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Thomas Lacroix

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Thomas Lacroix  
Research fellow  
International Migration Institute  
Dpt of International Development  
University of Oxford  
Thomas.lacroix@qeh.ox.ac.uk

# Integration, transnationalism and development in a French-North African context

## Summary

An increasing number of public policies and schemes aim to foster integration dynamics by supporting immigrant development practices. The intent of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of this correlation through a comparison between two major immigrant Berber groups in France: the Algerian Kabyles and the Moroccan Chleuhs. While Moroccan organisations have become active development actors for the benefit of their origin area, Algerian ones, though sharing similar immigration and post-immigration trajectories, do not display the same level of commitment. Contrary to their Moroccan counterparts, Algerians, for historical and geopolitical reasons, have never been able to build an organisational level between hometown networks and funding bodies, i.e. a group of NGOs bridging project holders and host country organisations.

This paper concludes with an attempt to distinguish the effects of development practices according to the definition given to integration. There is little evidence that development practices improve individual integration, not even the image of immigration in the host country. However, the study shows that commitment to development projects produces and is produced by functional integration of immigrant groups. The projects build up a cohesive interdependence between migrant actors and beyond, between immigrant and host country organisations.

In France, the debate on the relationships between immigrant transnationalism and integration is tightly connected with codevelopment and return policies. Since the late seventies, the government has encouraged cultural preservation and long distance state control upon their expatriates<sup>1</sup> with the hope that it would ease the return of labour immigrants to their origin country. Nowadays, codevelopment schemes aim to level down migration pressure in sending areas or to back up temporary schemes and return policies. Associated with the sheer budget curtailing of integration policies (-40% between 2007 and 2008), this approach to codevelopment policy fosters feeling that the government pursue “development instead of integration” strategy.

Conversely, at the local level, some municipalities have bet on development practices of immigrants to implement alternative integration policy. For example, the city of Paris initiated in 2008 a project co-funding scheme, the *label co-development Sud*, which, encourages partnerships between migrants and French private and public organisations through the implementation of development projects. This “development for integration” approach to codevelopment has been adopted by other French and European local authorities such as Milan and Catalonia (Lacroix 2009c; Mezzetti & Ferro 2008).

The public debate on integration/transnationalism interactions oscillates between two stances. For some, development practices can be a path toward integration. For contenders, on the contrary, the valorisation of transnational linkages and origin culture can only maintain a sense of belonging to the sending country which may ease future return, but impede proper rooting in the arrival country. The intent of this paper is to shed light on this debate through the study of Algerian Kabyles and Moroccan Cheuhs<sup>2</sup> immigrant hometown organisations (HTO) in France. These groups do not display even patterns of engagement in development practices. While Moroccan organisations have become active development actors for the benefit of their origin area, Algerian ones, though sharing a long standing history of collective mobilisation, do not display the same commitment. In order to explain these discrepancies, I will examine the impact of integration on the evolution of these groupings. This work draws upon a doctoral and postdoctoral research conducted between 1999 and 2003 and in 2006-2008. Interviews have been carried out with immigrant actors and stakeholders in Paris, Marseille,

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<sup>1</sup> Since the seventies, the French authorities have widely relied on state of origin authorities for the management of immigrant populations. Until the creation of the Conseil Français du culte musulman in 2002, Islamic cult was directly managed by origin countries. In addition, agreements were passed with sending countries government to organise language and culture courses to children of immigrants. Finally, in the North African case, the French authorities initiated the creation of states of origin-controlled associations (the Amicales) to bridle immigrant union activism (see hereafter)

<sup>2</sup> Chleuhs and Kabyles are two Berber groups regarded as the historical cores of North African immigration to France

Amsterdam, Brussels and Morocco<sup>3</sup>.

The paper is divided into three main parts. The first one draws an overview of the current state of the art on hometown organisations and relocates current knowledge within the wider debate on integration and transnationalism. The second section presents the Moroccan and Algerian immigration histories. This will set the background for the third part more specifically focused on hometown organisations. It will be shown how HTOs, originally meant to facilitate chain migration, found in development a new field of collective mobilisation in the nineties.

## **1. Hometown networks, integration and transnationalism**

### *1.1. Hometown organisations, a state of the art*

There is a long tradition of research on immigrant organisations, dating back to the 1920s with the Chicago school. Hometown organisations, as such, have first been studied in Western Africa in the 1960s, in the context of internal migration (Evans 2007). But, it is only since the early 1990s in France (Daum 1998; Gonin 1997; Quiminal 1991) and early 2000s in the USA<sup>4</sup> that a sizeable body of research has been dedicated to HTOs in Northern countries.

