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Welfare regime debate: past, present, futures?

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Abstract - The seminal work by Esping-Andersen (1990) has transformed and inspired social policy research over the past two decades. Various contributions have confirmed his typology, while others have challenged, and expanded, it from substantive and methodological perspectives. This article contributes to this debate in two ways. First, it provides a comprehensive analysis of the different typologies proposed in the literature, employing the concept of ‘ideal types’. Second, it elaborates new directions for research along three dimensions: (1) improving measurement validity by linking macro and micro data to overcome assumptions, largely based on the average (production) worker; (2) assessing the reliability of typologies over time; (3) systematically integrating both the work–welfare as well as the care–welfare dimensions.

Keywords - welfare regimes, ideal types, comparative social policy, three worlds of welfare capitalism
Introduction

The ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ (TWWC) is part of a long sociological tradition (Esping-Andersen, 1990) rooted in deductive reasoning and the use of ideal types. As Max Weber (1904 [1949]) highlighted, ‘the construction of a system of abstract and therefore purely formal propositions ..., is the only means of analysing and intellectually mastering the complexity of social life’ (1904 [1949]: 87). In this vein, Esping-Andersen (1990) constructed the welfare regime typology acknowledging the ideational importance and power of the three dominant political movements of the long 20th century in Western Europe and North America, that is, social democracy, Christian democracy (conservatism) and liberalism1.

The ideal social-democratic welfare state is based on the principle of universalism, granting access to benefits and services based on citizenship. Such a welfare state is said to provide a relatively high degree of autonomy, limiting the reliance on family and market. In order to achieve autonomy, social-democratic welfare states are characterised by a high level of decommodification and a low degree of stratification. Social policies are perceived as ‘politics against the market’ (Esping-Andersen, 1985). Christian-democratic welfare states are based on the principle of subsidiarity and the dominance of social insurance schemes, offering a medium level of decommodification and a high degree of social stratification. The liberal regime is based on the notion of market dominance and private provision; ideally, the state only interferes to ameliorate poverty and provide for basic needs, largely on a means-tested basis. Hence, the decommodification potential of state benefits is assumed to be low and social stratification high.

Various contributions have confirmed his typology, while others have challenged, and expanded it, from substantive and methodological perspectives. A number of scholars have criticised Esping-Andersen’s typology for the ‘misclassification’ of specific countries. Leibfried (1992) and Ferrera (1993) have argued that Mediterranean countries constitute a separate regime with limited social insurance coverage, which is (at least partially) rooted in clientelism. Jones (1993) and Goodman and Peng (1996) have argued that East-Asian welfare states also form a separate regime. Using the concept ‘family of nations’, Castles (1993) identified the Antipodean countries as radical welfare states. Others have argued that Esping-Andersen’s regime typology is quite limited to the work–welfare nexus and not applicable to other welfare state domains, such as the care–welfare nexus (Lewis 1992),2 education (Busemeyer and Nikolai, 2010) or healthcare (Bambra, 2005; Wendt, 2009; Reibling, 2010).

Although valuable, many of these criticisms (Kasza, 2002; Bambra, 2006; Scruggs and Allan, 2006) have not addressed the major methodological and theoretical shortcomings of Esping-Andersen’s approach;3 moreover, some have confused the concept of ‘ideal types’ with ‘real types’. In this article, we highlight the importance of ideal types and review 23 quantitative studies analysing welfare regimes and demonstrate the validity of the TWWC, before suggesting a number of methodological improvements, especially the need to take a more dynamic approach and to integrate micro- and macro-level data in order to obtain a more nuanced perspective on welfare state regimes.

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2 Lewis (1992) criticised Esping-Andersen’s sole focus on the traditional social risks of unemployment, sickness and old age, as he ignored the important care–welfare nexus and thus established a regime typology based on the social protection for the industrial male worker. Esping-Andersen (1999) incorporated Lewis’ criticisms in his subsequent work.

3 The debate on regime theory has been summarised in the past (Arts and Gelissen, 2002, 2010; Arcanjo, 2006; Bambra, 2007a; Powell and Barrientos, 2011); however these reviews have been neither exhaustive nor designed to synthesise the empirical evidence presented in the literature and propose new avenues for research.
The sociological foundations of typologies

The tradition of historical nominalism and the anthropological interpretation of culture and society (Benedict, 1935 [1961]) have been always hostile to classifications, generalisations and ultimately comparison. From this point of view, ideal types are only a vain sport, a meaningless academic game. Hence, typologies have to be avoided, as they constitute artificial constructions. Moreover, societies have to be analysed without presupposition through a fine-grained detailed case analysis (for a critique, see Smelser, 2003: 648). Although historically much of the academic work on social policy was dominated by idiosyncratic case study analyses and this tradition still seems to dominate much of the textbook market for social policy (for a review, see Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein, 2006), the comparative welfare state research community has largely accepted the benefits of using ideal types and typologies as heuristic devices, as evidenced by the high number of references to Esping-Andersen’s seminal work. The longstanding debate about the appropriateness of Esping-Andersen’s regime typology can be interpreted as a symptom of the ‘adolescence’ (Weber, 1904 [1949]: 104) of comparative social policy research, as scholars have not yet learned ‘to navigate safely in the vast area of empirical facts’ (Weber, 1904 [1949]: 104) without using the TWWC ideal typical construction.

At times the concept of ‘ideal types’ was confused with ‘real types’, although Esping-Andersen (1990: 28–29) himself was keenly aware of the impurity of real types:

We show that welfare states cluster, but we must recognize that there is no single pure case. The Scandinavian countries may be predominantly social democratic, but they are not free of crucial liberal elements. Neither are the liberal regimes pure types. The American social-security system is redistributive, compulsory and far from actuarial. At least in its early formulation, the New Deal was as social democratic as was contemporary Scandinavian social democracy. And European conservative regimes have incorporated both liberal and social democratic impulses. Over the decades, they have become less corporatist and less authoritarian.

