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Emmanuelle Prak-Derrington

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# How do person deictics construct roles for the reader?

## The unusual case of an “unratified reader” in Schnitzler’s *Leutnant Gustl* and *Fräulein Else*

Emmanuelle Prak-Derrington

ENS de Lyon

In narratology, the grammatical category of person remains to be studied from the perspective of the reader. This article focuses on a particular type of first-person narrative, a type of “interior monologue” in the present tense, via Arthur Schnitzler’s short stories *Leutnant Gustl* (1901) and *Fräulein Else* (1924). This type of monologue denies the reader’s existence within the text (the reader is un-ratified, a reader-voyeur) yet forces the participation of the real reader (who becomes a reader-actor, the only vehicle that brings the silent “voice” of the protagonist to life). I propose to replace the notion of “cooperative reader” (Eco 1979) by that of “unratified/complicit reader”. The simulated immediacy of the deictic *I* functions as a powerful conveyor of projection and identification of the reader with the protagonist.

### 1. Introduction

Today’s narrative theories can be divided into two schools of thought: the communicative vs. the non-communicative models of fictional narrative. In the footsteps of Hamburger (1957), Benveniste (1966), Banfield (1982) and Kuroda (1973, 1979), it has become increasingly accepted among linguists and narrative scholars (e.g. in France, Philippe 2000 and Patron 2009) that there are texts without a speaker,<sup>1</sup> or narratives without a narrator.<sup>2</sup> However, the communicative model (Genette 1972,

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<sup>1</sup> “Personne ne parle ici, les événements semblent se raconter d’eux-mêmes” (Benveniste 1971: 208), ‘No one speaks here; events seem to narrate themselves’ (transl. M. E. Meek, Benveniste 1971: 208).

<sup>2</sup> “There are thus at present two possible alternative theories of narrative style, one which is subsumed under communication theory, where every sentence has a speaker and every text a narrator [...] and another which divides the sentences of narrative into those with a subject and those without. As a consequence of the latter, every text cannot be said to have a narrator.” (Banfield 1982: 11)

Chatman 1978, Stanzel 1982 or more recently Rabatel 2011) remains widely accepted in France and Germany and contests this, postulating a dyadic speaker-and-addressee structure in every narrative, even in the absence of person deictics.<sup>3</sup> In both models, literary narratives are usually studied from the narrator's perspective. Narratology is the theory of narratives and narrators, and incidentally the theory of the readers of narratives.

Here the perspective will be here inverted, and the question will not be "who speaks?" (the question that sums up the positions of the communicative theories, see Patron 2009: 23) but "how is the reader spoken to?"; not "how is it written?" (position of the non-communicative theories, Patron 2009: 257), but "how does the reader perceive the writing?". Ultimately: "where is the reader in relation to the story and the characters?" With respect to personal pronouns: "Do narratives written in the first as opposed to the third person impose distinct roles on the reader?" Here I will contribute a study of a specific use of the first-person pronoun.

I will consider a role for the reader which, to my knowledge, has never been mentioned or analysed, even in reader-oriented studies. It is a very unusual one, restricted to interior monologues, written exclusively in the first person (referring to the main protagonist) and in the present tense. The study will focus on Schnitzler's *Lieutenant Gustl* and *Fräulein Else*. These simple questions will be asked: where is the reader situated in a narrative technique that is constitutively non-addressed? What happens to him or her when the text is by definition "without a listener and not uttered" ("un discours sans auditeur et non prononcé", Dujardin 1931: 58) therefore excluding everyone but the speaker him/herself? Rather than propose a comparative approach, I will highlight the characteristics shared by both short stories.

I will show that these two interior monologues, whose form cannot be considered as innovative as Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés* for example, or as accomplished as Molly's monologue in Joyce's *Ulysses*, nevertheless impose a very ambiguous role on the reader, who remains in an "unratified" position. I will further discuss how the chosen subject in the two short stories coincides ideally with the ambiguity of the reader's role.

## 2. The category of person from the reader's perspective

The specific image of presumed addressees in different periods, cultural spheres, text types, and genres has yet to be examined in detail. (Schmid 2014)

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<sup>3</sup> The increasing interest in the phenomenon of "enunciative effacement" (*effacement énonciatif*) is based on the same premise that every narrative remains "communicative" even in the absence of person deictics. For instance, Rabatel writes: "L'élimination des marques les plus apparentes de la subjectivité est alors conçue comme 'un simulacre d'effacement énonciatif ou comme simulacre d'une communication non-communicationnelle' " / *The elimination of the most obvious markers of subjectivity is thus conceived to be 'an imitation of enunciative effacement or an imitation of non-communicative communication'*" (Rabatel 2011: 109, my translation)

## 2.1. *Abstract Reader vs. Real Readers*

Booth's "postulated reader" (1983: 137-144), Iser's "implied reader" (1976, 1978), Eco's "model reader" (1979, 1985), Prince's "ideal reader" (1980 [1973]) are very general concepts which apply to all narratives, whether from an aesthetic / phenomenological (Iser), semiotic (Eco) or other, perspective. All refer to abstract entities which have to be distinguished from the concrete, real readers. The specific role of the reader in different text types, however, has yet to be examined in detail (Schmid 2014, quoted in the epigraph). The present study will adopt an enunciative pragmatic perspective, and therefore focus on the most obvious enunciative forms, i.e. the category of person.

Communicative theories belittle the category of person and the specificity of person deixis, assuming that there is an *I* and a *You* in every narrative, even when they do not appear. ("Toute narration est, par définition, virtuellement faite à la première personne" / *'Every narrative is, by definition, virtually made by an I'*, Genette 1972: 252). Non-communicative theories draw a line between two types of narratives: third-person narratives vs. first- or second-person narratives (Patron 2009: 26), but they focus on narratives without a narrator, on "unspeakable sentences", that is to say without obvious marks of personal subjectivity, such as first- and second-person pronouns.