By and large, the studies pursue twofold objective<sup>5</sup>. Firstly, they document the internal configuration of these groupings. Beyond the diversity of profiles depicted by the literature, some common traits can be listed<sup>6</sup>. They are constituted of aggregate families and are therefore small-sized organisations. They fulfil three main functions: reception and support of newcomers, internal social control and representation toward external institutions<sup>7</sup>. Most of them rely on internal sources of funding, mainly through the organisation of parties and community gatherings. The leadership is usually held by longstanding established immigrants who enjoy a stable situation in the receiving society. Leadership and collective mobilisation are rooted in traditional collectivist rules imported from the origin area. Finally, authors highlight a trend of formalisation of HTOs. Their increasing commitment to

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<sup>3</sup> Due to the uncertain political situation in Algeria at the time of the fieldwork, field research in sending countries has not been carried out

<sup>4</sup> The vastness of the Anglophone and Hispanophone bibliography is hinted by (Fox 2005; Goldring 2004)

<sup>5</sup> A third one, on HTOs activities, is addressed in the following section

<sup>6</sup> For a general synthesis of Mexican HTO structuring and functions, see (Fox et al 2006; Orozco 2000; 2003; Zabin & Radaban 1998)

<sup>7</sup> Kuah Pearce et al. proposes a detailed typology of immigrant organisations in the Chinese case which, however, can serve as a mapping of HTO functions in general ((Kuah-Pearce & Nu-Dehart 2006))

development projects leads these organisations to register legally in order to interact with public authorities in both countries (Zabin & Radaban 1998).

The second axis of investigation is the one of external arrangements of HTOs, i.e. the way they engage with both sending and receiving contexts. There is a wealth of studies documenting the Northern and Southern policies seeking to promote HTOs engagement in development initiatives (De Haas 2006; Ionescu 2006; Iskander 2006; Newland & Erin 2004). However, only a handful of works have explored interactions between HTOs and the civil societies in which they are embedded. According to Zabin, these interactions remain limited (Zabin & Radaban 1998, p.32). Conversely, Fox (2005, p.16) and Fitzgerald (2004) point to the entanglements of HTOs and workers' unions. The role of union leaders in HTOs is also highlighted by studies on North and West Africans in Europe (Daum 1998, p.117; Lacroix 2009a). Under the sway of civil society activists, some HTOs are getting increasingly involved in wider political issues. Their involvement in the campaign against the proposition 187<sup>8</sup> (Zabin & Radaban 1998) or in favour of the right to vote from abroad to Mexican general elections (Bakker & Smith 2003; Iskander 2006; Saldana 2003), are two Mexican-US illustrations of this tendency. In origin areas, the literature similarly highlights the ambiguities of political involvement of HTOs. Village-based partners on whom HTO can rely on to implement and follow the projects are, most of the time, close relatives of migrant leaders who partake with local elite. As a consequence, projects are often connected with local politics (Evans 2007; Lacroix 2005).

The analysis of external arrangements of HTOs is almost exclusively focused on their inscription in the political sphere. There is still a lack of work addressing their relationships with non-political institutions, for instance, with national development NGOs or with other immigrant organisations. By and large, there has been, so far, scarcely any effort to examine how immigrant HTOs fit into wider national and transnational civil societies.

### *1.2. Integration and transnationalism, evidence from the literature*

There has been very little attempt to analyse HTO development activities from an integration perspective. There is, however, a growing body of research addressing directly the interrelations between transnational practices and integration trajectories. In the US, transnationalism was primarily perceived as a symptom of a double rejection from sending and receiving societies (Guarnizo et al

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<sup>8</sup> The proposition 187 is the name given to a proposition of law to the Californian Parliament meant to limit the access of undocumented people to basic public services

2003, p.1238; Roberts et al 1999), or a way for immigrants to escape from assimilationist pressures of nation-states (Basch et al 1994). During the last decade, a strand of works has endorsed a more nuanced stance. Several authors have observed a positive correlation between transnationalism and upward mobility among Latin American in the USA. Analysing survey data collected among Latino immigrant groups in the United States, Portes *et al.* (2002) showed that transnational entrepreneurship is facilitated by social and financial resources provided by a successful integration trajectory. In Europe, a study on immigrant communities in the Netherlands showed that patterns of transnational involvement vary according to the level of integration (Snell et al 2006). Transnational practices are more likely to be found among immigrants showing higher levels of integration while those less favourably integrated tend to display higher level of identification with their origin country. In the same vein, Valentina Mazzucato found that Ghanaians in the Netherlands take to the transnational field only once a satisfactory level of financial and legal stability has been reach (Mazzucato 2008). Studies on second generation immigrants are still very scarce. The one by Ruben Gowricharn on people of Hindustani descent in the Netherlands points to the maintaining of strong transnational identifications and practices, though on very different level than the one of their parents (Gowricharn 2009).

