Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Review of Economic Studies Année : 2009

Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

Alexander Guembel
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 945412
Oren Sussman
  • Fonction : Auteur

Résumé

We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed

Dates et versions

halshs-00492531 , version 1 (16-06-2010)

Identifiants

Citer

Alexander Guembel, Oren Sussman. Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties. Review of Economic Studies, 2009, 76 (4), pp.1297-1320. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00542.x⟩. ⟨halshs-00492531⟩
91 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More