrutinizing, among other things, local newspapers, popular literature and neo-folk songs (Čolović 2002; Dragičević-Šešić 1994; Senjković 2002; Žanić 1998). After the war broke out in 1991, Croatian anthropologists developed a theoretically informed, though

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<sup>11</sup> This situation confirms Chris Hann’s general observation for Eastern Europe that Western anthropologists have often been in a more privileged position to discuss sensitive issues than local ethnologists (see Hann 1987).

nationally centred, ‘anthropology of tears and fears’ focusing on everyday experiences of war and exile, local-level transformations of (inter)ethnic relations, new war heroes and rituals associated with civilian victims and fallen soldiers (e.g. Čale-Feldman, Prica and Senjković 1993; Jambrešić Kirin and Povrzanović 1996). Anthropologists from Western countries, such as Robert Hayden, Bette Denich and Mart Bax were among the first to investigate the political uses of memories of World War II (Bax 1997; Denich 1992; Hayden 1992), while Cornelia Sorabji, Mirjana Laušević and Lynn Maners explored cultural transformations taking place in Bosnia (Laušević 1996; Maners 2000; Sorabji 1994).

One could even say that the Yugoslav wars have revealed the value of the ethnographic data collected during the socialist period. For example, during the war in Bosnia, when outside observers were asking how erstwhile neighbours could suddenly turn on each other, Sorabji offered a crucial explanation of the character of the violence. Coming back to the notion of *narod*, she wrote that ‘brutality is aimed at humiliating, terrorizing and killing the “enemy” population in order to remove it from the territory, but also at transforming the assumptions held by both victims and perpetrators about the very nature of identity groups and boundaries in order to prevent any future return of the exiled population. ... The creation and, more importantly, the maintenance of ethnically pure territories ... requires that the first [divisive] view of *narod* be retained and reinforced while all others are jettisoned. In this project personalized violence involving the killing of neighbour by neighbour, colleague by colleague and friend by friend acquires a particular importance’ (Sorabji 1995: 81, 90). The relevance of such analyses appear fully in Tone Bringa’s documentary film *We Are All Neighbours*: returning in 1993 to the village where she had conducted fieldwork in the late 1980s, she witnesses the deterioration of relationships between local Muslims and Croats and the expulsion of the Muslim population by the Bosnian Croat army, the HVO (Bringa 1993).<sup>12</sup>

Both foreign and local anthropologists, to varying degrees, have countered nationalist and essentialist interpretations of the Yugoslav wars, which of course does not mean that they were immune to bias and disputes among themselves (see Povrzanović 2000; Povrzanović-Frykman 1997, 2003). The most striking example of such a conflict is probably the tensions between the editors of a special issue of *The Anthropology of East Europe Review* and some of the contributors from Croatia, who decided to withdraw from the project when it was turned into an edited book (see Halpern and Kideckel 1993, 2000; Rihtman-Auguštin 2004). While Bosnia often occupied a central place in the arguments of anthropologists taking part in these discussions (including those who had done fieldwork in other parts of the world – see e.g. Borneman 1998, 2002; Bowman 1994; Hann 2003), field research in Bosnia effectively came to a halt, and the work of Bosnian academic institutions was hampered by the difficult war conditions (see e.g.

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<sup>12</sup> A sequel chronicles the return of some of the displaced Muslims to their pre-war homes (Bringa and Loizos 2001).

Buturović 2000; Sijarić 1996). Despite a growing ‘fieldwork-under-fire’ literature (Nordstrom 1995), few social scientists carried out fieldwork in Bosnia during the war, and those who did made only short research trips, for obvious practical reasons (Bougarel 2002; Bringa 1995: XV-XXI; Maček 2000: 11-44).

Against this background, this volume reflects a new generation of researchers who conducted fieldwork after the war or, like Elissa Helms and Stef Jansen, first came into contact with the region through local NGO work during the war. A few, however, had previous research experience in Bosnia (Xavier Bougarel) or in other parts of former Yugoslavia (Ger Duijzings) before the war, and Ivana Maček did her fieldwork during the war itself. Inevitably, for various reasons, we were not able to include all members of this new generation.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, despite some significant omissions, we feel this volume offers a relatively good sample of recent local-level research on post-war Bosnia.

Another feature of this volume, which could be considered a drawback, is that nearly all contributors come from Western Europe or North America. The only authors from the region are Ivana Maček and Larisa Jašarević, both of whom have been educated in Western countries. However, we argue that this should not come as a surprise, nor should it necessarily be viewed negatively. The first reason for the preponderance of foreign researchers is the lack of a tradition of anthropological research in Bosnia. Moreover, university structures dominated by scholars still influenced by Titoist or nationalist ideologies, along with the emigration of many young Bosnian scholars and the recruitment of others by international organizations and NGOs, have forestalled a badly needed change of generation. However, some of the most promising new scholars of Bosnia are Bosnians now being trained in contemporary theories and methods, and some modest attempts are being made to introduce socio-cultural anthropology in Bosnian universities.

There are admittedly other limitations of this volume, one of them being the uneven geographical spread of the contributions and the disproportionate attention to Bosniac-held territories. Far from a result of editorial design, this imbalance is more a reflection of the state of current ethnographic research on Bosnia. Most contributors to this book conducted fieldwork in the Federation (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar and Stolac) where research conditions for Western scholars have generally been more favourable than in the RS. This is also a continuation of a similar tendency among pre-war anthropological studies, such as those by Lockwood, Sorabji and Bringa, which focused on Bosnian Muslims and, to a lesser extent, Croats. Indeed, Croat communities have largely been studied where they

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<sup>13</sup> These include social policy scholar Paul Stubbs (e.g. Stubbs 1999, 2000b; Stubbs and Deacon 1998), anthropologists Kristof Gosztonyi (e.g. Gosztonyi 1999, 2003; Grandits and Gostonyi 2003), Mare Faber (Faber 2001) and Andrew Gilbert (e.g. Gilbert 2003, 2005), political scientist Paula Pickering (e.g. Pickering 2003, 2006), psychosociologist Natalija Bašić (e.g. Bašić 2004), and several graduate students working on doctoral dissertations.

co-exist with Muslims (Lockwood 1975; Bringa 1995) or because of the specific context of the Catholic pilgrimage site of Međugorje (Bax 1995; Claverie 2003), while the Bosnian Serbs have been largely ignored (see, however, Maners 2000). This is partly because most anthropologists studying particular ethno-national groups in pre-war Yugoslavia tended to carry out fieldwork in the group's 'home' republic or province: Bosnia was considered the home republic of the Muslim people, which presented an interesting case of 'nation-building' in contemporary Europe. Following a similar logic, interest in the Muslim, or Bosniac, population has been replicated by anthropologists during and after the war, with Bosniacs being perceived as the most 'Bosnian' of the three major groups. At the same time, this imbalance is also likely a reflection of wartime political preferences and a tendency among anthropologists to identify with underprivileged, voiceless or victimized groups. This volume does not overcome such biases: Armakolas, Delpa and Duijzings are the only contributors who conducted substantial fieldwork in the RS, and only Armakolas deals primarily and only with Bosnian Serbs living in the Serb entity.