This strand of research and the existing literature on immigrant hometown organisations hint for complex interplay between integration and development practices. Assimilationist contenders would argue that the legitimacy and utility of HTO would disappear while immigrants acquire legal and economic stability and conversely, collective remittances are to be expected among recent immigration groups who have maintained vivid linkages with the origin country and nurture traditional village norms and habitus. However, recent works on immigration suggest that collective remittances are to be found among long standing groups which possess sufficient economic and human resources to engage in development activities. This stance is supported by the fact that hometown networks have benefited from the skills brought by unionists and associative activists. In that case, it remained to be explained why integration processes of have not dissolved the sense of belonging and customary village habitus that spur their commitment to such projects. For these reasons, this work examines the long term evolution of North African HTOs in France with the aim to unveil the effects of integration.

## **2. Kabyles and Chleuhs in France**

### *2.1. Algerian immigrations to France*

The Algerian and Moroccan immigration to France have very similar trajectories, rooted in a shared colonial history. The first flows of Algerian people to France date back from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the land seizure by the colonial authorities in retaliation to armed uprising led to a massive pauperisation of the Kabyle population. Prior the First World War, 4000 to 5000 Algerians were numbered in France, mostly in Marseille and the collieries of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The Kabyle Mountains became the main basin of recruitment of the Algerian workforce, due to impoverishment of this population, but also to the opposition of settlers established in the agricultural plains of Central Algeria to let local labourers emigrate. During the First World War, the French army recruited approximately 175 000 soldiers and 78 000 workers in Algeria to offset the heavy losses underwent during the first months of the war (Bouamama 2003, p.8). This led to the establishment of a sizeable Algerian community in the country. The need for workforce in the French industry attracted newcomers in spite of the resistance of settlers and the suspicion fed by the emergence of nationalist movements within the expatriated community. After the Second World War, the immigration gradually changed. The Kabyle Mountains ceased to be the exclusive providing area of emigrants and the phenomenon started encroaching on other regions, including urban areas. Diversification was equally observed at the social level as departures were recorded among new layers of the population, including, from the sixties onward, women and children. But the post-war period, up until the seventies, were the setting of a deeper transformation of the Algerian migration. Abdelmalek Sayad described the gradual shift from a migration closely driven and controlled by the origin community, where emigration was only a bracket within a peasant life, to a state of dependence of this origin community where the hierarchy of values and status were reversed for the benefit of emigrants (Sayad 1999 [1977]). In parallel, chain and temporary migration based on kinship networks were replaced by family and settlement migration. In 1973 and 1974, emigration was officially suspended for labour workers. However, the flows did not decreased as family reunification replaced a migration of single men (women constitute 42% of the population in 1999, against 32% in 1975). The Algerian population reached a peak in 1982 with 805 126 people. Housing conditions changed radically, especially in the Parisian region. Shabby hotels of the city centre and slums were progressively deserted for social housing in the suburbs. Since the early eighties, the Algerian population has started decreasing, reaching 475 216 in 1999. This decrease is mostly due to the acquisition of the French nationality. It is estimated that 1,3 million people of Algerian origin live in France nowadays<sup>9</sup>. The number of actual

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<sup>9</sup> Global Migrant Origin database, University of Sussex, 2008 (download date)

return is unknown and regards more often than not people having reached the retirement age.

<b>1962</b>	<b>1968</b>	<b>1975</b>	<b>1982</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1999</b>
350 484	473 812	710 690	805 126	611 420	475 216

Source: population census

However, these figures leave the false idea that Algerian migration belongs to the past. Since 1996, immigration from Algeria increased sharply, surpassing the Moroccan group as the first immigrant nationality in 2002 (28 000 Algerians, against 26 000 Moroccans<sup>10</sup>). Contemporary immigration is multi-faceted. The largest category of entrance is done through family reunification. In addition, France receives a regular inflow of undocumented migrants (Thierry 2004) and, since the second half of the nineties, a sizeable population of highly-skilled migrants and students. Altogether, the contemporary image of the Algerian population in France is highly complex. If the proletarian profile is still outstanding (57% of men are unskilled workers in 1999), this population has considerably diversified. At the other end of the social scale, 3,6% of Algerians living in France are business owners and 4,8% are intermediary and highly skilled workers.