Nevertheless, some countries can be considered as prototypes, that is, countries with welfare state arrangements that very closely relate to the structures of the identified ideal types. Based on Esping-Andersen’s decommodification and social stratification index (see Table 1) (see also the Appendix for a detailed explanation of the concepts and the construction of the scores), Sweden (39.1), Norway (38.3) and Denmark (38.1) are the only countries placed one standard deviation above the mean decommodification score (34.9) and the highest ranked in terms of socialist attributes, therefore they seem to clearly fit in the social-democratic regime, whereas France and Germany are very close to the average (27.2), constituting the core of the Christian-democratic regime (also for their high level of conservatism). The United States (US) (13.8) has the lowest decommodification score, if we base our analysis on the decommodification score suggested by Scruggs and Allan (2006: 61), and also has the highest score of liberal attributes. Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 54) lower scores for Australia and New Zealand seem to be the result of an arbitrary score attributed to the contributory period and population covered (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54). All other countries can be understood as approximations, more or less closely fitting the ideal types.

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4 For a critique, see Scruggs and Allan (2006).
Table 1 – Revisiting Esping-Andersen’s decommodification and stratification scores to identify liberal, conservative and social-democratic ‘ideal types’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Decommodification Scores</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Degrees of liberalism, conservatism and socialism</th>
<th>Esping-Andersen prototypes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>High liberalism</td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>14.2 [13.8]</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>High liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>17.1*</td>
<td>CH</td>
<td>High liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Medium-high liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Medium-high liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Medium-high liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>IE</td>
<td>Low liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>Low liberalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>27.5 [27.2 (Mean)]</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>High conservatism</td>
<td>FR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>High conservatism</td>
<td>DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>AT</td>
<td>High conservatism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>BE</td>
<td>High conservatism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>High conservatism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>Medium-high socialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>FI</td>
<td>Medium-high socialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>High socialism</td>
<td>DK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>High socialism</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>High socialism</td>
<td>SW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BE = Belgium, CA = Canada, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, FI = Finland, FR = France, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, NZ = New Zealand, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.

Notes: Esping-Andersen miscalculated the decommodification score for the US. Therefore we provide the initial value [in brackets] and the corrected score.
* The low scores for Australia and New Zealand seem to be the result of an arbitrary score attributed to the contributory period and the population covered (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54; Scruggs and Allan 2006).
** Standard deviation
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Esping-Andersen (1990: 52; 1999: 74) and Scruggs and Allan (2006)

The empirical work on the ‘typology business’

The selection of studies for our review of the regime literature is based on the following criteria: (1) the use of quantitative methods; (2) the analysis of a minimum of 10 countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); (3) and the presence of a final classification.
These criteria led us to select 23 studies. Based on the six types introduced in the comparative welfare state literature, that is, the social-democratic, Christian-democratic, liberal, Mediterranean, radical and hybrid, we created a double entry table (Table 2), which establishes how often a country has been classified in one of the six types suggested in the literature (Table 3).

Among these quantitative analyses, most scholars – largely with the exception of Castles (1993) – did not attempt to propose new theoretically rooted typologies (or ideal types), but focused their attention on the inclusion of a wide range of indicators or on the use of more sophisticated statistical techniques. They certainly improved our understanding of welfare typologies from different perspectives, but the result is a confused debate, in which the only reference point seems to be Esping-Andersen’s contribution.

The aim of this review is to bring all these studies together in order to verify whether Esping-Andersen’s typologies constitute a good guidance for comparative social policy analysis (in particular for the analysis of the ‘ideal-typical’ cases). The comparison of these different studies is fairly complicated for two reasons: first, typologies are based on different policy domains/indicators; and second, typologies are based on data collected at different points in time.

The use of different policy domains (ie, pensions, unemployment, work injuries, sickness, disability, family, health and education policy, as shown in detail in Table A of the Appendix) or indicators (ie, social expenditure, benefit equality, fairness of the taxation system, social expenditure, institutionalism and corporatism) proposes two challenges for any systematic classification: first, the selection of studies to be included in the final classification; and second, the exclusion of analyses limited to certain policy domains.

The final classification is based on all 23 studies because the ‘purity’ of Esping-Andersen’s ideal types should be verified by considering all sorts of indicators and policy domains. However, when discussing the ‘divergent typologies’ from Esping-Andersen’s measurement, we analyse only studies based on cash transfers and those that included a mix of indicators (including indicators for social transfers) because they relate closely to the concepts of ‘decommodification’, ‘social stratification’ and ‘defamilialisation’ (used by Esping-Andersen’s to classify countries and described in the Appendix). Furthermore, education can be characterised as ‘market making’ and not ‘market breaking’ (cf Streeck, 1995), thereby following a distinctive, different logic from decommodification, social stratification and defamilialisation. Similarly, we exclude healthcare, as the provision of healthcare is not primarily about decommodifying or destratifying workers; in addition, the introduction of healthcare systems was not closely associated with different political movements, as argued by Esping-Andersen regarding the various transfer programmes, but mainly with the strength of service providers and the professional organisations of physicians (Heidenheimer, 1973: 323–4). As argued by Moran (2000: 139), ‘health care systems are ... shaped by dynamics of their own’. Based on this rationale, we exclude education and healthcare policies. Many deviations from Esping-Andersen’s typology are simply explained by the inclusion of indicators related to the healthcare and education system (Obinger and Wagschal, 1998, 2001; Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; Powell and Barrientos, 2004; Bambra, 2005; Castles and Obinger, 2008; Schröder, 2008).

