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► **To cite this version:**

| Camille Hémet. The Local Determinants of Victimization. 2013. halshs-00873530

HAL Id: halshs-00873530

<https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00873530>

Preprint submitted on 15 Oct 2013

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The Local Determinants of Victimization

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WP 2013 - Nr 49

The Local Determinants of Victimization

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October 15, 2013

Abstract

This paper explores the determinants of victimization at the neighborhood level, using data from the French victimization survey. Its contribution to the economics of crime literature is threefold. First, I provide evidence that neighborhood characteristics explain victimization better than individual characteristics. Second, I find that local unemployment rate is one of the most important factor explaining victimization, with a particularly large effect on small crimes such as motorbike theft or vandalism. I then tackle the endogenous location selection issue, by adopting the strategy developed by Bayer et al. (2008), based on the fact that the study is conducted at a very low geographic level. Third, I take advantage of the precise localization of the data to adopt a spatial approach, comparing the effect of unemployment rate in the reference neighborhood and in adjacent neighborhoods. The results support the idea that criminals are mobile across neighborhoods for more serious economic crimes, in line with the Beckerian theory of crime, but that petty crimes and vandalism do not involve any mobility, relating to the social disorganization theory.

JEL Classification : K42, R23, J64

Key words: victimization, neighborhood effects, unemployment, geography

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I thank Bruno Decreuse for his guidance and support, and for insightful discussion. I also want to thank Pierre-Philippe Combes, Emeric Henry, Christian Schluter and Tanguy van Ypersele for very useful comments and suggestions, and Roberto Galbiati for his advice. I am grateful to Marc Sangnier for his precious help with the neighborhoods adjacency matrix, and to Grigorios Spanos for cautious reading and valuable remarks. I finally thank participants at Sciences Po Eco Lunch Seminar and at AMSE PhD workshop for relevant comments. Access to data used in this paper was granted by the French Committee for Statistical Secret, through the use of a Secure Remote Center of Access to the Data (*Centre d'Accès Sécurisé Distant*, CASD).

1 Introduction

Some factors such as a high population density or a large unemployment rate, are known for rising crime rates. Living in a deprived US county, Italian province or French department hence puts one at a higher risk of being victim of a criminal event than living in a prosperous region. Yet, such a statement may hide important spatial disparities: a region characterized by well-defined social and economic attributes generally encompasses very heterogeneous areas. As we zoom in and focus on smaller and smaller areas, the relationship between social, economic or demographic characteristics and crime rates established at more aggregate levels may be altered. Consider for instance two adjacent neighborhoods, a prosperous one and a depressed one. Admittedly, unemployment breeds crime, so that the depressed neighborhood will be a nest for criminals. Those criminals may act in their own neighborhood, but they may as well travel to the more attractive adjacent neighborhood. At some point, there could even be a negative relationship between a neighborhood unemployment and crime rates. Alternatively, a dual crime market could exist, with different types of crimes committed in different neighborhoods (e.g. vandalism in poor neighborhoods and burglaries in wealthy areas). This simple example illustrates the idea that studying crime from a more microeconomic perspective can challenge some of the established results, and lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms behind criminal events. In particular, adopting a local approach allows the researcher to ask or revisit the following questions. What are the local determinants of crime? To what extent is the probability to be victim of a criminal event in a given neighborhood affected by the characteristics of surrounding areas? Can we observe a duality in crimes, with some crimes explained by intrinsic neighborhoods characteristics and others explained by the characteristics of more distant areas?

This paper answers these questions taking advantage of the French victimization survey that provides detailed information localized at a very low geographic level (a 2,000 inhabitants neighborhood). Note upfront that the survey asks whether individuals have been victims of any criminal event, that is *victimised*, but does not inform about people committing crimes.¹ Hence, I am able to characterize the circumstances of a crime and the victim, but not the criminal. Three important findings emerge from this study. First, neighborhood characteristics explain victimization better than individual characteristics, except for assaults. Second, among the various neighborhood characteristics considered, unemployment rate appears as the most relevant factor having a positive effect on victimization. Third, adopting a spatial approach reveals that for crimes such as burglaries and thefts of objects from cars, the effect of unemployment rate in surrounding neighborhoods is stronger than the effect in the neighborhood where the crime took place, while the reverse is true for smaller crimes.

¹I will henceforth use the term *victimised* to refer to someone having been victim of any criminal event (from property to violent crimes and vandalism). Similarly, a *victimisation* will refer to the event making one a victim.

The present work differs from the previous literature by exploring the determinants of victimization at a very low geographic level. The geographic unit considered, called IRIS, is a 2,000 individuals neighborhood and is the smallest census tract unit for which representative indicators can be constructed in France. Instead, existing results are generally obtained using more aggregate data: [Gould et al. \(2002\)](#) and [Kelly \(2000\)](#) rely on US counties, which add up to 3,140 units for the whole country; [Buonanno et al. \(2009\)](#) and [Bianchi et al. \(2012\)](#) are based on 95 Italian provinces; [Machin and Meghir \(2004\)](#) rely on 43 police force areas for England and Wales; and [Fougère et al. \(2009\)](#) use data from the 96 French *départements*. An exception is [Bell et al. \(2010\)](#) who study the impact of immigration on crime using data from 371 local authorities across England and Wales. Although I am not questioning the validity of the results based on aggregate data, I think that they present an important drawback. These studies fail to account for criminals' mobility, implicitly assuming that the offenders commit crimes in the area where they live (e.g. provinces), ignoring the heterogeneity across neighborhoods within this broad area (in terms of economic conditions for instance). By contrast, I argue that according to the type of crime and the expected pay-off, criminals might either operate in their own neighborhood or travel to a remote area. It is for instance reasonable to think that thieves are more likely to live in deprived neighborhoods and to steal from wealthier (possibly neighboring) areas, while young delinquents will not have any incentives to bear transportation costs in order to vandalize cars in a distant neighborhood. [Zenou \(2005\)](#) provides some theoretical background for this idea in an urban economics model explaining the link between crime and location by highlighting the role of the housing market. In particular, distance to the city center (where jobs and crime opportunities are located) affects the decision to commit crime instead of working by increasing commuting costs and reducing housing rents. The idea that distance and mobility matter in criminal decision also finds some empirical support in the criminology literature. It documents that the places where perpetrators commit crimes often differ from their area of residence, and that the distance between the two locations varies with the accessibility of the target area, the type of crime and the offender's characteristics (see [Bruinsma \(2007\)](#) for a detailed survey on the Netherlands, and [Bernasco and Luykx \(2003\)](#) for an analysis of criminals' target location choice). Working at a very local level enables me to add a spatial dimension to the study of crime, which is a key input to the literature. I am indeed able to compare the effects of the characteristics of adjacent neighborhoods on crime and therefore to capture more precisely the mechanisms behind the relationships obtained with aggregate data.

In addition to allowing for the localization of the surveyed individuals at the neighborhood level, the victimization survey data used in this paper present several valuable features. First, in some cases, it is possible to know where the victimization took place, and hence to control for the characteristics of this location. By contrast, studies relying on police data

usually consider the location of the police station where the crime was reported rather than the location of the event itself. Second, these data provide detailed information on individuals, so that relevant individual characteristics pertaining to potential victims' attractiveness can be taken into account, while they are ignored in most of the existing literature. Finally, victimization surveys are known for avoiding the under-reporting issue from which reported police data suffer. Not only are individuals less likely to report personal offenses or small property crimes to the police, but criminal attempts or threats are also not always taken into account by police forces. Relying on victimization survey data is thus particularly insightful regarding petty crimes and assaults. Distinguishing between petty crimes such as vandalism and more important economic crimes shows quite relevant, as these different types of crimes turn out to be driven by different channels.

The nature and the quality of these data enable me to answer the questions asked above. Regarding the local determinants of crime, I show that social, economic and demographic neighborhood characteristics are more important than individual characteristics in explaining victimization. This result is particularly strong for petty crimes such as motorbike theft or car vandalism. It holds for all types of crime considered except for assault for which individual characteristics dominate. It therefore looks as if offenders target neighborhoods rather than precise households or individuals. In particular, among the various neighborhood characteristics considered, unemployment rate appears as the most relevant factor, while factors such as the share of immigrants in the neighborhood are not important in explaining victimization. The subsequent results of this paper hence focus on the role of unemployment on victimization. The coefficient for local unemployment rate is positive and its magnitude is particularly strong for small crimes such as motorbike theft or vandalism. Therefore, it seems that crimes committed in more deprived areas relate more to social disorganization theory (e.g. [Shaw and McKay, 1942](#)) than to rational economic crime theory *à la* Becker. Note that these results are obtained after correcting for the biases related to endogenous sorting, as will be explained below.

