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Autre publication scientifique Année : 2008

On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game

Résumé

This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship between equilibria and common demand forms is not immediately apparent. We provide the full necessary and sufficient conditions for existence.
A simple condition on demand primitives is derived that determines the type of equilibria. Common demand forms are then shown to illustrate both finite-time and infinite-delay tacit collusion.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00373952, version 1 (08-04-2009)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00373952 , version 1

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Richard Rubble, Bruno Versaevel. On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game. 2008. ⟨halshs-00373952⟩
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