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JEL Codes: J21, J23, J31
Keywords: Indonesia, employment, earnings, multinomial selection

# Educational attainment and selection into the labour market: The determinants of employment and earnings in Indonesia * 

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#### Abstract

This paper uses household survey (Sakernas) data from 2004 to estimate the determinants of earnings in Indonesia, a country where non-salaried work is widespread and where earnings data are available for salaried employees only. We deal with the selection bias by estimating a full-information maximum likelihood system of equations, where earnings are observed for salaried employees, and selection into the labour market is modelled in a multinomial setting. We also deal with reverse causality between educational attainment and earnings by instrumenting years of schooling in both the multinomial selection and the earnings equations. Our identification strategy, following Duflo (2001), uses information on exposure to a large-scale school construction programme implemented in the 1970s. Duflo recognizes that schooling may affect an individual's probability of working as a salaried employee, which creates a simultaneity bias, but does not directly deal with this issue. We find that the parameters of the earnings equation estimated under multinomial selection differ from standard OLS estimates, which ignore the selection bias, and from a binomial selection procedure à la Heckman (1979). In particular, the estimated parameters that vary the most are those related to the variables with the strongest impact on individual selection into the different labour-market statuses. We also find that workers with higher educational attainment are most likely to find a job as salaried employees, and that non-salaried work is as an alternative to inactivity.


Keywords: Indonesia; employment; earnings; multinomial selection
JEL codes: J21; J23; J31

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## 1 Introduction

This paper uses data from the 2004 Indonesian labour market survey (Sakernas) to estimate the determinants of employment and earnings in Indonesia. Our aim is to explore how individual characteristics, such us age, place of residence and educational attainment, affect a worker's labour market status and earnings in a standard Mincerian setting. To do so, we face two main problems. The first is to deal with the fact that earnings data are available only for salaried workers in Sakernas, but not for the self employed and household workers, who account for the bulk of employment in Indonesia. It is well known that a truncated earnings distribution poses a problem for the estimation of employment and earnings equations. Conventional techniques, such as the Heckman (1979) binomial selection procedure, can be used to deal with this issue, but we argue that a binomial selection rule would be too simple to cover all relevant labour market outcomes in a segmented labour market, such as Indonesia's.

Another problem is related to the endogeneity of educational attainment in the wage equation. In a seminal paper, Duflo (2001) uses information on a large-scale government-sponsored school construction programme (Sekolar Dasah IMPRES), which was implemented between 1973-74 and 1978-79 and resulted in the construction of over 61000 schools nation-wide, to instrument educational attainment and estimate returns to education for a cross-section of male wage-earners. She recognizes the existence of a selection problem, since wage-earners make up only $45 \%$ of her sample, and that education is endogenous not only in the wage equation but also in the selection equation. However, she does not address the selection problem directly. ${ }^{1}$

In this paper, we deal with the selection bias by estimating a full-information maximum likelihood system of equations, where wages are observed for wage-earners (salaried employees), and selection into different labour-market statuses is modelled in a multinomial choice setting. We follow Hill (1983) in recognizing that the underlying selection rule that best describes the Indonesian labour market is thricotomous: individuals may be inactive (i.e., out of the labour force), they may work as wage-earners or they may work in non-salaried jobs.

[^1]Since educational attainment is likely to be endogenous in both the wage and selection equations, we instrument educational attainment in both equations, which is to our knowledge an innovation in the empirical literature, and use the same identification strategy as Duflo (2001). If the school construction programme is assumed to have no effect on wages other than to increase educational attainment, exposure to the programme (gauged by the intensity of school construction activity in an individual's district of birth and his/her age when the programme was launched) can be used to estimate the impact of educational attainment on wages. Duflo shows that this instrument has good explanatory power and that individuals born in districts that benefited from the programme were more likely to stay longer at school and to earn more once joining the labour force.

