Transnationalism and Development: The Example of Moroccan Migrant Networks

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The transnational paradigm is now a dominant approach in migration studies. This approach is rooted in the belief that the dense mobility of migrants has created social fields that differ significantly from the sedentary societies bounded by state borders. From the 1980s, transnational practices of migrants have been perceived as challenging integration dynamics and boundary construction. The analysis of development projects carried out by Moroccan migrants for the benefit of their home villages tells a very different story. This case study exemplifies the fact that transnationalism is rooted in migrant/non-migrant relationships. Moroccan transnational development networks are shaped not only by the expectations of the home villages but also by the co-funding policies implemented by different stakeholders. The case of the French co-development policy is examined here.

Keywords: Transnationalism; Morocco; Migration and Development; Co-Development

Introduction

Research into the impact of migration on countries of origin typically frames the question from the perspective of individual initiatives. Most studies consider transfers, of money or in kind (such as presents distributed during the summer returns), investments in housing and the creation of small enterprises. They are focused on individual actors and their relations with the society of origin. This type of approach tends to overlook the collective density of the circulation of people and goods, the social and spatial construction of which constitutes migrant transnationalism.

The analysis of transnational development networks allows us to grasp a collective form of transfers. In this context, ‘development network’ refers to a variety of migrant organisations involved in projects for the improvement of villages of origin. These networks are made up of highly diverse structures, from informal groups of individuals from the same village, to genuine migrant NGOs. The projects are also extremely varied, but typically involve the improvement of public goods in villages of origin, such as electrification or plumbing drinking water into houses. This type of network is a very particular form of transnational organisation and only concerns very specific groups of migrants. This type of operation has been observed among the Ticuani Indians of Mexico, the Otavalos of Ecuador, the Senegal River valley and the Kayes region in Mali, to cite only some notable examples (Daum 1998a; Gonin 1997; Quiminal 1991; Smith 1998).

This paper considers the example of Chleuh migrants resident in France, Belgium and the Netherlands.¹ The Chleuhs are one of the three Berber groups of Morocco. They are established in the mountain areas of southern Morocco. Since the beginning of the 1990s this region has experienced an unprecedented wave of development as a result of migrants’ activities. An idea of the extent of this phenomena can be gained from the Massa valley where the number of houses with direct access to drinking water increased from 5 per cent in 1992 to 75 per cent in 1998.

The analysis of this type of network enriches our understanding of transnational phenomena. The concept of transnationalism appeared in the 1970s to characterise the activities of non-state actors in the field of International Relations. In the early 1990s the concept was imported by several anthropologists in the United States to analyse migration-related activities. Studies of migration provided a new way of looking at the notion of transnationalism, coming at it not through the macro-
level verticality of large organisations but using an examination of human activity and social networks*transnationalism from below’ (Guarnizo and Smith 2002). However, the transnational approach remained deeply entrenched in the assumption of a strong opposition between states and transnational fields. Transnationalism had been more frequently used to characterise social systems that were closed around themselves, finding the resources to reproduce themselves in the areas of informality, dubious legality and avoidance of national legislations. Development networks do not fall into these categories. The ethnic dimension to their activities does not prevent development actors from working in collaboration with public authorities and civil societies of their societies of residence.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on migrant transnationalism. These questions are considered first through a brief review of the American and European literature on the subject, in which I try to trace the premises in which transnational analysis is rooted. The paper goes on to critically analyse this notion, based on the results of fieldwork. In conclusion, I will discuss three major issues that transnational research has brought to the fore: the relationships between transnational communities on the one hand and integration, circulation and state borders on the other.

**Transnationalism: Itinerary of the Concept**

Transnationalism has become a dominant paradigm of migration research. It is not my intention here to update the various syntheses of transnational studies which have been done so far (see Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Pries 2008). My intent is to unveil the premises of this concept and examine how it evolved over the last two decades, in order to grasp the underlying logics of this approach.

