



HAL
open science

Working at home: MEPs day-to-day practice of political representation in their constituency

Corentin Poyet

► To cite this version:

Corentin Poyet. Working at home: MEPs day-to-day practice of political representation in their constituency. Workshop: “Recent Developments in the Study of the European Parliament: new topics, approaches and findings”, College of Europe, College of Europe, Apr 2015, Bruges, Belgium. halshs-01182367

HAL Id: halshs-01182367

<https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01182367>

Submitted on 31 Jul 2015

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Working at home: MEPs day-to-day practice of political representation in their constituency

Corentin Poyet

Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux
poyetcorentin@gmail.com

Paper prepared for:

Workshop: “Recent Developments in the Study of the European Parliament: new topics, approaches and findings.” College of Europe, Bruges, April 7, 2015

First draft, do not cite without author permission

Abstract

In early 2000s, Simon Hix and his colleagues declared EP constitutes a good laboratory to test theories and hypotheses about legislative or party behavior. However, scholars mainly focused on roll-call votes analysis allowing them to investigate voting behavior, coalitions formation as well as activities in technical committees (Hix 2001; Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; Kreppel 2007; Mammoudh and Raunio 2003; McElroy 2006). In this paper, we propose to go further to analyze MEPs behavior with new methodological approach mobilizing new type of data. According to Fenno (1978), we argue that work in Parliament should not be investigated without considering constituency work. Surprisingly, despite the institutionalization of constituency work (the green weeks), only few studies focused on micro-level linkages between MEPs and citizens (Farrel and Scully 2007). Mobilizing ethnographic data collected in the IMPLOC project (managed by Olivier Costa and Jean-Benoit Pilet), the purpose of this paper is to investigate the concrete practice of political representation through the observation of MEPs’ activities in their constituency. This paper will investigate the scope, the practice and the pitfalls of MEPs constituency work and reflect it based on the current theories of representation. In addition, by investigating day-to-day contacts between citizens and their MEPs, this paper will offer a new perspective in the debate about the democratic deficit of EP (Farrel and Scully 2007; Clark and Rohrschneider 2009) and EU institutions (Moravcsik 2002; Rittberger 2003).

Introduction

This paper deals with the understudied question of concrete practice of political representation at the European Level. In the context of the European Union (EU), the Parliament (EP) is the only directly popular elected institution. Hence, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) hold a unique role in being the direct linkages between citizens and the EU institutions. They serve as communication channels between their constituencies and Europe to relay individuals and group grievances regarding the EU.

The scholars' interest for the functioning of the EP is growing following the evolutions and the increasing visibility of the EP. On the one hand, this interest led to a better knowledge of what happens inside the EP (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007; Hix 2001; Kreppel 2002; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; McElroy 2006). On the other hand, scholars did not focus on the MEPs activities outside the EP. According to Farrell and Scully (2007), this means that scholars know only a little about how MEPs remain connected with their constituents, about the day-to-day practice of representation.

Mobilizing ethnographic data, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the concrete practice of political representation through the observation of French MEPs' activities in their constituency. According to Fenno (1978), to understand the workings of representative democracy in action it is necessary to look not only at what is happening in the chamber but also on the other side of the coin: What do MEPs do in their districts? Why do they do it? And what difference does it make? By investigating the scope, the practice and the pitfalls of MEPs constituency work, this paper will offer a new perspective in the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU (Moravcsik 2002; Rittberger 2003). In addition, it will also challenge the traditional vision of MEPs disconnected from their electoral bases leading to a rareness of contacts between MEPs and their constituents (Clark and Rohrschneider 2009; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1991). Hence, if this paper focuses on a very specific part of

MEPs' activities, it has to be linked with a more general literature about parliamentary democracy at the European Level.

The paper is divided in six sections. The next proposes a state of the art about political representation at the European level. The third section is dedicated to the presentation of the theoretical framework. Fourth, we will display the empirical results. The fifth section concludes.

