"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete
David Martimort
- Fonction : Auteur
- PersonId : 1043577
- ORCID : 0000-0002-4185-8703
- IdRef : 070009635
Résumé
We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with promotional externalities at the downstream level. In contrast to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that with competing brands a 'laissez-faire' approach towards vertical price control might not always promote productive efficiency. Giving manufacturers freedom to control retail prices is more likely to harm consumers when retailers impose positive promotional externalities on each other, and the converse is true otherwise. Our simple model also suggests that, with competing supply chains, consumers and manufacturers might prefer different contractual modes if promotional externalities have substantial effects on demands.
Domaines
Economies et financesFormat du dépôt | Notice |
---|---|
Type de dépôt | Article dans une revue |
Titre |
en
"When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete
|
Résumé |
en
We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with promotional externalities at the downstream level. In contrast to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that with competing brands a 'laissez-faire' approach towards vertical price control might not always promote productive efficiency. Giving manufacturers freedom to control retail prices is more likely to harm consumers when retailers impose positive promotional externalities on each other, and the converse is true otherwise. Our simple model also suggests that, with competing supply chains, consumers and manufacturers might prefer different contractual modes if promotional externalities have substantial effects on demands.
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Auteur(s) |
Jakub Kastl
1
, David Martimort
2, 3
, Salvatore Piccolo
4
1
Stanford University
( 73500 )
- 450 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305-2004
- États-Unis
2
PSE -
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques
( 139754 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
3
PSE -
Paris School of Economics
( 301309 )
- 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
- France
4
University of Naples Federico II = Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II
( 544964 )
- Via Cintia Monte S. Angelo, 80126 Napoli, Italy
- Italie
|
Comité de lecture |
Oui
|
Vulgarisation |
Non
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Langue du document |
Anglais
|
Nom de la revue |
|
Audience |
Non spécifiée
|
Date de publication |
2011-10
|
Volume |
20
|
Numéro |
3
|
Page/Identifiant |
649-677
|
Public visé |
Scientifique
|
Sous-type de document pour les Articles |
Research article
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Version du document |
version éditeur
|
Voir aussi |
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Domaine(s) |
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Indexation contrôlée |
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00300.x |
ProdINRA | 316650 |
UT key WOS | 000293015200001 |
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