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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2015

Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory

Résumé

We propose a theory of strategic voting under “Commitee Approval”: a fixed-sized commitee of M members is to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants, and the M candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. We show that best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first M candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected.

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Dates et versions

halshs-01168767 , version 1 (26-06-2015)

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  • HAL Id : halshs-01168767 , version 1

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Jean-François Laslier, Karine van Der Straeten. Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory. 2015. ⟨halshs-01168767⟩
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