Education and social mobility
1
IDEI -
Institut d'Economie Industrielle
2 GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
3 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
4 IUF - Institut universitaire de France
5 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
7 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
8 PSE - Paris School of Economics
2 GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
3 TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics
4 IUF - Institut universitaire de France
5 PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
6 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
7 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
8 PSE - Paris School of Economics
Philippe de Donder
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 742006
- IdHAL : philippe-de-donder
- IdRef : 199756120
Résumé
This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degrees of elitism may even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education is available, but social mobility may be reduced.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
Education and social mobility
|
Résumé |
en
This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degrees of elitism may even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education is available, but social mobility may be reduced.
|
Auteur(s) |
Helmuth Cremer
1, 2, 3, 4
, Philippe de Donder
1, 2, 3
, Pierre Pestieau
5, 6, 7, 8
1
IDEI -
Institut d'Economie Industrielle
( 199449 )
- Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 allée de Brienne 31015 Toulouse Cedex 6
- France
2
GREMAQ -
Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative
( 744 )
- manufacture des tabacs - bat. F 21 Allée de Brienne 31000 TOULOUSE
- France
3
TSE-R -
Toulouse School of Economics
( 93477 )
- Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allées de Brienne 31000 Toulouse
- France
4
IUF -
Institut universitaire de France
( 56663 )
- Maison des Universités 103 Boulevard Saint-Michel 75005 Paris
- France
5
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
6
CORE -
Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]
( 48233 )
- 34, Voie du Roman Pays B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
- Belgique
7
CEPR -
Center for Economic Policy Research
( 143559 )
- Royaume-Uni
8
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
|
Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2010-08
|
Volume |
17
|
Numéro |
4
|
Page/Identifiant |
357-377
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
|
Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Domaine(s) |
|
Voir aussi |
|
Indexation contrôlée |
|
Mots-clés |
en
Elitism, Egalitarianism, Private education
|
DOI | 10.1007/s10797-010-9133-0 |
ProdINRA | 316703 |
UT key WOS | 000280923500003 |
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