Another feature of the Algerian migration history is the gradual mutation of the political landscape of the French-based Algerian civil society. After 1962, the pre-independence nationalist movements were merged into the French branch of the FLN party (Front de Liberation National). From the seventies onward a Berberist movement took shape around the FFS (Front des Forces Socialistes). The 1981 riots in Kabylie echoed in France with the creation of a new generation pro-Kabyle organisations around the RCD (Rassemblement Culturel Démocratique). In addition to these two major organisations, a wealth of cultural organisations sprung up to preserve Kabyle identity which was perceived as threatened in the host country by assimilation and in the origin country by the Arabo-Muslim Nation-State project<sup>11</sup>. In parallel, Algerian Islamist organisations opened branches in France, among them the Islamist Salvation Front (FIS). A third strand of Algerian organisations is composed of state-controlled associations created by the authorities in order to maintain a hold on the expatriates. The Amicales des Travailleurs et Commerçants Algériens emerged from the early seventies onward in the main areas of settlements. In 1988, a national uprising in Algeria led the government to put an end to the one-party

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<sup>10</sup> Source: AGDREF

<sup>11</sup> For a comprehensive panorama, see (Direche-Slimani 1997)



system and to the subsequent recognition of the main Berberist and Islamist parties. But the ten-year civil war that followed between the state and radical Islamists deepened the fragmentation of the civil society. In particular, the involvement of the two Berberist parties in the Algerian political game eroded their credential among the Kabyle population. This became apparent when, in 2001, during the last riots that flared up in Kabylie against the state “Hogra” (contempt), these two parties were ruled out by demonstrators and replaced by a spontaneous and temporary re-creation of the Aarch movement (a customary confederation of tribes). This fragmentation has also mirrored the internal diversification of the Algerian population. Children of immigrants found in the associational movement a way of building and asserting their presence in the French society. The “Beur movement” of the eighties heralded the rising of this new generation (Bouamama 1994). More recently, plethora of professional organisations sprung up with the arrival of highly-skilled immigrants and the increasing number of people of Algerian descent in higher professional positions.

## *2.2. The Berber Chleuh in France, a Moroccan workforce*

The paths followed by the Moroccan immigration are, in many aspects, similar to the Algerian one. The colonisation process and war recruitment have triggered the first arrivals in France. This early-days migration was mostly composed of Chleuh Berbers coming from the Mountains of Southern Morocco. The inter-war period flows were mainly directed to the coal mines of Northern France. After the Second World War, the migration underwent the same gradual diversification in terms of regions of origin and destination and actors’ profiles. This diversification gained momentum in the seventies while the closing of borders encouraged family reunification.

But the Moroccan migration took a different trajectory in the sixties, largely because of the diverging policies implemented by the two newly independent states. Algeria, heavily affected by eight years of fierce conflict, was reluctant to see its population leaking out to the former colonial power. The state finally forbade labour emigration in 1973. As a consequence, the Algerian migration system remained up until now confined in a face-to-face between Algeria and France. On the contrary, the Moroccan government used migration as a safety valve to contain poverty and political unrest. The Kingdom signed a series of workforce agreements with several European countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany). The Diaspora kept on increasing and spreading toward new destination countries since then. In the early nineties, the economic growth in Southern European countries (Italy and Spain) spurred a new wave of Moroccan immigrants. In North America, the US and French

speaking Canada attracted since independence an important Jewish and, more recently, Arabic community.

*Moroccan migration; main destination countries*

<b>France</b>	<b>Spain</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>The Netherlands</b>	<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Libya</b>	<b>USA</b>
759011	313739	294032	188104	165200	155819	116872	67207	47185