Migratory processes have only recently entered the field of transnational studies. Transnationalism was initially analysed from the 1970s onwards through other forms of non-state action, notably multinational companies, with their own political impacts. Transnationalism was initially a criticism of the realist approach in international relations which considered the state as the exclusive actor in the field (Keohane and Nye 1972). This critique developed during the 1980s. The transnational perspective was used to address the evolution of migratory systems following the enforcement of restrictive migration policies in the 1970s. Academics analysed the settlement of ethnic communities transformed by family reunion in Western Europe and North America. In that respect, Martin and Barbara Heisler underlined the paradox between this process of settlement and the maintaining of transnational linkages with the origin country (Heisler and Heisler 1986). Such migrant communities were deemed likely neither to return nor to assimilate, but to remain in a semi-settled situation, posing new challenges for the welfare state and the polity. Transnationalism was therefore perceived as a danger for integration.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall the East/West bipolarity was replaced by a state/ network duality. Turbulence in a World Politics by James Rosenau (1990) exemplifies this shift. According to Rosenau this duality opposed the international system of states to the sphere of multifaceted, polycentric social networks. Wherever the system of territoriality depended on the loyalty of citizens, the (dis)order of networks became established around strategies of identity and/or interest, and utilitarian and/or affective solidarity, in response to the crisis of authority.

In France the ‘turbulence’ thesis was well received. Researchers borrowed the theme of the correlation between the emergence of transnationalism and the end of sovereignty from US international relations. Transnational flows were defined by Smouts as ‘any exchange configured to avoid the control of nation-states, transgressing sovereignty or territorial control, either through deliberate intention or as a result of its particular arrangement’ (Smouts 1998: 50). Once freed from the nation-state container, new solidarities and identities became established at both the sub-national and international levels (Badie 1997). From this point on, state sovereignty had to meet the challenges presented by a global market and by movements of migrants who possessed newly established human rights which were often more significant than citizenship (Badie and Wiholt de Wenden 1994). In this context, postmodern US anthropology and sociology developed a complementary approach to transnationalism, based on the analysis of transnational immigrant communities and their relationship...
with the state. In Nations Unbound, the anthropologists Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc set up a theoretical framework for transnationalism based on a synthesis of investigations between the Philippines and the Caribbean and the US (Basch et al. 1994). According to these authors, transnationalism is above all a specific form of social organisation that is spread over several nation-states. They describe the density of the organisation of this transnational social space in terms of both material and symbolic relations. This organisation has developed through strategies of migrant resistance to the hegemonic projects of nation-states situated in a globalised environment. The structure of the labour market and hegemonic categories such as ‘race’, ‘nation’ or ‘citizenship’ imprison migrants into a subordinate socio-economic position without the possibility of involvement in their societies of residence. Transnational activities allow migrants to find economic, cultural and psychological resources to escape this enclosure.

This strand of works also describes a strong opposition between national and transnational spheres. However, the transnational approach of migration does not suggest that state structures crumble in the face of new global processes. Rather, the authors highlight the reproduction of hegemonic models that dominate nation-states within the transnational fields. They analyse different state strategies to use the transnational resources of migrants, including the production of ‘deterritorialised states’: ‘in this type of nation building, the idiom of the autonomous nation remains intact, even though the geographic boundaries of the state no longer can be understood to contain the citizens of the nation-state’ (Basch et al. 1994: 260).

Anglo-Saxon anthropology has updated our image of the diversity and wealth of migratory phenomena. Transnational space is far from being homogeneous. Just as there is a variety of territories, there is a multiplicity of transnational spaces. There is, first, the distinction between transnationalism ‘from above’ comprising multinational companies, international organisations and financial flows, and transnationalism ‘from below’, that of migrants (Guarnizo and Smith 2002). There is also a whole range of specialised networks within this space; networks concerned with politics, economics or communities (relating to marriage or particular villages). Finally, the transnational fields are not egalitarian social fields; certain studies highlight the diversity of roles within a stratified social hierarchy (Anderson 2001).

The question of how to find any coherence in such a diverse, complex space remains; what are the common characteristics of transnational actors or phenomena? Two particular themes emerge from the English language literature: the significant mobility of actors, and an involvement in the social life of both the place of origin and the place of residence. From this perspective mobility and engagement are not in opposition. It is possible to be involved economically, socially or politically in one place while living in another country, through efficient organisation and modern means of transport and communication.

Transnational research has also become widespread in Europe. Research carried out considers the relations between transnationalism and globalisation (Albrow 1996; Hannerz 1996), usually either in respect of particular migrant groups, such as Turks in Germany (Faist 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Pries 2001). Where research in the US has focused principally on economic questions, the European literature has opened new areas of investigation, particularly cultural and political fields (Bauböck 1994). This has encouraged an image of transnationalism as a new cultural or identity matrix rather than the simple addition of cultural production in migrants’ new societies of residence. As a way of identifying this particularity, European anthropologists such as Ulf Hannerz have emphasised a third characteristic of transnationalism, that of cultural hybridity (1996). This characteristic is obvious in European research, notably again in work on Turks in Germany (Faist 2000; Pries 2001). Jeffrey Jürgens defines hybridity as ‘a combination of forms from already established cultural traditions, rather than an emergent formation, relatively autonomous in its own right’ (Jürgens 2001: 101; see also Vertovec 2001).

