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Marie Miran-Guyon & Jean-Louis Triaud

Islam has had a centuries-long presence in Africa, both North and South of the Sahara, before colonial encounters added a new layer to the continent's already richly textured Muslim history. The extent to which nineteenth-twentieth century European domination brought about meaningful changes, willy nilly, in Muslim lives and outlooks -- and not simply within the religious domain -- cannot be underestimated. Yet at the same time, Muslim communities and Islamic thought kept evolving along their enduring, *sui generis* temporality. Weaving local, endogenous initiatives and global, cosmopolitan influences from the *umma*, the world Muslim community in and out of Africa, Muslim actors went on making and remaking their own temporal architecture of religious renewal and crises, expansion and downturns. This goes beyond acknowledging the importance of the *longue durée* to comprehend Islam's colonial past or questioning the Eurocentric, colonial-moment-centred division of African history. It underlines that Muslim Africa's colonial trajectories concurrently belonged to different, and partly straddling 'regimes of historicity'¹ -- mainly the Western

imperial, Islamic, and African's -- and that these mosaic, diachronic trajectories cannot be reduced to either one alone.

As with conceptions of time, diversity characterized Muslim Africa's vast spaces, which southern frontiers were mapped anew at an unprecedented scale in the colonial period under the twin processes of migration and conversion. A major ecological fault line runs between countries north and south of the Sahara. Medieval Arab historiography used to portray the Sahara desert as an inner sea, imagining the *Maghrib* ('West' in Arabic, for North Africa was then Islam's westernmost lands) as an island, remote from the *bilad al-Sudan*, 'the land of the Blacks', stretching from modern Senegal to Ethiopia. Noteworthy, the *Maghrib* itself was distanced from the heartlands of Islam by the interposition of Egypt, crossroad and gateway to the East — the 'Orient' of olden days, today's Middle East — with the metropolis of Cairo as a high place of Islam in its own right. But the colonial interlude did reify this fault line to a certain extent as British and French divide-and-rule policies were bent on keeping Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa as separate as possible, even when their empires bridged both sides. This also translated into an academic split between specialists of both cultural areas, which never fully receded despite recent claims that the contrary would be more fruitful.

This binary vision, though, unduly downplays the far-reaching networks of scholarly and other contacts which have nurtured the

intellectual and social life of sub-Saharan Muslim leaders, students, pilgrims, and traders over generations. These networks paved the way for these societies' integration into a broad moral community of African followers of Muhammad, in the Sunni branch of Islam and predominantly the Maliki school of law, even though Egypt, the Horn, and Eastern Africa follow the Shafi'i *madh'hab*, as in parts of the Indian Ocean world. Under colonial pressure, some of these long-distance networks faltered. But others proved resilient, while yet other ones were moved by new impetuses or into new directions.

Islam's foundational principle of unity of creed and *umma* does not rub off the breathtaking diversity of Muslim Africa's vast spaces, not to mention internal polychromy. Unity does not mean uniformity. Indeed, physical and cultural ecologies have always marked out porous territories where societies ceaselessly endeavoured to domesticate Islam's universal message in singular ways to fashion relevance to their manifold local contexts. For sure, Muslim life in colonial Cairo or Zanzibar -- the Swahili sophisticated metropolis -- contrasted with that of a Moroccan Berber village or a new converts' settlement on coastal West Africa. So much so that the very term 'Islam' with its essentialist overtone has been put to question as a valuable analytical category for History and the Social Sciences. Alternate heuristic phrasings include 'discursive tradition'² and 'Islamic religious culture'³, which can be declined in the plural form.

Recent demographic statistics (for lack of available ones on the colonial period) allude to the scale of Islamic pluralism: roughly half of Africa is Muslim and one in four Muslims worldwide is African.⁴

All this to bring to light some built-in limits of our Herculean task of synthesis, at a time when grand narratives on Islam in Africa, *i.e.* out of distinctive time-space contexts, no longer feature in the research agenda. This chapter concedes a focus on the *Maghrib* and West Africa, and on British and French colonial situations. It privileges Muslim religious élites and self-made entrepreneurs, almost exclusively male, though this doesn't mean that ordinary believers and women in particular were any less Muslim. It concentrates on facets of colonial States' *modi operandi* and Muslim experiences where the symbolic reference of Islam played or was made to play a central stage, though this is not to say that religion was the only factor defining Muslims' personal or collective engagements (many African actors discussed throughout the chapters of this book happened to be Muslim, though they did not always act primarily *as* Muslim). The chapter begins with a review of past and current historiographical trends and methodological issues, before delving into major historical themes to sketch a composite picture of Islam, imperial powers, and religious change in the time of colonial encounters.

STUDIES IN AFRICAN ISLAM: CONSTRUCTION OF THE DISCIPLINE

Local Muslim societies never faulted at producing their own internal knowledge in literate, oral, or material formats. But what we may call ‘African Islamic studies’ only began in earnest within the imperialist and colonial sphere. It matters to discuss the historicity of this fragmented field of research because the early period was foundational for the discipline in and of itself and because it had a performative impact on the unequal power-relations that unfolded between the infidel colonizers and the Muslim colonized, especially though not only under French rule. It also matters because the colonial production of knowledge on African Islam has had a lasting legacy within the discipline well past the independences’ threshold and sometimes to this day, to the point that recent research trends still deliberately situate themselves in contradistinction to it. Coming back to the early elaborations in the historiography of Islam in Africa is thus more than an erudite exercise: it speaks of the genesis of our current knowledge.

Egypt was African Islamic studies’ opening focus, and the ten-volume *Description de l’Egypte* (1809-1828) its first major work. Though mostly concerned with Pharaonic Egypt, this colossal study also put philologists to contribution. Most of all, as the scholarly by-product of the 1798 Bonaparte expedition, it inaugurated a distinctive French tradition of

exploration and encyclopaedic output under the sacrosanct guise of ‘science’, soon to become the norm in newly conquered lands. By contrast, the body of work of the then lead British Arabicist scholar, Edward William Lane (1801-1876), was far less imbued with imperial-minded Orientalism. His work included the daily life anthropological best seller *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (1836) and the reputable *Arabic-English Lexicon* (1863-1893).