Here a positive approach to person deictics is adopted. If different personal forms have to be associated with different properties for the narrator (present or absent, overt or covert...), the same is true of the reader. But surprisingly, even in recent reader-oriented studies, the role of the personal pronouns has only been seriously taken into account when the reader is explicitly addressed with the second-person pronoun: with "You" in English, "Du" or the polite form "Sie" in German, "Tu" or "Vous" in French. But the reader also occupies radically different positions in I-narratives or S/He - narratives.<sup>4</sup> "Anticipating one's Model Reader does not only mean to 'hope' that this reader exists, it also means working on the text to build him (or her)" (Eco 1985: 69, my translation).<sup>5</sup> The choice of the personal pronoun for the main protagonist, and then of the configuration in which it is used, is the very first step towards constructing a role for the reader (Prak-Derrington 2006, Prak-Derrington in press).

## 2.2. *Duality of deictics and duality of literary enunciation. The example of You*

Bakhtin's theory of dialogism has found a large resonance among French linguists (Ducrot 1984, Authier-Revuz 1995, etc.), who have established that the speaker is split

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<sup>4</sup> And in their much rarer plural forms, We or They.

<sup>5</sup> "Prévoir son Lecteur Modèle ne signifie pas uniquement 'espérer' qu'il existe, cela signifie aussi agir sur le texte de façon à le construire." (Eco 1985: 69)

in many discursive roles and is inhabited by numerous, mostly unidentifiable voices. The same is true of the recipient, whose constitutive heterogeneity was first shown in sociolinguistics (Goffman 1981, Brown & Levinson 1987).

A first general distinction has to be made between the formal addressee and the intended recipients. In everyday communication they usually coincide, but it is not always the case. The non-coincidence, however, is effective and the normal case for literature. It is a well-known fact that in drama, the actor's speech is addressed not only to the partner on stage, but also to the audience in the room. And in narratives, whether the abstract (or implied) reader is addressed or not, mentioned or not, the real reader is always the final recipient. Here I will focus on cases in which a communicative structure is set by the text, in other words, in which the text contains person deictics.

Deictic expressions (which give references to I-Here-Now) are known to have a dual status. As linguistic phrases, they refer, like any other phrase, to a referent in the world (*I* refers to the speaker), but as contextual phrases, they can only be interpreted in relation to the situation of utterance (in each speech-situation, *I* can refer to different speakers). This dual status is exploited in fictional narratives. Person deictics allow a game to be played with the constitutive polyphony of literary enunciation. The constitutive duality of deictics echoes the constitutive duality of, firstly, the real author/fictive narrator and, secondly, the fictive/real reader. Person deictics allow the distinction made between the fictive and real readers to fade or even disappear. This has been studied in *You*-narratives, *You* being the prototypical pronoun for the addressee function, and therefore merging internal and external addressee:

The address-pronoun *you* has a basic deictic function by means of which it designates the current interlocutor in a communicational exchange. Within a narrative, the current interlocutor of the narrator is the narratee or the persona of a projected listener or reader. Since empiric readers are reading the text, addresses by the narrator to his or her narratees lend themselves to a reading in which the actual, empirical reader feels personally addressed. The *you* is then taken to have immediate relevance to the real author – real reader circuit of communication. (Fludernik 1998: 234-235)

However, this is true of all the other person deictics: not only of *You* as a singular or plural form, but also of *We* or *I* (Prak-Derrington 1999). Each pronoun, or more specifically each different use of the pronoun, distributes a different role for the reader. For instance, it seems appropriate to distinguish two main roles for a *You*, whether *You* appears in traditional third-person narratives (the main protagonist is a *He* or a *She* (1)) or in modern *You*-narratives (*You* refers to the main protagonist (2)). In (1), we are confronted with what I propose to call a “heterodiegetic reader”, in (2), with a “homodiegetic ‘character-reader’”.

(1) *Gracious reader*, may *I* venture to ask *you* a question? Have *you* ever had hours, perhaps even days or weeks, in which all *your* customary activities did nothing but

cause *you* vexation and dis-satisfaction; when everything that *you* usually consider worthy and important seemed trivial and worthless? At such a time *you* did not know what to do or where to turn. [...] If, *favourable reader*, *you* have ever been in this mood, *you* know the state into which the Student Anselmus had fallen. *I* wish most heartily, *courteous reader*, that it were in *my* power to bring the Student Anselmus before *your* eyes with true vividness. (E. T. A. Hoffmann, *The Golden Flower Pot* [*Der goldene Topf*] 1819, translator unknown, italics mine)

It is no accident that this kind of address to the reader has been termed “author intrusion”. The content of such intrusions can be extremely varied, and may concern the story and narrated events, or indeed the act of reading or writing. These intrusions are all self-reflexive utterances and can be placed under the umbrella term *metafiction* (Waugh 1984, Neumann & Nünning 2014). They present an imaginary dialogue between the author and the reader, creating a common ground in the midst of the fiction. This common ground was also called “secondary fiction” by Vuillaume (1990). Author and reader remain clearly distinct from the characters because of a rigorous division among personal pronouns (I-author/You-reader vs. He- or She-protagonist) and verbal tenses (the dialogue with the reader is in the present tense whereas the story is in the past; Vuillaume (1991) defines this as “temporale Doppelbödigkeit” / ‘*temporal duality*’). The position of the reader remains outside, allowing us to define him or her as a “heterodiegetic reader”.