Mobility, fragmented social space and hybridity therefore appear as the fundamental characteristics of transnationalism. It is a phenomenon associated with avoidance, an escape route from social
constraint. Some researchers go as far as suggesting that transnational mobility has the power to break down the nation-state in its modern form of territorial organisation. In that respect, transnationalism constrasts strongly with the building of so-called sedentary societies, at the macro level (networks as opposed to state) as well as at the micro level (migrants as opposed to non-migrants).

However, there is a growing interest in the interactions between transnationalism and integration, especially in Europe. Research gives a sense of more nuanced relationships between the two processes; studies show that socio-professional exclusion in the host society is not a pre-requisite for transnational engagement, quite the contrary (Faist 2003; Lucassen 2006; Portes et al. 2002; Snell et al. 2006). These studies show that the scale of transnational involvement and level of integration vary accordingly. For example, according to Leo Lucassen (2006), there are three forms of transnationalism: bi-local, bi-national or pan-ethnic. In the same vein, Ulf Hannerz (1996) distinguishes the transmigrant engaged in a bi-local social field and the cosmopolitan whose sense of belonging transcends national containers (Werbner 1999). These authors link these different forms of transnationalism with the various patterns of integration within host societies. This suggests a far more complex relationship between states and transnational networks, or between migrants and non-migrants.

The present analysis, based on empirical fieldwork among a particular Moroccan migrant group, examines the actual entanglement between transnationalism, integration and state policies.

**Moroccan Development Networks: An Alternative Vision of Transnationalism**

The Chleuhs are a Berber group from Southern Morocco, originating in a region which includes the High and Anti-Atlas, the Souss valley, the Chtouka plain and a portion of the Atlantic coast. This area is the oldest region of international migration in the country. International migration from the region has its origins during the First World War and it remained the most significant area of emigration until the 1960s.

The first international migrations were produced by French companies, particularly the Houillères of the Nord_Pas-de-Calais, which began recruiting in the Chleuh region during the First World War. These miners established migration from the region which continued through the economic boom of the trente glorieuses in France (1945-75). From 1950 industry became the main sector of employment, notably autoworks in the Parisian region. Following the official suspension of labour migration in 1973, the Chleuhs in Europe gradually diversified. This initially involved professional diversification; they became particularly active in retail, continuing the tradition of Berber shopkeepers who are present in most large Moroccan towns. Demographic diversification followed with the arrival of students and most of all family reunification which began the process of feminisation and lowered the age of the migrant population. The Chleuhs are known for their attachment to their region of origin. Their development initiatives are one of the manifestations of this attachment.

The analysis of development practices leads to a different interpretation of transnationalism. In this section, I first present an overview of the Moroccan development networks. I then draw on this case-study to examine how transnationalism affects migrant/non-migrant relations within origin communities and to highlight the continuities between transnational activities and state actions through the example of the French co-development policies.

**Moroccan Development Networks**

Chleuh migrants’ development activities form part of a tradition of collective management of public goods, such as the mosque or the irrigation system. Emigrants’ obligations continue after their departure. With migration, contributions changed form; they were made financially, rather than through direct participation in the necessary work. The first collective projects have their origins in this tradition: the construction of a mosque or a well was a widespread initiative in the 1960s. The first development projects, such as electrification or the construction of schools, dispensaries or roads, were initiated in the 1990s. This change can be explained by the failure of decentralisation and
through the specific characteristics of civil society in the region. Under the IMF-imposed structural adjustment plan, Morocco agreed to a degree of administrative decentralisation at the end of the 1980s. The creation of new local administrative units (communes) provoked a significant demand for public equipment, but the new village-level administrations found themselves unable to take responsibility for commonly held properties due to lack of financial means. This led the village populations to take advantage of a policy development allowing greater freedom in the formation of associations. The opportunity to create a legal association without constraint allowed villages to establish village development associations in order to undertake public projects. The shift from ‘traditional’ projects to ‘development’ projects provoked a substantial growth in the number of associations in Morocco. As a result of the failure of decentralisation, the number of rural associations multiplied to take responsibility for the running and maintenance of community institutions. The particular characteristics of the associations in the South of Morocco were based on ancient Berber community structures. These associations reproduced and modernised the ancient patriarchal assembly of the village (in Arabic douar), the Jemaa. This community council has given the associations a great deal of legitimacy with the local populations.