After the 1830 conquest of Algiers, Algeria became the French laboratory for Muslim policies and ‘Islamological’ theories, in a way similar to the role played by India and later the Sudan and Nigeria for the British. Remarkably, Algiers became one of the most fruitful sites for the production of Islamological studies, geographical and historical works, as well as translations from medieval *Maghribi* scholars, including the famous Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406). The French devoted particular attention to the translation of treatises in Islamic Law, so essential to colonial jurisdictions. This concerned the key *kutub* or Islamic ‘books’ found in the *Maghrib* but authoritative in sub-Saharan Africa too, from as far back as the eleventh century for the oldest one (so important in fact were these books for local societies that they were and often still are essential readings in advanced Quranic education’s traditional curricula). Prominent among these *kutub* were the *Mukhtaṣar* (pub. 1848-1857), a concise handbook authored by Khalīl b. Ishāq (d. 1374), and the *Risāla* (pub. 1914), a treatise in Maliki

Law by Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (d. 996). Save for Maliki-oriented Nigeria, the British drew more attention to the Shafī'i and Hanafī legal systems of their Eastern African and Middle Eastern empire. All in all, this intense colonial literary production has had a major impact throughout the twentieth century in that it induced a specific representation of African Islam, encompassing all of its history, geography, customs and institutions: one that was constrictively text-based.

This strong Orientalist trend continued south of the Sahara in the first three decades of the twentieth century, though more limitedly. Sub-Saharan Africa became more of a research ground for ethnologists and linguists who put orality first and saw Islam as alien to what they imagined to be African societies' pristine 'authenticity'.⁵ Only a few pioneers drew their attention to local manuscripts written in Arabic or in vernacular languages transcribed in the Arabic script, referred to as *ajami*. Nonetheless, these pioneers were noteworthy. Among them: the French Maurice Delafosse, Octave Houdas, Henri Gaden, and the British Herbert Palmer. The well-known Orientalist Louis Massignon also worked for a while on Mauritania.

Primus inter pares was Delafosse (1870-1926). He served among others as the Political Affairs' director for the Government general of French West Africa and was one of the founding fathers of African Studies in France. Trained as a linguist, ethnologist, and historian, he also teamed

with his professor and later father-in-law, the Arabicist Houdas, whose career had begun in Algiers. Between 1898 and 1901, either alone or with Delafosse, Houdas edited both in Arabic and French the three famous seventeenth-eighteenth century historical chronicles, written by Sudanese intellectuals from the Niger bend: the *Ta'rīkh al-Sūdān*⁶, the *Ta'rīkh al-Fattash* and the *Tadhkirat al-Nisiān*. Made available in print format to a majority non-Arabophone African readership, these works played a central role in the writing of « Sudanese Empires' » history and public memory in contemporary Mali, and by extent in the self-fashioning of postcolonial Malian identities. A reminder that colonial encounters did intertwine Afro-European destinies in unforeseen ways and could even contribute to bridge the pre-colonial past to the post-colonial present.

Herbert Richmond Palmer (1877-1958) was Delafosse's distinguished British counterpart. A Cambridge University graduate, he spent 26 years in Northern Nigeria, becoming its Lieutenant-Governor at the end of his stay. Northern Nigeria is unique in many ways. It is West Africa's most densely populated Muslim area. It bears the legacy of the 1804 jihad of 'Uthman dan Fodio and the Sokoto caliphate, which was sub-Saharan Africa's main *shari'a*-minded Islamic state. Defeated by British troops, Northern Nigeria became a protectorate supervised by Sir Frederick Lugard (in between 1900-1906), later to become Nigeria's Governor general (1914-1919). Born in India, with service in Sudan and East Africa, Lugard

is a central figure of British imperialism continent-wide. He's best known as the architect of indirect rule, whereby natives act as colonial middlemen, as expounded in his manifesto *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922). Northern Nigeria witnessed the emergence of what Murray Last called the « Colonial Caliphate »⁷: a hybrid arrangement in which Islamic institutions and leading ruling families were kept in place under discreet British control. Northern Nigeria also houses one of Sudanic Africa's richest bodies of Arabic and *ajami* written sources, mostly about Sokoto. This was the peculiar politico-intellectual context in which Herbert Palmer was able to write extensively on Muslim states and societies, making use of manuscripts collected throughout the region: his three-volume *Sudanese Memoirs* were a compilation thereof.⁸ Notwithstanding later critiques, these documents too, most importantly the *Kano Chronicle*, became reference works for later generations of scholars and African actors alike.

Interestingly, after French and British translation endeavours receded by the late 1920s, it resumed on a smaller scale in the invigorated nationalist spirit of the independences at the initiative of Abdullahi Smith (1920-1984), a British-Nigerian professor at the University of Zaria, who was also a convert to Islam. He launched a systematic exploitation of Sokoto manuscripts, promoting at one and the same time a rich historical 'mine' and the caliphate's political position within the new and turbulent federation of Nigeria.⁹ Albeit no longer a central endeavour, the concern to catalogue,

preserve, and translate Muslim Africa's primary sources has not been relegated to the past. Among others, the series of regional volumes edited by Rex O'Fahey and John Hunwick attest to the fact.¹⁰

Concomitantly to the textual approach based on expert translations, African Islamic studies further developed along the writings of colonial officials in charge of monitoring Muslim societies. Collectively, these writings were mere 'discourses on' Islam, often ideological in nature, since they articulated the colonial perception of Islam (sometimes mere Eurocentric fantasies or paranoia!) at the expense of Islamic local developments. Nonetheless, these discourses played a major role both in colonial politics and in affecting the field's historiography on an enduring basis.

The French stand out in this respect. Two main themes summarise this literature: the *confrérie* or 'Brotherhood' theme and the concept of *Islam noir* or 'Black Islam'. The Brotherhood theme was born in Algeria. In the face of Algerian societies' relentless opposition to French conquest (half a century of armed conflict!) and more specifically the lengthy armed struggle led by 'Abd al-Qādir, *shaikh* of the Qādiriyya brotherhood in Western Algeria (1832-1847), French army officers developed the theory of a « brotherhood plot », with huge success. The theory fell within broader fears about an alleged « Islamic danger », as if brotherhoods were in a way coextensive with Islam itself. More than the British -- even though they

fought Islamic leaders and organisations too: in Nigeria, the Sudan and Somalia -- the French were convinced that Islam was a dangerous trans-national religion. In part, this persuasion built upon the French Republic's anticlericalism (against the Roman Catholic Church) and French civic officials' deep distrust towards « clerical » or « feudal » Muslim hierarchies: Islamic brotherhoods were viewed in a way as the Oriental equivalent of nineteenth century European revolutionary secret societies.