Finally, in order to test the idea that perpetrators may actually move across neighborhoods to commit economic crimes, I adopt a spatial approach that consists in controlling for both reference neighborhood and adjacent neighborhoods characteristics. The results show that for crimes such as burglaries and thefts of objects from cars, the effect of unemployment rate in distant neighborhoods is stronger than the effect in the reference neighborhood, while the reverse still holds for smaller crimes. Otherwise stated, for a given local unemployment rate, being surrounded by higher unemployment areas increases the probability of being burgled, but does not affect vandalism. Rather, vandalism is boosted by larger local unemployment rates for a given level of unemployment in the surrounding neighborhoods. This tends to support the idea of criminals mobility for some types of crime, e.g. economic crimes, in line

with Becker's theory, but not for other types of crimes (petty crimes and vandalism), relating instead to the social disorganization theory. This result is, to my opinion, the most important finding of this work. It helps understand the mechanisms behind the finding that, at larger geographic level, unemployment increases crime: unemployment would have a direct local effect on small crimes versus a remote effect on more serious economic crimes. Not only does it mean that the relationship between unemployment and crime is not trivial as we focus on smaller areas, but that this relationship also depends on the type of offense. This result shows the importance of taking criminals' mobility into account, and implies that distance, geography and transport infrastructure might be worth getting more attention in future research on crime.

This paper obviously relates to the large economics of crime literature, initiated by [Becker \(1968\)](#) and [Ehrlich \(1973\)](#). The hypothesis developed in these seminal papers is that the decision to engage into criminal activities is the result of a rational cost-benefit analysis. Most empirical research on the economics of crime aims at testing this hypothesis, which implies that economically weaker individuals (e.g. unemployed workers) have a higher propensity to commit crime because they face lower opportunity costs. Part of the literature hence focuses on economic factors, revealing that lower wages ([Gould et al., 2002](#)), larger unemployment rates ([Fougère et al., 2009](#)) or more inequality ([Kelly, 2000](#)) generate higher crime rates. Alternatively, several studies concentrate on demographic factors such as population density: [Glaeser et al. \(1996\)](#) show that crime is rife in denser and more populated areas due to extended social interactions. A similar idea is developed by [Calvo-Armengol et al. \(2007\)](#) and [Patacchini and Zenou \(2008\)](#) who show the importance of social relationships, in particular of weak ties,² in criminal behavior. A growing literature also focuses on the role played by immigration, and provides evidence that its causal impact on crime is not significant or only very moderate. For instance, [Bianchi et al. \(2012\)](#) demonstrate that the share of immigrants in Italian provinces has only a marginal effect on crime rates through robberies. Other studies, such as [Spenkuch \(2010\)](#) or [Bell et al. \(2010\)](#) show that the effect is driven by the most economically deprived immigrants. On another aspect, [Buonanno et al. \(2009\)](#) insist on the role of social norms and show that they tend to reduce property crimes.

Incidentally, the low geographic focus of this study binds it to the literature on neighborhood effects. A major concern in this literature is that households usually sort across neighborhoods in a non-random fashion. It is then possible that some unobserved household or individual characteristics influence both the propensity to be victim of a criminal event and neighborhood characteristics, therefore biasing the results. Several methods have been used in the literature to overcome this endogenous sorting issue, such as randomized experiments

²Weak ties are simple acquaintances, doing contrast to strong ties which are usually close friends and close relatives

or instrumental variables, that will be detailed more carefully in the paper. The approach adopted in this study follows Bayer et al. (2008) and builds on the very local nature of the data. The idea is that although households are able to select a given area in which they want to live, they are, however, unable to select a precise neighborhood within this given area. Therefore, once the characteristics of the larger selected area are controlled for, the remaining variation of unemployment rates across the smaller neighborhoods can be considered as exogenous.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data: I describe the victimization survey, and explain the particular geographic structure of the data. The empirical results are given in three distinct sections. Section 3 explores the determinants of the various types of victimization and compares the role of contextual versus individual characteristics. Section 4 deals with the issue of endogenous location selection, following the approach developed by Bayer et al. (2008). Section 5 is devoted to the new spatial approach, where I focus on the role of unemployment in the reference neighborhood versus adjacent neighborhoods, in an attempt to account for distance. Section 6 concludes.

2 Data overview

The French victimization survey (*Cadre de Vie et Sécurité* - Living Environment and Security, INSEE, CVS henceforth) is a repeated cross section, representative of mainland France households. It has been conducted annually since 2007 and each wave contains approximately 16,000 observations (one per household). The latest wave I use is the 2011. For each type of victimization considered in the CVS survey, the respondent is asked whether it occurred at least once over the two years preceding the survey. Various types of victimization affecting households in general are considered. These are mostly property thefts (or attempts) and acts of vandalism: burglary, attempt of burglary or theft without breaking in the main home (*burglary*), car theft or attempt, (*car theft*), motorbike (or scooter) theft or attempt (*motorbike theft*), *bike theft*, act of vandalism on the main home (*home vandalism*), act of vandalism on the car (*car vandalism*), and theft of objects from the car (*car objects theft*). I will henceforth refer to these types of victimization as household victimization. In addition, one randomly selected individual in each household is asked about his/her personal experience of victimization over the past two years.³ In this paper, I will consider three types of individual victimization: *robbery*, *theft* and *assault*.⁴ The shares of households and individuals victims of a given type of victimization at least once over the previous two years are displayed

³The member of the household selected to answer to the individual part of the survey is the person above 14 years old whose birthday is the closest to the 1st of January.

⁴The survey also informs about threats or insults, but I decide to let these types of victimization aside.

in the first column of Table 1. These figures are obtained pooling the 2007 to 2011 waves of the victimization survey. The other columns report the figures for various types of urban units, according to their population size and their degree of urbanization. Expectedly, the probability of victimization is higher in larger urban units (more than 50,000 inhabitants) and in the Paris urban unit than in less populated and rural areas. It is also clear from this table that occurrences of victimization are very rare events, which does not ease their study. The survey reveals that very few households or individuals report repeated occurrence of a given type of victimization, so that considering the occurrence of an event or its number does not make a large difference (this is not in the table).

When a victimization is reported, the respondent gives details about the circumstances, declaration to the police, consequences (physical injuries, protection behavior), and offender (e.g. when s/he was seen or arrested). The data also contain detailed information on households such as income, home ownership status or number of children, as well as individual characteristics such as age, gender, socio-economic category, education, income and national origins. Descriptive statistics of household and individual characteristics are reported in Table 2. In addition, the survey describes the neighborhood: the pollster characterizes the type of housings in the neighborhood and indicates whether s/he observes evidence of vandalism (burnt cars for instance). The respondent also reports whether s/he was aware of any crime or alcohol or drug related incident in the neighborhood and characterizes the general quality of the neighborhood (street light, green spaces, buildings aspect, bunch of people hanging around). Finally, the respondent rates her/his feeling of insecurity.

All this information is available in the public version of the survey. I also have access to more sensitive information, through a Secure Remote Center of Access to the Data (*Centre d'Accès Sécurisé Distant*, CASD). In particular, I am able to localize the precise neighborhood where the surveyed households live. This local area, called IRIS (*Ilots Regroupés pour l'Information Statistique*) is the smallest census tract unit for which representative indicators can be constructed in France. All French municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants and most of the municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants are divided into several IRISes. Each IRIS is defined so as to be an homogeneous area in terms of living environment, and its borders follow the main topographical and landscape frontiers (e.g. roads, railways and rivers). The target size of an IRIS is 2,000 inhabitants, so that IRISes actually include between 1,800 and 5,000 inhabitants.⁵ To give an idea of the level of aggregation, there are about 50,000 IRISes in France (for around 36,000 municipalities). By comparison, there are

⁵The IRISes are thus comparable in terms of population size, but not necessarily in terms of geographical space. Typically, a small village in the countryside is not divided into IRISes and is actually an IRIS of its own, while cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants are divided into several IRISes. The denser the city considered, the smaller the size of its IRISes.

96 *départements* in France, the geographical unit used by [Fougère et al. \(2009\)](#).⁶ For the sake of illustration, Figure 1 shows a map of Paris divided into IRISes. This is of course an extreme example with very small IRISes due to the high population density in Paris. In the remainder of the paper, I will interchangeably refer to IRIS or neighborhood.