We show that estimates of the earnings determinants obtained under multinomial selection differ from those estimated by OLS, which ignores the selection bias, and on the basis of a binomial Heckman procedure. The parameter estimates for the wage equation that differ the most across specifications are precisely those most relevant for individual selection into different labour-market statuses. For instance, living in rural areas is positively significant or insignificant in the OLS and binomial selection equations, but has a strong negative effect on wages when the selection rule is multinomial. The finding that rural workers have a lower probability of working as salaried employees is consistent with our intuition. Also, an interaction term between gender (female) and marital status (married) is insignificant in the binomial selection framework, while it is positively signed and significant under multinomial selection. This reflects the fact that married women have a much higher probability of being inactive than to work in non-salaried jobs, a characteristic of the Indonesian labour market that the binomial selection rule fails to capture. These finding suggests that a binomial setting is too crude an approximation of the selection process in the Indonesian labour market. The other parameter estimates are similar to those reported by Duflo (2001) for a cross-section of male wage earners in 1995. For instance, we estimate the returns to education at between 9 and $10.8 \%$, while she reports coefficients in the range of $6.8-10.6 \%$. Our results are very similar whether or not we treat educational attainment as endogenous, which underscores Duflo's conclusion that OLS estimates do not seem to be biased upwards, as argued by Behrman (1990) in the context of developing countries.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the literature review, Section 3 describes the data and the estimating methodology, and reports the empirical findings. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.

## 2 Literature review

This paper follows the empirical literature on the estimation of Mincerian wage equation (Mincer, 1974) to gauge the effect on earnings of individual characteristics, such as age, educational attainment and marital status, among others (Willis, 1987; Card, 1999; Heckman et al., 2003). Several methodological extensions have been proposed to deal with the limitations of the conventional Mincerian model: for instance, Ichino and Winter Ebmer (1999) show how the choice of instruments affects the estimated returns to education, and Björklund and Kjellström (2002) discuss how well the schooling coefficients of standard Mincer equations approximate the rate of return to education. Empirical evidence is now available for a host of developing and emerging market countries, including Panama (Heckman and Hotz, 1986), Mexico (Brown, Pagan and Rodriguez Oreggia, 1999), Colombia (Gaston and Tenjo, 1992) and Brazil (Dickerson, Green and Arbache, 2001).

An important extension to the empirical literature is the Heckman selection model, which deals with truncations in the earnings distribution (Heckman, 1979). This is case, for example, of the data used in this paper, where information on earnings is available only for salaried workers. It is known that OLS estimates are inconsistent if the earnings distribution is truncated. The literature has also proposed alternative methods for dealing with multinomial selectivity, as in the case where labour market status cannot be described by just two alternatives. Different methods were proposed by Lee (1983) and Dubin and McFadden (1984), and a non parametric alternative was developed by Dahl (2002). These multinomial selection models have been applied in different settings, including the study of self selection into technical training (Trost and Lee, 1984), the firm-size wage differentials (Brunello and Colusso, 1998), and the estimation of demand for electricity (Dubin and McFadden, 1984). We follow their step modeling selection into labor market as a thricotomous choice, which we estimate jointly with the wage equation in a full-information maximum likelihood setting. Our thricotomous selection is similar in spirit to the one proposed by Pradhan and van Soest (1995), however they estimate two wage equations (for formal and informal workers respectively) with the aim of comparing two selectivity models: ordered probit and multinomial logit à la Lee (1983). Our strategy also allows us to address the reverse causality of education, which we assume to be endogenous in both the multinomial selection and the earning equations. Few methodological papers have dealt specifically with the issue of regressors' endogeneity in sample selection models, namely Das, Newey and Vella (2003) in a non-parametric context, and $\operatorname{Kim}$ (2006) for a common endogenous dummy.