In Algeria, the administration put in place a systematic process of data collection to distinguish friendly from hostile brotherhoods. The Tijāniyya, which had been Abd al-Qadir's foe and whose *shaikh*, a grandson of Ahmad al-Tijani, the brotherhood's founder, married a French woman in 1870, progressively appeared — in Algeria¹¹ — as the model of the « good » brotherhood, meaning one which could work with the French for the latter's interests. By contrast, the Cyrenaica (Libya)-based Sanūsiyya, which founder was from Algerian soil and which was open to fleeing emigrants from Algeria, became the epitome of the 'bad' brotherhood, meaning one so drastically hostile to the French that it had to be repressed or suppressed.¹²

The brotherhood theme subsequently crossed the Sahara. Alfred Le Châtelier, a military and scholar who became professor at the *Collège de France*, is a telling example of this excessive emphasis. Though working primarily on Morocco, he published the first survey on Islam in Senegal and the French Sudan (now Mali), entitled *L'Islam dans l'Afrique occidentale*

(1899). His preface explains how he travelled south of the Sahara in the 1880s looking for brotherhoods but found none widespread. He then concluded that the Algiers school was bent on a wrong focus. Ironically, the French administration never ceased listing brotherhoods all the same (as it also listed ‘races’, ‘tribes’ and ‘ethnic groups’), while, in the Senegalese context at least, the mass brotherhood organisations which arose at the dawn of the twentieth century never actually threatened the colonial regime...

As situations and interests changed over time and space, so did the specific actors classified under the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Muslim categories. In 1950s French West Africa, the young graduates returning from Arab universities, referred to as ‘Wahhabi’ (details below), became the new ‘bad’ Muslims, promoting all ‘traditionalist’ Sufis to the rank of ‘good’ ones. But the binary, Manichean vision itself remained unchanged, and it remained in place well past decolonization under the new wordings of ‘moderate’/‘tolerant’ Muslims vs. ‘radical’/‘extremist’ Islamists.¹³ More than anything else, the one thing that brings recent scholarship trends in African Islam together is the attempt to deconstruct such brazenly ideological fabrications and suggest more nuanced interpretations of complex and polysemous realities.

To add to this brotherhood theme: Delafosse may be credited for coining the concept of ‘*maraboutisme*’ in his 1910s notes and reflections on West African Islam: i.e. the idea that *marabouts* (the French colonial label

for all types of Muslim clerics but especially brotherhood heads) are the pivotal figures behind the structuring of Muslim West African communities. The French State went on to bestow such an inflated prominence upon this Muslim elite (provided it was of the ‘good’ type) that we can argue the *grand marabout* was a colonial invention to a certain extent. This reading grid proved itself to be astoundingly enduring too, even within West African Muslim societies.

The British did not ignore the brotherhood theme altogether. C. Armine Willis for instance depicted Sudanese Islam through the sole prism of its brotherhoods¹⁴ but in an informative rather than conspirational fashion. In contrast, the concept of *Islam noir* was the exclusive elaboration of French imperialism. It was meant to cut off sub-Saharan Islam from its supposedly subversive Arab connections, at a time when Arab nationalism was arising in the Middle East. According to French colonial theory, Black Islam was heavily influenced by African traditional religions’ practices and as such, different from worldwide Islam: a milder, less radical version thereof (that this contradicted the brotherhood theory of bad *marabouts* did not seem to bother the colonial state) Practically, the French hoped to induce Islamic dissidences and syncretisms in African *terroirs*, but to no avail. The concept remained well grounded nonetheless and still pervades not only French but Western (paternalistic) public opinion at large.

The main propagator of the concept of black Islam was the prolific Paul Marty. As an officer in charge of Muslim Affairs in Dakar, he gathered intelligence reports and files about Muslims and Islam coming from the four corners of French West Africa. Between 1913 and 1931, he authored ten publications on each of the federation's colonies.¹⁵ Marty's books remained authoritative for a long time and though the interpretive framework is now thoroughly criticized, they are still useful as an informative source when handled with caution.

British endeavours at overviews on African Islam came later under the pen of John Spencer Trimingham (b. 1904). The perspective was different: he worked for the Church Missionary Society successively in Sudan, Ethiopia, and West Africa. He gathered a considerable amount of field data and between 1949 and 1971 published seven books on Islam in different countries.¹⁶ His method was later contested but fact has it that his books were the only available reference works of the kind in English before the 1970s. They contributed to bestow a scientific status on the study of sub-Saharan Islam in the UK. Matter-of-factly, quite a few men of the cloth were side-specialists of Islam in France as well, producing decent work from within a Christian ecumene.

The era of decolonisation in the 1960s opened up a new chapter for African Islamic Studies, as it did for African History generally. Breaking free from the colonial stranglehold was the new ideological order of the day,

carried along by nationalist sympathies and/or humanistic ideals. One way out of the colonial predicament was to focus anew on pre-colonial Islamic history by means of Arabic manuscripts, which located the now academic rather than administrative experts in Muslim subject matters in an erudite, philological enclave. Nehemia Levtzion and others excelled on that front¹⁷. For sure, the then trendy modernisation paradigm predicting religions' socio-political irrelevance did not propel Islam onto the centre stage, as the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution later did with a vengeance.

In this interstitial period nonetheless, some new contributions from fields of enquiry as varied as anthropology, sociology, and geography have to be reckoned with. Most shared a concentration on Egypt, Morocco (even more restrictively Atlas societies), and Senegal. This narrow focus -- to which we may add Northern Nigeria -- lasted until recently, when dissonant voices argued that these specific areas do not encompass the whole spectrum of Muslim Africa and that, trans-national phenomena notwithstanding, one should avoid the mere extrapolation of information and analyses from region to region (a legacy of these geographical monopolies remains a slow-to-come-down deficit in studies on East African Islam). In line with E. E. Evans-Pritchard's structuralist and functionalist approach was Ernest Gellner's *Saints of the Atlas* (1969). Among the first anthropologists to put 'Islam' on a book title was Clifford Geertz: his seminal essay *Islam Observed* (1968) discussed the fertile tensions between

Islamic texts and local contexts in a broad comparison between Moroccan *maraboutism* and Indonesian Sufism, on polar, peripheral ends of the Muslim world. South of the Sahara, Donal C. Cruise O'Brien's *The Mourides of Senegal* (1971) and Paul Péliissier's *Les paysans du Sénégal* (1966) entrenched a soon-to-flourish 'mourido-centrism' (named after the Muridiyya, an important but non-majority brotherhood) within studies of Senegalese Islam.