Finally, this collection presents analyses based upon fieldwork conducted mostly between 1999 and 2003, after the end of the war rendered Bosnia much more accessible. The only exception is Ivana Maček's opening chapter, which deals with everyday life in besieged Sarajevo and provides a vivid account of the war conditions that have so profoundly affected Bosnian society ever since. The rest of the chapters deal primarily with the time period when the Alliance for Change came to power in the Federation. As noted above, the Alliance was only a partial and short-lived success: it proved impossible to 'undo' the outcomes of the war and in November 2002 the nationalist parties regained political control. This period is thus particularly apt, given that this volume aims not only to illuminate the complexity of the situation on the ground and the worldviews and practical choices of Bosnians themselves, but also to provide a critical perspective on international (Western) intervention in Bosnia.

### **Bosnia from Below**

The book is divided into three sections, deliberately reflecting themes through which post-war Bosnia has often been analyzed: ethnic identities and conflicts, collective memories and 'ancient hatreds', 'protectorate' and 'transition' to democracy and a market economy. Our intention, however, is to show that local-level realities defy reduction to such simple categories. It is not enough to presume that ethnic nationalism informs every aspect of Bosnian political and social life. Nor can memories and narratives of the war be reduced to Serb, Croat, and Bosniac 'versions', as if these were uniform and uncontested. Likewise, in post-war Bosnia, the impact of international presence is not limited to one-way 'monitoring' and 'implementation' policies, and 'transition' is in no case an unproblematic given. In the following overview of the sections and chapters of this book, we also discuss

the themes by which they are grouped. Because they are prominent aspects of post-war Bosnian life in general, these themes are not (only) confined to the specific sections but reappear throughout the chapters.

### *Beyond 'Ethnicity'*

Section One deals primarily with the social and cultural categories through which participants in post-war processes act, react, and make sense of their lives. Some of these categories have been carried over from the socialist era, albeit transformed by the war; others are direct products of wartime experiences (see also Vlasisavljević 1997). Not surprisingly, the chapters show that, after war and ethnic cleansing, ethno-national categories have become more pervasive and rigid (see also Halpern and Kideckel 2000; Sorabji 1995), as well as more closely linked with religious markers and institutions (esp. Bougarel, Maček, Grandits; see also Bougarel 2001b; Bringa 2002). At the same time, however, they demonstrate that ethno-national identifications are still relative, changing and contested (see also Jansen 1998; Kolind 2004), and that some forms of interethnic cooperation have survived the war (see also Maček 2000; Pickering 2003).

Taking the reader 'beyond ethnicity', all of the book's chapters reveal the diversity of social groups and conflicts that have been transformed or produced by the war: the rural/urban divide and senses of local belonging have been reshuffled by massive population movements (see also Rolland 2004; Stefansson 2004a, 2004b); socio-professional groups and social classes linked with pre-war economy have disintegrated (esp. Jašarević, Maček, Jansen); new social groups and constituencies such as displaced persons (esp. Stefansson, Armakolas, Grandits; see also Stubbs 1999; Wesselingh and Vaulerin 2005), war veterans (esp. Bougarel, Grandits; see also Bašić 2004; Maček 2001, 2005), or families of missing persons (esp. Delpla, Duijzings) have appeared; gendered roles and representations have been redefined by wartime experiences (esp. Helms, Delpla, Bougarel; see also Cockburn 1998; Helms 2003a; Lilly and Irvine 2002). All these social groups and categories rely on specific war experiences and memories (see Section Two), and are often expressed through strong moral categories. Terms referring to victimhood (*žrtve*) and war crimes (*zločinci, dželati*); heroism (*heroji, gazije, šehidi*), cowardice (*podrumaši, pobjeglici*) and treason (*izdajnici*); poverty (*sirotinja*), illegitimate enrichment (*lopovi, bogataši*) and organized crime (*mafijaši, ratni profiteri*) inform public discourses as well as everyday conversations, and add a dramatic dimension to social conflicts.

Against this background, clashing interests and demands are quickly transformed into unyielding moral claims and intense struggles for legitimacy. In cities overwhelmed by displaced persons, the competition for scarce resources such as housing, jobs and collapsing public services is expressed through strong moral categories opposing 'cultured' urbanites to 'uncultured' newcomers, an opposition carried over from the socialist period (Bringa 1995: 58-65) but intensified by the war (esp. Stefansson, Jašarević, Kolind). More specifically, the acceleration of the

restitution and return process in the early 2000s pitted displaced persons and (minority) returnees against each other: the former emphasized their material needs and their right to settle in their new place of residence, while the latter demanded their pre-war property rights and redress for wartime injustices (esp. Maček, Stefansson, Armakolas, Kolind; see also Philpott 2005; von Carlowitz 2005).<sup>14</sup> At the same time, veterans lamented the loss of their wartime status and the ingratitude of society (esp. Bougarel, Jansen) while civilian victims longed for recognition of their own suffering (esp. Delpla, Helms; see also Delpla 2004b; Stover and Shigekane 2002).

This exploration of the inner complexity of Bosnian society would remain incomplete without taking into account two major issues. The first concerns the resilience of war-related groups and conflicts after the war. As all the chapters demonstrate, the social divides and conflicts running through Bosnian society are still largely informed by wartime roles and experiences. This is explained to a great extent by the sheer brutality of the war and ethnic cleansing, while material insecurity and lack of economic perspectives also play a role (esp. Maček, Jašarević, Jansen). More concretely, however, many war-related categories are deliberately nurtured by various actors, beginning with the main nationalist parties. In a dire economic situation, the distribution of housing, jobs and social benefits according to wartime roles and status not only contributes to nationalists' control over their respective ethno-national groups, but also perpetuates various kinds of war-related conflicts, inscribing them into the core of society (esp. Grandits, Bougarel; see also Cox 1998, 2001; Stubbs, 1999, 2001; World Bank 2002: 9-55). Within this context, the fact that the international community has sometimes contributed to the perpetuation of these conflicts becomes even more noteworthy (see Section Three).

