Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
New interface
Journal articles

Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model

Abstract : This paper analyzes the interaction between migrants income and remittances and between remittances
and the labor supply of residents. The model is cast as a two-period game with imperfect information
about the residents' real economic situation. Residents subject to a good economic situation may behave as if they were in a poor economic situation only in order to manipulate remitters' expectations. The latter, being aware of this risk, reduce the remitted amount accordingly. Therefore, in the equilibrium, residents who really are victims of the bad economic outlook, are penalized as compared to the perfect information set-up. In some circumstances, they can signal their type by drastically cutting working hours, thus further enhancing their precarity right when their economic situation is the worst.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Claire Naiditch Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, September 5, 2008 - 10:44:15 AM
Last modification on : Friday, April 29, 2022 - 10:12:36 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, June 3, 2010 - 8:03:41 PM


Files produced by the author(s)




Claire Naiditch, Radu Vranceanu. Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model. Economic Systems, 2009, 33 (1), pp.60-82. ⟨10.1016/j.ecosys.2008.07.003⟩. ⟨halshs-00318870⟩



Record views


Files downloads