In modern literature, a completely different use of *You* has also evolved in which the pronoun does not refer to a witnessing reader, but designates the main character in a story told in the present tense. Thus the act of reading and the plot become concomitant. *You* acquires a dual functionality: whilst remaining a self-address form, it is also a technique through which the author blurs the boundary between fictional character and real reader. The constitutive duality of literary enunciation is thus expressed by a phenomenon of “multiple addressing” (explicit self-addressing by the character and implicit addressing to the reader, Prak-Derrington 2006).<sup>6</sup>

Classic examples of this modern use of *You* include Ilse Aichinger’s short story, “Mirrorstory” (“Spiegelgeschichte”, 1949) in German, Butor’s “Second Thoughts” (“La Modification”, 1957) in French, Calvino’s “If on a winter’s night a traveller...” (“Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore”, 1971) in Italian.

(2) When *someone* pushes *your bed* out of *the ward*, when *you* see that *the sky* becomes green, and when *you* would spare *the curate the* funeral sermon, then it is time for *you* to get up, gently, as children get up, when *the morning light* shimmers through *the curtains*, secretly, so that *the sister* does not see it – and quickly!

But he has already begun it, the curate, *you* hear there his voice, young and eager and unstoppable, *you* hear there, he already speaks. *Let it happen! Let his good words be submerged* in the blinding rain. (I. Aichinger, Mirrorstory [Spiegelgeschichte], 1949, italics mine)

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<sup>6</sup> For a review of “multiple addressing” (“Mehrfachadressierung”), see Kühn 1995.

At the beginning of the novel no expense is spared to leave the *You* as open as possible, so that the reader can transpose him- or herself to the situation of the character: absence of proper nouns, use of “when”, use of the indefinite pronoun “someone”, systematic use of the definite article (“the ward”, “the sky”, “the curate”, “the sister”, “the curtains”), use of the imperative (“Let it happen”). Even when the protagonist is eventually characterized, and the real reader has become distinct, the continual use of *You* remains dual. Didactically the second-person pronoun lends the reader a mirror in which to see his or her own reflection (see Butor 1992: 80 [1964]). Aichinger’s title “Mirrorstory” must also be understood in this sense. This *You* exemplifies the dual status of literary enunciation, whilst joining the character and the reader to form what I call a “homodiegetic You-character-reader”.

These two roles for a You-reader have been well studied, although they are identified by different nomenclatures from that proposed here.<sup>7</sup>

The use of *You*, however, overtly plays with the reader as an addressee or/and a protagonist. Here the focus is on a type of text that *denies* the existence of the reader: texts in which the narrative scenography (Maingueneau 2004, 2009) not only does not construct an overt place for the abstract reader (as is the case in third-person narratives without person deictics), but deliberately appears to exclude him or her. This happens in one type of interior monologue, illustrated by two short stories by Schnitzler.

### 3. Schnitzler’s short stories, *Leutnant Gustl* (1901) and *Fräulein Else* (1924)

#### 3.1. A non-narrative form of narrative

Arthur Schnitzler’s *Leutnant Gustl* (1901) and *Fräulein Else* (1924) are considered to be “interior monologues”. The term is ambiguous. It can be understood in a broad sense, as a synonym of “inner speech” (someone speaks to themselves, and therefore the otherwise distinct instances of speaker and listener coincide), or even as a generic designation of all literary forms of representation of inner speech.

The inner speech is by no means confined to a mode of representation that is fixed once and for all [...] it uses all the forms offered by the range of representations of reported speech [...]. (Philippe 1997: 196, my translation)<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> They can be considered as subspecies of *metafiction* and *metanarration* (Waugh 1984, Neumann & Nünning 2014) or of “*fiction secondaire*” (‘secondary fiction’, Vuillaume 1990). See also Fludernik (1993, 1994, 1998) for the specificity of modern second-person narratives.

<sup>8</sup> “Le discours intérieur n’est en rien circonscrit dans un mode de représentation fixé une fois pour toutes [...] il emprunte toutes les modalités qu’offre la gamme des représentations du discours rapporté [...]” (Philippe 1997:196).

Here “interior monologue” will not be used in this broad sense. It will only refer to a narrative technique based on the joint use of the first person with the present tense, in other words on the simultaneity of the I’s-thoughts and of what is happening. It creates an illusion of immediacy and synchronicity (coincidence of discourse-time and of story-time).<sup>9</sup>

In terms of represented speech, this technique occupies a very special place in narratives, removing all traces of visible narration or mediacy,<sup>10</sup> and instead confronting the reader only with the immediacy of the character’s thoughts. The following examples of free indirect speech, free direct speech and interior monologue show how mediacy gradually decreases, and disappears completely with the technique of interior monologue.<sup>11</sup>

Free indirect speech:

(3) En face, au-delà des toits, le grand ciel pur s’étendait, avec le soleil rouge se couchant. *Qu’il devait faire bon là-bas ! Quelle fraîcheur sous la hêtraie! Et il ouvrait les narines pour aspirer les bonnes odeurs de la campagne, qui ne venaient pas jusqu’à lui.* (Flaubert, *Madame Bovary*, 2002 [1857]: 42)

(3’) Opposite, beyond the roofs spread the pure heaven with the red sun setting. *How pleasant it must be at home! How fresh under the beech-tree! And he expanded his nostrils to breathe in the sweet odours of the country which did not reach him.* (transl. Aveling, Flaubert 2006 [1857])

Free direct speech:

(4) Puis une fatigue *le* gagne. *Je* ne vais tout de même pas m’endormir, et celui-là qui va arriver d’un moment à l’autre ? *Il se secoue, passe* dans la salle de bains, *revient* en versant dans ses mains un peu d’eau de Cologne. (Danièle Sallenave, *Un printemps froid*, quoted by Rosier 1999: 290)

(4’) *He* suddenly *feels* overwhelmed with tiredness. *I am* not going to fall asleep, *am I*, especially with him due to arrive any minute? *He shakes* himself, *steps* into the bathroom, *comes* back pouring a little Cologne into his palm. (my translation)

Interior monologue in *Lieutenant Gustl*<sup>12</sup> and *Fräulein Else*<sup>13</sup>:

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<sup>9</sup> Erzählzeit vs. erzählte Zeit (Müller 1968 [1947]).