Constituency representation at the European level

If micro-linkages mechanisms between MEPs and citizens are understudied, the process of political representation at the European level is much more debated through the question of a democratic deficit in the EU introduced above. Until last decades, the voluminous theoretical literature focusing on this question contrasts with a lack of empirical investigations (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). It has to be noted that political representation is a multi-dimensional concept. According to Muller (1970, 1151) and Pitkin (1967, 8), this concept does not have an identifiable meaning allowing scholars to describe the causal dynamics of the mechanism of representation. The EU context is particularly outstanding for understanding the multi-dimensionality and dynamic nature of political representation. MEPs, coming from diverse national polities and under pressure of diverse national interests groups, interact each other and are subject to the multiplicity of institutional constraints in their attempt to represent the interests of European citizens. It leads to multiplicity of allegiances and a complex prioritization (Costa 2010). This multiple allegiance was empirically investigated by several authors focusing on diverse aspects of MEPs representational roles. The most frequent operationalization is related to the functionalist conception of representation (Wahlke *et al.* 1962) namely the focus and style of representation. Katz (1997) and Wessels (1999) were the first to apply this framework. According to Katz (1997), MEPs

are more or less oriented toward the representation of national interest, European priorities and constituency interests. However, the differences between MEPs are not explained. The same limit can be addressed to Wessels (1999). Thanks to their principal component analysis, Scully and Farrell (2003, 272-274) found four discriminant factors: importance accorded to the representation of national party (voters); social group representation; representation of broad interests (national or European) and importance given to the parliamentary activities. Similarly to Costa (2010), they show that MEPs prioritize their activities giving more importance to a particular “principal” (Scully and Farrell 2003, 279). Further, they tried to explain differences in how MEPs perceive their role but they failed to provide robust results, as they recognized themselves (Scully and Farrell 2003, 276). Brack and Costa (2013) detailed the situation of French MEPs showing that focus of representation depends mainly on political orientations. They also show the difficulties MEPs have to import local issues into the EP due to institutional constraints.

These studies provide an interesting picture of MEPs’ attitudes but the link with their activities and behaviors remains unrecognized. Actually, this critic is addressed to the functionalist approach in a whole and not only to its application to MEPs. As an answer to this limit, Beauvallet and Michon (2007) illustrate the local dimensions of MEPs’ behavior. They show that local ties are not sufficient to run for EP seats which depend mainly on political parties. Inside the EP, institutions constraints limit the possibility to import local issues but alternative sectorial structures are set up by MEPs sharing common interests like wine or fishery. As shown by Costa (2001) and Carter and Smith (2008), the impact of these structures on the production of public policies is real. Beauvallet and Michon (2007) also illustrate a top-down logic in MEPs’ constituency work. In addition, casework is observed even if issues have only a limited link with the EU. Similarly, participation in social events and meetings with the local communities are rather frequent.

Other scholars investigated political representation by analyzing parliamentary questions (Proksch and Slapin 2011; Raunio 1996). It has to be noted, first, that parliamentary questions at the European level are often used by national opposition parties. This means that EP and the commissioners are considered as alternative informational source (Proksch and Slapin 2011, 72). On the other hand, governing national parties can scrutinize the commission using other ways; outside the EP. The content of questions was investigated by Costa and Brack (Costa and Brack 2014) who did not find a systematic use of written questions to import local issues at the EP. On the contrary, the focus is an European one. However, the authors note that Eurosceptic MEPs focus more on local and national issues than their colleagues (Costa and Brack 2014, 16).

As introduced above, scholars mainly focused on the work inside the EP. However as argued by Fenno (1978), parliamentary work cannot be correctly analyzed without taking into account the work outside the Parliament. Parliamentary work and constituency work constitutes two sides of the same coin. This part of MEPs work was overlooked by scholars despite its institutionalization (green weeks).

MEPs constituency work: theoretical expectations

According to Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987), constituency work is answer to an institutional incentive. MPs spend time in their constituency in order to develop their individual reputation that can be translated into electoral resource. In some electoral systems, MPs are accountable to the constituency when, in others, the accountability is related to political parties (Carey and Shugart 1995; Norris 2004). In the formers, MPs are urged to cultivate personal vote with a great involvement in the local community because voters evaluate them on the basis of their individual successes and failures.

The European elections are regionalized and the system differs from one member state to another even if the proportional base is present in all countries. More and more countries adopt open-list systems allowing voters to modify the given order on the ballot. If this distinction does not matter for Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987), more recent studies show that it is central (Carey and Shugart 1995; Dudzinska *et al.* 2014; Poyet 2014a). For the formers, only single-member districts favor the development of personal vote. On the other hand, open-lists and high district magnitude can have exactly the same impact because it leads to a double concurrence: between and within lists. If district magnitude is high, candidates are numerous and have to develop their differences; become more than a part of the crowd in order to encourage the voters to place their name on the top of the list (Poyet 2014a, 9). If lists are closed and district magnitude lower, the incentive would be the same than in single member districts; thus enhancing constituency work.