Source: Global Migrant Origin database, University of Sussex, v. 4, 2008

At the level of organisations, similarities and differences also stand out. The Moroccan associative field is rooted in the history of pre-independence leftist movement which thrived in student circles. The date of birth of the contemporary associative field is 1962, when Mehdi Ben Barka, then Moroccan leftist leader in exile, gathered the various components of the movement within the Association des Marocains en France (AMF). The organisation aimed to provide support to the leftist movement in Morocco. Throughout the sixties and seventies, ideological disputes split the AMF into various currents. In parallel, a part of the militants took a growing part in immigrant struggles which gained momentum after 1968. In 1982, the association split into two different organisations: the AMF whose main strategy remained focus on the home country and the ATMF (Association des Travailleurs Marocains de France) which reoriented its activities toward the Moroccan working class hit by the decline of industrial employment. In parallel, the Moroccan state, like Algeria, established a network of loyalist organisations in order to offset the growing influence of leftist organisations. This led to a violent polarisation between pro-regime “Amicales” and refugee organisations until the late eighties. This polarisation lost edge in the nineties due to a series of converging factors. In Morocco, left parties ceased to be a threat for the monarchy. The King granted amnesty to leftist opponents and left-wing parties re-integrated the official parliamentary scene. In France, the Amicales were suppressed and official contacts were made between former refugees and Moroccan authorities. In parallel, throughout the nineties, a third associative sector, neither pro nor anti-regime matured along apolitical lines. It includes a wide array of organisations in the cultural, religious and professional sectors. Organisations active in the field of international development emerged in this context of de-politicisation of the associative field.

*2.3. The distinct levels of engagement in transnational development of Moroccan and Algerian organisations*

Arguably, Moroccans and Algerians in France do not display the same degree of engagement in development issues. Major migrant organisations operate in Morocco for two decades. “Migrations et Développement<sup>12</sup>” (MD), the largest and oldest of these organisations has been working in approximately 200 villages since its inception, in the mid eighties. MD has carried out projects in the field of public infrastructures (roads, electrification, water access, sanitation, etc.), social infrastructures (building of schools and colleges, health centres, community centres) and a couple of income generating activities such as the creation of Argan oil cooperatives and tourist hostels. Most of the projects have been achieved in the origin area of its founder, himself a Chleuh Berber, in the Anti-Atlas (Lacroix 2005). Another important player is “Immigration, Développement, Démocratie<sup>13</sup>” (IDD), created by leftist activists in 2000. It is a platform gathering sixteen smaller organisations from various backgrounds. Their main achievement is the building of public libraries in rural areas. Once again, Southern Morocco is one their main regions of activities but IDD displays a wider scope of intervention than “Migrations et Développement” and has achieved projects in Central (Beni Mellal, Fès, Khouribga), Eastern (Figuig) and Northern Morocco (Nador). Next to these two main associations, the FORIM (Forum des organisations de solidarité internationale issues de l’immigration), a French platform of migrant NGOs, counts eleven other members having a focus on Morocco. Next to these established NGOs, plethora of small organisations is engaged in occasional or regular development activities. They range from large associations for which development initiatives constitute a secondary set of activities (such as the “Association des Informaticiens Marocains en France” which sends computer equipment in Moroccan schools) to small networks of village fellows or even individuals who collect and send money for development purposes to their hometown.

On the contrary, the number of Algerian organisations having development as their primary aim is much more limited. Against the twenty-eight above cited Moroccan organisations, only four Algerian ones are members of the FORIM. The first one is Solimed, an association created by a long-standing development activist of Algerian origin. In parallel, he works for ENDA Maghreb, one of the leading French NGOs in Africa. Solimed is active in the health sector and organises yearly “caravans” of doctors in Southern Algeria. The two next organisations, Touiza solidarité and ID Méditerranée work on the model of MD and support village initiatives, but to a smaller scale than their Moroccan counterpart. Finally, AMSED (Association Migration Solidarité et Echanges pour le Développement) is a Maghreban organisations for which Algeria (and Morocco) is a focus among others.

Personal investigations in the informal sector in Paris yielded to little evidence that development

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<sup>12</sup> [www.migdev.org](http://www.migdev.org)

<sup>13</sup> [www.idd-reseau.org](http://www.idd-reseau.org)

activities are widespread among village networks. In December 2008, a meeting convened by ID Mediterranée gathered nearly fifty organisations already committed to or willing to be committed to development projects in Algeria. Most of them were village organisations, but only a handful had successfully achieved a project.

Kabyles and Chleuhs people in France represent two relatively similar groups, displaying roughly analogue migration histories and integration trajectories. However, this overview highlights several discrepancies. On the one hand, the Moroccan migration and, to some extent, the Chleuh migration is now scattered at the international level whereas the Kabyle immigration is quasi exclusively oriented to France. On the other hand, we have seen that the Kabyle associative field has kept a political sensitivity at a much higher level than the Moroccan Chleuh one. In the following section, I will try to explain why these two groups nurture different levels of commitment to development issues. I will do so by examining more closely the evolution of the Kabyle and Chleuh Hometown organisations and by showing how a set of migrant NGOs emerged to link them (or not) with the field of international cooperation.