Figure 1: Paris map of IRISes



Because each wave of the CVS survey comprises about 16,000 observations, there are very few observations in each IRIS (2.3 observations per IRIS per year on average). Working at such a small scale thus prevents me from computing representative victimization rates at the IRIS level. Instead, I use variables indicating whether each individual or household has ever experienced victimization over the past two years. On the bright side, working at the IRIS level presents a major advantage: it enables me to supplement the victimization data with social, economic and demographic characteristics representative of the IRIS. Indeed, the INSEE designed the IRIS to be the primary statistical unit of the census. Most of the French statistical data sources are therefore based on this geographical unit, so that it is easy to match information at the IRIS level. Using the French population censuses from 2006 to 2009, I can enrich the CVS survey data with socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the IRIS, at the time of the survey. Since 2004, the population census has been conducted annually, in a continuous way, and each wave contains information collected over five consecutive years.⁷ For instance, the 2006 census was conducted over the 2004 to 2008 period. Individuals living in municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants are all surveyed once over the period. For municipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, 8 % of the population is surveyed each year,

⁶[Bianchi et al. \(2012\)](#) rely on Italian Provinces, that adds up to a total of 95 units, and most studies on the US are done at the county level, that adds up to 3,140 units.

⁷Prior to 2004, the population census was conducted every decade on average, the latest one dating back from 1999.

so that 40 % of the population is included in the final census data. Because the CVS survey data of a given year concern events that happened over the previous two years, I match them with the census data of the previous year, to be as close as possible in terms of dates: the 2007 wave of the CVS survey is hence matched with the 2006 census data and so on. To be more precise, I enrich the CVS survey data with the following characteristics, representative at the IRIS level: unemployment rate, share of single-parent households, share of immigrants, share of public housing units, share of households arrived less than two years ago and share of 14-18 years old. Furthermore, I can retrieve the IRIS median household income (per consumption unit) from tax surveys. The median household income of a given IRIS is averaged over two consecutive years (weighted by the number of consumption units) and then matched to the following wave of the CVS survey. For instance, the observations from the 2007 wave of the CVS survey are matched with the average median income of 2005 and 2006. Table 3 describes the most relevant contextual variables accounting for households' living environment.

3 Preliminary results

3.1 Empirical methodology

When a victimization is reported in the survey, information is gathered about the circumstances in which it happened. In particular, the respondent has to indicate whether it took place in his/her own neighborhood or in some non-specified other place. As I am interested in the local determinants of victimization, I restrict the victimization occurrence to the events that happened in one's own neighborhood, which I am actually able to identify and to characterize. I can then control for the socio-economic environment of the IRIS where the event occurred. Hence, for all types of victimization considered, the dependent variable takes on value 1 if the household or the individual was offended in his own neighborhood and 0 otherwise, i.e. if the offence happened outside the neighborhood or if no offence happened at all. Table 4 documents the extent to which victimization happens in the neighborhood. It shows that most of the household victimization happens in the neighborhood, while the reverse is true for individual victimization. Limiting the study to victimization that happened in the victim's neighborhood can hence be an issue for individual victimization, but it is the only way to control for contextual characteristics.⁸

Let i , j and k indicate respectively individual, household and IRIS. For each outcome considered, I estimate the following equation.

$$VICT_{ijk} = \alpha + \beta X_i + \gamma Y_j + \delta Z_k + \varepsilon_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

⁸Excluding the observations for which a victimization happened outside of the neighborhood does not significantly affect the results.

where $VICT_{ijk}$ is a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of a given type of victimization at least once over the preceding two years. In the case of a household victimization i stands for the household head, j for the household and k for the IRIS, while in the case of an individual victimization, i stands for the surveyed individual. X_i is a vector of characteristics of the household head or of the interviewed individual according to the type of victimization considered (household or individual respectively). Then, Y_j is a vector of household characteristics and Z_k a vector of social, economic and demographic characteristics of the IRIS, along with other contextual variables that are detailed below. All results presented below derive from the estimation of a linear probability model, using OLS estimates, with robust standard errors clustered at the IRIS level.⁹

Two broad sets of variables are used in the regressions: one to control for the living environment in a general sense (Z_k) and another to control for individual and household characteristics (X_i and Y_j). Regarding contextual variables, I control for social, economic and demographic neighborhood (IRIS) characteristics: median annual household income (in log), unemployment rate, share of immigrants, share of households living in the public housing sector, share of 14-18-year-old individuals, share of single-parent families (*monoparental*) and share of households that have been living in the IRIS for less than two years (*recent movers*). As population density is known to be an important factor of crime, I control for the population density of the municipality (I do not know the density of the IRIS), along with an indicator of the size of the urban unit in which the IRIS is located. I also include a variable from the CVS survey describing the type of buildings in the neighborhood (dispersed houses out of the city, houses in a lot or in the city, apartment blocks in the city or in the suburbs). *Département* fixed effects are also included as contextual variables, with the intent of capturing more aggregate characteristics. In particular, the police force is organized at the *département* level (*préfecture*). Regarding household characteristics, the following controls are used: household monthly income (in three categories), ownership status (owner, tenant in the private housing sector or tenant in the public housing sector) and number of children in the household. As far as individual (respectively household head) characteristics are concerned, age, gender, nationality, occupation status and socio-economic category of the surveyed individual (respectively household head) are included in regressions of individual (respectively household) victimization.

⁹I have also run probit regressions, obtaining qualitatively similar results, which are available upon request.

3.2 Contextual versus individual determinants

As a first step of the analysis, I compare the role played by contextual variables to that played by individual variables, with two purposes in mind. One is to give a broad idea of the type of characteristics determining victimization, especially as victims' characteristics were never accounted for in the preceding literature. The other purpose is to give a first insight about the way offenders behave: do they target a specific house, car, or individual, or do they rather primarily target a neighborhood? To do so, I run regressions of the various types of victimization on different sets of controls, alternatively controlling for contextual and individual characteristics. Table 5 displays the adjusted R-squared of the various regressions, where each row stands for a given dependent variables (victimization), while each column corresponds to a different specification. Columns (1) to (4) include various sets of contextual variables, with column (4) including them all. Similarly, columns (5) to (7) include various sets of individual and household characteristics, with column (7) including them all. Finally, specifications including contextual, individual and household sets of variables are reported in column (8).¹⁰ Of course, none of the R-squared is very large, mostly due to the nature of the dependent variables: not only are they binary variables, but also with a very small number of "ones". In addition victimization is very likely explained to a large extent by unobserved factors such as individuals' behavior or the way people or goods look.¹¹ Still, we can note from this table and in particular from the comparison of columns (4) and (7), that contextual variables play a more important role than household and individual characteristics for both household and individual victimization. Assaults are the exception for which the reverse is true. Therefore, it looks as if the decision to commit a crime was determined by neighborhood rather than potential victims' characteristics. It is also interesting to note that among the various sets of contextual variables used, *département* fixed effects seem to matter the least, meaning that local environment characteristics explain victimization better than those measured on a larger geographic scale.

Let me now turn to a more detailed description of the results. Table 6 reports the estimates from the regressions of the various types of household victimization on all contextual and individual characteristics and including year fixed effects to ensure that we capture any time trend in victimization, related to changes in laws, or economic situation for instance. The corresponding results for individual victimization are reported in Table 7. Regarding neighborhood characteristics, the coefficients for the unemployment rate and the share of

¹⁰The results of the corresponding regressions are not shown here but are available upon request.

¹¹For instance, an individual is less likely to get his/her phone stolen if it is in a bag than if it is on a table at a cafe terrace. Similarly, a very strong and fit man risks less of being assaulted than a very thin one. It is important to bear in mind that what we observe from the survey might be intrinsically biased precisely because of behavior. Indeed, some people are more cautious, do not walk alone at night, protect their home and their car, and are therefore less likely to record a victimization.

households recently arrived are positive and significant for most of the victimization types. A possible interpretation for the latter is that the larger the share of recent movers, the less neighbors know each other, and hence the less likely they are to organize some kind of collective neighborhood watching. Another interpretation pertaining to the social disorganization theory is that weaker social ties undermine the ability of a community to exercise informal control over its members. The effect of unemployment rate is particularly large for motorbike theft, car vandalism and assault. Because these are non-lucrative and violent offenses, this effect also seems in line with social disorganization theory, reflecting social rather than financial deprivation. The strong relationship of unemployment with burglaries is less intuitive, as it suggests that burglars live and burgle in the same neighborhood. One interpretation could be that the burglaries happening in high unemployment neighborhoods are more about stealing goods for their personal use (e.g. TV sets, video game consoles, food) than for reselling them (e.g. jewelry, works of art). A possible alternative explanation is that it is easier to observe one's own neighbors and to know when they are away from home.

Although it is one of the main drivers of people's feeling of insecurity,¹² the share of immigrants is almost never significant, in line with the recent paper by [Bianchi et al. \(2012\)](#).¹³ The type of neighborhood is also particularly relevant for most types of victimization. As expected, households living in residential areas made of groups of houses are more likely to be offended than those living in isolated houses in the countryside. Households living in apartments buildings are less likely to be burgled, but more likely to have their car vandalized, especially if they live in the suburbs.¹⁴ Now taking a quick look at household and individual characteristics, we can see that wealthier households suffer more of home vandalism, but less of car vandalism, while their members are less likely assaulted. The result for cars is probably explained by the fact that wealthier household park their cars in a closed or secured space. Households with an unemployed head are more likely to be victims of burglary, home vandalism, and car theft. Similarly, unemployed individuals are more likely to suffer from violent crimes (robberies and assaults). Older individuals tend to be less victimized. Gender does not affect the probability of theft or robbery, but males are more victims of assaults than females.