The second issue is how ethno-national categories relate to others that have been produced or transformed by the war. Depending on the circumstances, war-related categories can undermine, override, reinforce, or complicate ethno-national identifications, at times even rendering them all but irrelevant (esp. Maček, Stefansson, Jansen, Jašarević). In the early 2000s, the restoration of freedom of movement and the increasing number of 'minority returns' favoured the (re)invention of new spaces and forms of cooperation (esp. Kolind, Armakolas, Jašarević; see also Bringa 2005; Grandits and Gosztonyi 2003; Helms 2003b; Pickering 2006). At the same time, however, competition over scarce resources, the ongoing restitution process and the granting of specific material support to (minority) returnees have aggravated interethnic tensions, at least in the short term and at the local level (esp. Stefansson, Armakolas, Kolind; see also Cox 1998; Ito 2001; Stubbs 1999, 2000b; World Bank 2002: 9-55). It is against this background that nationalist parties proved to be very skilful in (re)mobilizing ethno-national categories by adapting pre-war clientelistic practices to new war-related groups and conflicts and stirring up widespread feelings of insecurity and injustice (esp.

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<sup>14</sup> On the restitution process in Croatia, see Leutloff-Grandits 2005.

Grandits, Bougarel). In a similar way, moral categories and claims sometimes strengthen ethno-national identifications and conflicts, as is often the case with notions of heroism and victimhood (esp. Duijzings, Bougarel, Delpla). However, they can also exacerbate social and political divides *within* each ethno-national group (esp. Stefansson, Delpla, Helms), and lead ordinary Bosnians to reject nationalist ideologies by denouncing *en bloc* ‘armchair politicians’ (*foteljaši*) and ‘profiteers’ (*profiteri*) (esp. Grandits, Kolind, Helms) as opposed to the individual qualities of ‘decent/honest people’ (*pošteni/fini ljudi*) (esp. Kolind, Stefansson, Jašarević).

This first section, ‘Beyond Ethnicity’, begins with a look back at the realities of the war period, a time in which so many of the social and moral categories at work in the post-war period were solidified or given new meanings. Ivana Maček’s chapter (Chapter One) addresses the four-year siege of Sarajevo, analyzing its impact on the everyday life of the city’s inhabitants. She movingly reflects on their reactions to the pervasiveness of physical danger, irregular supplies of food and other staple commodities, sudden and drastic impoverishment, dependency on black markets and international humanitarian aid, the illegal occupation or looting of abandoned properties, and brutal ruptures in the bonds of family, friendships and relations between colleagues and neighbours. The break with pre-war normality and its associated values gave rise to feelings of deep insecurity and humiliation, a loss of meaning that in many cases led to serious states of depression. Material and psychological dependency also rendered the population more receptive to shifts in ethno-national identification encouraged by the nationalists in power, beginning with the increased presence of Islam in the public sphere. However, as Maček argues, Sarajevans did not just passively endure the chaos of war: their everyday strategies for survival were accompanied by a will to maintain some semblance of routine and normality, to regain a hold on their own war experience and lives and thereby recover a positive meaning for that part of their lives.

In Chapter Two, Anders Stefansson carries the focus on Sarajevo into the post-war period, exploring the social and cultural transformations experienced in the city after the departure of a large portion of the pre-war population and a massive influx of people displaced by the war. As a result of these shifts, many Sarajevans consider themselves ‘in exile’ in a city they do not recognize any more. At the same time, they deny the ‘invaders’ the right to settle in their new place of residence. For similar reasons, some of those who left during the war have hesitated to return. The demographic changes in Sarajevo have not only led to the ethnic homogenization of the city but also to the aggravation of the long-standing conflict between the urban, marked by ‘culture’ and ‘European-ness’, and the rural, associated with ‘non-culture’ and ‘backwardness’. Other divides compound this central one, as illustrated by the tensions between Sarajevans who stayed to endure the siege and those who fled abroad, or among displaced persons from various regions. All of these divisions relate to each other in complex and changing ways depending on the circumstances in which they are invoked. In general, Stefansson observes, Sarajevans seldom acknowledge that, far from revealing essential

cultural or moral qualities of classified groups, differences in ways of living in the city are fundamentally a reflection of different war experiences and access to scarce resources such as housing and financial income.

While Stefansson discusses the primarily rural ‘invaders’ of Sarajevo urban space, Armakolas (Chapter Three) draws our attention to some of those who left: Serbs displaced from Sarajevo to the small, semi-rural setting of nearby Pale, the wartime capital of *Republika Srpska*. During and after the war, as the Serb entity was inscribed into the political landscape, the modes of identification of these urban Serbs were also transformed away from any association with the now Bosniac-dominated city of Sarajevo and the Bosnian state it symbolizes. In the post-war period, due to the trauma of war and exile and to their resentment towards the international community, displaced Sarajevo Serbs have nurtured an intense longing for security. It is on this basis that they initially justified their rejection of any Bosnian state and their unwillingness to return to Sarajevo. However, their attachment to their city of origin has not disappeared altogether. Over the course of several field visits, Armakolas observes how factors such as the symbolic stigmatization of the RS and the increasing pressure put on its leaders by the international community, the restoration of freedom of movement between the entities, the restitution of illegally confiscated property, and the concentration of job opportunities in the Bosnian capital have gradually induced these same people to visit Sarajevo, to settle there, and to resume relations with the rest of the population. Through these spatial practices, Armakolas argues, they indirectly call into question the nationalist rhetoric still dominant in the RS.

The final two chapters in the first section deal with the part of Herzegovina which has been controlled by Croat nationalists since 1993. Hannes Grandits (Chapter Four) scrutinizes local political practices and discourses among Croats of the region in an attempt to explain the absolute hegemony exerted by the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) there throughout the 1990s. He locates the main factors supporting this hegemony in strong Croat national feelings tied to a vigorous Catholic faith, the memory of post-World War II communist repression, and enduring economic underdevelopment. This hegemony also reflects the capacity of the HDZ leadership in accommodating various factions with diverging ideological origins and material interests, channelling financial resources from Croatia and the Croat diaspora through parallel institutions, and redistributing them on a clientelistic basis. Against this backdrop, the allocation of material perks such as housing, jobs or social benefits to new social groups created by the war (displaced persons, veterans, etc.) plays a key role. As Grandits chronicles, during the 2000 electoral campaign, the HDZ relied heavily on these groups and their symbolic prestige in its confrontation with the international community and its related efforts to re-mobilize Croat voters – people who had become more and more critical towards their own leaders, whom they increasingly perceive as opportunistic and corrupt politicians.