Political Islam's late 1970s burst into the international public arena has had a huge but contrasted crescendo impact on African Islamic studies. Never before had this field of research attracted so much intellectual interest and fervour. The literary output keeps growing by leaps and bounds insomuch that it would be reductive to attempt to charter individual scholarship achievements, even when limiting oneself to works on the colonial period, which number pales in comparison with that of works on the contemporary scene (see chapter 31 on new religious movements). If some names and titles stand out -- to be found as non-exhaustive references in the following sections and in the bibliography -- the field's multidisciplinary and international collaborative edge is more critical than ever, though it is a far cry from meaning univocal. Exemplary of this trend are the bilingual journals *Islam et sociétés au Sud du Sahara* launched in 1987 by Jean-Louis Triaud and the more recent *Sudanic* (now *Islamic Africa*).¹⁸ Likewise of late, Brill -- the Netherlands-based publishing house

which supervises the ongoing rewriting of the revered multi-volume *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (first edition 1922) -- carved a new space for the field's output in its new series 'Islam in Africa'.¹⁹

On the downside: the anxiety associated with the rise of political Islam in the Arab-Islamic world and later in Muslim diasporas in the West has at times threatened to return the discipline to its early colonial concern with the monitoring of radicalising external influences on the local, grassroots forms of the faith. This was especially true for the *Maghrib* and Egypt. The Political Science-led tsunami almost buried research initiatives on Islam in the pre-contemporary period. Sub-Saharan Africa was spared this fate but studies of the 1980s-90s scholarly generation still shared a patent focus on socio-political aspects. Calls are now issued to cease neglecting the intellectual, spiritual, material cultural, as well as economic dimensions of the Muslim African experience. New studies addressing Muslim architecture, visual arts and music, or creative literature are among those starting to fill the gap -- and maybe fuelling a new horizon of critique against the all-out 'cultural turn'.²⁰

In reality, the recent historiographical shift in studies on African Islam was more than the mere by-product of the late 1970s and 1990s worldwide religious resurgence. It participated in refracted and at times explicit ways in the major intra- and trans-disciplinary debates and 'turns' of the time, with a liking for the 'Post' prefix: the Postmodern turn, the

Postcolonial and subaltern turn, and especially the heated debate generated by Edward Saïd's book *Orientalism* (1978), followed by a Post-Orientalist turn. It goes beyond the scope of this survey to discuss these vast intellectual currents in detail, but it matters to bullet point the meaningful ways in which they contributed to renew African Islamic studies' epistemology and methodology.

By far the most important advance is the now mainstream conception that one has to be careful not to reify or essentialise Islamic experience though time and space. As warned in introduction, the use of the very concept of 'Islam' is not unproblematic, though this doesn't mean that it is illegitimate if only because Muslim actors do use and cherish it, but in ways and for reasons that need to be deconstructed *in situ*. New studies insist on Islam's dazzling diversity, with multiple interpretations coexisting in any given context. Though prone to dogmatic dispute or genuine conflict, hegemonic coexistent interpretations of Islam may exert reciprocal influences on one another and thus have straddling, ever changing boundaries. So we also need to de-essentialize our entrenched visions of a Sufi/mystical version of Islam as well as of a 'Wahhabi'/Salafi/reformist one alike (these very designations and their antagonism are problematic in themselves and now under post-Orientalist reconsideration). As Roman Loimeier makes a case for the concept of the Sufi brotherhood or *tariqa* (but the same argument would hold true for 'Wahhabi' movements too): it may

well be a mere ‘essentialist abstraction, an idealization of realities, since a *tariqa* should more properly be viewed as a spectrum of potentially competing branches and networks loyal to prominent families of scholars or charismatic personalities (saints) who themselves embody a multitude of Sufi teachings’.²¹ Even more broadly, ‘Islam’ cannot be abstracted from the all-encompassing environment in which Muslim societies evolve. Muslim dynamics have to be studied through their multifaceted interactions in particular with other religions, mainly Christianity and African traditional religions -- and this well beyond the sole study of conversions.²²

Muslim internal plurality extends to just about everything, from ritual practices and religious imaginaries to micro-political strategies of agonistic Muslim actors. The socio-political impact of these different strands of Islam is assuredly at variance, yet all are worth academic enquiry: that of the learned and powerful for sure, but also that of ordinary Muslims and subalterns, including slaves or dependents, women, and even children. In fact, most studies on African Islam now seem to take pains to include at least a brief discussion on women’s roles and contribution (the profession has also become much more open to women). Furthermore, in tune with gender studies’ theories, a new focus on Muslim masculinities is emerging, as in the milieu of the *tirailleurs sénégalais* or colonial conscripts²³. The question whether the latest cutting-edge areas of research are commensurate with Muslims’ own preoccupations or merely arising from Western

societies' self-centred post-modern anxieties is open to debate. But the new celebration of Muslim complexities is welcome indeed.

Elaborating on the 'agency' concept central to Subaltern Studies, the new scholarship on African Islam's interface with colonialism further maintains the now consensual conception according to which Muslims, both individually and collectively, remained to varying degrees actors of their own destinies rather than passive victims of unfavourable circumstances. It goes without saying that the colonial yoke and repression were no fiction. But it was rarely almighty enough to block out all room for Muslims to manoeuvre through the system's contradictions and shortcomings. Muslims were thus able to take initiatives for their own benefit, or to the disadvantage of their internal competitors. They pursued these goals somewhat openly via a working (mis)understanding with the colonial State which has been labelled 'accommodation' and studied in detail by David Robinson²⁴ and others. They equally resorted to subtle and discrete demeanour, often unbeknownst to the colonialists themselves.

Accordingly, today's priority is to rewrite the colonial past from the African Muslim perspective, as opposed to the colonial State's. The new Post-Cold War generation puts the social history of Muslim societies in colonial contexts ahead of imperial history. And in their studies, the colonial apparatus is not infrequently relegated to a distant background: a faint

presence not quite meaningless but not that central to Muslims' ongoing daily lives.