4 The issue of location selection

A major concern with this low geographic setting, that is common in the literature on neighborhood effects, is that households usually sort across neighborhoods in a non-random fashion. It is then possible that some unobserved household or individual characteristics influence both

¹²These results are not shown in the paper but are available upon request.

¹³Exceptions are for thefts of objects from cars, and for non-violent individual theft, but these effects are limited.

¹⁴They are also less likely to have their home vandalized, but this is mechanically due to their home type.

the propensity to be victim of a criminal event and neighborhood characteristics, therefore biasing the results. Several methods have been used to overcome this endogenous sorting issue, that I briefly summarize here. A first approach consists in using a measure of the variable of interest aggregated to a higher geographic level as an instrument for this variable. For instance, [Evans et al. \(1992\)](#) instrument neighborhood poverty with metropolitan area poverty. An alternative method is to rely on randomized experiments designed such that the choice of neighborhood is actually exogenous. One of the most famous examples is the Moving To Opportunity program in the US, through which randomly selected households are given housing vouchers, enabling them to relocate in richer neighborhoods. In particular, and related to the topic of the present study, [Ludwig et al. \(2001\)](#) and [Kling et al. \(2005\)](#) use this experiment to examine the role of neighborhood characteristics on juvenile crime. These are, to the best of my knowledge, the only two existing studies researching the impact of neighborhood effects on crime. However, the very particular setting in which these results are derived brings some concern regarding their validity in a more general context. [Bayer et al. \(2008\)](#) review more extensively these alternative methods and discuss their limitations.

The approach adopted in this paper builds on the very local nature of the data. It follows [Bayer et al. \(2008\)](#) who study the role of neighbors on work location. The idea is that although households are able to select a given area in which they want to live, they are, however, unable to pinpoint a precise neighborhood within this given area. This assumption means that even if households are able to choose a given residential area, there will not be any correlation in unobserved factors affecting risk of victimization among individuals living in the same neighborhood *within the larger selected area*. It is now in order to present a few arguments supporting this assumption. First, because the housing market is very tight, it is reasonable to think that a household targeting a given area very unlikely has a choice over the precise neighborhood where it will end up in this area. This would indeed require that at least one housing unit satisfying the other decision criteria of the household (e.g. size) be vacant in each neighborhood within the larger area at the time when the household is looking for a new place. A second consideration is that it may be difficult for prospecting households to identify neighborhood-by-neighborhood variation in neighbors and contextual characteristics, prior to moving into the neighborhood. To put it differently, although the household may have a realistic *ex-ante* view on the characteristics of the targeted area, it is less likely to be actually able to identify differences in these characteristics across the various neighborhoods of the area. This makes even more sense in the context of victimization, for which *ex-ante* information is particularly difficult to gather. Finally, an interesting feature of the French neighborhoods studied here (the IRISes) is that they do not follow any kind of administrative frontier. For instance, they are distinct from police districts, and from school zones determining to which school children must go. Rather, the neighborhoods considered

here were designed to encompass 2,000 inhabitants on average, and to be homogeneous in terms of living environment, with borders following the main topographical and landscape frontiers (e.g. roads, railways and rivers). People ignore where these borders are, and more generally do not even know what an IRIS is, as it is only used for statistical purpose. For those reasons, it is practically impossible that households purposely decide to live in a given IRIS rather than in a contiguous one.

All these arguments support the validity of the assumption that there should be no correlation in unobserved factors affecting victimization among neighbors living in the same neighborhood (IRIS) *within the larger selected area*. As a consequence, once we control for the characteristics of the larger area selected by the individual, the remaining spatial variation of characteristics across neighborhoods within the larger area is supposed to be exogenous. This is done through the inclusion of fixed effects of larger areas than the IRISes, literally called a "large neighborhood" in the French statistical jargon (*grand quartier*). Large enough municipalities are divided into several large neighborhoods, which themselves encompass several contiguous IRISes. If the municipality is too small, then all the IRISes of the municipality belong to the same large neighborhood, so that the large neighborhood actually corresponds to the municipality. Although there is no formal evidence that large neighborhood is the geographical unit targeted by households when looking for a housing, this area makes a reasonable reference neighborhood compared to the IRIS. Figure 2 depicts the four large neighborhoods of Paris 7th *arrondissement*: each area of specific color is a large neighborhood, and each subdivision of a large neighborhood is an IRIS.

Figure 2: Paris 7th *arrondissement* map of Large Neighborhoods




Table 8 summarizes the results of the regressions including large neighborhood fixed effects instead of *département* fixed effects. The specification is otherwise similar to the full

specification presented in the previous section.¹⁵ According to these estimates, a larger share of immigrants in the IRIS would imply a lower probability of being burgled and robbed. On average, the coefficients on the share of immigrants are lower than in the previous specification (Tables 6 and 7): the coefficients for *theft of objects from cars* and *theft* were significantly positive and are now driven down to zero (in part due to an increase in the standard errors), while some of the coefficients that were not significantly different from zero are now significantly negative (*burglary* and *robbery*). This suggests that controlling for large neighborhood fixed effects actually corrects a bias induced by the fact that immigrants tend to settle in more criminogenic areas because of lower rents for instance. The estimates for unemployment are rather stable for burglary, car vandalism and assault. Yet, they are driven down to zero for car theft, motorbike theft and bike theft, while the coefficient for robbery becomes slightly positive. Note also that unemployment seems to be the most relevant characteristic explaining crime, both in terms of the number of victimization types for which is involved and in terms of magnitude of the effect.

5 A spatial approach

An important dimension to take into account in the study of crime is criminals' mobility. To put it simply, if criminals are not mobile, the larger the number of criminals living in a neighborhood, the more likely the other inhabitants of this neighborhood experience victimization. On the other hand, if criminals are mobile, then even individuals living in a criminal-free neighborhood may face a risk of victimization if they are located at some reasonable distance of a neighborhood populated with criminals. Consider for instance a high unemployment neighborhood, more likely to breed criminals according to Becker's theory. The potential offenders could commit crime in the neighborhood where they reside, if, for instance, they cannot afford the cost of commuting to a more distant neighborhood, or if they benefit from observing their neighbors' habits and routine activities. Alternatively, they could decide to commit a crime in a more distant neighborhood if they fear to be more easily identified in their own neighborhood, or if their neighborhood is too deprived to be attractive. Whether an offender decides to act in his own neighborhood or in a remote one thus reflects a weighting of the expected gains, the direct costs and the opportunity costs of committing crime in another neighborhood. Therefore, even if we find that unemployment increases victimization on average, the effect might actually depend on where one lives relative to high unemployment neighborhoods.

Although the question of criminals' mobility seems highly relevant when studying deter-

¹⁵The coefficients for the variables other than IRIS characteristics are available upon request. They are not significantly affected by the inclusion of large neighborhood fixed effects.

minants of victimization, it is not addressed in the economics of crime literature, mainly due to the fact that most studies rely on aggregate data. By contrast, because I work with data localized at a low geographic level, I am able to connect individuals not only to the characteristics of the neighborhood where they live, but also to the characteristics of the neighborhoods that are further away. This new spatial approach enables me to indirectly account for criminals mobility.¹⁶ To this aim, I consider the IRIS where the surveyed individual lives as the reference neighborhood, and I construct two successive circles of adjacent IRISes to represent more distant neighborhoods. More precisely, all the IRISes contiguous to a given IRIS constitute the first ring of adjacent neighborhoods (denoted as *IRIS1*), while all the IRISes contiguous to those in the first ring, excluding the reference IRIS and the first ring IRISes themselves, constitute the second ring of adjacent neighborhoods (denoted as *IRIS2*). The map on Figure 3 illustrates the three geographic levels on which I rely. The total area depicted here represents the seventh *arrondissement* of Paris. Each subdivision of this district is an IRIS. Consider for instance the IRIS colored in the darkest shade as the IRIS of reference. Then, the set of IRISes colored in a slightly lighter shade constitute the first ring of IRISes, i.e. the area made of all the adjacent IRISes. Finally, the lightest IRISes constitute the second ring of IRISes, with respect to the reference IRIS.


