Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1284421
- IdHAL : ariane-lambert-mogiliansky
- ORCID : 0000-0003-4065-2049
- IdRef : 219670277
Résumé
This note reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient", and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats' bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
|
Résumé |
en
This note reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient", and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats' bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
|
Auteur(s) |
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky
1, 2
, Mukul Majumdar
3
, Roy Radner
4
1
PJSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 1312 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
2
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
Economics Department - Cornell University
( 153639 )
- Department of Economics 404 Uris Hall Cornell University Ithaca, N.Y. 14853
- États-Unis
4
Stern School of Business
( 153991 )
- États-Unis
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2009-04
|
Volume |
13
|
Numéro |
1-2
|
Page/Identifiant |
45-57
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Mots-clés (JEL) |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Petty corruption, Intermediaries, Game-theory
|
DOI | 10.1007/s10058-008-0068-1 |
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