None of the models based on education and health care indicators is included in this section, but is taken into account in the summary tables (Tables 2 and 3) and the final classification (Figure 1).

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5 Accordingly, and in addition to the various qualitative studies, the following quantitative analyses were excluded: Kangas (1994), Fawcett and Papadopoulos (1997), Gough (2001), Lødemel and Trickey (2001), Kautto (2002); McMenamim (2003); Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005). Table A includes all studies reviewed.

6 Hybrid’ is a residual category used by many authors (eg, Ragin, 1994; Obinger and Wagschal, 1998, 2001).

7 See Table A in the Appendix.

8 Mainly descriptive statistics, cluster analysis and principal component analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Social-democratic</th>
<th>Christian-democratic</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Mediterranean</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Hybrid</th>
<th>Total classifications</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Key: AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BE = Belgium, CA = Canada, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, FI = Finland, FR = France, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, NZ = New Zealand, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States. Note: The total in some case is not 100% due to rounding.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>[22] 100%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>[20] 95%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>[20] 91%</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>[12] 67%</td>
<td>[5] 28%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Medium-High consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>[21] 95%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[21] 91%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[2] 9%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>[2] 12%</td>
<td>[14] 82%</td>
<td>[1] 6%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>[4] 18%</td>
<td>[16] 73%</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Medium-High consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[12] 63%</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>[6] 32%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Medium-High consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[20] 100%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Pure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>[1] 5%</td>
<td>[3] 16%</td>
<td>[15] 79%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Medium-High consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[2] 10%</td>
<td>[15] 71%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[4] 20%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Medium-High consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[3] 21%</td>
<td>[9] 64%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[0] 0%</td>
<td>[2] 14%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Medium-High consistency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average consistency all groups: 80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Social-democratic</td>
<td>Christian-democratic</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td><strong>Bambra (2006)</strong></td>
<td>21 classifications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Classification(s)</td>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>20 classifications</td>
<td>Goodin (2001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>22 classifications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BE = Belgium, CA = Canada, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, FI = Finland, FR = France, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, NZ = New Zealand, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.

Notes: 1. We only mention those authors who are not in accordance with our classification. 2. Studies indicated in bold are those that do not include indicators for health and education.

Source: Authors' elaboration.
Another constraint to the comparability of different typologies is the use of data collected at different points in time (from 1950s onwards). At a theoretical level, the comparison between typologies based on data from different points in time might seem less problematic because, according to Esping-Andersen (1990: 9–12), regimes are the result of the influence of dominant political movements, suggesting stability over time.9

According to the criteria illustrated above and on the basis of the consistency of the ranking for each country in the various studies, the quantitative data collected in Table 2 are reorganised along a continuum, ranging from the most social-democratic to the most liberal welfare state, in order to test Esping-Andersen’s ideal-typical construction. We identify the following groups of countries based on the consistency of the classifications:

- ‘pure countries’: classified more than 80% of the time in the same regime type (Sweden, Norway and Denmark – social-democratic; France, Germany and Austria – Christian-democratic; and the US – liberal);
- ‘medium-high internal consistency countries’: classified between 61% and 80% of the time in the same regime type (Finland – social-democratic; Belgium and Italy – Christian-democratic; and Canada, the UK, Australia and Japan – liberal);
- ‘medium internal consistency countries’: classified between 51% and 60% of the time in the same regime type (New Zealand and Ireland – liberal).

Among the countries included in the various analyses, only Switzerland and the Netherlands are not classified in the same regime type in more than 50% of the studies. Both countries are hybrids, classified in the literature in four distinct ‘worlds’ (Table 3), and have therefore been excluded from our further systematic literature review. Goodin (2001: 15) describes the Netherlands as a post-productivist model, which does not follow the decommodification logic used to build welfare typologies, and Obinger (1998) argues that the Swiss welfare state cannot be clearly categorised.

The pure countries

Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the US are ‘pure models’. Sweden and the US are classified in the same world in every analysis; their internal consistency places their social security systems at the opposite ends of the continuum from social-democracy to liberalism. The other countries are in an intermediate position (see the next section).

Like Sweden, Denmark and Norway form part of the social-democratic regime. Only Goodin (2001) classified Norway as liberal (Table 3), based on its high labour market participation and low social security expenditure. However, using these criteria is somewhat problematic, as the Scandinavian model is based on high labour market participation (Huber and Stephens, 2001), which can in effect lead to lower spending levels, as is demonstrated by the fact that according to the most recent OECD spending figures, France has the highest social expenditure (OECD, 2010).

Hence, we consider Goodin’s classification as an outlier, which does not undermine the overall classification of Norway as a social-democratic welfare state.

The Danish welfare state was classified by Bambra (2006) as Christian-democratic and as liberal by Korpi and Palme (1998). Whereas Bambra’s decommodification score seems to be out of sync with all other decommodification scores,10 without providing any explanation, Korpi and Palme (1998) included the Danish case en passant in their analysis of pension models.11 The latter classified countries along the dimensions of targeted versus universal benefits and redistribution. According to

9 In case of more than one classification presented in the study we have included the most recent typology in our analysis.
10 ll other models and in particular the recalculation proposed by Scruggs and Allan (2006) confirm Esping-Andersen rather than Bambra.
11 The country appears only in one table and not in the remaining empirical discussion.
Korpi and Palme’s classification, Denmark belongs to the ‘basic security model’, because the public pension system is based primarily on flat-rate universal benefits, whereas the other Scandinavian/social-democratic welfare states have built their pension systems on the ‘encompassing security model’, which includes the provision of earnings-related benefits on top of the universal basic provision (Korpi and Palme, 1998: 668–9). Neither Bambra (2006) nor Korpi and Palme (1998) seem(s) to invalidate the overall classification of Denmark as belonging to the social-democratic regime.