In France, the electoral system for European elections is proportional with closed-list and high district magnitude. Carey and Shugart (1995) argue that this system do not give incentives for cultivating personal vote and, then, to spend time in constituency. However, elsewhere, we show that district work can be encouraged not because of personal vote but because of a party incentive (Poyet 2014a). This kind of incentive seems to be present in systems with a high number of parties. Candidates, mainly seniors and frontbenchers, are incited by their party to develop ties in their districts. The profit is, thus, not individual but collective. In state-wide districts, the country may also be divided between candidates as shown by Uslaner (1985) in the Israeli case. In addition, European Parliament can be considered by politicians by a step before running for local or national elections. In France, other elections require strong local ties regardless the level of governance. Hence, MEPs may find a strategic incentive for spending time in constituency (Brack and Costa 2013; Costa and Brack 2014).

If institutional design was previously considered as a constraint limiting the possibility to import local issues at the EP, Costa (2001) and Costa and Brack (2014) argue in the opposite direction. According to them, constituency work and constituency representation are an answer to the lack of democratic legitimacy EP. Hence, they can increase their representativeness and legitimacy as well as, indirectly, the EP's one (Costa 2001). The institutional constraint *inside* the EP constitutes, thus, an opportunity for MEPs to develop local ties *outside* the chamber.

If MEPs do not need to hunt personal vote for running to the next election, other incentives coexist and justify we investigate constituency work. Because of the lack of studies about MEPs district work, the theoretical expectations will be driven by studies investigating MPs constituency activities as well as by an inductive reasoning.

One of the main activity in district is casework namely when MPs take care of citizens individual issues. As argued by Kerrouche (2009), MPs and their staff are considered as last chance administrative shelter for housing, working of financial problems. Le Lidec (2008) explains that MPs should be considered as a network for individuals without network. In the EP, this activity was indirectly investigated by Michon (2008) who looked at the treatment of individuals' solicitations by MEPs and their collaborators. This study is not strictly focused on district work because of the impossibility to evaluate the origins of the demands. The author shows that the solicitations are not really oriented towards MEPs' legislative work and depend on MEPs' focus of representation (EU, national, interests groups...). Individual issues (housing, employment,...)observed in MPs mails and appointments are not relevant. In addition, Beauvallet and Michon (2007) also show that MEPs spend time for casework but the frequency of this activity remain overlooked. Two contradictory expectations may occur: On the one hand, the irrelevance of individual issues might indicate that MEPs are not a last chance administrative shelter, neither inside the EP nor in their (virtual) district. On the other

hand, we may also expect that individual issues are irrelevant only in mails because they are processed in district during specific appointments. The empirical analyses will give an answer to this double expectation.

The second activity in district is composed by social events with a political orientation or not. In these activities, which are mainly festive and/or commemorative, MPs are not solicited as they are during office hours. Social events are strongly related with the seniority and experience of MPs. Norton and Wood (1990) argue that junior MPs have more incentives than the previous generation due to the stronger expectations of citizens. Fenno (1978) also argues in the same direction by demonstrating that after a first period of “incumbency” during which MPs devote considerable share of time in constituency, MPs have only to maintain their electoral base. In addition, because of a lack of time, senior and high resourced MPs will not assure this presence themselves but through their collaborators and a professional communication (frequent newsletter, media, and social networks). Kerrouche (2009) claims that MPs with resources (those with an office) tend to rationalize their time in constituency in favor of social events that are more important in terms of human relations and which cost less time. In addition, the majority of social events do not have any political content leading to a more passive position from the MP. It is interesting to note that studies about members of national parliaments show homogeneous results regardless the country. Then, in the context of the EP, there is no objective reason to argue that MEPs will have different behavior.

Third, maybe more important in the context of EP, is the link with social groups and interest groups. In France, contacts with interest groups in constituency are rather limited. On the contrary, MPs spend more time with social groups at social events (sport game; cultural exhibition...) or during specific appointments. It has to be noted that these activities represent only 9% of the time spent in constituency by French MPs and are very heterogeneous (Poyet 2014b, 13). In the case of the EP, we expect that these meetings are much more frequent than

in the national context. Two reasons explain this expectation: first, interest groups and lobbying have a real and measured impact on MEPs preferences (Eising 2007; Grossman and Saurugger 2002; Marshall 2010; Saurugger 2002). If this influence takes place mainly inside the EP we can expect that the game is also played in district with local interest groups and other social groups. Second, the EU may be a financial contributor for local projects integrating social groups like sport clubs or cultural organizations. Hence, MEPs may play the role of moderator between these groups and the European administration. The same argument may be applicable to hypothesize a connection between MEPs and local institutions and politicians (mayors...).