<sup>10</sup> For a review a « mediacy », see Alber, Fludernik 2011.

<sup>11</sup> The examples are first given in the original language and then translated in English. All italics are mine.

<sup>12</sup> German edition: Schnitzler, Arthur. *Leutnant Gustl* [1901]. In: *Die großen Erzählungen*. Stuttgart, Reclam, 2006, 7-47. English edition: Schnitzler, Arthur. *Lieutenant Gustl*, translated by R. L. Simon, Los Angeles, Per Bregne, 2003.



(5) Der einäugige Amerikaner auf der Rosette hat ausgesehen wie ein Boxkämpfer. Vielleicht hat ihn beim Boxen wer das Auge ausgeschlagen. Nach Amerika würde ich ganz gern heiraten, aber keinen Amerikaner. Oder ich heirate einen Amerikaner und wir leben in Europa. Villa an der Riviera. Marmorstufen ins Meer. Ich liege nackt auf dem Marmor. (Fräulein Else, 51, 52)

(5') That one-eyed American at the Rosetta looked like a prize-fighter. Perhaps someone knocked his eye out in a fight. I'd rather like to be married in America, but not to an American. Or I'll marry an American and we'll live in Europe. A villa on the Riviera, with marble steps going down into the sea... (Fräulein Else, transl. F. H. Lyon, 8)

(6) Wie lang' wird denn das noch dauern? Ich muss auf die Uhr schauen... schickt sich wahrscheinlich nicht in einem so ernsten Konzert. Aber wer sieht's denn? Wenn's einer sieht, so paßt er gerade so wenig auf, wie ich, und vor dem brauch' ich mich nicht zu genieren... Erst viertel auf zehn?... Mir kommt vor, ich sitz' schon drei Stunden in dem Konzert. Ich bin's halt nicht gewohnt... (Leutnant Gustl, 9)

(6') How long is this thing going to last? Let's see what time it is... perhaps I shouldn't look at my watch at a serious concert like this. But no one will see me. If anyone does, I'll know he's paying just as little attention as I am. In that case, I certainly won't be embarrassed... Only quarter to ten?... I feel as though I've been here for hours. I'm just not used to going to concerts. (Lieutenant Gustl, transl. R.L. Simon, 5)

Both the dialogical indeterminacy of free indirect style in (2) (third person, imperfect, no quotation marks but “enunciative discord signals” [*discordanciels*], Rosier 1999: 153, the connective *and* marking the return to narration) and the duality of free direct speech in (3) (no quotation marks, present tense, but shift from third to first person in the personal pronouns), presume mediacy. In contrast, the Interior Monologue in (4) and (5) does away with any visible mediacy and seems to exist totally independently of a narrator or narrative function. Cohn (1983: 217-265) therefore calls it an “autonomous monologue”. Schnitzler's examples resemble theatrical soliloquies, except that these texts were not written to be staged, but to be read. They can be described as the non-narrative form of narrative. This fact has major consequences for the real reader.

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<sup>13</sup> German edition: Schnitzler, Arthur. *Fräulein Else* [1924]. In: *Die großen Erzählungen*. Stuttgart, 2006, Reclam, 49-127. English edition: Schnitzler, Arthur. *Fräulein Else*, translated by F.H. Lyon, London, Pushkin Press, 2012.

### 3.2. Schnitzler's two short stories: a very unusual form

In this type of IM, everything has to be thought and perceived through the eyes of the first-person protagonist, at the very moment it is perceived and thought.

(7) Die Kirche hat auch das Gute, daß man jeden Augenblick fortgehen kann. – Wenn ich wenigstens einen Ecksitz hätt'! — Also Geduld, Geduld! Auch Oratorien nehmen ein End'! Vielleicht ist es sehr schön und ich bin nur nicht in der Laune. Woher sollt' mir auch die Laune kommen? (Leutnant Gustl, 8)

(7') There's one advantage church has over a concert: you can leave whenever you want to. – I wish I were sitting on the aisle! Steady, Steady! Even Oratorios end some time. Perhaps this one's very beautiful and I'm just in the wrong mood. Well, why not? (Lieutenant Gustl, transl. 5)

This produces a double stricture. In terms of fictional representation, the concomitant use of I as the only possible deictic centre (“Ich-Origo”, Bühler 1934), and of the simultaneous present (there is a coincidence between discourse time and story time) is a very coercive obligation.<sup>14</sup> It imposes limits that cannot easily be overcome, for instance existential limits. How can such an I-protagonist relate his or her own death or birth in the present tense, or relate somebody else's thoughts? It then contradicts the authorial power and liberty given by epic fiction: “Epic fiction is the sole epistemological instance where the I-originary (or subjectivity) of a third-person qua third person can be portrayed” (Hamburger 1968: 73, translated and quoted in Cohn 1983:7).<sup>15</sup>

For this reason, only few texts are entirely written in this style and even then they cannot be very long. Most of the time, the technique is preferentially associated with other techniques, so that its restriction to “one personal pronoun, one mind” can be overcome. For example, it can be used in a single chapter in a third-person novel, like the famous monologue of Molly Bloom at the end of Joyce's *Ulysses*. Or several different monologues can be combined, so that the reader is confronted with a plurality of perspectives. For example, Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying* consists of 59 chapters, narrated by fifteen different I-characters; Christa Wolf's *Medea* retells the Greek myth through five different voices, etc. Each chapter, which is named after the corresponding I-protagonist, introduces a change of perspective and so releases the reader from imprisonment in one mind only.

