Knowing Necessary Truths - HAL-SHS - Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Accéder directement au contenu
Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2016

Knowing Necessary Truths

Résumé

How account for the intuitive difference between simply knowing a necessary proposition, and knowing that it is a necessary truth? In the paper it will be shown that two-dimensional semantics does not do the job in an adequate way. A solution is provided which is based on Hintikka's worldlines. Assuming a slight extension of the syntax, modal epistemic logic can thus deal with classical puzzles like knowledge of identities.
Fichier non déposé

Dates et versions

halshs-01483086 , version 1 (04-03-2017)

Identifiants

Citer

Manuel Rebuschi. Knowing Necessary Truths. J. Redmond, O. P. Martins, Á. N. Fernández. Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction,, Springer, 2016, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-26506-3_10⟩. ⟨halshs-01483086⟩
83 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More