To shed light on these semi-hidden African Muslim initiatives, the injunction is to pay attention to Muslim voices. This requires a new combing of the colonial (and missions') records to decipher untapped echoes in between the lines; the unravelling of neglected indigenous written sources (devotional poetry, treatises, rhetoric, prayer, praise of the Prophet, *fatawa* or legal opinions, narratives of pilgrimages and other journeys, Islamic press: in Arabic, vernacular languages, and timidly colonial languages too); and the making up of a corpus of oral and alternative primary data. A new writing ethics further invites the researcher, especially the non-Muslim West-based one, to deploy polyphonic devices so as to cease writing over Muslim actors' shoulders and accentuate the concert of variegated Muslim voices. Anthropologists of Islam took the lead in discussing at great length all these methodological issues on a reflexive mode. Dale Eickelman, a specialist of Morocco and the Arab Middle East, once analysed the new approach as a 'political economy of meaning'.²⁵ The method is constantly being rethought and refined collectively. A landmark change of very recent years has been the emergence of a respected Muslim African academic voice in African and West-based universities, especially among historians. Though minority, this collective voice combining internal

knowledge, respect for religious sensibilities, and social sciences' critical requirements is redefining the field in yet uncharted ways.

UNFOLDING HISTORY: COLONIAL CONQUEST'S IMPACT UPON AFRICAN MUSLIMS & THEIR ADAPTIVE RESPONSES

As for other colonised peoples, for most African Muslims the loss of sovereignty was a cruel condition. What was specific to Muslims was that they were subdued by Christian *kuffâr* (infidels), a defeat resonating for some in the popular memory of the Crusades: the conquest was experienced as much as a spiritual as a political calamity. If the turmoil was plainly shared by all Muslims, short- and longer-term reactions were cloudier: negotiation with realities is a convoluted process, in dire as much as routine circumstances. Nonetheless, interpretations were long unsubtle. Colonial administrations accounted for Muslim actors' variegated situations and strategies through the distorting prism of surveillance, often caricaturing both Muslim initial opposition and later forms of cooperation. Conversely, nationalist-era historiography celebrated a series of war and Muslim chiefs as resistance fighters. Among them was the Senegal-valley-born Al-Hājj 'Umar²⁶ (d. 1864), who was a shaykh and the main propagator of the Tijāniyya in West Africa. He was an important figure, yet a complex one. He launched a *jihād* of the sword against 'pagan' populations in the area

between the Senegal and Niger rivers, but later similarly against a rival Muslim hegemony, the Qadiriyya-oriented Dina of Masina. Zooming on his encounters with colonial troops, post-colonial Senegal mainly celebrates the staunch fighter whom the French typified as a dangerous *marabout* (neglecting the fact that he once signed a truce with the French, probably to buy time, as ‘Abd al-Qādir also did in Algeria).

Further south was Samori Touré (d. 1900 while exiled in Gabon). Originating from Upper Guinea, he created an empire extending to northern Côte d’Ivoire. He proclaimed himself *almamy* (imam) as a political title, but this didn’t stop him from destroying the town of Kong, a centre of Islamic scholarship; his later policy of forced Islamization also met with strong internal opposition. If Samori features in the resistant fighters’ hall of fame (more ambiguously though on the Ivorian side than in Sékou Touré’s Guinea), it is owing to his direct clashes with the expanding, rival imperialism of the French.²⁷ It can be noted that Samori’s framed portrait can be seen today looking down from the wall of Paris’s *Moroccan*-style central mosque -- a building of historical interest in itself, inaugurated in 1926 and partly funded by French tax payers to thank Muslim conscripts who fought alongside the *Métropole* in the First World War.

In Sudan, the British faced Muḥammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah a.k.a. the Mahdī (d. 1885)²⁸ and in Somalia, Muḥammad ‘Abdallah Hasan a.k.a. the « Mad Mullah » (d. 1920).²⁹ From 1911, when they set in motion the

conquest of the Ottoman province of Libya, the Italians confronted the opposition of the Cyrenaica-based Sanūsiyya brotherhood. A peaceful and missionary organisation at its beginnings, the Sanūsiyya effectively assumed control of much of eastern Libya following the collapse of Ottoman power. From the turn of the twentieth century, Sanūsī troops fought against the French, the Italians and the British on fields of operations in Libya, Egypt, Algeria, and Niger. The final defeat came in 1931 with the execution of ‘Umar al-Mukhtār, the military chief, and the exile of the brotherhood’s leaders. Of note, a year after the UN voted the creation of the Libyan State in 1949, the then shaikh of the Sanūsī order became its new king. He was deposed in 1969 by Muammar al-Qaddafi: a pan-Arab and pan-African leader with ‘Islamic socialist’ inclinations of a radically different genre and a new spirit of non-complacency towards ‘Western imperialism’.

On a smaller scale throughout sub-Saharan Africa, messianic figures self-proclaimed as the *mahdī* or ‘Promised Saviour’ also led local, sometimes bloody insurrections. All in all, Muslim-led armed resistance against colonial encroachments was thus real enough. But in no way was it peculiar to Muslim society. Continent-wide, non-Muslim communities opposed as much and often tougher resistance (see chapters 8 and 10).

Facing the unprecedented situation of *kuffār* rule over *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam), Muslim clerics resorted to the vast resources of Islamic

casuistry to devise canonical solutions³⁰: *jihād* in due course; physical emigration (or mental withdrawal) for faith's sake after the Prophetic model of Muhammad's 622 *hijra* or exile to Medina (also marking the start of the Islamic/*Hijri* calendar); and *taqiyya* or dissimulation/doublespeak out of fear of repression. Clerical families sometimes split on the best course of action to adopt for safeguarding the same Islamic ideals. In the Senegal valley for instance, choices pitted the conciliatory Sa'd Būh against his *mujahid* brother Mā al-'Aynīn; as well as Agibu, al-Ḥājj 'Umar's seventh son, who stayed and cooperated with the French, against his cousin Hashimi, who fled eastwards towards Mecca. Records teach us that the Sanūsī family and many Algerian families were similarly divided.³¹ When all armed *jihād* were defeated and proved inefficient, compromise prevailed as the alternative option.