Finally, fourth, a top-down process may also occur when MEPs spend time in their constituency as illustrated by Beauvallet and Michon (2007). By top-down, we consider all activities by which MEPs or MPs represent the parliamentary institution. In France, at the national level, this process is rather limited even if it exists. At the European level, in a context of lack of legitimacy we expect that it is much more developed than at the national level. More specifically, we expect a high frequency of event like information meeting, visit to school but also visit to the industrial actors.

Data and methods

In this paper, we will use the data compiled in the IMPLOC project, coordinated by Olivier Costa and Jean-Benoit Pilet. The ambition of the IMPLOC project is to investigate the actual practices of representation through MPs' and MEPs constituency work. If the project adopts a comparative perspective mobilizing data from France and Belgium but only the former are taken into account in this paper. Between 2012 and 2013, 53 MPs and MEPs have been observed during two days when they were in their constituency. Concerning MEPs, we

observed 21 events grouped in eleven categories. We conducted an interview with all MEPs during or just after the observation.

The methodological framework of this paper is thus double. First it mobilizes moderate participant observation (Dewalt, Dewalt, and Wayland 1998) which is completed by an interview. This mixed-method approach is distinguished from other studies based only on interviews (Dolezal and Müller 2001) because it leads to a better knowledge of MEPs work. The main advantage of observation fits perfectly the goal of our paper: catching the reality of MEPs work. Observation allows investigating the concrete activities of MEPs in their constituency and, thus, the reality of the contacts with citizens. A systematic approach has been adopted through the application of a strict protocol. Investigators had to fill a specific document for each specific event indicating its content. This approach has a double advantage: First, MEPs may adopt different behavior regarding the situation (Fenno 1978). By always evaluating MEPs behavior on the same criteria our sample can deal with this. Second, for the same reason, it facilitates the comparison between MEPs. The typology of events is based on previous studies about French and German MPs through the CITREP project (see Poyet 2014b) but also specific literature about constituency work (Fenno 1978). Eleven types have been selected plus an “other” category. After the observation phase, two categories have been added in order to fit the reality of the field. Our hypotheses are based on these categories. For each event and each MEP, the investigator has also narrated the observation by pointing all interesting behavioral features of MEPs which cannot be added in the former document. It is, for example, jokes or body-language. The objective was also to retrieve all informal discussions between MEPs and their collaborators which could not be considered as events.

To complete the observations, we also conducted interviews with MEPs. The objective of the interviews was to understand the opinion MEPs have about their work. The mixed-

method approach using in this paper has one advantage: the mutual complementarity between the two methods. On one hand, observation allows the researchers investigating the reality of constituency work but the meaning of the activities remain hard to understand. On the other hand, researchers may understand this meaning by interviewing MEPs and more precisely the meaning given by MEPs to their own activities.

Empirical results

The results remain very descriptive and because of the low number of cases, they need to be carefully evaluated.

MEPs: social workers for initiated citizens




Table 1 summarizes the type of events we observed. The first result is the absence of appointments with citizens of the constituency when it is the first activity, in terms of time spent, among French MPs. Almost all observed MPs organized surgeries during the two days

regardless their party or seniority. This absence may be explained by five reasons: the first is related to the size of the constituency which leads to a limited accessibility of the MEP. As observed at the national level, surgeries are not as frequent in large rural districts as they are in the small urban ones. Compared to rural national constituencies, the French European electoral district are much bigger leading to a stronger effect of this factor. Second, casework may take place outside the formal context of surgeries as, for example, during an appointment or visit of a firm. We observed such of *decentralized* surgeries by observing a MEP [PES, woman] visiting farms in her constituency. Questions about available EU subventions and the mechanisms of attribution were asked by farmers and appointments with MEP's collaborator were fixed. Third, surgeries become more-and-more virtual through social networks and emails (Jackson 2003). The increasing number of emails received by MEPs was pointed by Michon (2008). Contacting a MEP or several MEPs by emails is costless and effortless. The size of the constituencies might also reinforce this factor. It is indeed easier to send an email than taking the car and driving to the city where MEPs have their office. However, the volume of emails must be relativized: according to Michon (2008), each MEP receive, in average, about ten emails relative to individual issues every week. This number can reach a hundred or so for French MPs. Fourth, these requests may also be directly managed by a collaborator. Hence, citizens do not meet MEPs themselves even if the gain produced by "their" help would contribute to their reputation. Fifth, MEPs explain that Europe is far in the citizens' considerations. One of them say:

I guess they [citizens] don't care ! Really ! They are happy when I come to meet them but the EP itself is far. It is a soil-less plant. [...] They occasionally come at my office...Anyway...

Europe is far. [ALDE, Man]

As argued by Van Ingelgom (2014), a large share of citizens is indifferent regarding the EU and that sentence tends to show that this indifference also affects MEPs themselves. If



MPs were considered as last-chance administrative shelter, it seems that MEPs are a shelter but for initiated citizens. Those who have a matter with the European Union like the farmers introduced above.

When we investigate MPs activities in district, the second most frequent type of event is the social events namely local celebration without political content. This pattern is not observed among MEPs. We observed only two participation to a social event namely to the *Village Européen* which took place in Bordeaux¹ and a conference about poverty in the EU². As indicated by their name, these events are strongly related to the EU. It is interesting to note that in Beauvallet and Michon's catalogue of MEPs' local-related, social events are not proposed (Beauvallet and Michon 2007). Our observations tend to confirm this argument. This result may be explained by the situation of MEPs in their constituencies. Contrary to MPs, they are not unavoidable when a social event is organized; the capital gain for the organizer is rather limited. The question of electoral gain for MEPs remains open but if we refer to the theory of personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987), such activities procure only limited advantages. Because of the electoral system, MEPs target specific local actors that allow MEPs reaching this goal: political party and its leaders, local interest groups and local elected representatives (Abélès 1990; Beauvallet and Michon 2007; Phélippeau 2002).

¹ The participation of the MEP was public and pictures were posted on the MEP's website (<http://www.alainlamassoure.eu/000doc/lettreinfo12.pdf>). This is the reason why we decided to give the name of the event.

² Both events were divided in, respectively, 3 and 2 different events. The *Village Européen* contain a visit of an exhibition, a conference and a drink. The second was a conference and a drink. It explains the high percentage of table 1.

Importing Europe in the district



Our data give evidence to this argument. A detailed investigation of the events shows that almost all of them are linked to the three targets. During the week-end we observed her, one MEP focused on agriculture and cattle/pig farms. These sectors have a considerable role in the local economy and directly or indirectly hire a large share of workers. In addition, they become more and more dependent on the EU, mainly through the CAP subventions.

Similarly, free trade agreements within the EU but also between the EU and other countries affect these sectors (Carter and Smith 2008; Smith, Costa, and de Maillard 2007). Through the case of Breton farmers, our data allow us to portray a double process: First, there is a bottom-up practice of political representation: district is a source of information for MEPs. With the gathered information, MEPs can act at the European level, inside the EP or by influencing the commissioners, in favor of the region. Beauvallet and Michon (2007, 7) investigated the content of diverse speeches, questions that MEPs often highlight their regional identification and the local issues. Second, a top-down process is also observed through a hard communication about MEPs' success: public meetings, letter of information, etc. For example, a public meeting was organized by the main farmers union in order to allow the MEP [PES, woman] presenting her successes... and failures. The same pattern is observed during the meetings between MEPs and local elected representatives.

In addition to this double process of "information-communication", there is a last type of activity that needs to be highlighted: the representation of Europe. As introduced above, the EP is the only popular elected institution meaning that MEPs are the only European representatives that have a political relationship with citizens. In the previous paragraphs we discussed of the bottom-up linkages between citizens and the EU. Furthermore, the data show that the median position of MEPs is also use as a communication channel from the EU to the citizens and social groups. If the case of communication about CAP was already discussed above, this process goes further. In a context of lack of legitimacy, MEPs can play the role of EU-spokesperson with the citizens. This *teaching Europe* role was observed a lot: an interview by a graduate student, a visit of a school, speaker in a conference, etc. The majority of them are initiated by the citizens or by local institutions and mainly by schools. It has to be noted that the demand is latent but MEPs control it by showing their (dis)interest.