Using this setting, it is possible to relate any individual or household in the survey to the characteristics of the neighborhood where it lives, as well as to those of the first and second rings of adjacent neighborhoods. Thus, I can explore whether a given factor matters more within the neighborhood or from a remote one. In the following empirical analysis, I will focus on one particular factor: the unemployment rate. First, as noted at the end of the previous section, this factor shows the most relevant in explaining victimization. Second, I make this choice in order to avoid a likely collinearity issue with other IRIS characteristics. The unemployment rate of a given neighborhood is indeed highly correlated with most of the other IRIS characteristics (share of immigrants, median income, share of single parents families and share of public housing), as can be seen from Table 9. Concretely, I compute the average unemployment rate over all the first and second rings of IRISes respectively, weighted by the size of the active population in each IRIS. To summarize, and using the same notation as in section 3, I estimate the following equation:

$$VICT_{ijk} = \alpha + \beta X_i + \gamma Y_j + \delta U_k + \eta U_{k+1} + \nu U_{k+2} + \varepsilon_{ijk} \quad (2)$$

Where U_k is IRIS unemployment rate, U_{k+1} the average unemployment rate of the first ring of adjacent IRISes, and U_{k+2} the average unemployment rate of the second ring of adjacent IRISes.

¹⁶It is not direct as I have no information about the offenders, so I am not actually able to locate them.

Figure 3: Paris 7th *arrondissement* map of IRIS



Note however that this geographical approach has some drawbacks. First, as I do not have any information for the road or transportation networks, I am not effectively capturing transportation time or cost, which are key determinants of mobility. This could be addressed using the information about road networks provided by the French Institute of Geography (IGN), and performing a Geography Information System analysis. However, because I do not have access to these data nor to the technology necessary to deal with it, I keep this step for future research. Second, this approach with adjacent IRISes does not enable me to directly capture distance, as IRISes are heterogeneous in terms of size. As mentioned in Section 2, only municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants are divided into IRISes, and the target size of an IRIS is 2,000 inhabitants so that denser cities tend to have smaller IRISes. To deal with this issue, I restrict the sample to municipalities that are actually divided into IRISes, hence reducing the variation in the size of the IRISes. Such a restriction typically excludes rural villages, which are quite large IRISes (in terms of surface).

The estimated effects of the unemployment rate in the three successive neighborhood rings (IRIS, IRIS 1 and IRIS 2) on the various types of victimization are reported in Table 10. The first set of results displayed are the estimates obtained when no other control is included, while the second set of results is obtained including the full set of controls. Note that for each specification, I control for large neighborhood fixed effects to avoid the endogeneity issue, as discussed in the previous section. Let us first look at the burglaries in column (1). In the no other control specification, only the unemployment rate in the first ring of adjacent IRISes is positive and significant at the 10% level. In the full specification, both the IRIS and the IRIS 1 unemployment rates are significant at the 5% level, with a larger coefficient for the latter. The results are similar for thefts of objects from cars. The unemployment rate in the first contiguous neighborhoods is the only significant one that in the full specification. This suggests that economic types of crimes such as burglary and theft of objects from cars are better explained by the unemployment rate from more distant places than from the immediate

neighborhood. This is in line with the idea that when it turns to economic crimes, offenders are more likely to travel to some remote area. Several considerations can help rationalize this: stealing from one’s direct neighbors is not financially attractive when one lives in a more economically deprived neighborhood; the expected financial gain from an economic crime allows the offender to afford the cost of travelling to a more distant neighborhood; and the criminal limits the chance to be identified by witnesses when committing an offence in a different place than the one where he lives. It is then a bit puzzling that the unemployment rate in the reference IRIS still matters for burglaries. A possible explanation is that there are two types of burglars: those who travel to a remote place to steal expensive goods they can resell such as jewelry and works of art, and those who steal very basic goods such as food or TV sets from their own neighbors for their personal consumption. An alternative explanation could be that the habits and general behavior of one’s direct neighbor are more easily observed, so that it simplifies the planning of the crime. It is also surprising not to find any significant effect on car and motorbike thefts. A possible explanation could be that stealing this type of goods requires an even longer distance, so that it is more easy to stock or use the car.¹⁷

On the other hand, Table 10 also shows that the unemployment rate in the immediate neighborhood is particularly relevant in explaining non-economic and violent crimes such as acts of vandalism, whether on the home or on the car, and assaults. In this case, the social disorganization theory is more appropriate to understand the mechanisms than the Beckerian approach.

The concern linked to the IRIS size may persist, with the existence of very small IRISes in densely populated cities such as Paris. In this case, the distance between two IRISes may not be relevant, with a null transportation cost across the three contiguous rings of IRISes. In what follows, I therefore exclude the observations of the three largest cities (Paris, Lyon and Marseille), hence getting rid of the smallest IRISes. The regressions presented above are then replicated on this sub-sample. The estimates for unemployment rates in the successive rings of IRISes in the full specification are reported in Table 11. The previous results are robust to this sample restriction. The results are stable for burglaries, with a positive effect of direct (IRIS) unemployment rate and a larger positive effect of more distant (IRIS 1) unemployment. Note that the gap between the two coefficients is even slightly larger than in the previous table. The estimates for both acts of vandalism, theft of objects from car and assaults are also similar to those presented above. There are however two differences compared to the regressions including large cities: the coefficient for IRIS unemployment rate is now significantly positive

¹⁷Note that when *département* fixed effects are included instead of large neighborhood fixed effects, the coefficient of $u_{iris}1$ is positive and significant at the 5% level in the full specification for the car theft regression, supporting this intuition.

(at the 10% level) in the motorbike theft and in the robbery equation. To the extent that robberies are violent crimes by opposition to thefts, this new result tends to comfort the idea that the direct exposure to unemployment affects violent rather than economic crimes. The result for motorbike theft could be at odds with this intuition, unless most of the thefts observed apply to motorcycles rather than to more powerful motorbikes.

6 Conclusion

This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first study on victimization at the neighborhood level. This local approach brings new insights to the economics of crime literature as it enables me to characterize precisely the context (both location and victim) in which criminal events occur. By contrast with previous papers based on aggregate police data, I am therefore able to distinguish between factors related to the opportunity cost of committing crime (e.g. unemployment, wages) and factors pertaining to the attractiveness of the victims (e.g. wealth). I find that household and individual characteristics are minor determinants of household and individual victimization respectively, while the economic situation of the neighborhood actually matters. In other words, victims (individuals or households) are not directly targeted (except in the case of assaults): rather, it is the neighborhood where the mischief occurs that is coveted. In particular, local unemployment rate is found to be strongly related to household victimization. In order to address the endogenous neighborhood selection issue, I included "large neighborhood" fixed effects in order to control for the characteristics of the larger area that the households are likely to have actually selected. Most of the estimates of neighborhood characteristics are attenuated once selection is corrected for. Yet, the local unemployment rate remains a strong predictor of several types of victimization.

This paper also sheds new light on the mechanisms behind this relationship, through the adoption of an original spatial approach. I take advantage of the precise location of the data to control for the characteristics of both the reference neighborhood and the first and second rings of adjacent neighborhoods. That way, I can account for heterogeneity across neighborhoods and hence indirectly for criminals mobility. This is an improvement over the existing literature which ignores this dimension. The results reveal that for burglaries and thefts of objects from cars, unemployment rate in the adjacent neighborhoods have a stronger explanatory power than unemployment in the precise neighborhood where the misdeed occurred. On the contrary, local unemployment rate dominates over more distant unemployment rates in explaining vandalism and assaults in particular. A natural interpretation of these findings is that criminals are mobile for economic crimes but not for violent crimes. In other words, they can afford some transportation cost when they expect a financial reward from their mischief, in line with the Beckerian theory of crime. On the other hand, violent crimes and vandalism escape from this logic and relate more to the social disorganization theory. This

new method helps understanding more precisely criminal behavior according to the different types of crimes, and is therefore a key contribution to the literature.

Naturally, the empirical design endorsed in this paper presents some drawbacks and will be subject to future improvements. For instance, considering only two rings of adjacent neighborhoods is somehow arbitrary and is an important limitation as criminals may travel from more remote areas. In particular, car thefts may involve longer distances so as to reduce the risk of apprehension. This could explain why none of the unemployment rate estimates (IRIS, IRIS1 and IRIS2) is significant for this type of crime. One of the next developments of this work will therefore be to take into account all neighborhoods in an exhaustive fashion. The idea would be to express crime as a function of the sum of unemployment rates in all surrounding neighborhoods, weighted by distance or transportation costs. In other words, this would consist in adapting the market-potential function developed in the new economic geography literature (e.g. [Harris, 1954](#); [Hanson, 2005](#)) to the economics of crime literature. Because it reveals the relevance of a spatial approach and stresses its necessity, the present paper is a first step in this direction.

Table 1: Share of households or individuals victimized at least once over the past two years.