Grandits’ discussion of Croat politics and HDZ tactics in Herzegovina provides relevant background for Torsten Kolind’s study (Chapter Five) on Stolac, a small

Herzegovinian town whose Bosniac inhabitants were expelled by Croat forces in 1993. Faced with the pervasiveness of ethnic divisions in everyday life, the Bosniacs who have returned to the town since the late 1990s have developed a counter-discourse based on non-ethnic cultural and moral categories. First of all, these Bosniacs recognize several categories of Croats (locals vs. refugees, urbanites vs. peasants, ‘fascists’ vs. ‘good Croats’, and the like). More generally, they contrast ‘decent people’ with corrupt and cynical politicians, denounce politicians and ‘politics’ in general as fundamentally immoral and removed from ‘the people’, and hold them responsible for the war. Through these stances, Kolind argues, Stolac Bosniacs strive to give meaning to the chaos and violence of war, to overcome their own feelings of insecurity and suspicion, and to restore the cognitive and normative frameworks that regulated everyday interethnic relations before the war. Kolind concludes that this counter-discourse, without being openly political, calls into question the ethnicization of everyday life; it renders ethnic categories more complex and flexible, and facilitates the creation of new spaces and new forms of peaceful coexistence.

### *Beyond ‘Ancient Hatred’*

Section Two focuses on war memories. Due to the very aims of the recent war, these memories have a clear ethno-national dimension, which nationalist parties strive to perpetuate (see also Torsti 2003, 2004; Wesselingh and Vaulerin 2005). War memories, however, are less related to ethnicity as such than to place – such as, for example, the side of the frontline on which people were trapped during the war (esp. Maček, Armakolas, Jansen; see also Maček 2000; Povrzanović-Frykman 1997) –, social status that predates the war or emerged along with it (esp. Jašarević, Helms, Bougarel; see also Jambrešić Kirin and Povrzanović 1996), and personal experiences of interethnic violence or cooperation (esp. Maček, Kolind, Delpla; see also Sorabji 2006). Thus, conflicts of memory not only pit ethno-national groups against each other, but also reflect other divides such as those between war participants and returning refugees (esp. Stefánsson, Jansen), believers and secularists (esp. Bougarel, Jansen), and supporters of nationalist parties and their opponents (esp. Jansen, Helms, Kolind).

All these memories are expressed through various means: from commemorative events and public monuments (esp. Duijzings, Bougarel, Grandits; see also Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobric 2001; Torsti 2004) to private rituals and conversations (esp. Jansen; see also Jansen 2002; Sorabji 2006), from official reports and schoolbooks (see Perry 2003; Torsti 2003) to personal diaries and photo albums (see Willekens 2003). This diversity is at times reduced to an opposition between ‘official’ and ‘hidden’ memories, collective and individual ones. In reality, however, official narratives and personal stories, political strategies and psychological needs constantly meet, confront and influence each other (esp. Duijzings, Delpla, Jansen). Thus political actors do play a key role in the shaping of war memories, but are also often met with resistance from the

population (esp. Duijzings, Bougarel, Kolind, Armakolas; see also Sorabji 2006). By and large, however, the pervasiveness of war memories contributes to the perpetuation of war-related social categories and to their expression through unyielding moral claims (see Section One). As shown by most of this book's chapters, what is at stake in the conflicts over memories in post-war Bosnia is not only the (re)interpretation of the past, or the (de)legitimization of the results of the war and ethnic cleansing. These conflicts also reflect divergent material and symbolic interests (esp. Bougarel), and represent attempts to promote new moral hierarchies and definitions of justice (esp. Delpla, Kolind, Helms). As is the case with war-related social categories, taking an approach 'from below' to war memories therefore raises several new and important questions.

Many analysts have faulted the Titoist 'politics of memory' for celebrating fallen and living Partisans, remaining silent on the fate of civilians, demonizing political adversaries and, last but not least, striving to 'de-ethnicize' the bloody events of World War II. As has been shown by historians and anthropologists alike, the collapse of this official narrative coincided with that of the Yugoslav federation itself (see e.g. Denich 1994; Hayden 1994; Höpken 1994, 1999). Policy makers and NGO activists therefore insist that reconciliation must be based on truth instead of state censorship or nationalist propaganda, and on justice and individual responsibility instead of impunity, revenge or collective guilt (see e.g. Bass 2000; Neuffer 2001; Stover and Weinstein 2004). It is beyond the scope of this book to re-examine how socialist Yugoslavia legitimized itself through ideological representations of the past and the future (see e.g. Höpken 1994, Lilly 2001). A closer comparison with post-war Bosnia, however, reveals important continuities. In many cases, individual memories of the recent war are influenced by those of World War II and the socialist period (esp. Armakolas, Kolind, Jansen, Jašarević). At the political level, nationalist parties reject the Titoist narrative of World War II, but they also draw on commemorative practices inherited from that period (esp. Duijzings, Bougarel, Grandits), while 'civic' forces cultivate the image of a pre-war Bosnia suffused with the spirit of 'Brotherhood and Unity' (esp. Helms).

International organizations also play an active role in the shaping of war memories (see Section Three), and their presence in Bosnia contributes to one of the main aspects distinguishing the present period from that following World War II, that is the existence of a pluralistic political and media landscape. But this major difference raises further questions. In such a diverse and fragmented public sphere, the question of whether reconciliation can best be achieved through the establishment of a shared narrative of the war or through the recognition of divergent war memories (esp. Duijzings, Jansen; see also Borneman 2002; Bougarel 2001a; Halpern and Weinstein 2004) becomes a very practical and puzzling one. In the early 2000s, for example, the trial of General Krstić at The Hague resulted in the classification of the Srebrenica massacre as genocide (ICTY 2001). Subsequent international pressures compelled the *Republika Srpska* authorities to finally acknowledge, in October 2004, the reality of the massacre (RS

Commission 2004). At the same time, however, war-related monuments and commemorations continued to reshape space and time along ethno-national lines (esp. Duijzings, Bougarel, Grandits; see also Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobric 2001; Torsti 2004). In everyday life, too, the coexistence between local hegemonic ethno-national groups and ‘minority returnees’ is most often accompanied by the silencing of sensitive issues such as wartime events and responsibilities (esp. Kolind, Armakolas, Jašarević; see also Grandits and Gosztonyi 2003; Wesselingh and Vaulerin 2005).<sup>15</sup>

