Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime
1
ICREA -
Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats = Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies
2 UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier
3 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
4 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 PSE - Paris School of Economics
6 GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux
7 The Research Institute of Industrial Economics
2 UT3 - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier
3 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
4 PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
5 PSE - Paris School of Economics
6 GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux
7 The Research Institute of Industrial Economics
Thierry Verdier
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 737748
- IdHAL : thierry-verdier
- IdRef : 035502037
Résumé
This paper analyzes the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labor. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, instead, jobs are well paid and/or crime is not profitable, unemployment benefits have to be high enough to induce workers to stay unemployed rather to commit crime because they are less vulnerable to crime activities. Also, in segregated neighborhoods characterized by high interactions between peers, a policy only based on punishment and arrest will not be efficient in reducing crime. It has to be accompanied by other types of policies that take into account social interactions.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Strong and Weak Ties in Employment and Crime
|
Résumé |
en
This paper analyzes the interplay between social structure and information exchange in two competing activities, crime and labor. We consider a dynamic model in which individuals belong to mutually exclusive two-person groups, referred to as dyads. There are multiple equilibria. If jobs are badly paid and/or crime is profitable, unemployment benefits have to be low enough to prevent workers for staying too long in the unemployment status because they are vulnerable to crime activities. If, instead, jobs are well paid and/or crime is not profitable, unemployment benefits have to be high enough to induce workers to stay unemployed rather to commit crime because they are less vulnerable to crime activities. Also, in segregated neighborhoods characterized by high interactions between peers, a policy only based on punishment and arrest will not be efficient in reducing crime. It has to be accompanied by other types of policies that take into account social interactions.
|
Auteur(s) |
Antoni Calvó-Armengol
1, 2, 3
, Thierry Verdier
3, 4, 5
, Yves Zenouc
3, 6, 7
1
ICREA -
Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats = Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies
( 300218 )
- Passeig Lluís Companys 23, 08010 Barcelona
- Espagne
2
UT3 -
Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier
( 217752 )
- 118 route de Narbonne - 31062 Toulouse
- France
3
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
4
PJSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1312 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
5
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
GAINS -
Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux
( 198500 )
- Université du Maine - Avenue Olivier Messiaen - 72085 Le Mans cedex 9
- France
7
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics
( 215267 )
- Suède
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2007-02
|
Volume |
91
|
Numéro |
1-2
|
Page/Identifiant |
203-233
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Social interactions, Crime, Labor market, Forward-looking agents
|
DOI | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.05.011 |
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