The effect is quite different when the entire text is written in the first person and in the present tense, as in Schnitzler's short stories. The originality of these two short

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<sup>14</sup> Of course, the protagonist can *think of* past or future events, but all events that *occur* must coincide with the time of utterance.

<sup>15</sup> “Die epische Fiktion ist der einzige erkenntnistheoretische Ort, wo die Ich-Originalität (oder Subjektivität) einer dritten Person als einer dritten dargestellt werden kann.” (Hamburger, 1968 (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.): 73, 115)

stories lies then, not so much in the language, which remains rather classical and close to theatrical soliloquies, as in the denial of what constitutes the distinctive feature of narratives: its mediacy.

### 3.3. *The limits of immediacy: the hidden inscription of the reader. The example of verbs of movement*

In these short stories, the required immediacy conflicts with the necessity of keeping the reader informed. There is one domain in which the limits of this type of IM become obvious and can lead to a certain verbal clumsiness: when perceptions, movements and gestures (as opposed to verbal thoughts) have to be described. The representation of pre-reflexive perceptions, which have not yet reached the stage of consciousness, has been pointed out as one of the most unsettling verbalization problems in IM (Philippe 2009: 114-117). Strategies have been developed to report non-conceptual perceptive data. Here, I will concentrate on the representation of movement.

In real life, most of our movements are performed without thinking. In IM, why should spontaneous movements be described, if not for the reader? Some sentences then sound, if not unlikely, at least quite incongruous:

(8) „Adieu, Paul.“ *Wo habe ich die schmelzende Stimme her.* Er geht, der Schwindler. Wahrscheinlich muss er noch etwas abmachen mit Cissy wegen heute nacht. Wünsche Viel Vergnügen. *Ich ziehe den Schal um meine Schulter und stehe auf und gehe vors Hotel hinaus.* (Fräulein Else, 71)

(8') "Good bye, Paul". *Where did I get that melting voice from?* He's going, the humbug! Probably he has to arrange something with Cissy about tonight. I wish him joy. I'll put my shawl round my shoulders and get up and go out in front of the hotel.<sup>16</sup> (Fräulein Else, transl., 34)

(9) „Also auf Wiedersehen, Else.“ *Ich antworte nichts. Regungslos stehe ich da.* Er sieht mir ins Auge. *Mein Gesicht ist undurchdringlich.* Er weiß gar nichts. (Fräulein Else, 82)

(9') "Au Revoir then, Else". *I don't answer. I stand here without moving.* He looks deeply into my eyes. *My face is impenetrable.* He knows nothing. (Fräulein Else, transl., 49)

Verbalization of gestures is not impossible in inner speech, but such sentences seem to be justified only by the existence of the reader. For this reason they have been pointed out as one of the most visible weaknesses of IM:

As Dujardin's *Les Lauriers sont coupés* and Schnitzler's *Fräulein Else* show, when monologues become much more enterprising they begin to sound far less convincing;

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<sup>16</sup> In the English translation, "will" replaces the simultaneous present.

forced to describe the actions they perform while they perform them, they tend to sound like gymnastic teachers vocally demonstrating an exercise (Cohn 1978: 222).

The following descriptive passage, which is typical of a third-person narrative, “She walks to the window and leans out to look outside”, is easily transposable/translatable into a second-person narrative: “You walk to the window and lean out to look outside.” However it becomes different as soon as it is transposed to the first person in the present tense: “I walk to the window, I lean out to look outside”. The utterance no longer remains simply descriptive: it acquires a purpose. Why is there simultaneity between the movement and the verbalization? Instead of simply saying “I climb the stairs”, the protagonist could say:

Let’s climb the stairs!

Ah the stairs... Up we go!

These bloody stairs, God, my knees hurt...

Etc.

There is a tension in the text between two contradictory imperatives: to be clear to the reader, and yet to remain believable (Philippe 1997: 33). In order to maintain the credibility of a non-addressed discourse, various strategies are developed so that the reader is seamlessly informed. The monologist becomes both spectator and addressee of him/herself, asking him/herself questions, giving him/herself orders, commenting on his/her movements and gestures, etc.

In Schnitzler’s stories, three main strategies can be distinguished in the verbalization of gestures: modal, aspectual and commentative (see below). Most of the time they are combined. They all introduce an external perspective; however, they are expressed differently in German and in the English translations.<sup>17</sup> The examples below are classified with respect to the strategies used in the original German texts.

1. The modal strategy is the most common and diversified. It focuses on the category of person, the speech act type and the predication type: *Du* (11), *Wir* (10) and impersonal forms (infinitives (10) or verbless sentences (12) are then used instead of *Ich*; declarative sentences are replaced by questions (12) or orders (10):

(10) Setzen wir uns einen Moment – aber nicht einschlafen, wie im Prater (Leutnant Gustl, 40)

(10’) I’ll sit down a moment but I won’t go to sleep (Lieutenant Gustl, transl. 46)

(11) Schau, Gustl, Du bist doch extra herunter in den Prater gegangen, mitten in der Nacht, wo Dich keine Menschenseele stört (Leutnant Gustl, 32-33)

(11’) Look here, Gustl, you especially came down here to the Prater in the middle of the night so that not a soul would bother you (Lieutenant Gustl, transl. 39)

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<sup>17</sup> For instance, an imperative or an infinitive form, the simultaneous present in German are often replaced by “will” in English (8’, 10’, 17’), etc. The only strategy that can be preserved without changes in translation is the commentary (16, 17, 18).

(12) Die Aspernbrücke... Wie weit renne ich denn noch? Wenn ich so weiterrenne bin ich schon um Mitternacht in Kagra (Leutnant Gustl, 24)

(12') Already at the bridge? How far am I running? If I keep on this way I'll be at Kagra by midnight. (Lieutenant Gustl, transl. 26)

2. With the aspectual strategy, immediate anteriority or posteriority replace simultaneity: use of the present perfect or the simultaneous present. This strategy is perfectly in keeping with the confusion with which the protagonists are struggling. They accomplish their actions mechanically, and only notice them once they are completed.