The first two chapters of this section centre on publicly expressed narratives of the war. Ger Duijzings (Chapter Six) addresses divided war memories and separate commemorations in eastern Bosnia, which seem to undermine any attempt to reach consensus about what happened during the war or to bring about reconciliation. The text looks particularly at the afterlife of the Srebrenica massacre (July 1995), that is the way in which it has been remembered and commemorated by the Muslim community, resulting in the inauguration of the Potočari Memorial Centre in 2003, and the parallel counter-commemorations organized by local Serbs. Duijzings places these competing commemorative practices in historical perspective, especially focusing on how World War II memories were locally managed under socialism. Because of their varying historical experiences and allegiances, local Serbs and Muslims developed ‘different ways of being in history’: the former were able to commemorate their victims, while the latter had to keep silent. The 1990s saw the rise of a new official narrative of Muslim or Bosniac victimization, in which the Srebrenica massacre has become a key symbol. Duijzings also shows that the commemorative practices related to the Srebrenica events cannot be properly understood without taking into account the interventions into the local ‘commemorative arena’ by international bodies, most importantly the OHR, which played an active part in the opening of the Potočari Memorial Centre.

In Chapter Seven, Xavier Bougarel describes the rise of a new cult of *šehidi* (martyrs to the faith) in Bosniac-dominated parts of Bosnia, as part of the re-islamization efforts ushered in by the SDA. In principle, only fallen soldiers are considered to be *šehidi* but, during and after the war, the very definition of this concept, and the rituals attached to it, have remained much more ambiguous and fluid. The population itself has both resisted the cult of *šehidi* and co-opted it to fit its own needs and perspectives. The resulting tensions relate not only to the process of defining a new Muslim/Bosniac national identity, but also to divergent interpretations of the war and to the crystallization of new social groups and moral hierarchies within the Bosniac population. In particular, the heroic figure of the *šehid* has played a central role in the construction of the veteran population (veterans, war disabled, and the families of fallen soldiers) as a social group with a specific material and moral status. Bougarel shows how this process was made evident in 2001, when the attempt to reform the system of war pension benefits led

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<sup>15</sup> On similar processes in Croatia, see Jansen 2002; Jansen, forthcoming.

to an open confrontation between veteran associations and the newly-elected Alliance for Change.

The final chapter in this section (Chapter Eight) examines the issue of war memories and narratives from the perspective of individual and everyday interactions. Stef Jansen relates the encounter among three former work colleagues in October 2000 in Tuzla. Samir and Hasan are both Bosniacs, but the first fought in the Bosnian Army, whereas the second was in Germany when the war broke out. Robi, a Serb, has come back to Tuzla after having spent several years in Serbia. It rapidly becomes clear that humour will not be enough to ease the strained atmosphere, and Hasan takes Robi to task for having left Tuzla in the first days of the war. Robi tries to justify himself, but then an even more violent argument breaks out between Hasan and Samir: Hasan implicitly accuses Samir of abandoning his people and the latter takes full responsibility for his choice not to participate in ‘a dirty war between Balkan nations’. This discussion, Jansen argues, shows that the various war memories in conflict with each other in Bosnian everyday life are not only related to ethnic divisions but are also influenced by divergent assessments of the socialist past, personal experiences of the war and people’s relationships to the state and politics. It also illustrates the way in which Bosnian citizens incorporate the normative categories of an omnipresent international community into their own modes of justification and everyday conversations.

### *Beyond ‘Protectorate’*

In many analyses, the international organizations present in post-war Bosnia appear as a force acting on local society and politics ‘from above’: the very terminology reduces this relationship to a ‘quasi-protectorate’ in which a benevolent ‘international community’ exerts a one-way influence (through ‘implementation strategies’, ‘monitoring mechanisms’, etc.) on problematic local practices (such as ‘obstructionist tactics’, ‘democracy deficits’, etc.). In contrast, the third and final section of this book reveals some of the ways in which ‘international actors’, in their many guises, roles, and initiatives, have both a formal and informal impact on local level dynamics, just as ‘local actors’ affect the choices and possibilities of the international community.<sup>16</sup>

An approach ‘from below’ thus sheds new light on the trials and tribulations of the international presence in post-war Bosnia. The very fact that this presence involves a large variety of actors with their own agendas means that international

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<sup>16</sup> For the sake of brevity, both inter-governmental organizations and international NGOs are referred to here as ‘international actors’, in spite of their differences in modes of functioning and fields of intervention. By contrast, ‘local actors’ are social and political actors who come from and primarily operate in Bosnia. Part of our argument, however, is that ‘local actors’ are quite often ‘transnationalized local actors’ (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 995) that act within transnational networks and systems of meanings.

policies can contradict each other and even backfire. From a ‘top-down’ perspective, constitutional reforms, removal of obstructive politicians, support to non-nationalist parties and NGOs, and ‘minority returns’ appear as convergent moves towards a common aim: the progressive reintegration of Bosnia. On the ground, however, ‘minority returns’ are most strongly resisted in places where they are perceived as a threat to the political *status quo* (esp. Grandits, Duijzings; see also Cox 1998; Ito 2001), institutional changes can lead to renewed support for the nationalist parties (see Grandits on the ‘Croat crisis’), and compliance with the decisions of international organizations can weaken non-nationalist forces (see Bougarel on the ‘veteran crisis’).

Beyond the issues dealt with in the mainstream literature, international actors also contribute to the reshaping of the social categories, war memories and moral claims described in Sections One and Two. Helms and Delpla, for example, explore the impact of the ICTY, the OSCE and foreign NGOs on gendered roles and representations (see also Bougarel on the World Bank’s impact on veterans’ status). Local level studies also reveal how the allocation of international aid according to war-related categories – including that of ‘minority returnee’ – can contribute to their reinforcement, and thus, indirectly, to the perpetuation of interethnic tensions (see e.g. Gilbert 2003, 2005; Stubbs 1999; World Bank 2002: 9-55). From this point of view, the case of the restitution and return process, which reached its peak in the early 2000s, is especially telling: at the local level, it has not only led to awkward situations and difficult compromises, but has also produced much more limited and ambivalent results than those expected by its advocates (esp. Armakolas, Kolind; see also Dahlman and O’Thuatail 2004; O’Thuatail and Dahlman 2005; Philpott 2005).<sup>17</sup>