While the empirical literature on employment is relatively rich for Indonesia (Lim, 1997; Islam and Nazara, 2000; Suryadarma, Suryahadi and Sumarto, 2007; Islam and Chowdhury, 2007), evidence is considerably more limited on the determinants of earnings. Among the few contributions available to date, Pirmana (2006) uses four waves of Sakernas to estimate earning differentials among groups of workers. He concludes that socio demographic factors, human capital and place of residence are powerful determinants of individual earnings, and that only $42 \%$ of the earnings differential between males and females is caused by differences in individual characteristics. Suryahadi, Sumarto and Maxwell (2001) use a panel of Sakenas data from 1988 to 2000 to gauge the impact of changes in the minimum wage on earnings and employment, and find that the elasticity of average wages with respect to the minimum wage is positive but statistically insignificant. Skoufias and Suryahadi (1999) use a synthetic cohort approach and show that the decline in real wages induced by the financial crisis of 1997-98 was evenly distributed across cohorts, while the impact of the crisis on wage inequality within cohorts was mixed. Deolalikar (1993) uses National Socio Economic Survey (Susenas) data to estimate a wage equation and the returns to schooling for different groups. His approach is comparable to ours in that he acknowledges the problem of selectivity. But he deals with it on the basis of a dichotomic selection rule (i.e. individuals may work as wage earners or not), while we argue that a multinomial selection is more appropriate.

## 3 Data, methodology and results

### 3.1 The data

We use the 2004 wave of data from the Indonesian National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas), which started to be collected in 1976 and is currently carried out on an annual basis. In the 2004 wave 75371 households (237 290 individuals) were surveyed.

Data on earnings and employment are reported in Sakernas as follows. Each family member belonging to the working age population (those aged 15 years and above) is classified as employed or unemployed depending on his/her activities during the previous week. Employed individuals are classified as wage-earners (salaried workers), self employed (with or without assistance) or unpaid/family/casual workers. While Sakernas data are overall considered to be of good quality, earnings data are collected for employees only, thus excluding the large
number of workers. Table 1 reports labour force participation, employment, unemployment and the incidence of non-salaried work for 2004.

Table 1: Labour force participation, unemployment, employment
and the incidence of non-salaried work, 2004
(In per cent, individuals aged 15 years and above)

|  | Participation | Employment | Unemployment | Non-salaried work |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total | $\mathbf{6 5}$ | $\mathbf{6 0 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{6 9 . 6}$ |
| By gender |  |  |  |  |
| Males | 83.5 | 78.6 | 5.8 | 67.7 |
| Females | 46.7 | 42.9 | 8.2 | 72.9 |
| By age |  |  |  |  |
| 15-24 | 50 | 39 | 22.1 | 58.8 |
| $25-54$ | 74.2 | 71.8 | 3.2 | 68.5 |
| $55-64$ | 63.5 | 63.1 | 0.6 | 88.4 |
| 65+ | 39.7 | 39.6 | 0.2 | 95.5 |
| By residence |  |  |  |  |
| Rural | 69.8 | 67.1 | 3.9 | 86.3 |
| Urban | 60.1 | 54.2 | 9.9 | 48.7 |
| By education |  |  |  |  |
| No schooling | 63.5 | 62.8 | 1.2 | 92.2 |
| Primary | 66.6 | 64.9 | 2.6 | 84.4 |
| Lower secondary | 55.9 | 51.7 | 7.5 | 72.2 |
| Upper secondary | 68.9 | 58.7 | 14.8 | 41.0 |
| Tertiary | 85.3 | 77.3 | 9.4 | 15.9 |

Note: non-salaried work is expressed in \% of employment.
Source: Sakernas
Labour force participation is about two-thirds for individuals aged at least 15 years. It is higher in rural areas and for males, and tends to rise with educational attainment. Employment patterns are comparable to those of labour supply: it is higher for males, residents in rural areas and among prime age individuals. Unemployment is particularly high for youths and, somewhat surprisingly, for workers with upper-secondary and tertiary education, who would otherwise be best equipped to work as salaried employees. When faced with a job loss, these individuals may prefer to wait for another salaried employment opportunity, instead of changing their labour-market status, so long as they can support themselves and their families in the meantime (queuing unemployment). Non-salaried work, including self employment
(own account workers, with or without assistance) and unpaid/casual/household work, accounted for about $70 \%$ of employment in 2004 and is more widespread among women than men, workers living in rural than urban areas, and among older individuals. ${ }^{2}$ The incidence of non-salaried work declines with educational attainment.