Austria, France and Germany represent the ‘pure’ Christian-democratic cases (Table 3). Only Bambra (2006) classified France in the social-democratic group. Germany, on the other hand, has been classified as a hybrid by Ragin (1994), based on its structure of the pension system, and by Obinger and Wagschal (1998) using Esping-Andersen’s social stratification index. Ragin (1994) defined Germany a spare case close to the Christian-democratic group, and Obinger and Wagschal (2001) in a more recent article classified Germany as Christian-democratic, in line with mainstream literature. Both instances lead us not to question the purity of Germany’s classification.

While Austria is usually identified as belonging to the Christian-democratic welfare regime, Esping-Andersen (1990) and Bambra (2006) have classified the Alpine republic as belonging to the social-democratic model, largely as a result of its generous pension system. Powell and Barrientos (2004) have classified Austria as liberal, mainly as a result of including education-related indicators in their analysis. Based on our systematic literature review of studies, we have no doubt that Austria can be considered as a ‘pure’ Christian-democratic welfare state, especially if one excludes employment policy, which longer than in many other European countries had been based on the concept of ‘Keynesianism’ (Scharpf, 1991).

Medium-high internal consistency

Finland (social-democratic), Belgium and Italy (Christian-democratic), Canada, the UK, Australia and Japan (liberal) are part of the medium-high internal consistency group (Table 2). While Finland is a social-democratic country with a strong secondary Christian-democratic component (Tables 2 and 3), largely based on its pension system (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ragin, 1994; Scruggs and Allan, 2006), Belgium can be categorised as a Christian-democratic country with a secondary social-democratic component (Table 1), captured by various decommodification indices (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Bambra, 2006; Scruggs and Allan, 2006) and some other indicators (Castles and Mitchell, 1992). At the political level, the Christian-democratic nature of the Belgian welfare state regime and its secondary social-democratic component is explained by the dominance of Christian Democrats in government coalitions, in which socialist parties (especially from Wallonia) were the junior partners (Seiler, 1977: 460).

Italy clearly belongs to the Christian-democratic regime type (Tables 2 and 3) whenever the analysis is limited to three ideal types. If, however, a fourth ideal type, the Mediterranean type, is added, Italy has always been classified as Mediterranean (Bonoli, 1997; Gallie and Paugam, 2000; Obinger and Wagschal, 2001; Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; Soede et al, 2004; Castles and Obinger, 2008). This raises a methodological question about the number of ideal types to be included.

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12 As discussed for Denmark, also in this case Bambra (2006) presents the only discrepant classification (Scruggs and Allan [2006] using a similar indicator to Esping Andersen include the country in the Christian-democratic regime).
13 He based his conclusions on the private sector’s share of total pension expenditure, the expenditure on pensions of public employees as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the number of occupational programmes and the pension decommodification index.
14 This typology includes indicators related to health care.
15 Castles and Mitchell (1992) included expenditure data, benefit equality and taxation.
16 Leibfried (1992) was the first to theorise about a distinct Mediterranean regime.
in an analysis of rich democracies. Nevertheless, based on the principle of parsimony and in accordance with the overwhelming number of other analyses, we maintain that Italy should be considered as belonging to the Christian-democratic type as suggested by Esping-Andersen (Table 3).

An overwhelming majority of scholars have grouped Canada into the liberal category (Table 3) and only Bambra (2004, 2006) and Scruggs and Allan (2006) have placed the country into the Christian-democratic group. In order to overcome the lack of data for female labour force participation rates (one of the four indicators used by her to measure defamilialisation), Bambra (2004: 205) attributed to Canada a score on the basis of the average values of all the other countries included in her analysis (Bambra, 2004: 205). This procedure, although acknowledged by Bambra, seems arbitrary and questions the overall validity and reliability of the classification. The other two models that include Canada in the Christian-democratic cluster (Bambra, 2006; Scruggs and Allan, 2006) have used higher decommodification scores than Esping-Andersen for the Canadian pension system.

Similar to Canada, the UK also belongs to the group of countries with medium-high internal consistency (Table 2), but with a slightly higher fragmentation (Table 3). The hybrid classification is partly explained by the transitional state of the pension system. Using the concept of ‘defamilialisation’, Bambra (2004) groups the UK into the Christian-democratic regime. In her analysis she uses a wage replacement rate of 50% for maternity leave for a duration of 18 weeks (Bambra, 2004: 205), which seems a too-generous estimate, as in 1996 maternity leave provided a wage replacement rate of 90% for the first six weeks and a flat-rate benefit of £55 per week for the remaining 12 weeks (Gauthier, 2003). Hence, the average replacement rate only reached the level of 50% for mothers with an income below the average wage.

Castles and Mitchell (1992), Korpi and Palme (1998) and Shalev (2007) have classified Australia as radical and Gal (2004) as Christian-democratic (Table 3). Gal’s typology does not seem to be representative of the generosity of the welfare state systems as a whole, as his analysis is limited to work injuries programmes, which represent less than 1% of the total public social expenditure (OECD, 2010). The introduction of a radical type encounters the same issues raised above relating to the Mediterranean type, that is, the number of ideal types to be included in the analysis. Only when the radical type is included in the analysis, and with the exception of Gal’s analysis, Australia is not classified as liberal.