### **3. Kabyle and Chleuh hometown organisations in France**

#### *3.1. The Kabyle case*

The pre-war and immediate post-war periods were the heydays of informal chain migration. The process itself is well-known. Migrants chose their destinations according to job availabilities and the presence of a kin who will facilitate installation. This process entails the clustering of immigrants in the arrival countries according to their regional origin. Village communities in the receiving areas were undergoing a frequent turn-over and the harsh conditions in which migrants lived used to spur a strong sense of solidarity. Sharing a room between 5 or 6 fellows was not uncommon.

The appearance of hometown organisations is reported during this first age of immigration. In the case of Kabyles hometown organisations, membership goes with a set of rights and duties imported from the country of origin. The groupings reproduce the Jemaa, i.e. the customary village assembly which rules Berber villages in Kabylie. Emigrants chose among them a leader (the “Amin”), on the basis of his respectability, skills and reputation. The men representing their extended family or household are called “Tamen”. The selection process of the Tamen is consensus-based. Cafés owned by a Kabyle

friend or relative often constitute a place for meeting. The primary function of Kabyle hometown organisations is to maintain a “caisse commune” (they use this French term which means “collective fund”), to cover the expenses of the repatriation of the corpse in case of the death of a fellow. This participation is not voluntary, but compulsory. The money given by the members are not periodical fees, but a kind of community tax. If a member fails to pay, its participation is demanded by the Amin. The social pressure is backed up by honour and reputation. Ultimately, heavy faults and refusal to abide with the decisions taken are sanctioned by banishment. This measure, rarely enforced, consists in the impossibility for the banished to participate in any collective gathering: weddings, religious ceremonies, etc. The shame of banishment spills over to the relatives of the banished. It is, still today, not uncommon to cross over members paying for fees in the stead of a relative who refuses to contribute in order to avoid facing the disgrace of his banishment. Broadly speaking, the Jemaa ensures that emigrants respect the Tiwizi, i.e. the set of customary norms ruling the village life. This occasionally entails the participation in the maintenance of collective equipment such as the irrigation system or the mosque. The contribution to these traditional projects constituted a preliminary form of collective remittances. Village organisations are therefore functioning as a transmission belt for village communities to exert control on the expatriated village fellows.

This organisational form has withstood the transformation of the Algerian immigration. Nowadays, a large proportion of village organisations have disappeared. With family reunification, immigrants gradually moved to Parisian suburbs in search for large accommodation, a process which dismantled the spatial concentration of village groups. The transformation of power relations between migrants and villages, the process of individualisation and the loss of social homogeneity among migrants put an end to the original *raison d'être* of expatriated Jemaa(s). However, this form of organisation is still quite common among Algerian Kabyles. Even though there is no way of counting them due to their informal status, their existence has been confirmed by interviewed associative actors in Paris or Marseille.

Contemporary village organisations do not fulfil the same set of functions as in the early ages of migration. The repatriation fund is still operative in some of them, but they their normative capacity has lost edge. By and large, they keep on being an identity focus which materialises a sense of belonging. The diversification of the Kabyle population in France has strongly affected them. Three categories of actors have more specifically impacted on these organisations. Firstly, highly skilled professionals and militants have been instrumental in modernising the formal structures of these organisations. They brought new associative techniques such as secret ballot elections and decision making (in the stead of

cooption and show-of-hand decision making). The “café” as a meeting place have been replaced by premises in community centres and posters on café walls and word to mouth have been replaced by email and mobile phones as means to disseminate information. In the second place, the recent trend of modernisation has opened to youngsters the possibility to engage with these groupings. Traditionally, they cannot seat and partake in the decision making The change in election and decision making procedures have opened the possibility for them to rely on skill-based legitimacy challenging the clan-based legitimacy of elders. The vast majority of youngsters active in contemporary village organisations I encountered were born in Algeria and therefore retain a certain degree of attachment to the origin country. French-born youngsters are predominantly absent from village organisations. They do not share the same sense of obligation and identification toward the origin community than the elders. A fourth category of actors participating in the transformation of village organisations are the people having reached the age of retirement. Their situation grants them the possibility to dedicate more time to the community life. In addition, retired people share their life between the origin and settlement countries. Their cross border life has vivified the communication flows between expatriated and village communities and they have become crucial conveyors of information between the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