The strong and pervasive international presence in post-war Bosnia does not mean the absence of local agency. Several chapters show how ‘locals’ in turn perceive, react to and influence the activities and discourses of international actors, be it at the political level (esp. Grandits, Duijzings, Delpla, Helms) or in everyday life (esp. Jašarević, Armakolas, Jansen). Local actors, beginning with nationalist parties, sometimes openly resist international interventions (esp. Grandits, Duijzings). Even in the case of nationalist parties, however, the relations between international and local actors are most often located somewhere between ‘collision and collusion’ (Wedel 1998): the international community places strong political pressure on nationalists, but at the same time indirectly contributes to the financing of their clientelistic networks (see e.g. Bliesemann de Guevara 2005; Cox 2001; Donais 2005; Pugh and Cooper 2004; Stubbs and Deacon 1998). In the longer term, this sort of relationship has led to the ‘domestication’ (Creed 1998) of the international presence, with local actors adopting new cultural patterns, legal frameworks and political practices and fitting them into their own interests and representations. At the same time, international actors themselves experience

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<sup>17</sup> On similar processes in Croatia, see Babić 1999, 2000; Leutloff-Grandits 2005; Povrzanović 1998.

processes of ‘hibridizations and creolizations’ (Gupta 1995: 393) adopting some of the practices and representational forms of the local society, as shown by several studies on the behaviour of UNPROFOR soldiers during the war (see e.g. Cockburn and Žarkov 2002; Frankfort 2002a, 2002b; Thiéblemont 2001).

The diversity of interactions taking place between the international community and the local society means that, on the ground, the distinction between international and local actors becomes blurred. New-style NGO activists, together with the ‘local staff’ of major international organizations and foreign NGOs, belong to a new transnational elite (esp. Coles, Helms, Jansen; see also Sampson 2002a, 2002b; Stubbs 1997).<sup>18</sup> More generally, boundaries between ‘locals’ and ‘internationals’ are continually renegotiated and redrawn in everyday life: the international community is a major source of income for many Bosnians and ‘locals’ and ‘internationals’ directly interact on a regular basis, though this does not mean they escape the reassertion of various legal and symbolic hierarchies (esp. Coles, Delpla, Jansen; see also Coles 2003). Despite this continual interaction on the ground, international and local actors do not always share the same values, expectations and symbolic frameworks (esp. Delpla, Jašarević, Duijzings; see also Helms 2003b; Sampson 2002b).

Against this background, international actors are often unaware of their full impact on local society, leading at times to unexpected results, including the cultivation of new nationalist mobilizations. International organizations and foreign NGOs, for example, want to encourage reconciliation and, therefore, to influence the way local war memories are shaped (esp. Duijzings, Delpla, Helms). But their own aid policies tend to reproduce the very war-related social groups and categories on which nationalist memories and discourses are based. The reverse case exists as well, in the sense that international decisions not related to the war can indirectly call into question war-related social and moral hierarchies (esp. Bougarel, Jašarević). One could argue, for example, that some of the actions of the international community contributed to the November 2002 defeat of the Alliance for Change, the very coalition it had painstakingly helped over several years to build. Finally, everyday interaction between local and international actors can also undermine international policies: Kimberley Coles, in particular, demonstrates that the way ‘internationals’ live beyond the scope of Bosnian authorities and perceive Bosnian society in essentialist terms works against the restoration of a viable state in Bosnia and its integration into the European Union (see also Coles 2003).

Isabelle Delpla’s chapter (Chapter Nine) examines the impact of the ICTY in Bosnia. She argues that the Hague Tribunal is one of the rare institutions which embodies moral values, though it remains distant for most Bosnian citizens, addressing only a small fraction of post-war injustices. Focusing on some victim associations primarily made up of Bosniacs, Delpla shows that their primary concern is to achieve official recognition of their status as victims. Furthermore, their concepts of justice do not overlap entirely with those put forth by ICTY

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<sup>18</sup> On similar developments in Kosovo, see Lafontaine 2002.

promoters. Advocates of international criminal justice hope to contribute to the restoration of basic universal values and a common humanity. Though victims endorse some categories of international criminal law, they still understand justice in a narrower, more personal or local sense, focusing on the individuals whom they knew before the war and who committed atrocities in their municipalities of origin. Hence, the ICTY matters for them mainly through arrests and punishments of those specific war criminals. Moreover, Delpla argues, trials going on at The Hague have very little social effects beyond municipal boundaries. This localism in victims' approach to (international) justice is linked to a strong sense of local belonging from before the war, and to the key role played by municipal authorities in ethnic cleansing campaigns. But paradoxically it might also be reinforced by The Hague tribunal itself, through its policy of selective indictments focusing on a few symbolic municipalities.

In Chapter Ten, Elissa Helms examines the activities and self-representation strategies of Bosnian women involved in local NGOs and political parties. During the war, women were above all depicted as passive victims of ethnic cleansing and mass rape, and therefore as symbols of the victimization of their respective ethno-national groups. Beginning especially in 1996, however, and in response to direct and indirect international intervention, a variety of local women's NGOs were created and gender quotas were later made part of the new electoral law. Since politics is perceived as a typically male activity, while its corrupting nature is symbolized by a morally negative female figure ('politics is a whore'), women who are active in the public sphere must constantly justify their social commitment and simultaneously avoid any question of their own moral and sexual reputations. Against this backdrop, the discursive strategies they adopt are based on a denial of the political nature of their activities and/or insistence on their status as civilian victims of the war. This is expressed through reference to moral qualities deemed to be typically female and especially associated with motherhood, such as unselfishness, concern for future generations, and a willingness to compromise. Such strategies reveal changes experienced during and after the war in gendered roles and representations, as well as in the boundaries of public and private spheres.

Kimberly Coles (Chapter Eleven) examines the ways in which the 'internationals', or Westerners working in Bosnia, create new physical and symbolic boundaries between themselves and the local society. As members of a new transnational elite, they are beyond the reach of the Bosnian state, living as they do in their own distinct legal space with its own identification cards and social welfare system. At the same time, their involvement in the efforts to restore the authority of the Bosnian state and their everyday relations with Bosnian colleagues prompt 'internationals' to reproduce prejudices about the 'lack of competence' or the 'cultural deficits' of the local population. In so doing, they perpetuate an essentialist vision of post-communist Balkan societies, which they contrast with the ideal and apolitical picture neo-liberal Europe imagines for itself. It appears, therefore, that the efforts to turn Bosnia into a viable nation-state are undermined

by the very forms of privatized and supranational governance in which the ‘internationals’ participate. What’s more, as Coles shows, the wish to integrate Bosnia into the European Union is accompanied by the symbolic exclusion of Bosnian society from the normative frameworks of the new European project.