The observation MPs district work leads to a surprising conclusion: Mostly, the events are not related with the national political agenda or to any national consideration. MPs are more *super local elected representatives* than national MPs meaning that they take care of their constituency as a local politician would do. The importance of national politics is rare and activities are deprived of ideological consideration. In other words, local affairs matter. This pattern is not observed among MEPs constituency work. Quite the contrary, European issues take over the other ones. As displayed in table 3, the shape of the EU is observed during almost all activities.

If they bring their expertise when they are in constituency, MEPs also bring Europe in a whole. We argue that is a manner to become unavoidable at the local level. We show elsewhere that MPs develop their local by a deep involvement in the local social life (Poyet 2014b). Our data show that MEPs develop their local ties thank to their expertise. More than a member of the community, MEPs is an expert and become unavoidable thank to their abilities to import Europe at the local level.

Conclusions

Scholars become more and more interested in MEPs' behavior but overlooked their activities in their districts. These micro-linkages between citizens and their European representatives are unknown despite their importance for legislative work. The goal of this paper was to investigate MEPs day-to-day practice of political representation.

Despite the limited data, the analyses provide interesting results: MEPs district work is strongly connected to their European status. First, surgeries are rare and when they are organized the demands stem from initiate citizens that have matters with the EU. Second, MEPs do not spend time in local celebration, at least less than observed MPs. Third, a large share of their time is devoted to the representation of Europe in their constituencies. Data

show that developing local ties is important for MEPs but the strategy is not the same than observed among French MPs. In their district, MEPs are the experts of European affairs more than a member of the community close to citizens. In the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU, this paper brings a new perspective: MEPs are moderators who facilitate the relation between citizens and the EU. Hence, the expertise seems to be more important than the local reputation. MEPs are facilitators who have the ability to deal with the complexity of the EU.

These first results are an encouragement to develop our database and mainly adapt it to other countries.

List of quoted references

Abélès, Marc. 1990. *Jours tranquilles en 89. Ethnologie politique d'un département français*.

Paris: Odile Jacob.

Beauvallet, Willy, and Sébastien Michon. 2007. « Eurodéputés et représentation des territoires ». *Les cahiers du CRESS*, n° 7: 129-34.

Brack, Nathalie, and Olivier Costa. 2013. « The challenges of territorial representation at the supranational level: The case of French MEPs ». *French Politics* 11 (1): 1-23.

Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote. Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Carey, John M, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. « Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas ». *Electoral Studies* 14 (4): 417-39.
doi:10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2.

Carter, Caitríona, and Andy Smith. 2008. « Revitalizing public policy approaches to the EU: 'territorial institutionalism', fisheries and wine ». *Journal of European Public Policy* 15 (2): 263-81.

- Clark, Nick, and Robert Rohrschneider. 2009. « Second-Order Elections versus First Order thinking: How voters Perceive the Representation Process in Multi-layered System of Governance ». *Journal of European Integration* 31 (5): 645-64.
- Costa, Olivier. 2001. *Le Parlement européen, Assemblée délibérante*. Brussels: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.
- . 2010. « Les députés européens entre allégeances multiples et logique d'institution ». *Journal of European Integration* 24 (2): 91-112.
- Costa, Olivier, and Nathalie Brack. 2014. « Who do MEPs represent? A first exploration of their written parliamentary questions (1994-2011) ». paper presented at the APSA Annual meeting, Wasington DC, August 30 2014.
- Dewalt, Kathleen M., Billie R. Dewalt, and Coral B Wayland. 1998. « Participant Observation ». In *Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology*, H. Russel Bernard. London: Altamira.
- Dolezal, Martin, and Wolfgang C. Müller. 2001. « Die Wahlkreisarbeit ». In *Die österreichischen Abgeordneten. Individuelle Präferenzen und politisches Verhalten*, Wolfgang C. Müller, Marcelo Jenny, Barbara Steininger, Martin Dolezal, Wilfried Philipp, and Sabine Preisl-Westphal. Vienne: WUV Universitätverlag.
- Dudzinska, Agnieszka, Corentin Poyet, Olivier Costa, and Bernhard Wessels. 2014. « Representational Roles ». In *Representing the People. A Survey among Members of Statewide and Substate Parliaments*, Kris Deschouwer and Sam Depauw, 19-38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eising, Rainer. 2007. « Institutional Context, Organizational Resources and Strategic Choices Explaining Interest Group Access in the European Union ». *European Union Politics* 8 (3): 329-62.