Most *hijra* episodes may have been discreet and quiet, some stand out which are well documented. Muḥammad Bello Maiwurno, fifth son of Sultan Al-Tāhiru -- Sokoto's eleventh sultan killed in action in 1903 against the British -- led a massive migration towards the Sudan (where he happened to be well received by the same British). Algeria was the scene of the 1911 exodus, where hundreds of Tlemcen Muslims fled military recruitment among other woes. It was part of a broader movement of out-migration of Algerians hoping to reach free Muslim lands in the Ottoman-ruled Orient.

Ulamā referred to the concept of *taqiyya* -- derived from a *Quranic* term meaning « fear » -- to legitimate strategies of colonial accommodation. It applies to Muslims facing a major danger, in which case it becomes permissible to interact with the adversary though only « with the tongue, not the heart » so as to preserve the community's security. Borrowed from Islamic law, another legitimising concept was that of *maṣlaḥa* or common good of the (Muslim) community. With these canonical references in mind, individual spiritual guides had to tinker their tactical choices, juggling their own convictions with local balances of power. Based upon mutual -- however unequal -- advantage, these compromises offered valuable interlocutors to colonial powers as well as an opportunity for Islamic leaders to create or secure their own clienteles through protection and intermediation. In this respect, « accommodation » should be analysed as a long-term process of Muslim re-appropriation and renewal of older forms of power, paving the way for post-independence forms of empowerment.

Where and when colonial authorities endorsed this partial brokerage policy, it led to many different Muslim 'paths of accommodation', noteworthy in French colonies but in British ones too as illustrated by the 'Colonial Caliphate' arrangement. Such was also the case in Italian Eritrea (1890-1941) and Ethiopia (1935-41). In the Horn nothing like in Libya, Italians (and the British in their footsteps) favoured the development of Islam and protected its institutions as a counterbalance to the Amhara

monarchy, local powers, and the Orthodox Church.³² The larger picture was that Italian fascists were wooing Arabs and Muslims in support of their Mediterranean policy, even amongst Tripolitania-based anti-Sanūsiyya Islamic groups.

One major difference must nonetheless be noted between French and British colonial situations. On the French side, Islamic leaders' action potential was curbed by the requirement to publicly acknowledge subservience and cooperation with the colonial State -- ambiguously at one and the same time a 'secular' power in the French Revolution's tradition and a self-proclaimed 'Muslim power' in want of grandeur through self-interested co-option. In effect, some Muslim leaders only paid lip service to this requirement, while others agreed to it perspicaciously and unabashedly as a means to reach other goals. A long list of great *marabouts* from the four corners of French West Africa would include Sa'ad Buh (d. 1917), Sidiyya Shaikh Baba (d. 1924), Amadu Mokhtar Sakho, Boghé's *cadi* (d. 1934), Shaykh Fanta Madi Cherif of Kankan in Guinea (d. 1955), al-Hajj Malik Sy (d. 1980), and Seydu Nuru Tall (d. 1980). A grandson of Al-Hajj Umar, the latter may have appeared the most obsequious of them all *vis-à-vis* the French. But his modern-day peers' conviction that he rendered invaluable services to his Tijani trans-national community all the while now supersedes this perception.³³ Those who evaded the colonial pledge of allegiance faced repression, as in the best known cases of Amadu Bamba, founder of the

Muridiyya, in his early preaching career, and Sheikh Hamallah, founder of the Hamawiyya, a peculiar branch of the Tijaniyya, who died in 1943 in deportation in France. Yet neither 'resistance' nor 'collaboration' -- oversimplified binary terms fraught with value judgments -- were on the agenda of all these Islamic actors as an end in itself. What mattered urgently for them was only to safeguard Islamic social ties as best as possible given the uneasy circumstances, and preserve a future waiting for *kuffâr* rule to come to an end.

On the British side, Islamic elites could have a wider margin of autonomy and greater visibility. The British did not abhor religious fiefdoms like the French. Rather, they developed elective affinities with local aristocracies, in the political as much as religious domain. The outstanding French exception was General Hubert Lyautey, who was Moroccan Protectorate's *Résident général* (c.1912-1925). He conducted an experiment of French indirect rule quite similar to Northern Nigeria's, keeping in place and protecting political and religious institutions.

In fine, complexity has to prevail in the analyses of Muslim-colonial interrelations. Nowhere and at no time was there an automatic and unique Islamic response: trajectories have to be carefully contextualized. The variety of Muslim adaptive responses to colonialism provides an inexhaustible matter for more history books to come.

HISTORY FROM WITHIN: ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND COMMUNITY DYNAMICS IN COLONIAL SITUATIONS

For long the conventional outlook was that the colonial ‘interlude’ had an overall negative impact on the inner workings of Islamic religious culture and society, in Africa as elsewhere. The fact that young cohorts of Muslim reform-minded activists held discourses of the same vein seemed to corroborate these scholarly conclusions (the former, though, had an agenda for socio-religious change, not historical accurateness). At worst, colonial times amounted to a dark age: an era of disruption and crises, when « larger or smaller doses of western secular thought and ‘methodological atheism’ » were perfidiously injected into Muslims’ « intellectual horizons »³⁴, relegating Muslim authorities and believers into social marginality in the new crushing Europe-oriented political economy. Traditional Quranic education based on rote memorization of sacred texts in Arabic (a language sub-Saharan pupils were not taught to master) seemed doomed to irrelevance.³⁵ Everywhere, those trained in secular or Christian schools seemed to hold the upper hand. Overtaken by events, gullible crowds of Muslim devout were characterized as easy preys for those new entrepreneurial-like marabouts making out all right and displaying their newfound material wealth as *baraka*. Admittedly, nowhere did the colonial yoke break down deep-rooted feelings of belonging to Islam nor the very

transmission of Islam. This was true in North Africa where the use of the Arabic language added to the shaping of the religious realm into *de facto* cultures of resilience or spiritual refuges. It was also the case South of the Sahara: local communities kept living their daily lives clinging to their own rules. But the colonial environment's hostility was seen as unpropitious for Islamic development, to say the least.