Japan does not seem to clearly fit any of the typologies and has been characterised as belonging to a distinct East-Asian or Confucian welfare state (Goodman and Peng, 1996). Esping-Andersen (1997) has rejected this criticism, and has labelled Japan as a ‘hybrid’. However, we suggest excluding Japan from our analysis in this article altogether for two reasons: (1) it is impossible to assess quantitatively whether Japan belongs to a distinct East-Asian or Confucian regime, as robust comparable data for the time period in other East-Asian or Confucian countries are unavailable; and (2) as Japan’s political and societal system is rooted in the tradition of neither liberalism, nor Catholicism nor social democracy, it seems inappropriate to characterise the Japanese welfare state as belonging to either of the regimes, even if some of the variables are closely related to certain regime characteristics. Obviously, this does not mean that Japan per se should be excluded from comparative welfare state analysis of rich democracies, but that any such analysis should include

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17 Studies that group countries using descriptive statistics (employing the decommodification index [see Esping-Andersen, 1990] or double entry tables [Castles and Mitchell, 1992]) force the number of typologies. They determine arbitrarily the existence of three or four worlds; hence, countries with a strong secondary component (ie, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and Finland) might be part of a regime only because of the method used.

18 This is partially due to the different assumptions used to calculate pension replacement rates by Esping-Andersen (1990: 54) and Scruggs and Allan (2006: 64).

19 During the 1980s, the pension system underwent a series of incremental reforms. Ragin’s (1994) analysis, based on 1986 data, reflects this transitional phase, which consequently led to the classification of the country as hybrid.
functional equivalents of public social policy to make the comparison meaningful (see Seeleib-Kaiser, 2001; Estevez-Abe, 2008).

Medium internal consistency

The medium internal consistency group includes only two liberal countries: New Zealand and Ireland (Table 2). Similar to Australia, New Zealand has been classified as radical (Castles and Mitchell, 1992; Shalev, 2007) and hybrid (Ragin, 1994). Although Ireland has overwhelmingly been categorised as liberal, Scruggs and Allan (2006), Bambra (2004, 2006) and Shalev (1996, 2007) have categorised Ireland as Christian-democratic, using decommodification and defamilialisation (Bambra, 2004) indices and a range of other indicators. Based on the strong influence of the Catholic Church (especially with regard to family policies; see Daly, 1999), it seems plausible that the Irish welfare state has a number of elements that place the country close to the Christian-democratic regime cluster.

Discussion

The results of the previous section grosso modo confirm the existence of three worlds of welfare capitalism; all countries (with the exception of the Netherlands and Switzerland) are classified in more than 50% of the studies in one of the three original worlds defined by Esping-Andersen (Table 2).20 Furthermore, seven countries are ‘pure’ (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the US), six are medium-high consistent (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Italy and the UK), and two are medium-consistent (Ireland and New Zealand). The social-democratic and the Christian-democratic worlds are smaller and more cohesive than the liberal one (Table 2).

The countries analysed are placed on a continuum based on three criteria (Figure 1): (1) the number of times each country has been classified in the same group; (2) the positioning of the seven pure countries; and (3) the presence of countries with a high secondary component.21 Social-democratic countries are positioned to the left-hand side, the Christian-democratic in the middle and the liberal on the right-hand side.

Sweden, Norway and Denmark are the pure social-democratic cases. Finland belongs to the same group, however, differently from the other three social-democratic countries has a large secondary Christian-democratic component (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Austria, France and Germany are ‘pure’ Christian-democratic welfare states. Although Belgium also belongs to the Christian-democratic regime type, it has a number of social-democratic elements, which, however, fall short of our definition of ‘secondary component’. Italy, on the other hand, has a strong secondary Mediterranean component (Table 2 and Figure 1).

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20 The classification is even closer to Esping-Andersen’s regimes if the mixed typologies (those that include health and education) are excluded (Table 3).

21 Attributed to the countries classified in more than 25% (because this score represents half membership) of the studies into a category different from the main classification.
As already emphasised, the liberal regime is the least cohesive and occupies 40% of the total spectrum (six countries out of 15). The US is the only ‘true’ liberal country, since Canada incorporates some Christian-democratic elements (Table 2), and the UK has been classified in five different regimes (Table 2). Australia and New Zealand have been classified into a separate radical category by about 20% of the studies reviewed. Finally, Ireland completes this world with its strong secondary Christian-democratic component (Table 2 and Figure 1).

The continuum elaborated to review the quantitative models confirms Esping-Andersen’s theory and affirms its connection to Weberian ideal types. In the next section, attention turns to measurement validity, and the proposal of an innovative range of ways to improve the ‘typology business’.

Regime futures?

The results reported in the previous section confirm the overall validity of Esping-Andersen’s typology. However, many analyses aiming to test the validity of TWWC insufficiently deal with the issue of measurement validity, are largely based on a static measurement of welfare regimes and lack a systematic integration of the work–welfare and the care–welfare nexi. In order to connect the evolution of welfare state systems over time to Esping-Andersen’s theoretical framework, we suggest:

1. using latent class analysis (LCA) or fuzzy sets, as suggested by Kvist (2007), to link micro and macro data to improve measurement validity;\(^\text{22}\)
2. investigating welfare state evolution without assuming path dependence, by exploiting panel data;
3. analysing the work–welfare and care–welfare nexi in an integrated manner.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{22}\) A first attempt to use micro data to investigate regime theory has been performed by Goodin et al (1999); however, they did not systematically integrate micro and macro data, as they assumed the macro categorisation to be fixed.
First, measurement validity can be improved by using LCA to link micro and macro data. The three quantitative methods (descriptive statistics, cluster analysis and principal component analysis [PCA]) used to class countries in different regimes do not sufficiently link welfare regime theory and empirical measurement. The use of descriptive statistics imposes a fixed number of typologies and requires the establishment of thresholds and cut-off points; cluster analysis cannot sufficiently connect theoretical hypotheses and measurement; and PCA does not deal with the possibility that the co-variation of the observed variables can potentially be dependent on the existence of one or more latent variables (i.e., welfare generosity), which exert a causal inference on the observed variables.