### 3.2 The methodology

Because earnings data are available only for wage-earners, estimation of a Mincerian equation by OLS would produce biased estimators if, as expected, selection into different job market statuses were correlated with potential determinants of earnings. In an influential paper, Heckman (1979) proposes a two step procedure based on the non selection hazard ratio (i.e., the ratio of the probability density function over the cumulative density function of a distribution) to obtain consistent estimators in the presence of dichotomous sample selection. Analogous results can be obtained by jointly estimating the selection and the earnings equations by full-information maximum likelihood.

This paper aims to compare estimates of wage determinants using a multinomial selection rule against those obtained by OLS and under binomial selection. To ensure comparability, a full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) technique is used to estimate three models: a single continuous-variable earnings equation; a two-equation system for the binomial selection model, including a wage equation with a continuous censored dependent variable and a selection equation with a binomial dependent variable; and a multiple-equation system for the multinomial model, including a wage equation with a continuous censored dependent variable and separate equations for each alternative labour-market status.

The multinomial selection model, where individuals can chose among $M$ alternatives, can be defined as:

$$
\begin{align*}
y_{1} & =x \beta_{1}+\epsilon_{1}  \tag{1}\\
y_{s}^{*} & =z_{s} \gamma_{s}+v_{s} \tag{2}
\end{align*}
$$

where $s=1, \ldots, M$ and the wage outcome $y_{1}^{*}$ is observed if and only if $y_{1}^{*}=\max _{j \neq 1} y_{j}^{*}$, so

[^2]that category 1 (salaried work) is chosen. As shown by Mac Fadden (1973), under the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) hypothesis, Equation (1) reduces to a multinomial logit model. ${ }^{3}$ We estimate the two equations for $y_{1}$ and $y_{s}^{*}$ jointly to take account of the correlation between the error terms, which is equivalent to estimating a recursive system of generalized linear models with a Gaussian error distribution: in the ML-based seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR), all equations are independent, but the underlying errors are jointly normally distributed. In the multinomial selection equation, each choice other than the base alternative $s=2, \ldots, M$ is represented separately by an equation. Since multinomial choice depends on the same set of regressors for all alternatives, we have to impose the IIA condition through constraints on the covariance among the errors of the $M-1$ equations representing the selection alternatives. ${ }^{4}$

In some specifications (e.g., Table 3, columns 4 to 9 ), we also address the problem of endogeneity of educational attainment by instrumenting the individual's years of schooling, which is a right hand-side variable in both the wage and the selection equations, by the number of new schools built in his/her district of birth between 1973-74 and 1978-79. To do so, we add a reduced-form equation to the FIML system(s) with years of schooling as the dependent variable and all exogenous variables and the instrument as regressors. Since the instrumentation strategy imposes recursiveness, in this case only the second-step coefficients are structural (limited-information maximum likelihood).

### 3.3 Definition of the variables

Under binomial selection, individuals are either employed as salaried workers (and hence we observe their wages), or they are not. In the multinomial selection framework, we assume that workers can select themselves into three labour-market statuses: inactivity, employment as a wage-earner and non-salaried work. ${ }^{5}$ The set of exogenous explanatory variables is the same for both selection rules (binomial and multinomial) and includes: age, age squared, a place of residence dummy (rural), a gender dummy (female) and a marital status dummy (married). We also include an interaction term (female*married) and the dependency ratio (computed as the number of household members who are younger than 15 or older than 65

[^3]divided by the number of household members aged 15 65) on its own and interacted with gender (female*dependency ratio). Educational attainment is measured as years of education. ${ }^{6}$ Finally, we control for the average years of schooling of the other adult household members, which proxies for an individual's socio-economic background. Provincial dummies (the omitted province is Aceh) are included in all regressions.