The volume concludes with a study by Larisa Jašarević (Chapter Twelve) that brings together elements of international intervention with local moral hierarchies in the context of post-war struggles for economic survival. Jašarević compares the open-air market ‘Arizona’, located in the neutral Brčko District, with the traditional peasant market (*čaršija*) as described by William Lockwood in the late 1960s. Arizona has little in common with the traditional *čaršija*, the collapse of the production economy having forced both independent peasants and wage-earners to move into trade activities that were previously considered marginal and degrading. But Arizona’s traders still refer to the key symbolic figures of the *čaršija* – the ‘peasant-producer’ and the ‘*švercer*’ (smuggler) – in their attempt to endow their new activities with a positive meaning. At the same time, traders object to the neo-liberal market models promoted by the OHR and the District authorities. Instead, they invoke a morality of exchange based on non-economic criteria which aims at ensuring the possibility of survival to the greatest portion of the population. Arizona is therefore neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘transitional’ market. Moreover, despite the wishful pronouncements of many foreign observers, it is not primarily a site of interethnic reconciliation, but a place where conflicts common to all of Bosnia, between an impoverished population and new economic elites and between an ethics of shared survival and the logic of unbounded accumulation, come to the fore.

### **Bosnia and Beyond: Toward an Anthropology of ‘State-Building’**

On the basis of the material presented here, it is possible to outline some directions for an anthropology of ‘state-building’ which could draw on other topics such as the anthropology of ‘transition’, the anthropology of state, or the anthropology of violence and recovery.

All of the chapters in this volume show that the social and political ruptures of the war and post-war periods should not be allowed to overshadow important continuities. For example, the frequent assumption that ‘civil society’ is something new in Bosnia must be re-examined, since charities, cultural societies and trade-unions appeared there at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (see e.g. Hadžibegović and Kamberović 1997), and various voluntary associations were also active in socialist Yugoslavia (see e.g. Hann 1996; Stubbs 2000a; World Bank 2002: 68-118).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Taking a broader definition of civil society, anthropologists have also explored the roots of interethnic conflict or tolerance through social practices continued from the socialist period and before (for contrasting views see Hayden 2002; Sorabji forthcoming; and for a discussion see Hann 2003).

Similarly, and despite the burden of the war legacy, the political difficulties faced by post-war Bosnia share much in common with those experienced by other post-socialist countries. The clientelistic manipulation of the gap between legal entitlements and available financial means or the ethnic legitimization of informal power networks are practices that were already present in socialist Yugoslavia and, indeed, contributed to its final demise (see e.g. Sekelj 1993; Woodward 1995a, 1995b). Ambivalent perceptions of the state as both illegitimate predator and provider of physical and material security, the surrender of the public sphere to 'corrupt' political elites, the withdrawal into the private sphere and reliance on kinship solidarities and personal connections (*veze*) were all existing patterns that the circumstances of the war and the post-war periods only encouraged and reshaped (see e.g. Gosztonyi and Rossig 1998; Sorabji forthcoming). Finally, a comparative study of the Austro-Hungarian, early socialist and the present periods would demonstrate that even the imposition of imported modernization projects and their 'domestication' by the local society is nothing new in Bosnia.

Against this background, an anthropology of 'state-building' in Bosnia will inevitably have much in common with anthropologies of post-socialism.<sup>20</sup> As with 'transitology' in general, the literature on post-war Bosnia is often based on the notion of a linear 'transition' to democracy and market economy.<sup>21</sup> In the minds of Dayton's main architects, such a 'transition' was meant to allow for the removal of its initial ambiguities: together with the return process, the establishment of democracy and market economy was to have led to the replacement of the nationalist elites and the rebirth of a shared economic space and political community. Anthropologists working on post-socialist countries, however, have shown how the notion of 'transition', with all its normative presuppositions, is unable to reflect the complex processes taking place in post-socialism, as well as their effects in everyday life (see e.g. Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Hann 2002). This is all the more true for Bosnia, which is both a post-socialist *and* a post-war country.

Beyond issues specifically linked with post-socialism, it could therefore be useful to consider recent insights offered by anthropologies of the state. Akhil Gupta, for example, argues that an ethnographic study of the state should encompass 'both the analysis of the *everyday practices* of local bureaucracies and the *discursive construction* of the state in public culture' (Gupta 1995: 375; emphasis in the original), since at the local level, what one is most likely to

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<sup>20</sup> As some anthropologists have pointed out, parallels can also be drawn between post-socialist 'transition' and post-colonial 'development' (see e.g. Barsegian 2000). For anthropological approaches to 'development' policies, see e.g. Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Grillo and Stirrat 1997.

<sup>21</sup> In 2002, Wolfgang Petritsch himself talked about Bosnia going through a 'transition from war to peace, and from a Communist system to a market democracy' (speech to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 22 January 2002, available at <<http://www.ohr.int>>).

encounter on the ground are ‘blurred boundaries’ between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ (Gupta 1995: 384; see also Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Mitchell 1999). In a similar way, Michel-Rolph Trouillot emphasizes the fact that the state ‘is not necessarily bound by any institution, nor can any institution fully encapsulate it’ (Trouillot 2001: 126), and that, in the context of globalization, ‘state practices, functions, and effects increasingly obtain in sites other than the national but never entirely bypass the national order. The challenge for anthropologists is to study these practices, functions, and effects without prejudice about sites or forms of encounters’ (Trouillot 2001: 130-1; see also Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Kalb 2002).

Post-war Bosnia is indeed being shaped by a variety of state and state-like effects. As shown by Grandits in this volume, the state itself is struggling, fragmented, and contested, due to the institutional framework in place since Dayton and to an enduring crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Many of its functions have been taken over by intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, in a unique exercise in international intervention (esp. Coles, Duijzings, Grandits, Jašarević; see also Gosztanyi 1999, 2003; Stubbs 2000a, 2000b, 2005). The efforts of foreign donors to ‘promote civil society’ and the role of both international and local new-style NGOs in the delivery of public services and social benefits have introduced new distinctions between ‘national’ and ‘international’, ‘governmental’ and ‘non-governmental’, ‘political’ and ‘humanitarian’ (esp. Helms; see also Sampson 2002a, 2002b; Stubbs 2000a, 2001; Stubbs and Deacon 1998). International intervention has clearly produced state-like effects at the local level, and both practices by and expectations of ‘the state’ have undergone deep transformations. These new forms of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991) are characterized by multiple layers of government and by ‘blurred boundaries’ between ‘the local’ and ‘the global’ (see e.g. Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gupta 1995; Trouillot 2001).<sup>22</sup> Against this background, the ways in which ordinary people experience international policies and the level of trust they place in various local, foreign, and international institutions make a difference, as several of the chapters in this book demonstrate (esp. Grandits, Delpla, Bougarel, Jašarević). In other words, the final outcome of international policies depends also on local practices and worldviews, and it is only by ‘going local’ that one can hope to fully understand the state or state-like effects of international intervention and, more broadly, of globalization (see e.g. Burawoy 2000; Gupta 1995; Trouillot 2001).<sup>23</sup>