		Full Sample (1)	Rural Areas (2)	Less than 50,000 inhab. (3)	More than 50,000 inhab. (4)	Paris Urban Unit (5)
Household victimization						
Burglary	Mean	4.61 %	3.81 %	4.01 %	5.20 %	5.18 %
	StDev	(.210)	(.191)	(.196)	(.222)	(.222)
	N	85141	16211	19175	35755	13895
Car Theft	Mean	3.36 %	1.59 %	2.97 %	4.19 %	4.87 %
	StDev	(.180)	(.125)	(.179)	(.200)	(.215)
	N	69226	14953	16599	28183	9413
Motorbike Theft	Mean	5.34 %	2.25 %	4.42 %	7.28 %	8.91 %
	StDev	(.225)	(.148)	(.205)	(.260)	(.285)
	N	10051	2633	2470	3755	1181
Bike Theft	Mean	3.71 %	1.14 %	2.56 %	5.52 %	6.34 %
	StDev	(.189)	(.106)	(.158)	(.228)	(.244)
	N	46321	10974	11687	17877	5730
Home Vandalism	Mean	4.13 %	1.93 %	3.93 %	5.68 %	3.69 %
	StDev	(.199)	(.138)	(.194)	(.231)	(.188)
	N	85142	16214	19177	35751	13895
Car Vandalism	Mean	10.46 %	5.66 %	8.46 %	13.42 %	14.48 %
	StDev	(.306)	(.231)	(.278)	(.341)	(.352)
	N	69192	14955	16593	28170	9396
Car Object Theft	Mean	6.71 %	3.52 %	5.41 %	8.16 %	10.79 %
	StDev	(.250)	(.184)	(.226)	(.274)	(.310)
	N	69227	14953	16598	28186	9412
Individual victimization						
Robbery	Mean	0.95 %	0.29 %	0.54 %	1.13 %	2.09 %
	StDev	(.097)	(.054)	(.073)	(.106)	(.143)
	N	85154	16213	19177	35759	13900
Theft	Mean	3.38 %	2.46 %	2.88 %	3.74 %	4.62 %
	StDev	(.181)	(.155)	(.167)	(.190)	(.210)
	N	85148	16211	19176	35759	13897
Assault	Mean	2.42 %	1.76 %	2.03 %	3.09 %	2.34 %
	StDev	(.154)	(.132)	(.141)	(.173)	(.151)
	N	85142	16212	19171	35758	13896

Table 2: Sample characteristics: households and individuals characteristics.

Household Characteristics				
	[Min - Max]	Mean	(StDev)	Med
<i>Household monthly income:</i>				
$w \leq 1500$	[0 - 1]	0.313	(0.464)	0
$1500 < w \leq 2500$	[0 - 1]	0.294	(0.456)	0
$w > 2500$	[0 - 1]	0.393	(0.488)	0
<i>Ownership Status:</i>				
Owner	[0 - 1]	0.598	(0.490)	1
Rent in private market	[0 - 1]	0.213	(0.410)	0
Rent in public housing	[0 - 1]	0.144	(0.351)	0
Other	[0 - 1]	0.045	(0.207)	0
<i>Household composition:</i>				
Head with a partner	[0 - 1]	0.569	(0.495)	1
Number of children	[0 - 11]	0.644	(0.993)	0

	Household Head				Individual			
	[Min - Max]	Mean	(StDev)	Med	[Min - Max]	Mean	(StDev)	Med
<i>Age</i>	[15 - 101]	53.25	(17.87)	52	[14-102]	47.19	(19.62)	46
<i>Gender</i>	[0 - 1]	0.622	(0.485)	1	[0 - 1]	0.479	(0.500)	0
<i>Nationality:</i>								
Native French	[0 - 1]	0.908	(0.290)	1	[0 - 1]	0.907	(0.290)	1
Naturalized French	[0 - 1]	0.043	(0.203)	0	[0 - 1]	0.042	(0.201)	0
EU 15	[0 - 1]	0.021	(0.142)	0	[0 - 1]	0.019	(0.136)	0
Other EU (after 2004)	[0 - 1]	0.001	(0.037)	0	[0 - 1]	0.001	(0.037)	0
Maghrebian	[0 - 1]	0.013	(0.115)	0	[0 - 1]	0.014	(0.118)	0
Other African	[0 - 1]	0.005	(0.073)	0	[0 - 1]	0.006	(0.075)	0
Other nationality	[0 - 1]	0.009	(0.092)	0	[0 - 1]	0.010	(0.100)	0
<i>Employment status:</i>								
Employed	[0 - 1]	0.559	(0.496)	1	[0 - 1]	0.488	(0.500)	0
Unemployed	[0 - 1]	0.041	(0.198)	0	[0 - 1]	0.059	(0.235)	0
Inactive	[0 - 1]	0.340	(0.490)	0	[0 - 1]	0.453	(0.498)	0
<i>Socio-economic Category:</i>								
Farmer	[0 - 1]	0.014	(0.117)	0	[0 - 1]	0.012	(0.108)	0
Craftsman, shopkeeper	[0 - 1]	0.046	(0.209)	0	[0 - 1]	0.034	(0.182)	0
Higher occupation	[0 - 1]	0.111	(0.314)	0	[0 - 1]	0.078	(0.269)	0
Intermediate occupation	[0 - 1]	0.150	(0.357)	0	[0 - 1]	0.128	(0.334)	0
Employee	[0 - 1]	0.130	(0.336)	0	[0 - 1]	0.165	(0.371)	0
Factory worker	[0 - 1]	0.155	(0.362)	0	[0 - 1]	0.131	(0.337)	0
Retired	[0 - 1]	0.353	(0.478)	0	[0 - 1]	0.286	(0.452)	0
Other inactive	[0 - 1]	0.041	(0.198)	0	[0 - 1]	0.166	(0.372)	0

Reading: The head of the average household is 53 years and 3 months old. The average surveyed individual is about 47 years and 2 months old. 55.9 % of household have an employed head. 48.8 % of individuals are employed.

Table 3: Sample characteristics: households living environment

	Contextual Variables			
	[Min - Max]	Mean	(StDev)	Med
<i>IRIS Characteristics:</i>				
Share of immigrants	[0 - 0.794]	0.079	(0.074)	0.055
Median income (log)	[7.69 - 10.98]	9.792	(0.258)	9.784
Unemployment rate	[0 - 0.741]	0.112	(0.056)	0.100
Share single-parent families	[0 - 0.673]	0.137	(0.068)	0.127
Share hh in public housing	[0 - 1]	0.136	(0.187)	0.064
Share of recent movers	[0 - 0.935]	0.129	(0.061)	0.116
Share of 14-18 y.o.	[0 - 0.239]	0.056	(0.017)	0.056
<i>City density (log)</i>	[-1.09 - 10.55]	6.297	(1.955)	6.292
<i>Type of neighborhood:</i>				
Dispersed houses	[0 - 1]	0.176	(0.381)	0
Houses Lot / in cities	[0 - 1]	0.443	(0.497)	0
Apartment block (city)	[0 - 1]	0.231	(0.422)	0
Apartment block (suburbs)	[0 - 1]	0.091	(0.288)	0
Mixed	[0 - 1]	0.059	(0.235)	0
<i>Size of the Urban Unit:</i>				
Rural Areas	[0 - 1]	0.226	(0.418)	0
Less than 50,000	[0 - 1]	0.251	(0.433)	0
More than 50,000	[0 - 1]	0.365	(0.481)	0
Paris Urban Unit	[0 - 1]	0.158	(0.165)	0

Reading: The average household lives in an IRIS where there are 7.9 % of immigrants. 59.8 % of households own their home. The head of household lives with a partner in 56.9 % of households.

Table 4: Probability that the incident occurs in own's neighborhood

	Mean	(StDev)	N
Household Victimization			
Car theft	0.724	(0.447)	2,052
Motorbike theft	0.643	(0.479)	497
Bike theft	0.755	(0.430)	1,620
Vandalism on the car	0.657	(0.475)	6,581
Theft of object from car	0.289	(0.454)	4,080
Individual Victimization			
Robbery	0.396	(0.489)	633
Theft	0.301	(0.459)	2,308
Assault	0.372	(0.484)	1,725

When at least one offence is reported, more details are asked about the latest event. In particular, the respondent indicates whether the incident happened in one's "own village or neighborhood". Reading: 72.4 % of the latest car theft happened in the owner's neighborhood. 37.2 % of the latest assaults occurred in the victim's neighborhood.