Despite the obvious differences of their respective profiles, these three groups of actors have found in village organisations a way of re-composing their transborder identity. On the one hand, their engagement is a way of preserving a Kabyle identity against the assimilationist pressures. Indeed, emigration has been the crucible in which the postcolonial Kabyle identity has been re-engineered. Berberist cultural organisations, academics artists and political parties have been key players of this process (Direche-Slimani 1997; Scheele 2009). But village organisations proved to be instrumental in embedding the Kabyle identity in the grassroots habitus of emigrant populations. On the other hand, village organisations have been affected by detachment from village customary rules and hierarchies. Community functioning has been re-moulded by the process of integration. New legitimacy patterns arise and prop a new hierarchic architecture. However, rather than a mere substitution of customary norms by modern ones, village organisations create a constructive combination between community belonging and diversity. Their transformation gives to the members the possibility to invent a balance between the different of spheres of their identity. Through their engagement, actors forge collectively a response to the social injunction to be either from here or there (i.e. the spaces of origin or reception), and create a position from where they can legitimately put forward that they simultaneously belong to here and there.

In this process, development initiatives convey this identity claim. They renew an allegiance toward the place of origin but they also transform emigrants into agents of modernisation. However, in the Kabyle case, development remains at the stage of wishful thinking. The organisation of a meeting in Bobigny (North East of Paris) by Idmediterranée, an Algerian Kabyle migrant NGO, attracted several tenths of village organisations willing to carry out their own development projects. Only handful of them had managed to reach the stage of implementation. This is a major difference with the Moroccan case. I will show that the link between village organisations and the wider migrant civil society (a missing link in the Algerian case) is crucial for stepping from projection to implementation.

### *3.2. Moroccan HTOs*

As in the Kabyle case, the history of hometown organisations paralleled the one of the Chleuh migration. Village organisations were first articulated to chain flows and the need for village communities to keep a hold on those who left, in order to make sure they would not disappear and stop remitting money. Family reunification and the closure of borders disrupted this articulation and reversed power relations between villagers and migrants. The functions and physiognomy of village organisations were further transformed by the emergence of new actors' profiles such as associative or union activists, youngsters and retired people. Development practices have been supportive of the maintenance of a sense of community belonging in spite of diversification and scattering trends and were also instrumental in helping actors to forge a composite but articulate identity between "home and away". Beyond these similarities, several major differences stand out. They partly explain why the Chleuhs HTOs display a stronger commitment to development issues than their Kabyle counterparts.

In the first place, Chleuhs HTOs have never displayed a similar degree of formalisation. Moroccan HTOs have never maintained repatriation funds nor replicated to the same extent the customary structures of the Jemaa. In this sense, village groupings appear to coalesce as networks rather than as proper organisations. They, nevertheless, display a strong level of stratification with leaders grounding their legitimacy in family affiliations. Community life is none the less intense. Meetings at homes are frequent and occasional events such as marriages attract large number of village fellows, sometimes from other European countries. Despite their weaker level of formalisation, Chleuh village networks have fulfilled the common set of functions of this type of groupings, i.e., the "cushioning effect" for newcomers, assistance for settling in, and a channel mediating the relationships between migrants and

villagers. For example, Chleuhs migrants carry on fulfilling their “Tiwizi” duties by participating in the maintenance of the village infrastructures. The severe droughts affecting Southern Morocco in the seventies were in greater part overcome thanks to the digging of new wells funded by emigrants (Pascon 1985). In addition, this low degree of formalisation has allowed village networks to withstand the wide dispersal of emigrants in different European countries. Personal investigations have highlighted the case of hometown group scattered between, Paris, Northern France, Belgium and the Netherlands, and though capable of pooling resources to electrify their origin village (Lacroix, 2005).

In the second place, contrary to what happened in the Kabyle case, development became a point of convergence between hometown networks and the wider immigrant civil society. While, hometown networks were increasingly committed to development projects in the nineties, a series of NGOs emerged. These NGOs (“Migration et Développement”, and “Immigration, Démocratie, Développement”, to cite the largest ones), have been created by activists who have long-standing past of militancy, either in unions or in refugee organisations. They found in development a way of mobilising their skills. This happened in a context of gradual normalisation of the relationships between leftist groups and the Moroccan authorities. The field of development activities provided to a number of refugees a way of re-creating in Morocco a space of mobilisation (Lacroix 2009a). At the same time, in the nineties, the inception of the codevelopment policy opened to migrant organisations a source of financial and political support. The activities of “Migrations et Développement”, from 1993 onwards, benefited from the support of the Ministry of Foreign Office. Likewise, IDD launched its first activities in the domain of rural libraries thanks to a funding from another FO programme, the Programme Concerté Maroc. Both organisations are among the leading ones at the FORIM, the Forum of Migrant organisations, created in 2002 to provide of representation of migrant NGOs towards public authorities and national NGOs. Indeed, the unprecedented surge of collective remittances observed among Moroccan immigrants in general and Berber Chleuhs in particular, is directly related to the recognition of emigrants as development actors through the codevelopment policy.