Though not quite a trend reversal, the growing post-Orientalist literature is more nuanced and positive in outlook. It shows that in continuity with past, pre-colonial experience, Muslim leaders and societies never ceased questioning the relevance of Islamic laws and values to the new context of colonial modernity. This comes clearly to the fore in new studies making a point to understand Muslims in their own terms: debates on Islamic dogma and orthodoxy, practice and ritual differences, proper guidance and leadership, means to achieve social justice, etc. have been as intense under the colonial joke as before, producing new, fruitful responses. Colonial times were thus also a period of renewal (*tajdid*) and reform (*islah*).

Over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the *tariqa* landscape had undergone important internal changes in many regions of the Muslim world including Africa, as exemplified by the legacy of the Moroccan mystic and theologian Ahmad b. Idrīs, who inspired numerous followers throughout the continent and as far away as South East Asia; some of his

disciples founded new brotherhoods, including the Sanūsiyya and the Sudanese Khatmiyya.³⁶ At the core of these changes: Sufi thought and practice tended to re-state the centrality of *shari'a* (the exoteric legal code) and *'ilm* (knowledge through Islamic books) as foundational steps towards *tasawwuf* (mysticism or spirituality) and *ma'arifa* (inner esoteric knowledge): a complex movement towards 'a less mystical mysticism, a more rigorous orthodoxy, (...) or a marrying of Wahhabism with a reformist form of Sufism'.³⁷ In an authoritative article, Rex O'Fahey and Bernd Radtke debunked the label 'neo-Sufism' coined to describe those transformations, arguing that these did not represent any form of doctrinal innovation: rather, they were inscribed in the very history of older Sufi renewals.³⁸ Yet both agreed that brotherhoods were significantly reshaped in that period on a socio-political standpoint as they became more centrally institutionalized and ceased to being exclusive elite circles confined to a few ascetics to become more of mass movements (the ascetic model did not disappear for that matter).

The *tariqa* landscape kept changing along its own lines in the colonial period. Brotherhoods continued to segment according to their time-old fissiparous course, with the emergence of new charismatic *shūyūkh* and devout communities of *talaba* (sg. *talib*, Arabic for student) but also new intra-Sufi divisions. In Senegal, Amadu Bamba Mbacké (1853-1927) founded the Muridiyya, named after the collective term for disciple or *murid*

in Arabic: the main brotherhood ever founded by a black African (a smaller one, that of the Layennes, was founded at around the same time near Dakar). Ascetic and erudite, Amadou Bamba preached the ‘greater jihad’³⁹ or *jihad al-nafs* in Quranic terminology (opposed to the lesser *jihad* of the sword): spiritual devotion, study, and disciplined work in quest both for personal piety and exemplary behaviour in this world, and salvation in the hereafter. Central to the Muridiyya’s socio-religious architecture was the *dara* or rural *zawiya* (Sufi lodge), where murids working in the community’s peanut fields received spiritual guidance and protection as part of *khidma* or service in the name of the *shaykh* (and later of his *khalifa* or successor). When murids began moving to towns after World War II and diversifying their occupations, they founded *dairas*, the urban equivalent of the *dara* -- all being tied by hierarchical networks of small and big marabouts caring for their local religious clientele. Against the polluted colonial environment, Murids endeavoured to Islamize their own sacred space. This included the growing settlement of Touba (Senegal’s second largest city today), which became the destination of a major yearly pilgrimage known as the Great Maggal after Bamba’s death.

New branches of the Tijaniyya also developed in French West Africa. Shaikh Hamahullah (1883-1943) founded a distinct path in Nioro (now Mali) known as the Hamawiyya or reformed ‘eleven-beads’, which the ‘twelve-beads’ Tijaniyya of the Al Hajj Umar line fiercely opposed from

the outset.⁴⁰ In Senegal, the long understudied but highly influential Ibrahima Niasse of Kaolack (1900-75) launched his own Tijani community (though not a separate *tariqa*) variously known as Niassene, Ibrahimiyya, *Tarbiya* (Ar. for education), and *Fayda* (Ar. for spiritual flood). At its centre was the peculiar *tarbiya* developed by Niasse: a new kind of spiritual training reserved for the initiated which accelerated the attainment of *ma'arifa* (ecstatic knowledge). Though Niass himself insisted on strict rules in the transmission of his *tarbiya*, it soon fuelled controversies as an increasing number of believers joined the ranks of his community and claimed to having seen God. While the Muridiyya remained tied to its Wolof base in Senegal, the more cosmopolitan Fayda expanded throughout West Africa and especially in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, which Shaykh Niasse regularly visited from the early 1950s.⁴¹ A few of the Fayda *muqaddam* (authorized transmitters of Niass' path) were women.⁴² Both Amadu Bamba and Ibrahima Niasse aimed at spiritual *tajdid* (renewal) through education and were prolific writers of religious texts in Arabic.

Straddling the pre-colonial and colonial periods, the Salafiyya (from the Ar. *salaf* or 'Pious Forebears') inaugurated another major course of change within Islamic thought. Its late nineteenth century African bastion was Egypt. It started as an intellectual trend associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who called for the renewal and reform of Islam to better resist

Western cultural and scientific domination. All three criticized *taqlid* (blind adherence to tradition) and some non-Islamic practices labelled *bid'a* (innovation) which they associated with some Sufi excesses. Instead they advocated *ijtihad*, the individual effort based on the Quran and Sunna, in view to adapt Islamic Law to modern queries.

Salafi teachings inspired the Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwān*), which began as a socio-religious movement when it was founded in 1928 by the Egyptian primary school teacher Hasan al-Banna. In the 1940s when the Society claimed one million members and sympathizers, it had turned to political activism. After it resorted to terrorist practices (assassination of a Prime minister in 1948 and attempts against President Nasser's life in 1954), it was severely repressed. Al-Banna was put to death in 1948. Sayyid Qutb, who had joined the Brotherhood in 1953 and published influential writings against the Nasser and Arab regimes cursed as *jahili* (pre-Islamic idolators), was also put to death in 1966. The radical wing of the Salafiyya later inspired many so-called 'Islamist' groups in different parts of the Muslim world.⁴³

In French Algeria, Salafi ideas influenced Shaykh Abdelhamid Ben Badis (1889-1940), who founded the Association of Muslim Algerian Ulama in 1931. Though its impact remained limited, the Association was noteworthy for defending the Arabic language, establishing new Islamic schools, and coalescing religious, cultural, and nationalist feelings. Its

leader Tawfiq al-Madani authored the famous slogan ‘Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my fatherland’.⁴⁴