The set of regressors is the same in the wage and selection equations, with the exception of the dependency ratio and its interaction with the gender dummy, which are omitted from the wage equation to fulfill the exclusion restrictions. As an additional robustness check, we control for the worker's sector of activity (agriculture, manufacturing or services, with trade as the omitted category) in Table 3 , columns 7 to $9 .{ }^{7}$

To deal with the endogeneity of educational attainment, we instrument years of education by exposure to Sekolah Dasar INPRES, measured as the intensity of school construction in an individual's district of birth and his/her age when the programme was launched (Table 3, columns 4 to 9). Following Duflo (2001), we define district-level programme intensity as the number of schools built in a district between 1973-74 and 1978-79 divided by the number of children aged 5-14 years living in that district in 1971 (in thousands). Since most Indonesian children attend primary school between the age of 6 and 12, we assume that children benefit from the construction of schools only if they are aged 11 or less at the time the school is built. Therefore, our instrument programme exposure is equal to programme intensity in the individual's district of birth if he/she was aged 11 or less in 1974, and zero otherwise. ${ }^{8}$ Duflo shows that this instrument has good explanatory power and that individuals born in districts that benefited more from the program were more likely to stay longer at school and to earn more once joining the labour force.The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2.

[^4]Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

| variable | obs. | mean | min. | max. | s.d. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Log. hourly wage | 38551 | 8.24 | 4.83 | 13 | 0.74 |
| rural | 189605 | 0.51 | 0 | 1 | 0.5 |
| age | 189605 | 35 | 15 | 65 | 13.1 |
| age squared | 189605 | 1400 | 225 | 4225 | 999.54 |
| female | 189605 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 | 0.5 |
| married | 189605 | 0.69 | 0 | 1 | 0.46 |
| dependency ratio | 189605 | 0.33 | 0 | 5 | 0.3 |
| years of education | 189605 | 7.96 | 0 | 16 | 3.64 |
| household education | 189605 | 7.84 | 0 | 16 | 3.44 |
| sector: agriculture | 123043 | 0.4 | 0 | 1 | 0.49 |
| sector: manifacture | 123043 | 0.17 | 0 | 1 | 0.38 |
| sector: services | 123043 | 0.15 | 0 | 1 | 0.35 |
| programme intensity | 181483 | 2.01 | 0.59 | 8.6 | 1.12 |
| programme exposure | 183493 | 1.37 | 0 | 8.6 | 1.33 |

Source: Sakernas

### 3.4 The determinants of earnings

The results of the estimation of a Mincerian wage equation for 2004 are reported in Table 3. The sample includes all individuals aged 15-65 years who worked at least one hour as salaried workers in the previous week. The dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wages. ${ }^{9}$ Nine different specifications are reported: educational attainment is treated as exogenous in the first set of results (Table 3, columns 1 to 3 ) and is instrumented by programme exposure in the second set of results (columns 4 to 6 ). We control for workers' sector of activity in the third set of results (columns 7 to 9 ). ${ }^{10}$ For each set of results, three specifications are presented: OLS, which ignores the selection bias (column 1, 4 and 7); binomial selection, where inactivity and non-salaried work fall in the same category (column 2,5 and 8 ); and the multinomial selection process described above with three different outcomes: salaried work,

[^5]non-salaried work and inactivity (column 3, 6, 9).

A few parameter estimates differ a great deal across specifications. For instance, the rural dummy is positive signed or insignificant in the OLS and binomial selection specifications, while it is negative and highly significant under multinomial selection, which takes into account the fact that salaried work is very infrequent in rural areas. Likewise, the interaction female* ${ }^{*}$ married is insignificant under binomial selection, but positive and significant under multinomial selection. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the interaction term suggests that being married, which yields a wage premium, offsets in part the negative effect of being female, which is probably related to the fact that very few married women work as salaried workers. ${ }^{11}$ It is worth noticing that the regressors whose estimated effects on wage vary the most across specifications are the ones that have the strongest impact on multinomial selection into the labour market: rural, married and female*married (see below). These variables help to discriminate among those two statuses (non-salaried work and inactivity) that are treated as a single outcome under binomial selection and whose coefficients are therefore biased in the associated wage equation. These findings suggest that a binomial rule is too crude for describing selection in the Indonesian labour market.