In support of such anthropological approaches to ‘state-building’, we would like to come back to one the main findings of this volume: the pervasiveness of moral categories and claims in post-war Bosnia. In all the chapters, it is especially

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<sup>22</sup> On new forms of transnational governmentality in Eastern Europe, see e.g. Kalb 2002; Pandolfi 2002, 2003; Stubbs 2000a, 2005; Wedel 1998, 2001, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> At the same time of course, political violence and processes of globalization represent new challenges for ethnographic fieldwork (see e.g. Burawoy 2000; Greenhouse 2002; Marcus 1995; Nordstrom 1995).

striking to see how war-related social and cultural categories bolster and are bolstered by competing moral claims, and that this competition is pervasive throughout all of Bosnian political and social life. Notions of culture and morality, justice and common good reappear throughout the chapters. This central (but often neglected) feature of post-war Bosnian society reflects not only a lingering confrontation over the causes and outcomes of the war, or the exacerbation of social conflicts over scarce material resources, but, more fundamentally, the need *and* the difficulty of restoring common normative frameworks after the collapse of the pre-war legal order and the gross violation of commonly accepted norms of comportment.

In the aftermath of violence, issues of rule of law, definitions of justice and everyday moralities are closely related and much more intricate than many ‘top-down’ analyses suggest (see e.g. Das and Kleinman 2000, 2001). On the one hand, the moral categories and claims so prominent in post-war Bosnian society apply to various issues and temporalities – from the recognition of historical misdeeds (esp. Duijzings, Grandits) to the allocation of scarce material resources (esp. Stefansson, Bougarel, Jašarević), through the prosecution of war crimes (esp. Delpla) and the hierarchization of wartime sufferings and merits (esp. Duijzings, Helms, Armakolas, Jansen). Even the distinction frequently made between retributive, reparative and distributive justice is not sufficient to understand how these different registers reinforce or contradict each other (esp. Grandits, Bougarel, Delpla), and are mobilized, renegotiated and reshaped at the local level (esp. Kolind, Stefansson, Helms, Jašarević.). On the other hand, what is common to all these moral categories and claims is their utmost rigidity. The articulation of social and political conflicts in moral terms is by no means peculiar to Bosnia, or to post-war societies. In the Bosnian case, however, the ubiquity of a narrow selection of moral categories and claims ensues from the need to ascribe meaning to wartime experiences and to the uncertainties of the post-war period. It can also be perceived as a legacy of totalitarian ideologies and imposed historical narratives. In this light, the main question is whether such categories and claims contribute to the restoration of common normative frameworks or, by turning social conflicts into unyielding moral hierarchies, prevent Bosnian society from successfully managing its inner contradictions.

As illustrated by the issues of war crimes and the return of the displaced, local level studies call for nuanced answers to this fundamental question. The activities of the ICTY contribute to the restoration of a minimal consensus on the necessity to punish war criminals and, together with the pressures exerted by the OHR on the authorities of the RS, to the establishment of truth and the recognition of victims (Delpla, Duijzings). At the same time, the management of war memories remains a highly contested process, both in and among ethno-national groups (esp. Duijzings, Bougarel, Kolind), and the restoration of interpersonal cooperation often implies the avoidance of sensitive topics or the recognition of diverging war experiences (esp. Armakolas, Jašarević, Jansen). In a similar way, the amendment of the entity laws on ‘abandoned’ real estate in the late 1990s may have only had a limited

impact on the return process, but these amended laws did allow for the nearly complete restitution of reclaimed property and, after a period of heightened tension between legal owners and *de facto* occupants, for the restoration of a minimal consensus on the legitimacy of pre-war property and occupancy rights (esp. Stefansson, Armakolas; see also Delpla 2004a; Philpott 2005; von Carlowitz 2005).

In their own work on violence and recovery, anthropologists Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman point out that, after violence has led to ‘the distortion of local moral worlds’ (Das and Kleinman 2000: 1), coming back to everyday life implies, ‘on the one hand, creating a public space in which experience of victims and survivors can not only be represented but also molded, and, on the other, engaging in repair of relationships in the deep recesses of family, neighbourhood and community’ (Das and Kleinman 2001: 3). In such a context, ‘community healing ... means repair but it also means transformation – transformation to a different moral state’ (Das and Kleinman 2001: 23), and ‘the fresh attempt to build communities or neighbourhoods is never purely a local affair’, since ‘it is simultaneously an attempt to redefine and re-create the political society’ (Das and Kleinman 2001: 4). In Bosnia, the painstaking elaboration of common normative frameworks is indeed accompanied by the crystallization of new forms of governmentality: the activities of the ICTY have also indirectly contributed to the reform of the Bosnian judicial system, and the restoration of pre-war occupancy rights has been followed by the privatization of socially owned apartments. The production of new normative frameworks, new forms of governmentality and new allocations of power and wealth appear as complementary aspects of what is labelled ‘state-building’ by mainstream literature. It is against this backdrop that the difficulties met by the international community in its endeavour to establish a viable state and a shared political community must be reconsidered.

International organizations have played a key role in the removal of certain physical and social divides inherited from the war (esp. Duijzings, Armakolas, Kolind). But international policies and the forms of governmentality they produce can also complicate the reformulation of common normative frameworks and represent new challenges for a shattered political community. This is evident in the way the collapse of the production economy and the socialist welfare state has forestalled consensus on the definition of legitimate income and social justice (esp. Jašarević, Bougarel, Jansen). Once again, it becomes clear that the difficulties encountered by the international community are attributable not only to deliberate obstruction by the nationalist parties, but also to a widespread, longstanding perception of ‘politics’, as shown by the fact that ‘internationals’ and NGO-activists are themselves perceived as ‘corrupt’ by many Bosnians (esp. Coles, Helms). Paradoxically enough, some international practices and discourses feed this perception, and can thus work against the emergence of a shared political community in post-war Bosnia.