The reformist wave gained some ground in the 1950s in West Africa, mostly in cities where a new generation of graduates from al-Azhar and other Arab universities as well as pilgrims back from Mecca began questioning the competence and legitimacy of the old ‘traditional’ religious guard, whose positions were often hereditary. It swept through the Malinke/Jula world (bridging the present-day states of Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea), leading to violent clashes for the control of mosques in cities such as Bamako, Bouaké, and Kankan. Shaykh Ture (1925-2005), who founded the Muslim Cultural Union in Dakar in 1953, was vigorous in his condemnation of some marabouts’ alleged collaboration with the colonial State, which was prompt in return to denounce the assumed Arab-fomented sedition of these young sub-Saharan Muslims misleadingly labelled ‘Wahhabis’.⁴⁵ In East Africa, the reform-oriented movement was led by the Zanzibari Shaykh al-Amîn b. ‘Alî al-Mazrû‘î (1890-1947) and ‘Abdallâh Sâlih al-Farsy (1912-82).⁴⁶

Though Salafis remained minority, the concern to reform Islamic education had a broad, long-term impact on local Muslim societies. To borrow from Louis Brenner’s terminology⁴⁷, classical Quranic schools or *majlis* were part of an ‘esoteric episteme’ where the transmission of knowledge was hierarchical, restricted, and centred around the teacher

whose legitimacy derived from his *silsila* i.e. genealogical chain of previous masters. Reformed Islamic schools or *madrasa* -- with classrooms, timetables, and exercise books as in colonial and Christian schools -- introduced an epistemic shift towards a 'rationalistic episteme' characterized by a democratization of knowledge through printed books in Arabic now taught as a foreign language, along with some secular topics. Sweeping generalizations about the '*madrasa* turn' have their limits though, for it had hybrid roots and distinct developments according to local context. A case in point is the Ansar-Ud-Deen Society of Nigeria -- the oldest and largest educational association of Yoruba Muslims found in Lagos in 1923 - - which brought together influences from the Indian Ahmadiyya, Protestant missions, and Yoruba dynamics.⁴⁸

In short, beyond the variety of sectarian differences, many Muslim communities underwent analogous changes over the colonial interlude. It involved the revisiting of the old notions of religious truth and ignorance; finding relevant means to forbid the wrong and command the right; the redefinition of *irshad* or religious guidance; the rise of new religious entrepreneurs and new communities of knowledge; the restructuring of means of community organisation and new means of communication; a relative empowerment of the Muslim youth and to a minor extent of women; and more generally the coming-into-being of less local and more generic or standardized ways of 'being Muslim', owing most notably to a

new insistence on regular prayer and fasting during the month of Ramadan. In the context of French West Africa, Robert Launay and Benjamin Soares put forth the idea of the emergence of an 'Islamic sphere', autonomous from and evading the control of the colonial State, where Muslims debated, disagreed and at times broke apart on all these matters.⁴⁹ Whether all of these meaningful transformations meant a modernization of Islam or an Islamization of modernity -- through the making of a vernacular Islamic modernity -- will be the subject of on-going academic debate.

COLONIAL CONVERSION: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA'S EXPANDING ISLAMIC FRONTIERS

The eighteenth-and-nineteenth-century *jihads* and the rise of mass Sufism resulted in a new wave of Islamization in those regions of Sudanic Africa where Muslims had hitherto formed a minority. In what has been described as one of the greatest though unintended and paradoxical consequences of colonial rule: this expansion trend continued on an even broader scale throughout the colonial period. Oddly, the issue of colonial conversion to Islam remains poorly researched despite the 1970s-80s conflicting debate on African conversion to world religions initiated by Robin Horton and Humphrey Fisher.⁵⁰ Clearly, data is not readily available. Conversion may not have been publicly visible at first and was a gradual (sometimes life-

long) and instable process, which did not preclude reversion or changeover to the older or another faith (this holds true for conversion to Christianity too). If Christian missions' alarmist vision of a roller-coaster progress of Islam should not be taken at face value, the phenomenon was striking nonetheless. Despite the lack of reliable religious statistics, it can be estimated that the Muslim population from Senegambia to Cameroun and from Sudan to Mozambique probably at least doubled in the era of colonial encounters.

In the late nineteenth century *bilad al-Sudan*, Islam tended to be concentrated in distinct towns, territories, and ethnic groups, notably the Jula and Hausa tied by their long-distance trading networks. As the colonial economy developed new axes of communication through plantation agriculture, the monetization of exchange, and new urban centres in the forest belt and along the Gulf of Guinea, Muslim merchants and migrant workers sought to seize new opportunities. Clerical lineages benefited from the loss of power of established warrior clans after colonial conquest. Some followed the merchants' route to serve an heterogeneous clientele of forced and voluntary labour migrants from all walks of life, many of whom left the 'microcosm' of their ancestral cults for Islam and the 'macrocosm' of the colonial world.⁵¹ Mossi migrants became Muslim in southern Côte d'Ivoire and contributed via circular migrations to Islamize their native regions in Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso). In Eastern Africa, Islam made

inroads in a reverse direction, from the Swahili coast into the hinterland. In need for social reconstruction after conquest, the Yao of the Tanganyika, Nyassaland, and Mozambique frontier converted in mass to Islam. In both West and East Africa, many freed slaves became Muslim in a quest for a new identity and enhanced social status. Some iconoclast Muslim preachers advocating a break with past practice burnt fetishes as among the Baga in French Guinea.⁵² In Accra, some Ga Muslim converts of Methodist origin launched Islamic Sunday schools where Islam was taught in the English Bible for a while. Everywhere, peripatetic Muslim healers and proselytising Sufi *shûyûkh* contributed to expand the African Muslim map on both demographic and geographical standpoints.

Independence did not represent a watershed in the history of Islamic societies and religious cultures in Africa. Any more than in the face of colonial intrusion, Muslims were neither united nor collectively mobilised in nationalist struggles. Post-colonial State power fell into secular hands, whether political economic choices favoured socialism or capitalism. By and large, Islam kept evolving away from the public scene. The change of course would come later with the post-1970s international Islamic revival. Meanwhile, the diversity of Africa's Islamic movements -- the Sufi brotherhoods, the Egyptian *Ikhwān*, the 'wahhabis', etc. -- were reshaped by the internally contested dialectics of continuity and change in relation to new, local and global contexts.

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