Conversely, LCA has a confirmatory character because concepts and causal models have to be derived from theoretical and deductive perspectives and then tested with the available empirical data. Those concepts and causal models are never purely derived from the existing data, as is the case for PCA, but they need to have a strong theoretical background. LCA creates latent variables from the indicators, but differently from PCA handles measurement errors, resulting in more stable measures of unobserved variables. LCA can be proficiently exploited to verify the robustness of the Esping-Andersen regimes and statistically generate more comprehensive and theoretical sophisticated typologies.

Furthermore, welfare generosity is usually calculated on the basis of entitlements for the average (production) worker (APW). However, if the past three decades in many OECD countries can be accurately characterised as an ‘age of dualization’, largely maintaining previous levels of social protection for labour market insiders, while retrenching policies for an increasing number of outsiders, as suggested by Emmenegger et al (2012: forthcoming), we need to move beyond the

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23 For other innovative approaches, see Kvist (2007) and Scruggs (2007).
27 Three types of cluster analysis have been applied to welfare regime theory: (1) hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA), which finds the closest pairs of cases and then by amalgamation combines other cases to form clusters; (2) k-means cluster analysis (KCA), which proceeds to the amalgamation of cases by starting from a fixed number of regimes determined by the researcher; and (3) HCA and KCA combined. HCA has been applied to different dimensions of social policy, that is, healthcare, education and social security (Kangas, 1994; Obinger and Wagschal, 1998, 2001; Kauto, 2002; Saint-Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; Powell and Barrientos, 2004), generating a wide range of welfare regime typologies. This widespread use of HCA has been criticised for its inductive foundations. According to this critique, HCA cannot support a theoretical framework thereby contravening Esping-Andersen’s theoretical premises (Gough, 2001). In order to overcome this issue, Gough employed KCA and Bambra (2007b) and Castles and Obinger (2008) subsequently integrated HCA and KCA. Despite this methodological advance, the evaluation of welfare generosity with all types of cluster analyses is just as arbitrary as grouping countries based on descriptive statistics, because: (1) the selection of the number of clusters is completely subjective, one can decide to stop at different levels of amalgamation and there are no precise rules to know when to stop the analysis; (2) clusters are generated in every case, no matter what indicators are used; (3) the analyses are unstable: alternative algorithms produce totally different results starting from the same data; and most importantly (4) these types of analyses do not adequately connect deductive reasoning and empirical measurements because of the predetermination of the number of regimes (necessary to apply KCA), contrarily to what has been suggested in the literature (Gough, 2001), is not a theoretically driven way to connect deductive reasoning and empirical measurement. Deductive reasoning can be formulated, instead, on the basis of typologies driven by the selection criteria (as in the case of latent class analysis) in accordance with a refined theoretical framework.
28 Scruggs (2007) proposed to overcome this problem by using various household types. This would considerably increase the accuracy of the models; however, it would not completely resolve this issue, as the typologies would still be based on statutory entitlements, albeit for different socio-economic groups.

14
entitlements for the APW to assess the generosity of welfare regimes. A model based on survey data at the individual or household level might help to overcome this problem, because it provides the possibility to calculate different ‘real’ decommodification indices (or other generosity indices), distinguishing between various socioeconomic groups, for instance along the dimensions of gender, education and skill levels.

Second, welfare regime typology analyses are often rather static: Esping-Andersen’s (1990) original analysis related to data from around 1980 and most subsequent studies were also limited to a snapshot of a certain point in time. A cornerstone of the regime typology is its foundation in the three main political movements of Western Europe, that is, social democracy, Christian democracy and liberalism (cf Esping-Andersen, 1990). If, however, political parties have undergone significant transformations over the past decades, as some research suggests (see Pontusson, 1995; Seeleib-Kaiser, 2002; Rueda, 2007; Seeleib-Kaiser et al, 2008), we should assess stability and change of welfare regimes over time. Using longitudinal micro data at the individual or household level would seem to be an appropriate approach to capture possible dynamics. However, comparable panel data are only available for a limited number of countries and thus using micro simulations for various stylised workers, for example, APW, high- and low-general skilled workers in the service sector, at various points in time might be a suitable alternative (for pensions, cf Bridgen and Meyer, 2008).

Third, the work–welfare nexus has been at the centre of the welfare regime typology debate, primarily focusing on ‘old’ social risks, such as old age and unemployment. However, research has pointed to the emergence of new social risks since the 1980s in many rich democracies (Bonoli, 2007). Although the work–welfare nexus still constitutes a core element of welfare regimes, defining social risks and the consequent generosity of entitlements to protect citizens only from this point of view seems outdated. The care–welfare nexus, as emphasised by Lewis (1992), constitutes the second core element of the welfare state and cannot be neglected. Demographic trends and the difficulty for parents to reconcile work and care further demonstrate the importance of this nexus. Many authors have argued that the future of welfare state systems will be dependent on the ability to balance work and family life (Lewis, 1993; Crompton, 2006; Gilbert, 2008; Esping-Andersen, 2009). Thus, to capture the dynamics of welfare state change it would seem appropriate to analyse welfare regimes along both the work–welfare and the care–welfare nexi, as retrenchment along one dimension might coincide with the expansion of policies in the other (Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004; Fleckenstein, Saunders, Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). Although Esping-Andersen (1999) took into account some of the criticisms highlighted by Lewis (1992) to integrate the work–welfare and the care–family welfare nexi, his empirical model was somewhat unbalanced, as he compared the decommodification index based on data from around 1980 with the defamilialisation index based on data from the 1990s. Once again we suggest a dynamic approach, integrating the decommodification and defamilialisation indices.

