Sustainable Oligopolies - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Economic Theory Année : 1991

Sustainable Oligopolies

Résumé

In this paper, we show that an oligopoly market where both increasing returns to scale and competition are present can nevertheless satisfy stability conditions. In a sustainable oligopoly (1) each consumer chooses the firm which proposes the price-quality schedule he prefers (2) firms earn non-negative profits (3) no new firm could attract consumers and make profits. We prove that such a sustainable oligopoly exists under rather weak assumptions. The results apply to most models of vertical or horizontal product differentiation or to models of quality differentiation due to congestion effects.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00670928 , version 1 (16-02-2012)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-00670928 , version 1

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Gabrielle Demange, Dominique Henriet. Sustainable Oligopolies. Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, 54 (2), pp.417-428. ⟨halshs-00670928⟩
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