All other coefficients are comparable in sign and magnitude across specifications. For instance, wages rise with educational attainment and age (albeit for age in a non linear manner), and women are paid less than men. Socio-economic background, proxied by the average years of schooling of all other adult household members, is positively signed and significant, as expected. Moreover, all else equal, workers in trade are paid less than in the other sectors, while the highest wages are in manufacturing. Our estimate for the returns to education ranges from 9 to $10.8 \%$, which is comparable to the interval of $6.8-10.6 \%$ reported by Duflo (2001) on the basis of a cross-section of male workers from the 1995 Inter-Census Survey of Indonesia. The estimated coefficients do not change significantly whether educational attainment is instrumented or not, which underscores Duflo's finding that OLS coefficients do not appear to be biased upwards, as argued by Behrman (1990) in the context of developing countries.

[^6]Table 3. Wage equation, 2004 (Dep. Var.: Logarithm of hourly wage)

|  | (1) <br> Mincerian | (2) <br> Heckman selection | (3) <br> Multinomial selection | (4) <br> Mincerian | (5) <br> Heckman selection | (6) <br> Multinomial selection | (7) <br> Mincerian | (8) <br> Heckman selection | (9) <br> Multinomial selection |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| rural | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0333^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.0102 \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0284^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.0271^{* *} \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline-0.0199 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0390^{* * *} \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.0240^{* *} \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline-0.0242^{*} \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0422^{* * *} \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ |
| age | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0437^{* * *} \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0567^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0379^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0460^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0579^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0392^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0465^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0583^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0383^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ |
| age squared | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0003^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0005^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0003^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0004^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0005^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0003^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0004^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0005^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0003^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ |
| female | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1996^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.2014^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1717^{* * *} \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.2031^{* * *} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.2060^{* * *} \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1769^{* * *} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1990^{* * *} \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.2017^{* * *} \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1726^{* * *} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ |
| married | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0788^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0837^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0527^{* * *} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0724^{* * *} \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0833^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0524^{* * *} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0627^{* * *} \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0765^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0439^{* * *} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ |
| female*married | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0675^{* * *} \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0251 \\ & (0.020) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0849^{* * *} \\ & (0.026) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0701^{* * *} \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0308 \\ & (0.020) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0782^{* * *} \\ & (0.027) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0657^{* * *} \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0414^{* *} \\ & (0.021) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0762^{* * *} \\ & (0.029) \end{aligned}$ |
| years of education | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1032^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1161^{* * *} \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1121^{* * *} \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0965^{* * *} \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1084^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1036^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0949^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1079^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1021^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ |
| household education | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0064^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0066^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0103^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0096^{* *} \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0103^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0144^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0115^{* *} \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0120^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0162^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ |
| sector: agriculture |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0598^{* * *} \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0545^{* * *} \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0510^{* * *} \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ |
| sector: manifacturing |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1613^{* * *} \\ & (0.007) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1611^{* * *} \\ & (0.007) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1619^{* * *} \\ & (0.007) \end{aligned}$ |
| sector: services |  |  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0753^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0735^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0800^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ |
| Provincial dummies | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Education instrumented | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Constant | $6.0426^{* * *}$ | $5.5217^{* * *}$ | 5.9520 *** | 6.0573 *** | 5.5570*** | 5.9899*** | $5.9715^{* * *}$ | 5.4580*** | 5.9317*** |
|  | (0.043) | (0.099) | (0.102) | (0.048) | (0.105) | (0.108) | (0.047) | (0.109) | (0.116) |
| Observations | 38551 | 38551 | 38551 | 38551 | 38551 | 38551 | 38551 | 38551 | 38551 |

[^7]Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Education attainment is instrumented using the product of programme intensity in the individuals' district of birth and a dummy equal to one if the individual was aged 11 or less in 1974, and 0 otherwise.

### 3.5 Selection into the labour market

The results of the selection equation(s) are reported in Table 4. The estimations carried out under binomial selection are reported in column (1), where the estimates refer to the probability of non-salaried work or inactivity (salaried work is the omitted category). Columns (2) and (3) report the multinomial selection results: column (2) refers to the probability of non-salaried work, and column (3) refers to the probability of inactivity (salaried work is the omitted category). In columns (4) to (6) educational attainment is instrumented as described above. Again, column (4) reports the binomial selection coefficients, while columns (5) and (6) refer to the multinomial selection equations.