- Farrell, David M., and Roger Scully. 2007. *Representing Europe's Citizens? Electoral Institutions and the Failure of Parliamentary Representation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Grossman, Emiliano, and Sabine Saurugger. 2002. « Etudier les groupes d'intérêt en Europe ». *Politique européenne* 7 (3): 5-17.
- Hix, Simon. 2001. « Legislative Behavior and Party Competition in European Parliament: An Application of Nominate to the EU ». *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39 (4): 663-88.
- Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury, and Gerard Roland. 2007. *Democratic Politics in the European Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, Nigel. 2003. « Vote Winner or a nuisance: email and British MPs relationship with their constituents ». Paper presented at the 2003 PSA annual conference, Leicester, April 15.
- Katz, Richard S. 1997. « Representational Roles ». *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (2): 211-26.
- Kerrouche, Éric. 2009. « Usages et usagers de la permanence du député ». *Revue française de science politique* 59 (3): 429-54. doi:10.3917/rfsp.593.0429.
- Kreppel, Amie. 2002. *The European Parliament and supranational party system: A study in institutional development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Le Lidec, Patrick. 2008. « Les députés, leurs assistants et les usages du crédit collaborateurs. Une sociologie du travail politique ». *Sociologie du travail* 50 (2): 147-68.

- Mamadouh, Virginie, and Tapio Raunio. 2003. « The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation ». *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41 (2): 333-51.
- Marshall, David. 2010. « Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees ». *European Union Politics* 11 (4): 553-75.
- McElroy, Gail. 2006. « Committee Representation in the European Parliament ». *European Union Politics* 7 (1): 5-29.
- Michon, Sébastien. 2008. « Réception et traitement des sollicitations reçues par les eurodéputés. Le travail politique au Parlement européen sous contraintes ». Working Paper. Strasbourg.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2002. « In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union ». *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (4): 603-24.
- Muller, Edward. 1970. « The Representation of Citizens by Political Authorities: Consequences for Regime Support ». *American Political Science Review* 64 (4): 1149-66.
- Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norton, Philip, and David M. Wood. 1990. « Constituency Service by Members of Parliament: Does it Contribute to a Personal Vote? ». *Parliamentary Affairs* 43 (2): 196-208.
- Phélippeau, Eric. 2002. *L'invention de l'homme politique moderne, Mackau, l'Orne et la République*. Paris: Belin.
- Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- Poyet, Corentin. 2014a. « Explaining MPs Constituency Orientation: A QCA Approach ». Paper presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, Wasington DC, August 26.
- . 2014b. « French MPs Constituency Work: a History of Social Relations with Citizens ». Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, September 3 2014.
- Proksch, Sven-Oliver, and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2011. « Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union ». *European Journal of Political Research* 50 (1): 53-79.
- Raunio, Tapio. 1996. « Parliamentary questions in the European parliament: Representation, information and control ». *Journal of Legislative Studies* 2 (4): 356-82.
- Rittberger, Berthold. 2003. « The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament ». *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41 (2): 203-25.
- Saurugger, Sabine. 2002. « L'expertise : un mode de participation des groupes d'intérêt au processus décisionnel communautaire ». *Revue française de science politique* 52 (4): 375-401.
- Schmitt, Hermann, and Jacques Thomassen. 1999. *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scully, Roger, and David M. Farrell. 2003. « MEPs as Representatives: Individual and Institutional Roles ». *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41 (2): 269-88.
- Smith, Andy, Olivier Costa, and Jacques de Maillard. 2007. *Vin et politique. Bordeaux, la France et la mondialisation*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Uslaner, Eric M. 1985. « Casework and Institutional Design: Redeeming Promises in the Promised Land ». *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 10 (1): 35-52.
- Van der Eijk, Cees, and Mark N. Franklin. 1991. « European Community politics and electoral representation: Evidence from the 1989 European Elections Study ». *European Journal of Political Research* 19 (1): 105-27.

Van Ingelgom, Virginie. 2014. *Integrating Indifference. A Comparative, Qualitative and Quantitative Approach to the Legitimacy of European Integration*. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Wahlke, John C., Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson. 1962. *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior*. New York: Wiley.

Wessels, Bernhard. 1999. « Whom to Represent? Role Orientations of Legislators in Europe ». In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*, édité par Hermann Schmitt et Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.