Emigrants were naturally the first people contacted to support the implementation of development projects. Even so, the shift to true development projects required a more significant input of resources. Collections within the emigrant community were not sufficient to cover the financial requirements. The need to diversify the resource base has had a profound impact on the organisation of village associations in Europe. The development of new forms of leadership is one of the visible results of these impacts. The first of these forms is that of the traditional leader whose legitimacy is founded on respectability, age and usually belonging to an important family. He (and it is always a he) has a great capacity to encourage participation in projects. The second type is a modern leader, educated, able to construct a grant application or a project budget, whose legitimacy is founded on the ability to engage external resources. In reality, most leaders are characterised by different degrees of each leadership profile. The leadership of development actors is particularly characterised by a capacity to play with these norms and break through normative fields, to move from a bureaucratic context where exchanges are based on written norms and contracts, to a context of community solidarity where reputation and spoken agreements are more important.

The appearance of these development collectives has produced a real demand for skills in project development and grant writing amongst Chleuh migrants in Europe. Several NGOs have grown out of this demand, run by Moroccan migrants who are able to support this type of initiative. These migrant NGOs make up a second level of development networks. They create a link between the grassroots project organisation, international donors and public authorities and with their society of residence more generally.

The first and oldest of these NGOs is ‘Migrations et Développement’, an NGO created in 1987 by a group made redundant from a factory run by the company Péchiney. They started a debate about the use of the return allowance (prime de retour) which accompanied their redundancy payment. With this money they were able to provide electricity to a village in Taroudant province in 1989, then another in 1992. With the support of the CCFD they were able to obtain grants from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Union. Until now, ‘Migrations et Développement’ has been involved in more than 200 villages in the south of Morocco.

The organisation of these migrant NGOs is comparable to the development collectives. They have the same forms of leadership and the same ability to articulate the discourse and adapt the sense of international development. Most of the leaders of these organisations have a background of union activism. For example, the director of ‘Migrations et Développement’ is a former labourer who became a representative with the CFDT. The network of associations created by Moroccan political refugees is also very involved in this area and a number of migrant NGOs are directed by refugees. This is the case of Immigration Démocratie et Développement (IDD) which was created in 1998 by a member of ATMF, a Moroccan political refugee organisation in France. The development context
allows these individuals to apply their ability to mobilise others. Development became the focus for activist engagement in the early 1990s. It allows activists to engineer a political ‘return’ to Morocco, which they abandoned in the 1970s as a result of the repression of the radical left under Hassan II. These projects allow two myths of return to coincide: the political return of the refugee and the yearning for return of the emigrant.

Transnational Development and Migrant Identities: New Means of Spatial Expression of Migration

Labour and trade migration from southern Morocco date back to at least the Middle Ages, directed either to the large cities of the Kingdom or towards the central arable plains. Mobility was primarily a response to the lack of local resources in the region. The Berber Chelehs have developed a migration culture in order to maintain the circulation of people while conserving social structures and hierarchy. For those remaining in the village, migration poses two kinds of problem: first, they must ensure that migrating village members retain their links to the village, thereby guaranteeing a flow of remittances; and second, assuring that migrants’ economic capital is not converted into political capital so that the political order (and the power of village elites) is not challenged.

The answer to both of these issues is found in a system of social pressure on migrants which was manifested through what I have termed the ‘stigmatisation of signs of elsewhere’. The space of destination was perceived in a very ambiguous manner. On the one hand, this space is highly attractive, a place where self-accomplishment is possible. On the other hand, it was a place of (Christian) foreign values and corruption. Everything which identified the migrant, such as possessions, clothes or vocabulary, was associated with the corruption inherent in this ‘elsewhere’. Berber poetry is full of these accusations directed at migrants: ‘He dyes his hair, the emigrant, the beautiful European! He stinks of wine like a market porter. And he reeks of cigarette smoke like the mouth of a furnace’ (quoted in Lefèbure 1990: 261). This stigmatisation had a significant impact on migrants’ identity. It is the origin of an identity paradox as migrants are called upon to conceal their identity of ‘immigrants’, but at the same time to display their success. This provokes a fracture between the identities of ‘immigrant’ and ‘emigrant’ and confines them in an illegitimate position.