The estimation results shed some light on the differences between non-salaried work and inactivity. The rural dummy is always positive in columns (1) to (3), but the magnitude of the effect is much bigger for non-salaried workers. This suggests that individuals living in rural areas, who are on average less educated but have a higher participation rate (from Table 1), are more likely to work in non-salaried jobs than being inactive and to work as salaried employees, an effect that is not captured by the binomial selection rule, which averages out non-salaried and inactive workers. However, when educational attainment is instrumented, the rural dummy for inactive workers under multinomial selection is not significant. The effect of age on labour-market status is, as expected, non linear. Older workers are more experienced and therefore more likely to work as salaried employees, although the effect is counterbalanced by a quadratic term, which is positively signed. Under the multinomial rule, the female dummy is negatively signed for non-salaried workers but positively signed for inactive individuals, and women tend to choose inactivity much more frequently than men (also from Table 1).

Marital status also matters. The married dummy is negatively signed under binominal selection, although married individuals are more likely to have non-salaried jobs and less likely to be inactive than single individuals under the multinomial rule. The combined sign and magnitude of the interaction terms suggests that married women have a slightly higher probability of having a non-salaried job than working as salaried workers and a much higher probability of being inactive.

Under multinomial selection, a higher dependency ratio seems to discourage workers from remaining inactive and to push them into non-salaried jobs, while the distinction is not cap-
*** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05$, * $\mathrm{p}<0$.
Standard errors in parentheses

|  | Heckman selection | Multinomial | selection | Heckman selection | Multinomial | selection |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) <br> Non-salaried inactive workers | (2) <br> Non-salaried workers | (3) <br> Inactive workers | (4) <br> Non-salaried inactive workers | (5) <br> Non-salaried workers | (6) <br> Inactive workers |
| rural | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.0862^{* * *} \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.2175^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.0291^{* * *} \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0812^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.2118^{* * *} \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0150 \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ |
| age | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0285^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0099^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1208^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0280^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0091^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1191^{* * *} \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ |
| age squared | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0004^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0002^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0016^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0004^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0002^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0015^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ |
| female | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0018 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1343^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0481^{* * *} \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0044 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.1377^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0405^{* * *} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ |
| married | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0137^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0410^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.3670^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0140^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0408^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.3674^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ |
| female*married | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1696^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1797^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.6838^{* * *} \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1674^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1767^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.6800^{* * *} \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ |
| dependency ratio | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0282^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0230^{* * *} \\ & (0.007) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0788^{* * *} \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0282^{* * *} \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0230^{* * *} \\ & (0.007) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0788^{* * *} \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ |
| female*dependency ratio | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0111^{*} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0441^{* * *} \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.2217^{* * *} \\ & (0.018) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0122^{* *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0454^{* * *} \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.2246^{* * *} \\ & (0.018) \end{aligned}$ |
| years of education | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0277^{* * *} \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0484^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0542^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0317^{* * *} \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0534^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0658^{* * *} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ |
| household education | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0002 \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0121^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0150^{* * *} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0017^{*} \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0010^{* * *} \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0206^{* * *} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ |
| Provincial dummies | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Education instrumented | NO | NO | NO | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 189605 | 189605 | 189605 | 189605 | 189605 | 189605 |

tured under binomial selection. As for the interaction female*dependency ratio, females living in a household with a high dependency ratio are less likely to work as a salaried employee and more likely to be inactive than those living in a low dependency household. The effect is overall positive, but greater in magnitude for non-participants under multinomial selection. The finding is robust to instrumentation of years of schooling.

Educational attainment seems to be a powerful predictor of labour-market outcomes: an additional year of education decreases the probability of non-salaried work and inactivity with respect to salaried work across all specification, and the negative effect is more pronounced when educational attainment is instrumented (columns 4 to 6). Finally, the average years of schooling of the individual's household raises his/her probability to be inactive relative to having a salaried or non-salaried job. This seems to suggest that members of highly educated households tend not to accept low quality non-salaried jobs. The effect is stronger once the endogeneity of educational attainment is taken into account.

