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Chapitre d'ouvrage Année : 2016

Knowing Necessary Truths

Résumé

How account for the intuitive difference between simply knowing a necessary proposition, and knowing that it is a necessary truth? In the paper it will be shown that two-dimensional semantics does not do the job in an adequate way. A solution is provided which is based on Hintikka's worldlines. Assuming a slight extension of the syntax, modal epistemic logic can thus deal with classical puzzles like knowledge of identities.

Domaines

Philosophie
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Dates et versions

halshs-01483086, version 1 (04-03-2017)

Identifiants

Citer

Manuel Rebuschi. Knowing Necessary Truths. J. Redmond, O. P. Martins, Á. N. Fernández. Epistemology, Knowledge and the Impact of Interaction,, Springer, 2016, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-26506-3_10⟩. ⟨halshs-01483086⟩
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Dernière date de mise à jour le 07/04/2024
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