(13) Nun, er *ist offen* der Brief, und ich *habe gar nicht gemerkt*, dass ich ihn *aufgemacht habe*. (Fräulein Else, 57)

(13') Why, the letter *is open*, and *I never noticed* that I was opening it. (Fräulein Else, transl., 15)

(14) Wo ist denn mein Mantel?... Ich *hab'* ihn ja schon *angezogen*... *Ich hab's gar nicht gemerkt*... Wer hat mir denn geholfen... Ah, der da... dem muß ich ein Sechsel geben... (Leutnant Gustl, 18-19)

(14') Where's my coat?... Why *I'm already wearing it*... *I didn't even notice it*... Who helped me on with it?... Oh, that one here... I'll have to tip him... (Leutnant Gustl, 18)

(15) Was, ich bin schon auf der Straße? *Wie bin ich denn da herausgekommen?* (Leutnant Gustl, 18)

(15') What? Am I already on the street? *How did I ever get here?* (Lieutenant Gustl, 19)

3. If the combination of *I* and the simultaneous present cannot be avoided, the sentence adds a justifying commentary that legitimizes the verbalization of the gesture. The easiest and most common form of commentary is then given by a simple repetition (16, 18). The second utterance can then be considered as a form of "autonymic connotation" (Authier-Revuz 1995); it becomes an implicit metalinguistic comment. Any repeated word is at the same time a use of the word and a reflexive, retroactive mention of the word, i.e. of the first utterance.

(16) Dass sie was miteinander haben, Cousin Paul und Cissy Mohr, darauf schwör ich.[...] Nun wende ich mich noch einmal um und winke ihnen zu. *Winke und lächle. Sehe ich nun gnädig aus?* (Fräulein Else, 51)

(16') I'll swear there's something between Cousin Paul and Cissy Mohr. [...] *Now I'll turn around again and wave to them. Wave and smile. Do I look gracious now?* (Fraülein Else, transl., 7)

(17) Ich setze mich aufs Fensterbrett und lese ihn [den Brief]. *Achtgeben, daß ich nicht hinunterstürze.* (Fraülein Else, 57)

(17') I'll sit down on the window-sill and read it [the letter]. *I must take care I don't fall out.* (Fraülein Else, transl., 15)

(18) Ha, *ich kann ja, ich kann.* Ich bewege die Hand, ich rege die Finger, ich strecke den Arm, ich sperre die Augen weit auf. *Ich sehe, ich sehe.* Da steht mein Glas. *Geschwind,* ehe sie wiederkommen. (Fraülein Else, 123)

(18') *Ha, I can, I can.* I move my hand, then my fingers, I stretch out my arms, I open my eyes wide. *I see, I see.* There my glass stands. *Quick,* before they come into the room again (Fraülein Else, transl., 104)

The imprisonment in an internal perspective cannot be held all the time and can lead, as shown by some of the examples above, to what may be regarded as a weak point in Schnitzler's monologues: underhanded information for a reader who is not supposed to be there. But the required immediacy, the giving up of multiple perspectives, can also become very productive. The choice of IM offers Schnitzler a powerful matching between the chosen subject of both stories and the ambiguous, dual status of the reader.

#### 4. An unratified reader

The dyadic model of speaker/hearer (in literature, author/reader) is an oversimplification of the complexity of their roles in interactions. The concept of "polyphony" refers to the complexity of the speaker's roles, but there is no similar established concept for the hearer. Goffman's *participation framework* (1981) provides an interesting comparison for the reader in IM.<sup>18</sup> He deconstructs the hearer into a range of quite different participants. He opposes ratified (authorized) participants (whether they are directly addressed or not), to unratified (unauthorized) participants. The unratified participants, or *bystanders* are subdivided into *eavesdroppers* (who deliberately listen without permission) and *overhearers* (who hear without seeking to do so).

In Schnitzler's stories, the reader becomes an unratified participant, equivalent to an "eavesdropper" (but reading and not hearing), who catches words that are not supposed to be heard. Only the protagonist (Gustl, Else), or rather their thoughts, are presented on stage. There is no narrator, no reader; but the very reader who is rejected finds his or her status considerably increased. Instead of being the second, additional, or ultimate

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<sup>18</sup> A participation framework displays the relationships among participants, speakers and hearers.

recipient (whether explicit or implicit), the reader becomes the unique possible recipient. The reader is then caught in a double movement which denies his or her existence, but simultaneously amplifies his or her power. The loss of the reader's legitimacy within the text is concomitant with an amplified implication of the real reader.

This non-ratified, illegitimate status of IM puts the real reader in an uncomfortable and ambiguous position. i) He or she is forced to break into the verbal thoughts of the character. ii) His or her sphere of influence increases drastically. The reader is alone, face to face with the character.

In this type of IM, the notion of "cooperative reading" proposed by Eco (1984, 1991) seems inappropriate. Any cooperation requires both sides to participate towards a common goal. It must be done in the open, with a contract that defines or legislates the roles of both participants. Whether the work is "open" or "closed" (Eco 1984, 1991), the reader is always pre-supposed, only the amount of his/her interpretative work varies. With IM, everything changes. How can cooperation be established when the reader is not supposed to exist? How can there be a "reading contract" when both parties have to remain hidden from each other? To describe this secret agreement, i.e. the hidden, underhanded cooperation of the unratified reader of IM, I prefer the word "colluding" ("to work together secretly to commit fraud or an illegal act", wordreference.com) or even the word "complicity" ("the fact or condition of being an accomplice, esp. in a criminal act", wordreference.com). Both concepts can be subsumed under the French concept of "complicité", which implies not only a criminal, but also a positive aspect, the idea of a secret intimacy.<sup>19</sup> In IM, the reader is put in a position of voyeurism, breaking into another I-mind without permission. At the same time, the use of the deictic I, without any visible mediacy, forces the reader to identify with the character. He or she has to become a reader-actor.