Conclusion

Our literature review confirms the existence of three worlds of welfare capitalism in the light of ideal types. We propose a classification of rich democracies on a continuum from the most purely social-democratic (Sweden) to the most liberal country (the US). Following Weber (1904 [1949]) and

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29 Micro data should be used to calculate individual (or household level) generosity indices that can then be aggregated according to different demographic characteristics.

30 The Cornell Equivalent File (CNEF, 1970–2008) provides a good source of comparable micro data on demographics, income and employment (including data on the UK [BHPS], Australia [HILDA], Korea [KLIPS], Switzerland [SHP], Canada [SLID], the US [PSID] and Germany [SOEP]). Other comparative sources of micro data are: the European Community Household Panel (ECHP, 1994–2001) and the longitudinal component of its successor, the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU–SILC, 2005 onwards); and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 1980–2004).

31 See previous note.
Durkheim (1894), Esping-Andersen emphasised the importance of deduction to develop sociological theory; his typology provides an excellent starting point and heuristic device for empirical research.

The critiques proposed in the field, from nominalist and technical perspectives, did not always seem to fully grasp the theoretical foundations of the three worlds of welfare capitalism. Despite all their criticisms, subsequent analyses overall have confirmed the consistency of the three worlds, as all countries have been classified in more than 50% of the respective studies in the same group. This empirical evidence has been used in this article to construct an ideal-typical continuum. The continuum shows that different countries and regimes have dissimilar internal consistencies; in particular the liberal model appears to be the least homogeneous (Figure 1). Finally, we have emphasised the necessity to connect the deductive framework provided by Esping-Andersen with more refined empirical instruments to analyse welfare typologies using theoretically specified methods (like LCA), analysing the provision not only for the APW, considering the potential evolution of regimes over time and integrating systematically the work–care and care–welfare nexi.

Finally, we want to emphasise that although typologies are not set in stone, their existence is essential in providing theoretical orientation and meaning as well as in establishing new methodological principles. Too often, sophisticated data analyses become an end rather than constituting a means to understanding the real world. Ideal types can function as beacons in the twilight of complex empirical research.

All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialisation, once it is oriented towards a given subject matter through particular settings of problems and has established its methodological principles, will consider the analysis of the data as an end in itself. It will discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed, it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general. And it is well that it should be so. But there comes a moment when the atmosphere changes. The significance of the unreflectively utilised viewpoints becomes uncertain and the road is lost in the twilight. The light of the great cultural problems moves on. Then science too prepares to change its standpoint and its analytical apparatus and to view the streams of events from the heights of thought. (Weber, 1904 [1949]: 112)

To conclude, typologies are a fundamental heuristic tool for welfare state scholars, even for those who claim that in-depth analysis of a single case is more suited to capture the complexity of different social policy arrangements. Welfare typologies have the function to provide a comparative lens and place even the single case into a comparative perspective – to paraphrase Goethe, ‘those who know nothing of foreign languages [read other welfare regimes] know nothing of their own’; wanderlust educates.

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32 With the exception of the Netherlands and Switzerland.
Appendix

Decommodification

According to Esping-Andersen ‘decommodification refers to the degree of to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially accepted standard of living independently of market participation’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 35-47).

Esping-Andersen measured decommodification by considering the eligibility rules and the restrictions of entitlements, levels of income replacement and the range of cash benefits provided to deal with traditional social risks: unemployment, sickness and old age (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 47).

Based on these indicators, countries are divided into the following regimes (see Table A):

- liberal: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US;
- conservative: Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland;
- social-democratic: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Social stratification

The social stratification concept attempts to measure through a wide range of indicators how key welfare state key institutions operate in structuring class and social order: ‘[t]he organizational features of the welfare state help determine the articulation of social solidarity, division of class, and status differentiation’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 55). Welfare states participate in the process of social stratification according to their own historical legacy (conservative, liberal, socialist).

Social stratification is measured by using seven indicators (Esping-Andersen: 1990: 71):

- corporatism (conservative principle), ‘measured as a number of occupationally distinct public pension schemes’;
- etatism (conservative principle), ‘measured as expenditure on pensions to government employees as % of the GDP’;
- means-tested poor relief spending (liberal principle), ‘measured as % of total public expenditure’;
- private pensions spending (liberal principle), ‘measured as % of total pension’;
- private health spending (liberal principle), ‘measured as % of total health spending’;
- average universalism (socialist principle), ‘measured as the average score for sickness, unemployment and pensions’;
- average benefit equality (socialist principle), measured as ‘average differential between basic and minimum social benefits for sickness, unemployment, and pensions (based on net, after-tax benefits). Benefit differentials are based on the ratio of guaranteed basic social benefit to the legal maximum benefit in the system’.

Based on these indicators, countries are divided into the following regimes:

- liberal: Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the US; conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy;
- social-democratic: Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden
- not clearly classified: Ireland, New Zealand and the UK.

Defamiliarisation

The defamilialisation concept captures the level of familism in each welfare state. With the term ‘familistic welfare state’, Esping-Andersen (1990: 45) indicated a social security system that ‘assigns a
maximum of welfare obligations to the household’. Conversely he defines defamilialization as follows (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 45):

I shall use ‘de-familialization’, yet another admittedly awkward word, to capture policies that lessen individuals’ reliance on the family; that maximize individuals’ command of economic resources independently of familial or conjugal reciprocities. It is, like the concept of de-commodification, empirically more a matter of degree than of an ‘either-or’. Given that women’s (or at least mothers’) family responsibilities easily restrict their ability to gain full economic independence solely via work, their de-familialization, as many studies have shown, depends uniquely on the welfare state.