## 4 Conclusions

This paper uses household survey (Sakernas) data for 2004 to estimate the determinants of earnings in Indonesia. The Indonesian labour market is segmented, with a majority of workers engaged in non-salaried occupations, and earnings data are available only for salaried workers. This poses problems for the estimation of wage equations, because selection into different labour-market statuses is likely to be non random. In addition, correcting for this selection bias using a binomial rule would not be appropriate, because a binomial rule would not encompass the different labour market outcomes, which include not only salaried and non-salaried work, but also the possibility that individuals may drop out of the labour force altogether.

We dealt with the selection bias by estimating a full-information maximum likelihood system of equations, where wages are observed for salaried employees only and selection into the different labour-market statuses is modelled in a multinomial setting. We dealt with reverse causality between educational attainment and earnings by instrumenting years of schooling in both the multinomial and earnings equations, using the same identification strategy as Duflo (2001), which is based on exposure to a large-scale school construction programme implemented in the 1970s. Duflo recognizes that educational attainment may affect the proba-
bility of working as a salaried employee, but she does not deal directly with the selection issue.

Comparison of the results obtained under multinomial selection with those estimated by standard OLS, which ignores the selection bias, and a binomial procedure à la Heckman (1979) shows that several parameter estimates differ when multinomial selection is allowed in the estimation of the wage equation. In addition, the regressors whose estimated effects vary the most are those with the strongest impact on individual selection into different labourmarket statuses. Overall, our findings cast doubt on the binomial selection specification and suggest that workers with higher educational attainment are more likely to find a job as salaried employees.

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[^0]:    *The authors are indebted to Esther Duflo for sharing her data.
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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ She uses instead two alternative procedures to investigate the amount of the bias: she first conditions in the second stage on the probability of selection given the instruments (Heckman and Hotz, 1989), and then she tries to impute an income to self employed individuals. In both cases, no significant change in the estimated coefficients is observed.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ The (already high) estimates of non-salaried work may in fact be biased downwards, as individuals working independently as non-wage earners may define themselves as employees.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ See Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2007) for a survey of the available methods to obtain consistent estimates of $\beta_{s}$ and $\gamma_{s}$ with a two-step procedure.
    ${ }^{4}$ For a detailed description of the required IIA parameterization see Roodman (2009).
    ${ }^{5}$ For both selection rules, individuals who are currently unemployed and actively looking for a job (around $7 \%$ of the overall population) are excluded from the sample.

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ Because Sakernas reports the highest educational qualification achieved, we transformed the reported achievements into the minimum number of years required to obtain the corresponding qualification in Indonesia. For instance, primary educational attainment is coded as 6 years of schooling, while Diploma III (which corresponds to a Bachelors' degree) corresponds to 15 years of schooling. We assigned a score of 3 to those individuals who declared to have started but not finished primary education.
    ${ }^{7}$ The original classification follows the ISIC rev. 3 codes. We aggregate all sectors under four macro labels: "agriculture" (agriculture, fishing), "manufacturing" (mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction), "trade" (trade, hotels, transports) and "services" (finance, real estate, government, education, health, other services).
    ${ }^{8}$ Although it is not obvious to assume that the district of residence is also the district where pupils attend primary school, Duflo reports that $91.5 \%$ children surveyed in the Indonesian Family Life Survey were still living in the district of birth at age 12.

[^5]:    ${ }^{9}$ Respondents are asked the number of hours worked during the previous week and their average monthly wage as employees. For those employees who are temporarily out of work at the time the survey is conducted, the number of hours worked in the previous week is computed as the mean of the sample distribution.
    ${ }^{10}$ The results of the instrumenting equation (i.e., the regression of years of schooling on programme exposure and the other controls) are not reported to economize on space, but they are available upon request. Our point estimates are very similar to those found by Duflo (2001). For instance, for each new school built per 1000 children we found an average increase of 0.11 years of education, while Duflo finds a coefficient of 0.15.

[^6]:    ${ }^{11}$ In our sample, $52 \%$ of unmarried women and $54 \%$ of married women are inactive. On the other hand, $40 \%$ of unmarried men but only $4 \%$ of married man are out of the labour force.

[^7]:    *** $\mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1$