The production of illegitimacy functions even better as it is also produced in countries of residence, but in the opposite sense. In Europe it is the link with the country of origin which is degrading since it exacerbates the exclusion of migrants. This means that the migration space is asymmetric. In Europe the migrant suffers from being ‘here, but not from here’, whereas in Morocco they are ‘from here, but not here’. In terms of relations with their countries of residence, migrants are called upon to display signs of their integration; but in their relations with their home society they have to display their attachment. In the words of Abdelmalek Sayad, the migrant is never in the correct place, but is always ‘dis-placed’ (Sayad 1999).

Involvement in development projects transforms the meaning of space and therefore the relationship between migrants and non-migrants. These projects allow migrants to express their bonds with the space of destination more positively. Development projects provoke a radical transformation of the living conditions of the villagers, which does not go without creating difficulties of adaptation and sometimes a feeling of apprehension among villagers. In this context, migrants not only bring financial resources, but also their experience of living abroad. Migration experience allows the villagers to take control of development and the changes in their daily life that it involves. These projects allow a legitimation of the status of migrant. ‘Really, we have the opportunity and the pleasure of being able to share the two cultures and the two countries [. . . ] and the ability to be able to allow one [understood as the village] to benefit from the other if we can’ (interview with Lahcen, President of Zeklaouia, Paris).

As a result, development actors find a new and balanced way of life between the place they came from and the place where they settled. Development provides a justification for their transnational
lives. Their spatiality now becomes marked by symmetry. This appears clearly in interviews I carried out during the survey through a whole variety of expressions: ‘I come and go’ or ‘I have one foot in Morocco and one foot here’. This symmetry expressed by development actors contrasts with the asymmetry of the emigrant/immigrant condition. Development actors overcome the duality ‘here/there’ by claiming a double rootedness, a double belonging.

**State Policies and Development Activities**

There are numerous public mechanisms to support development projects in both Europe and Morocco. An exhaustive examination is not possible here so I will focus on a French example, co-development policy. Co-development, as it has existed since the early 1990s, is based on the instrumentalisation of migrants to develop areas of significant emigration in order to reduce migration pressure. This policy is itself a legacy of return allowance policies implemented in the 1980s. Due to the failure of return allowances, the French authorities were looking for a new strategy to enhance return. Public authorities sought to link policy mechanisms with informal practices of financial contributions focused on development projects. The first half of the 1990s is therefore a period of consultation of the different stakeholders and of experimentation. These policies were initially tried in West Africa, notably in Mali and Senegal under the Programme Développement Local Migration (PDLM) which was broadly considered a failure (Daum 1998b). During this period, migrant organisations were noticeably absent from the policy-making process. As a result, the programme objectives were at odds with the aims of the migrants. The programmes had the short-term aim of supporting immigrants in their plans to return and the long-term aim of developing regions of emigration. However, as we have seen, development is, for migrants, most significantly a facilitation of circulation and the legitimisation of the status of ‘in-betweenness’.

In 1997 a second stage began with the publication of a report by Sami Nair (1997), which provided an institutional and ideological framework to co-development. It was the first time that the term was used to name policies aiming to harness migration and cooperation policies with migrant practices. A new institution, the MICOMI (Mission Interministérielle pour le Codéveloppement et la Migration Internationale), was established in order to go beyond the level of experimentation. However, almost immediately, this institution was discredited, being accused by civil society actors and migrant associations of serving the objectives of return decreed by the Ministry of the Interior.

In parallel, links between the French administration and development actors were progressively institutionalised. In 1997 a working group was established within the Co-Development Commission (CCD) a mixed coordination group linking French NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1999 a group of migrant associations denounced the mediation of French NGOs and claimed their own place in the policy-making process. The bilateral framework for discussions was broadened to include migrants. The creation of FORIM (Forum of Migrants’ International Solidarity Organisations) followed two years later. FORIM is a platform of migrant NGOs in France established to facilitate dialogue between the migrant NGOs, French NGOs and public authorities. This linked migrant organisations into the field of international cooperation and provoked a substantial evolution of the co-development discourse and notably the disappearance of the notion of return. It has almost 600 members.