Table 5: Occurrence of victimization: role of environment vs household characteristics

	IRIS	Environment	<i>Département</i>	IRIS, environment, <i>dép f.e.</i>	Household	Individual	Household, individual	All sets of Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
All hh vict	0.021	0.022	0.012	0.032	0.015	0.018	0.022	0.050
Burglary	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.007
Car theft	0.004	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.013
Motorbike theft	0.021	0.023	0.005	0.026	0.013	0.012	0.020	0.035
Bike theft	0.018	0.018	0.005	0.021	0.014	0.012	0.019	0.031
Home vandalism	0.007	0.008	0.005	0.013	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.015
Car vandalism	0.029	0.028	0.009	0.036	0.018	0.017	0.025	0.047
Theft of car objects	0.012	0.008	0.005	0.014	0.005	0.006	0.007	0.017
All ind vict	0.007	0.007	0.004	0.009	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.014
Robbery	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.005
Theft	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.005
Assault	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.007	0.008

The figures reported in this table are adjusted R^2 from OLS regressions of the occurrence of a given type of victimization (first column) on a given set of controls, as specified in columns (1) to (8). The set of controls are defined as follows. (1) IRIS characteristics: share of immigrants, median income (log), unemployment rate, share of single-parent families, share of household living in a social housing, share of recently arrived (less than two years) households and share of youth (14 to 18 y.o.); (2) Environment characteristics: city density (log), type of neighborhood (5 categories, e.g. houses vs apartment buildings), size of the urban unit (4 categories); (3) *Département* fixed effects; (4) $= (1)+(2)+(3)$; (5) Household characteristics: income, ownership status, number of children; (6) Individual characteristics (corresponding to the surveyed individual for individual victimization, and to the household head for household victimization): nationality, age (log), gender, employment status, socio-economic category; (7) $= (5)+(6)$; (8) $= (4)+(7)$. In each regression, IRIS level clusters are used.

Table 6: Household Victimization: Full Specification (to be c'ed)

	Burglary (1)	Car Theft (2)	Motorbike Theft (3)	Bike Theft (4)	Home Vandalism (5)	Car Vandalism (6)	Theft of car objects (7)
<i>Neighborhood characteristics</i>							
Share of Immigrants	0.032 (0.023)	0.009 (0.021)	-0.045 (0.060)	0.040 (0.032)	0.008 (0.023)	-0.040 (0.035)	0.041** (0.019)
Median Income (log)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.019 (0.018)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.007)	0.020* (0.011)	-0.002 (0.006)
Unemployment rate	0.116*** (0.028)	0.046* (0.024)	0.218** (0.081)	0.097** (0.035)	0.043 (0.028)	0.261*** (0.044)	0.006 (0.024)
Share Monoparental	0.013 (0.021)	0.008 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.054)	0.008 (0.024)	0.014 (0.021)	0.107*** (0.030)	0.040** (0.016)
Share Public Housing	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.015* (0.008)	0.028 (0.029)	-0.034** (0.011)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.014* (0.007)
Share Recent Movers	0.042** (0.018)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.010 (0.055)	0.107*** (0.027)	0.123*** (0.021)	0.167*** (0.030)	0.044** (0.017)
Share 14-18 y.o.	0.124* (0.067)	0.077 (0.056)	-0.110 (0.170)	0.024 (0.084)	0.043 (0.068)	0.080 (0.098)	0.092* (0.053)
City Density (log)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
<i>Type of buildings in the neighborhood (Ref: Dispersed houses)</i>							
Houses Lot / in cities	0.005* (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.016*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)
Apartment block (city)	-0.019*** (0.004)	0.005* (0.003)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.018*** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.005)	0.009** (0.003)
Apartment block (suburbs)	-0.026*** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.026* (0.015)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.030*** (0.007)	0.007* (0.004)
Mixed	-0.017*** (0.005)	0.012** (0.004)	0.019 (0.012)	0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.012** (0.004)
<i>Size of the Urban Unit (Ref: Rural Areas)</i>							
Less than 50,000	-0.002 (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.006** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
More than 50,000	0.005 (0.005)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.000 (0.008)	0.001 (0.004)	0.007* (0.004)	0.010** (0.005)	0.001 (0.003)
Paris Urban Unit	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.024* (0.013)	0.003 (0.007)
<i>Household income (Ref: bottom 30%)</i>							
Middle 30%	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.003** (0.002)
Top 30%	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.008** (0.003)	0.007** (0.002)	-0.011** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)
<i>Household Ownership Status (Ref: Owner)</i>							
Rent in private market	-0.004 (0.003)	0.007** (0.002)	0.011* (0.007)	0.016*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.002)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.004** (0.002)
Rent in public housing	-0.002 (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.020* (0.011)	0.013** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.007** (0.003)
Other	-0.004 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)
<i>Number of children in hh</i>	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.007** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)

Standard errors clustered at the IRIS level are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table 6: Household Victimization: Full Specification (C'ed)

	Burglary (1)	Car Theft (2)	Motorbike Theft (3)	Bike Theft (4)	Home Vandalism (5)	Car Vandalism (6)	Theft of car objects (7)
<i>Nationality</i> (Ref: Native French)							
Naturalized French	-0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.015)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.014** (0.007)	-0.000 (0.004)
EU 15	-0.002 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)
Other EU (after 2004)	0.006 (0.027)	0.042 (0.040)	0.076 (0.122)	0.097 (0.069)	-0.034** (0.012)	0.074 (0.056)	0.005 (0.029)
Maghrebian	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.010 (0.007)	0.112* (0.061)	0.039** (0.018)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.008)
Other African	-0.020** (0.009)	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.095*** (0.020)	0.059* (0.032)	-0.013 (0.009)	0.021 (0.030)	0.018 (0.019)
Other nationality	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.010)	0.087 (0.056)	0.037* (0.019)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.015* (0.008)
<i>Employment Status</i> (Ref: Employed)							
Unemployed	0.024*** (0.005)	0.010** (0.005)	0.021 (0.015)	0.009 (0.007)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.018** (0.008)	0.003 (0.004)
Inactive	0.011 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)	0.046 (0.036)	0.008 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.010)
<i>Age</i> (log)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.031*** (0.006)	-0.011*** (0.003)
<i>Male</i>	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)
<i>Socio Economic Category</i> (Ref: Higher Occupation)							
Farmer	0.028** (0.010)	0.001 (0.004)	0.029* (0.015)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.003 (0.004)
Craftsman	0.016** (0.006)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.004)
Intermediate	-0.009** (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.009** (0.005)	-0.005* (0.003)
Employee	-0.006* (0.004)	0.007** (0.003)	0.016* (0.009)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.006** (0.003)
Factory worker	-0.007* (0.004)	0.006* (0.003)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.008** (0.003)
Retired	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.047 (0.037)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.010)
Other inactive	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.017 (0.039)	-0.024* (0.013)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.024 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.011)
Intercept	-0.053 (0.074)	0.131** (0.060)	-0.225 (0.185)	-0.096 (0.098)	0.054 (0.071)	-0.142 (0.108)	0.043 (0.059)
<i>Département</i> f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	63586.000	52453.000	7891.000	35665.000	63588.000	52428.000	52455.000
Adj. R ²	0.007	0.014	0.035	0.031	0.015	0.047	0.032

Standard errors clustered at the IRIS level are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table 7: Individual Victimization: Full Specification

	Robbery (1)	Theft (2)	Assault (3)
Neighborhood characteristics			
Share of Immigrants	0.004 (0.007)	0.022* (0.011)	0.001 (0.010)
Median Income (log)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.008** (0.003)
Unemployment rate	0.013 (0.009)	0.000 (0.014)	0.048*** (0.014)
Share Monoparental	0.000 (0.006)	0.018* (0.011)	-0.000 (0.011)
Share Public Housing	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.011** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Share Recent Movers	0.013* (0.007)	0.023** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)
Share 14-18 y.o.	0.010 (0.023)	-0.030 (0.032)	-0.042 (0.030)
City Density (log)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.000)
<i>Type of buildings in the neighborhood</i> (Ref: Dispersed houses)			
Houses Lot / in cities	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Apartment block (city)	0.002 (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Apartment block (suburbs)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Mixed	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
<i>Size of the Urban Unit</i> (Ref: Rural Areas)			
Less than 50,000	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
More than 50,000	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Paris Urban Unit	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)
<i>Household income</i> (Ref: bottom 30%)			
Middle 30%	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Top 30%	-0.001* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
<i>Household Ownership Status</i> (Ref: Owner)			
Rent in private market	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Rent in public housing	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Other	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
<i>Number of children in hh</i>	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.002*** (0.001)

Standard errors clustered at the IRIS level are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table 7: Individual Victimization: Full Specification (C'ed)

	Robbery (1)	Theft (2)	Assault (3)
<i>Nationality</i> (Ref: Native French)			
Naturalized French	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
EU 15	0.000 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
Other EU (after 2004)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)
Maghrebien	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009** (0.003)
Other African	0.004 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.006)
Other nationality	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.005)
<i>Employment Status</i> (Ref: Employed)			
Unemployed	0.003** (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Inactive	0.005 (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)
<i>Age (log)</i>	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)
<i>Male</i>	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
<i>Socio Economic Category</i> (Ref: Higher Occupation)			
Farmer	0.001 (0.001)	0.028*** (0.007)	-0.001 (0.002)
Craftsman	0.006** (0.002)	0.008** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)
Intermediate	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Employee	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Factory worker	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Retired	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)
Other inactive	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
Intercept	0.049** (0.022)	0.057 (0.039)	-0.040 (0.035)
<i>Département</i> f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Year</i> f.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	63655.000	63653.000	63649.000
Adj. R ²	0.005	0.005	0.008