#### *4.1. The reader-voyeur*

In both short stories, the protagonists have to face a conflict of conscience: Gustl is struggling with the 19th-century military code of honour. Else is caught between two threats of dishonour that are equally unbearable. Their conscience is the only possible place where the conflict, which is tearing them apart, can be resolved. The dilemma that they must confront cannot be admitted without them losing face. In both cases, speaking means losing their honour.

Gustl, an Austrian junior officer, is humiliated by a baker who jostles him at the opera, insults him and immobilizes him using his own sword (symbolically making him impotent). In the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the 19th century, the military code of honour obliges him to fight a duel to avenge the insult. Indeed Gustl already has an

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<sup>19</sup> This latter aspect is not so accurate in the word "complicity" in English, but it is actually both aspects I have in mind for the reader of IM.

appointment to duel the next day at four o'clock in the afternoon. However, in this case Gustl suffers the insult without replying. If he reveals the insult he will be dishonoured in the eyes of his peers; if he does not, he will be dishonoured in his own eyes.

As for Else, the young aristocrat, she is required by her mother to beg thirty (then fifty) thousand florins from a rich old art dealer, Dorsday, to save her family from ruin. Being a bourgeois arriviste, who has doubtless suffered countless humiliations to reach his present status, Dorsday accepts, on condition that Else strips naked for him. Else is thus caught between two impossibilities: either she refuses and her family will be financially ruined and dishonoured, her father facing either prison or suicide; or she accepts, causing her own dishonour, since for her, such an act would be akin to prostitution.

The monologue follows each protagonist's mental torment and wandering thoughts, and suicide appears to be the only possible escape.

(19) ...es ist ja aus mit mir... Ehre verloren, alles verloren!... Ich hab' ja nichts anderes zu tun, als meinen Revolver zu laden und ... Gustl, Gustl, mir scheint, Du glaubst noch immer nicht recht dran? Komm' nur zur Besinnung... es giebt nichts anderes... wenn Du auch Dein Gehirn zermarterst, es giebt nichts anderes! (Leutnant Gustl, 24)

(19') All is over with me. Honor lost – all lost! There's nothing else for me to do but load my revolver and... Gustl, Gustl, you're not thinking there out properly! Come to your senses!... There's no way out... No matter how you torture your brain, there's no way out! (Lieutenant Gustl, transl. 27)

In the two short stories, the end determines the interpretation. Gustl, saved in extremis by the serendipitous death of the baker (from a heart attack), appears grotesque and ridiculous. Freed from the possibility of anyone discovering his shame, not only does he learn nothing from the incident, he also becomes even more aggressive. All his sentiments concerning honour can retroactively be regarded as lies.

By contrast, Fräulein Else finishes tragically. She does something insane: she chooses to display her nudity in the reception room of the hotel, an act which would remain incomprehensible to the reader had he or she not followed her thoughts step by step. Finally she kills herself with an overdose of barbiturates.

The removal of the reader from the scenography of IM takes much more resonance in each case because his or her intrusion into the thoughts of the characters violently contradicts the necessity for both of them to keep their secrets.

As soon as he learns of the death of the baker, Gustl's humiliation becomes irrelevant. He has saved his face; he cannot be found out. His last words, with which he defies, in thought, his future adversary in the duel that afternoon ("I will cut you to pieces", my transl.) show him unchanged by his recent experience.



(20) Ich bin so froh, so froh!... Was mach' ich denn nur? ... Was mach'ich denn nur? Es muß ja was geschehen, sonst trifft mich auch noch der Schlag vor lauter Freud!... [...] Und nachmittag um vier... na wart mein Lieber! Ich bin grad gut aufgelegt... Dich hau' ich zu Krenfleisch! (Leutnant Gustl, 47)

(20') I'm so happy, so happy!... What am I doing?... What am I doing? Something's got to happen, or I'll be overcome by a stroke of joy! [...] And this afternoon at four... Just wait, my boy, I'm in a wonderful trim.... I'll knock you to smithereens! (Lieutenant Gustl, 59)

Else, on the other hand, follows the opposite path. Her exhibitionism in the hall of the hotel allows her to escape the private humiliation imposed by Dorsday's deal, so that she refuses to submit to any private complicity.

According to Goffman's "face theory" (1981), the fundamental rule that any individual must respect is to preserve their face and that of their partners. The reader, being excluded from the scenography of IM, is made guilty of invading the intimacy of the characters, being let into all their secrets. Reading becomes a "face-threatening act" – Butor (1992 [1964]: 79) once described interior monologue as the rape of a closed mind: "Reading becomes equivalent to a fantasy rape, which is otherwise prohibited by reality" (my translation).<sup>20</sup>

The reader becomes just as guilty as Dorsday who wished to see Else naked. Consequently, Else's exclamations have a very strong impact on the reader when she accuses the world (her family, relatives and relations) of being responsible for her death. She uses a second-person pronoun, in an exclamation which could well condemn the reader-voyeur, *Ihr alle! Ihr alle!* ('All of you! All of you!'):

(21) Alle haben sie michgemordert und machen sich nichts wissen. Sie hat sich selber umgebracht, werden sie sagen. Ihr habt mich umgebracht, ihr alle, ihr alle! (Fräulein Else, 123)

(21') They've all murdered me and pretend to know nothing about it. She killed herself, they'll say. You've killed me, all of you, all of you. (Fräulein Else, transl. 104)

In *Eulogy of the secret (Eloge du secret)*, Pierre Levy-Soussan writes:

The reason why secret is lucrative is that it has a high potential for excitement. Not only because of its transgressive dimension, but also because it gives power to the one who possesses it. (Levy-Soussan, 2010: 192, my translation).<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> "La lecture se présente comme le rêve d'un 'viol' à quoi la réalité se refuserait constamment".