This institutionalisation has provoked significant changes both in the definition of policies and in the activities of migrants. The creation of an institutional framework encouraged the formalisation of migrant activities. This has led to the creation of legally constituted associations, providing an official structure to previously informal practices with the aims of developing discussions with public authorities and of finding financial support. Co-development policy has therefore made a major contribution to shaping transnational development networks. A further result of this formalisation is the appearance of an elite of development actors. These individuals have benefited from the need for links between the administration and the organisers of small-scale projects. Members of this elite are able to meet the expectations of the administration and mobilise project holders. This requires a
genuine capacity to communicate and translate the important reference points. They have contributed to align the two discourses on development. In addition, the migrant NGOs have adopted, like all NGOs, the development vocabulary and mindset defined by the donors.

As far as policy-making is concerned, the coming of migrant stakeholders has led to a redefinition of co-development objectives. After 2002, the MICOMI was suppressed and replaced by the creation of the post of co-development ambassador at the Foreign Office. This ambassador consulted with the different stakeholders and finally declared that co-development was not a return policy. The government thus agreed to break the link between development projects and return.

Co-development policies can therefore be considered as a means of coupling the administrative networks of the state and the transnational networks of migrants. This coupling has significant effects on both networks, which demonstrates the possibility of interactions between transnationalism and state action.

**Conclusion**

The concept of transnationalism has been trapped in a dualist vision of the world which opposes networks and territories, migrants and states, and nomads and non-movers. This study supports a reconceptualisation of this framework in order to examine the complementarities between migrants and non-migrants. The commitment of Moroccan migrants to development initiatives provides an example of transnationalism which stemmed from the interaction between these two groups. My argument is therefore that transnationalism does not appear by itself or outside of or against the societies of residence, but involves them entirely. This case-study leads me to reassess the premises of the transnational theory that I identified in the first section of this paper, i.e. based on the binaries of mobility/immobility, state borders/networks, and transnationalism/integration.

Firstly, transnationalism is not determined by the practice of intense circulation. Most individuals interviewed for this research only visit Morocco once a year, during the summer holidays, no more regularly than average migrants. Circulation is significant less as a practice than as a ‘capacity’ which legitimates the ‘in-between’ status of migrants. Transnational phenomena emerge during interactions with non-migrants when this capacity to circulate is mobilised to legitimate the transmigrant’s status. Intense circulation is not a central element of transnational identities, which are, rather, based on a search for legitimacy of in-betweenness.

Secondly, transnationalism does not dissolve borders and territories. Transnationalism is rather a process of appropriation of political/social/economic discontinuities. Transmigrants base their legitimacy on their ability to circulate and above all to organise the circulation of goods and capital between origin and settlement spaces. The border gives value to the transmigrants’ abilities and mobilities and therefore provides legitimacy. Development projects provide a perfect example of this. Under these conditions, the frontier is not an object that is dissolved by the migrants’ actions but reappropriated by them as a basis for their identity. The border must be understood as the symmetrical axis of their transborder life. The link that is maintained on one side of the Mediterranean justifies and legitimates the involvement in the society on the opposite side. Transmigrants negotiate their position by exploiting lack of continuity and difference. This capacity to get access to resources abroad and the ability to import resources from abroad provides the basis of the legitimate existence of transmigrants in the eyes of non-migrants.

Finally, transnationalism is not incompatible with migrants’ integration into their societies of residence; quite the opposite. The capacity to capture and circulate resources from one side of the Mediterranean to the other depends on their knowledge and their involvement in the socio-economic environment to the North. The most dynamic development actors, who have demonstrated their leadership abilities, are those who are able to negotiate a number of different environments: the bureaucratic environment of public authorities and donors and the more informal context of relations within an immigrant group. These leaders have either a high level of education, or a background of union or NGO activism and have the skills necessary to encourage collective action. Other work on
transnational entrepreneurs comes to similar conclusions on the relationship between transnationalism and integration (Portes 2002). Integration encourages transnationalism, just as much as transnationalism can lead to new forms of integration in which both sides of the classic ‘here/there’ duality can contribute equally.

Notes

[1] The fieldwork on which this article is based was carried out from 1999 to 2003 (Lacroix 2005).
[2] Also called OSIM (Organisation de Solidarité Internationale des Migrants) according to the official terminology.
[3] The Comité Catholique Contre la Faim et pour le Développement, one of the largest development NGOs in France.

References