This dynamic is only on its inception among Algerian Kabyles. The fragmentation of the associative field and the overall distrust in leading Berberist parties has not made possible the emergence of an intermediate level between village networks and funding bodies. This lack of trust was magnified in 2001, when the riots in Kabylie triggered spontaneous demonstrations in which the RCD and the FFS kept a low profile (Collyer 2008). The political sensibility of the Kabyle context has hindered any form



of grassroots mobilisation, be it in France or in Algeria, and has complicated the dialogue with local authorities, even on apolitical issues such as development. The emergence of new immigrant NGOs such as Idméditerranée and Touiza, their growing presence in official structures such as the FORIM, leaves the hope that the situation might improve in the years to come.

### **Conclusion: can development foster a dynamic of integration?**

The comparison between Kabyle and Chleuh village organisations in France brings new insights on the relationships between development initiatives and integration. First of all, it shows that integration is not a necessary condition for the implementation of transnational initiatives. We saw that collective investments of emigrants in the origin area were possible (even though scarce and limited in scope) even in the early days of chain migration to France. The digging of wells, roads and religious buildings are reported as soon as the sixties and seventies. However, one can argue that these initiatives cannot be regarded as development outcomes (especially religious buildings), but as community duties. Integration proved to be crucial in the emergence of modern form of engagement in development activities. This latter observation is in line with the findings of alternate works on transnationalism (Mazzucato 2008; Portes et al 2002). Integration plays a role in the emergence of complex transnational practices.

The present study improves our understanding by showing that the interactions between both terms hinges on the *definition* given to integration (and not merely on the *pattern* of integration as Snell et al. put forward). Three definitions of integration can be distinguished: individual, societal and functional.

*Individual integration* is usually understood as the level of achievement of the members of a foreign group in the economic, cultural, political and educational domains. Most studies addressing the relationships between integration and transnationalism rely on such a definition. This work shows that there is no clear cut correlation between engagement in development initiatives and individual integration. Development actors display a wide array of profiles and integration levels and it turns out that it is more in the combination of this diversity that lays the capability of hometown organisations. This observation confirms that integration is not a condition for transnationalism but affects its forms. Another dimension of individual integration, which is usually overlooked by earlier works but turns out to be crucial in the present case, is the psycho-social one. Development practices turn out to be instrumental in integrating the different identity spheres of the actors. They use development as a means to legitimate a new pattern of relationships with the origin country and with other village fellows

in accordance with their multi-layered identity.

*Societal integration* occurs when the presence of a group and of its members is felt as unproblematic by the rest of the host society. Pro-immigrant organisations and codevelopment actors refer to societal integration when they put forward that development affects positively the image of immigrants in the receiving society. However, there is no evidence that commitment to development may prop any societal integration for immigrant groups. A research carried out for the Panos Institute on public discourses related to the migration and development dynamics showed the paucity of the media coverage of this issue (Lacroix 2009b). This coverage increased with the growing interest of policy makers for migration and (co)development. But there is no apparent effect of this surge of interest on the public opinion. In other words, societal integration processes seem confined to limited political and associative circles but is far from pervading to the rest of receiving societies.

Finally, *functional integration* can be defined as a cohesive interdependence between the various components of a social ensemble. Understood as such, it is clear that development activities favour integration of immigrant groups. The projects are conducive to the connection of various skills and resources available within emigrant groups and beyond. In a way, development practices of migrants does not simply reveal a certain pattern of integration but a set of diverging trajectories which grant access to different set of resources. Evidence of the correlation between diversity of integrations and resources is highlighted by the distinctive patterns of leaderships. Traditional leadership enables the mobilisation of internal resources through donations while modern leadership derives from the capacity to access to external sources of funding (such as public funding and NGOs). Conversely, the Kabyle case shows that the lack of functional integration impedes successful engagement into development practices.

This study leads the author to consider that there is no straightforward answer to the question to know whether development practices can foster integration dynamics. The comparison between Kabyle and Chleuh immigrants in France shows that integration in the host society does not lead *per se* to transnational involvement but, rather shapes it. Development practices, in that sense, are an outcome of the varied trajectories of integration within these populations. But we also saw that integration into the host society does not entirely account for the occurring of development practices. The relationships with the origin communities and the political context in which this relationship is embedded turn out to be determinant factors. The interactions between integration and transnationalism are therefore to be addressed in a wider context than the one of the receiving country.

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