<sup>21</sup> "S'il est vendeur, c'est que le secret a un fort potentiel d'excitation. Non seulement il a quelque chose de l'ordre de la transgression, mais il donne aussi un pouvoir à celui qui le détient".

As “God alone reads the hearts and minds of men”,<sup>22</sup> the reader of IM commits sacrilege, and in both of Schnitzler’s short stories, the reader’s guilt echoes that of the two characters.

However, a voyeur is a passive accomplice... being a voyeur also means remaining at the edge, and not participating in events. Whereas this is exactly the opposite of what happens here. Collusion implies a secret understanding and sharing. The reader-voyeur evolves to become a reader-actor, obliged to coincide with the character. It is through the reader that the silent thoughts of the character are given birth and find their voice. The analysis will end with this second aspect of the reader in these short stories.

#### 4.2. *The reader-actor*

This second aspect has already been described: it is related to the linguistic properties of *I* and to its duality as a deictic expression (see 1.2). It will therefore be mentioned only briefly here.

In Schnitzler’s stories, the pronoun *I* refers firstly to Else or Gustl, but its simulated immediacy forces the reader to engage an enormous part of him- or herself by the simple fact he or she is reading. The absence of any visible mediacy forces the reader to re-enunciate the thoughts, and to make them his or her own. The pronoun *I* thus becomes a trap for the reader, an ancestor, in terms of narratives, to what an avatar is now for video-gamers. There is no other possible pronoun than *I* to refer to one’s avatar. The active implication in the game leads to identification with *I*. But as these two short stories were written in the first two decades of the 19th century, the more traditional comparison with a play seems more appropriate than the comparison with modern video games.<sup>23</sup>

In many third-person narratives, author and reader remain off stage, witnessing the narrated events without being involved.

It is as if reader and narrator were separated [from the action] by a glass wall, through which they can see without being seen. [...] They must not intervene in the action. (Vuillaume 1991: 93, my translation)<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> ‘Dieu seul lit dans les pensées et dans les cœurs des hommes’ (Hoffmann E.T.A. 1958 [1821]:125).

<sup>23</sup> Sarraute, for instance, compared a third-person novel to a tennis match, with the writer as umpire, the readers as spectators in the stands and the characters as players on the court. “Ni le romancier ni les lecteurs ne descendent de leur place pour jouer eux-mêmes le jeu comme s’ils étaient l’un ou l’autre des joueurs” / ‘Neither the writer nor the readers leave their seats to take the place of the players on court and play as if they were players themselves.’ (Sarraute 1983: 108, my translation).

<sup>24</sup> “Leser und Erzähler sind wie von einer Glaswand getrennt, durch die sie hindurchsehen können, ohne selbst gesehen zu werden. [...] sie dürfen nicht in die Handlung eingreifen.” (Vuillaume 1991: 93).

By contrast, the moment the protagonist is not referred to by a third-person pronoun, but becomes an I-narrator, author and reader are invited to put themselves in his or her place at the story level:

[The I] is the author's representative, his *persona*. Let us not forget that he is also the representative of the reader, more precisely the standpoint which the author invites the reader to take in order to appreciate, get a taste of a given string of events, to make the most of it. (Butor, 1992 :70 [1964], my translation; italics in the original text)<sup>25</sup>

The pronoun *I* constrains author and reader to participate; they have to leave their seats as spectators, to go on the court (Sarraute 1983:108)... or on stage, thus becoming “actors”.

With the first-person pronoun, identification is linguistically laid out in the text. However, in many first-person narratives, the presence of a narrating *I*, offering a counterpoint to the experiencing *I*, allows the reader to experience his or her role at second hand.

In Schnitzler's stories, the simulated immediacy of the *I* leaves no respite to the reader. Each monologue is an un-vocalized soliloquy without any stage directions and the reader is the only vehicle that brings this silent “voice” to life. Cannone (1998) describes the reader of IM as a reader “on red alert” (*sur le qui-vive*). The reader is never simply a spectator but is always involved, as both voyeur and principal actor, obliged to play this dual role once he or she has chosen to read.

## 5. Conclusion

In Schnitzler's short stories, the reader is at the same time a reader-voyeur and a reader-actor. These two mutually antagonistic and indivisible roles determine the status of what I have called “the unrati ed reader” (in French “lecteur complice”) and “complicit reading”. In this type of interior monologue, it is because the reader has no assigned place in the text (scenography) that the real reader is solicited as never before. This is a very specific use of the personal pronoun *I*, through which the simulated immediacy of the pronoun imprisons the reader and the character in a single conscience.

But many different roles remain to be described for the reader, not only for *I*, but for all person deictics (Prak-Derrington, in press). In the past, the category of person was strongly criticized by one of the most famous representatives of New Criticism:

Perhaps the most overworked distinction is that of person. To say that a story is told in the first or the third person will tell us nothing of importance. (Booth 1961: 150)

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<sup>25</sup> “[Le JE] est le représentant de l'auteur, sa *persona*. N'oublions pas qu'il est également le représentant du lecteur, très exactement le point de vue auquel l'auteur l'invite à se placer pour apprécier, pour goûter telle suite d'événements, en profiter.” (Butor, 1992:70).

This verdict rose to prominence, but it is often forgotten that Booth himself revised this statement, twenty-two years later, in the second edition of *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, making this comment in the afterword:

Plain wrong. It was radically underworked [...]. It had been talked about a lot; more than most aspects of technique, but the talk had been [...] superficial. (Booth 1983: 412)

The role of the personal pronouns for the reader in narratives remains to be more fully explored.

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