Standard errors clustered at the IRIS level are reported in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table 8: Determinants of victimization: including large neighborhood fixed effects

	Household victimization										Individual victimization				
	Burglary (1)	Car Theft (2)	Motorbike Theft (3)	Bike Theft (4)	Home Vandalism (5)	Car Vandalism (6)	Theft of car objects (7)	Robbery (8)	Theft (9)	Assault (10)					
Share of Immigrants	-0.118** (0.043)	0.024 (0.038)	0.049 (0.165)	0.079 (0.056)	0.024 (0.041)	-0.038 (0.063)	0.036 (0.035)	-0.022* (0.013)	0.017 (0.021)	0.006 (0.020)					
Median Income (log)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.074 (0.051)	0.024 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.020)	0.009 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.007)	0.011* (0.006)					
Unemployment rate	0.105** (0.044)	0.007 (0.039)	0.181 (0.169)	0.059 (0.056)	-0.003 (0.042)	0.216*** (0.064)	-0.017 (0.035)	0.026* (0.013)	-0.026 (0.022)	0.041** (0.020)					
Share Monoparental	-0.027 (0.035)	0.061** (0.030)	-0.032 (0.126)	0.070 (0.043)	-0.018 (0.034)	0.152** (0.050)	0.048* (0.027)	0.009 (0.011)	0.016 (0.017)	0.021 (0.016)					
Share Public Housing	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.024** (0.011)	0.071 (0.047)	-0.021 (0.016)	0.028** (0.012)	-0.040** (0.018)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.007* (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)					
Share Recent Movers	0.042 (0.031)	0.021 (0.026)	0.021 (0.115)	0.060 (0.038)	0.089** (0.030)	0.104** (0.044)	0.050** (0.024)	0.014 (0.010)	0.036** (0.015)	0.003 (0.014)					
Share 14-18 y.o.	0.098 (0.096)	0.087 (0.082)	-0.099 (0.339)	0.040 (0.115)	0.095 (0.092)	0.141 (0.135)	0.076 (0.074)	-0.027 (0.029)	-0.060 (0.047)	-0.038 (0.044)					
N	63,586	52,453	7,891	35,665	65,588	52,428	52,455	63,655	63,653	63,649					

In addition to the IRIS characteristics reported here, the regressions include the following controls: city density (log), type of neighborhood, household characteristics, household head (respectively individual characteristics) in the household (respectively individual) victimization regressions. They also control for year and large neighborhood fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table 9: Correlation between IRIS characteristics

	Share Immigrants	Median Income	Unemployment Rate	Share Single Parent	Share Public Housing	Share Recent Movers	Share 14-18 y.o.
Share Immigrants	1.000						
Median Income	-0.255	1.000					
Unemployment Rate	0.528	-0.645	1.000				
Share Single Parent	0.496	-0.457	0.671	1.000			
Share Public Housing	0.505	-0.527	0.661	0.697	1.000		
Share Recent Movers	0.066	0.049	0.126	0.191	-0.104	1.000	
Share 14-18	0.128	-0.158	0.225	0.161	0.292	-0.151	1.000

These correlations are obtained using one observation per IRIS per year. The numbers in the columns of the first line correspond to the numbers in the lines of the first column. For instance, (1) stands for the Share of Immigrants, so that "-2.255" is the correlation between the share of immigrants in an IRIS in a given year and the median income in the same IRIS and year.

Table 10: Household victimization: unemployment rate in adjacent neighborhoods.

		Household victimization					Individual victimization				
	Burglary	Car Theft	Motorbike Theft	Bike Theft	Home Vandalism	Car Vandalism	Theft of car objects	Robbery	Theft	Assault	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
No other controls											
<i>u_{iris}</i>	0.005 (0.025)	0.049** (0.024)	0.273** (0.115)	0.116** (0.038)	0.096*** (0.026)	0.353*** (0.042)	0.055* (0.023)	0.016* (0.009)	-0.012 (0.013)	0.051*** (0.013)	
<i>u_{iris} 1</i>	0.104* (0.058)	-0.009 (0.054)	0.145 (0.266)	0.054 (0.086)	0.034 (0.059)	0.133 (0.095)	0.286*** (0.052)	0.016 (0.020)	0.041 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.029)	
<i>u_{iris} 2</i>	-0.028 (0.089)	0.049 (0.082)	-0.372 (0.362)	-0.093 (0.127)	-0.055 (0.091)	-0.211 (0.143)	0.140* (0.079)	-0.005 (0.031)	0.014 (0.047)	-0.035 (0.044)	
N	45,736	34,949	4,538	21,968	45,733	34,923	34,950	45,744	45,744	45,739	
Full specification											
<i>u_{iris}</i>	0.081** (0.028)	0.021 (0.027)	0.211 (0.128)	0.021 (0.042)	0.124*** (0.029)	0.235*** (0.047)	-0.006 (0.026)	0.013 (0.010)	-0.018 (0.015)	0.029** (0.014)	
<i>u_{iris} 1</i>	0.144** (0.062)	0.035 (0.058)	-0.045 (0.283)	0.030 (0.090)	0.024 (0.063)	0.112 (0.100)	0.226*** (0.055)	0.018 (0.022)	0.051 (0.032)	-0.011 (0.031)	
<i>u_{iris} 2</i>	-0.013 (0.094)	0.052 (0.087)	-0.475 (0.379)	0.166 (0.132)	0.063 (0.096)	-0.189 (0.150)	0.001 (0.083)	0.004 (0.033)	0.028 (0.049)	-0.052 (0.047)	
N	41,781	32,191	4,264	20,502	41,780	32,170	32,194	41,826	41,826	41,822	

In these regressions, the sample has been restricted to observations living in actual IRISes, so that the remaining IRISes are homogeneous in terms of size. "*u_{iris}*" is the local (IRIS) unemployment rate, "*u_{iris} 1*" the average unemployment rate in the first ring of adjacent IRISes, and "*u_{iris} 2*" the average unemployment rate in the second ring of adjacent IRISes. In the second set of results, the controls are environment characteristics (city density (log), type of neighborhood, size of the urban unit), year fixed effects, household characteristics (income, ownership status, number of children) and individual characteristics, corresponding to the surveyed individual for individual victimization and to the household head for household victimization (nationality, age (log), gender, employment status, socio-economic category). They also include large neighborhood fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

Table 11: Unemployment rate in adjacent neighborhoods, excluding Paris, Lyon and Marseille

	Household victimization					Individual victimization				
	Burglary Theft (1)	Car Theft (2)	Motorbike Theft (3)	Bike Theft (4)	Home Vandalism (5)	Car Vandalism (6)	Theft of car objects (7)	Robbery (8)	Theft (9)	Assault (10)
<i>u_{iris}</i>	0.074** (0.029)	0.042 (0.028)	0.243* (0.129)	0.003 (0.042)	0.126*** (0.030)	0.227*** (0.048)	0.002 (0.026)	0.017* (0.010)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.026* (0.015)
<i>u_{iris} 1</i>	0.164** (0.064)	0.057 (0.059)	0.031 (0.288)	0.008 (0.090)	0.053 (0.066)	0.104 (0.103)	0.213*** (0.056)	0.017 (0.021)	0.037 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.032)
<i>u_{iris} 2</i>	-0.033 (0.097)	0.073 (0.088)	-0.308 (0.377)	-0.216 (0.132)	-0.076 (0.100)	-0.199 (0.153)	0.011 (0.083)	0.023 (0.032)	0.025 (0.047)	-0.052 (0.049)
N	38,409	30,409	3,945	19,525	38,405	30,390	30,412	38,451	38,450	38,448

In these regressions, the sample has been restricted to observations living in actual IRISes, so that the remaining IRISes are homogeneous in terms of size. "*u_{iris}*" is the local (IRIS) unemployment rate, "*u_{iris} 1*" the average unemployment rate in the first ring of adjacent IRISes, and "*u_{iris} 2*" the average unemployment rate in the second ring of adjacent IRISes. The controls are environment characteristics (city density (log), type of neighborhood, size of the urban unit), year fixed effects, household characteristics (income, ownership status, number of children) and individual characteristics, corresponding to the surveyed individual for individual victimization and to the household head for household victimization (nationality, age (log), gender, employment status, socio-economic category). They also include large neighborhood fixed effects. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001

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