The indicators included to measure defamilialisation are: the intensity of family welfare provision (measured as the percentage aged living with children, unemployed youth living with parents as a share of total, weekly unpaid hours of work for women [Esping-Andersen, 1999: 63]), the entity of welfare state services to families (measured as family service spending as a percentage of GDP, public child care coverage, home-help coverage [Esping-Andersen, 1999: 71]).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Typologies</th>
<th>Policy domain / indicators</th>
<th>Data year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
2. Conservative (IT-JP-FR-DE-FI-CH)  
3. Social-democratic (AT-BE-NL-DK-NO-SE) | Pension coverage, unemployment and sickness insurance (decommodification only) | SCIP (1980) |
2. Conservative (DE-IT-NL)  
3. Non-right hegemony (BE-DK-NO-SE)  
| Ragin (1994)                  | 1. Liberal (AU-CA-CH-US)  
2. Social Democratic (DK-NO-SE)  
3. Corporative (AT-BE-FI-IT)  
| Shalev (1996)                 | 1. Scandinavian (SE-DK-NO-FI)  
2. Conservative (IT, FR, BE, AT, IE)  
3. Liberal (US-CA-CH-JP)  
4. Close to conservative group (DE-NL)  
5. Liberal in character with moderate level of class mobilization (UK-AU-NZ) | Institutionalism and corporatism are the two factors that emerge from the principal component analysis | EA (1990) |
2. Conservative (NL-BE-FR-LX-DE-FR)  
3. Residual (UK-IE)  
4. Mediterranean (IT-CH-ES-GR-PT) | Social expenditure (as a % of GDP), social expenditure financed through contributions (as a % of GDP) | OECD (1989, 1992) |
3. Encompassing (FI-NO-SE)  
2. Radical (AU-NZ)  
3. Conservative (AT-FR-IT)  
4. Social-Democratic (DK-NO-SE)  
2. Liberal\minimal (UK-IE)  
3. Employment centred (FR-DE-NL-BE)  
2. Corporatist high spending (AT- BE-FR)  
3. Corporatist low spending (DE-IT-IE)  
2. Radical (AU-NZ)  
3. Conservative (AT-FR-IT)  
4. Social-democratic (DK-NO-SE)  
2. Conservative (BE-FR-DE)  
3. Social-democratic (DK-NO-SE)  
4. Hybrid (NL) | Social security and labour market | Various early 1990s |
| **12. Saint-Arnaud and Bernard (2003)** | 1990s  
1. Liberal (CA-US-UK-NZ-AU-IE)  
2. Conservative (BE-FR-DE- AT)  
3. Social-democratic (SE-FI-NO-DK)  
4. Latin countries (ES- IT-GR-PT) | Social situations, public policies, political participation | Various 1980s and 1990s |
2. Medium defamilisation (AT-BE-CA-FR- DE-IE-IT-NL-NO-CH-UK)  
2. Conservative (GR-DE-AU- PT-FR-ES- NZ-FI)  
3. Liberal (AT-IE-US-UK-CA-BE) | Spending on social security, education, and active labour market policy | OECD, UNDP, ILO (1990s) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
1. High score (DK-SE)  
2. Middle to high score (AU-DE-FR)  
3. Low score group (ES-UK) |
| | Work injury programmes  
1. Social-democratic (DK-FI-US)  
2. Conservative (AT-BE-FR-DE-LX)  
3. Liberal (AU-CA-IE-UK-US)  
4. Hybrid (NL)  
5. Mediterranean (GR-IT-PT-ES)  
6. Eastern European cluster |
| | Social security and labour market  
Various (1998/2001) |
| 17. Bambra (2005) | 1. FI-NO-SE  
2. DE-CH-NL  
3. IE-NZ-UK  
5. AT-BE-CA-DK-FR-IT |
| | Pension, unemployment, sickness and healthcare  
2. Conservative (IE-IT-DK-CA-NL)  
3. Social-democratic (CH-AT-FR-BE-NO-FI-SE) |
| | Replication EA (1990)  
OECD (1998/1999) |
1. Liberal (US-AU-IT-UK-NZ)  
2. Conservative (IE-CA-FR-AT-DE-FI)  
3. Social-democratic (BE-NL-CH-DK-NO-SE) |
| | Replication EA (1990)  
Scruggs (2004) |
2. Catholic-conservative (IT-FR-BE-AT-IE)  
3. Liberal (US-CA-CH-JP)  
4. Close to conservative (DE-NL)  
5. Close to liberals (UK)  
6. Antipodean (AU-NZ) |
| | See 4 (Shalev, 1996)  
EA (1990) |
1. English speaking (CA-UK-AU-US-IE)  
2. Stepchildren (CH-JP)  
3. Scandinavian (DK-SE-NO)  
2. SE-DK-FI-NO  
3. UK-NZ-AU-CA-IE-US  
4. CH  
2. Corporatist (DE-BE-FR)  
3. Liberal (AT-UK-CA-US)  
4. Hybrid (NL) | 2 dimensions (over 50 indicators):  
1. Universalistic-particularistic  
2. Residual-extensive | Various (1990s mainly) |

Key: AT = Austria, AU = Australia, BE = Belgium, CA = Canada, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EA = Esping-Andersen, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, LX = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, NZ = New Zealand, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.

Note: a We generally indicate policy domains, however in some cases (ie, when expenditure data are used) we provide only the indicators.

Source: Authors’ elaboration.
References


